

Questions
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Questions in Politics Editorial Staff

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About the GPSA



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Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

Questions in Politics is the official journal publication of the GPSA.

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Preface

The Editors-in-Chief of *Questions in Politics* (*QiP*) welcome readers to Volume I.

QiP is the scholarly journal of the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) that was formerly titled *The Proceedings of the Georgia Political Science Association*. The articles in this volume began as papers presented at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the GPSA. The authors then submitted the manuscripts to the journal, where they were initially reviewed twice by anonymous reviewers. Further review and editing commenced, and out of twenty-five manuscripts submitted, ten are published here.

We are also pleased to announce that the first article in Volume I, “Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan” by Professor Arild Schou of Buskerud and Vestfold University College in Drammen, Norway, is the McBrayer Award winner for 2013. The McBrayer is given annually to the best paper presented at the Annual Meeting. The winning author or authors have traditionally received a certificate and a cash award. To further recognize this achievement, the McBrayer winner will be the first article in this and each successive volume.

The GPSA was founded in 1968. The organization’s publication of papers presented at the Annual Meeting began almost immediately thereafter. Dr. J. Larry Taulbee, Associate Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University, worked on those early volumes and continues to serve the GPSA as the editor of *QiP*. In 1973, the GPSA formalized its journal, titling it *Southeastern Political Review*, and until the early 1990s published it with covers that were the color of Georgia clay. *SPR* sought manuscripts beyond the GPSA, and the journal was eventually titled *Politics & Policy* as it became focused on all fields of scholarship within political science, with support coming from a variety of state political science organizations. In 2005, *P&P* was transferred to the Policy Studies Organization.

Dr. Joseph S. Trachtenberg, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Clayton State University, was the driving force behind the rebirth of *The Proceedings*, and they were relaunched online in 2005. As Founding Editor, Dr. Trachtenberg returned the journal to a refereed, reviewed, and edited compilation of papers presented at the Annual Meeting. He continues to serve the *QiP* as Editor Emeritus.

The change of this journal's name to *Questions in Politics* reflects a broadening in scope of scholarship in political science. The source of the articles remains the same—papers presented at the GPSA Annual Meeting—but the articles cover all the fields of the discipline, as well as issues in public policy and teaching and learning in political science. All of these topics are addressed in a scholarly manner, and the larger and enduring questions in politics, as well as the discipline of political science, are considered in each volume.

Thomas E. Rotnem and Adam Stone

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Abstracts

Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan

Arild Schou

Buskerud University College, Norway

Page 1

Territorial autonomy design has during the last decades been proposed or adopted as a solution to self- government conflicts in several countries around the world. The sustainability of such designs, however, have been highly disputed among scholars; some claim that they are a recipe for further conflicts and—in extreme cases—secession, while others see them as the only viable way to accommodate autonomy claims at that same time as they preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The most recent discussion, however, is geared toward conflict management mechanisms within the autonomous units themselves. The stability of units with relatively large minorities is particularly challenging because these minorities may have the power, collective self-consciousness, and international legitimacy to resist designs where they have become a minority in a unit whose population has been granted protection from national majority rule. This article examines the stability of three recent autonomy settlement deals in the light of the recent discussion on ethnic conflict management within such units; focusing on the Gayos in Aceh, the Serbs in Kosovo, and the indigenous peoples in Sudan. It concludes by challenging the present idea that local or national power-sharing is essential for coming to a conflict settlement, adding on two dimensions that would be relevant; the nature of the ethnic minority and the degree of power that are devolved to the concerned units.

From Armed Struggle to Peaceful Change: ETA's Role in a Basque Peace Process

Cleo Dan

Elon University

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This article examines the process by which Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) transitioned from terrorism to nonviolence in the pursuit of

policy goals. This article, part of a larger project examining how and why non-state actors utilizing violence engage in a political process, addresses three issues contributing to ETA's adoption of peaceful tactics: (1) domestic political and institutional context, (2) international political and institutional context, and (3) the role of public opinion and the media. This article offers policy relevant generalizations explaining why ETA sought alternatives to violence. It argues that the birth of Basque political parties that offered nonviolent outlets for Basque nationalism changed the political environment to one favorable to the ETA moving away from violence. This article seeks to place ETA's political interaction within a larger framework of how terrorist organizations end, with the hope of contributing to scholarship from a perspective linking policy, theory, and history.

The Critical Elections of 1968 and 1992

John A. Tures

LaGrange College

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Many scholars have accepted that southern whites shifted their political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, and that the northeastern United States is no longer GOP territory. But were the 1968 and 1992 elections really "critical elections"? Both contests are analyzed to see if they meet the timing, turnout, third parties, and trends in regional voting criteria that would qualify them as a critical election. Then both are studied to see if such regional variations with the past led to subsequent national voting changes.

The Natural State's Unnatural Politics: Democratic Dominance in an Otherwise Red State

Nicholas A. Rudnik

Valdosta State University

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At midcentury, Arkansas was solidly under one-party Democratic control. In recent decades, state Republican functionaries have slowly eroded the one-party Democratic lock. Arkansas is often seen as a special case in

the politics of the former Confederate states; to that end, this is still true. While the erosion of the Solid Democratic South has had much less of an appreciable impact in Arkansas, the Republican Party is finally beginning to cement itself as the more dominant party in the state. Empirically, state politics is well within a level of two-party competition. If current trends hold true, the Natural State may still be viewed as a special case, though a special case where two-party politics could evolve into complete one-party Republican domination—reminiscent of the old Democratic politics at midcentury. The momentous political changes in the state can largely be attributed to shifts in the economy and demographics.

**Presidential Power and “Midcentury Conditions”:
An Analytical Essay Remembering Richard Neustadt
and Reevaluating His Ideas**

Carl D. Cavalli

University of North Georgia

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Richard Neustadt’s *Presidential Power* took us from the constitutional, legalistic, and structural studies prevalent in political science at the time full-bore into the behavioral revolution. Presidential power is not the power to command, Neustadt said, but rather “the power to persuade,” dependent upon the choices presidents make. He based his work on what he termed “midcentury” conditions: a common setting “marked by a high degree of continuity,” which he summarized as “emergencies in policy with politics as usual.” Presidential scholars rode his work well into the twenty-first century. This raises important questions. First, do “midcentury” conditions still hold at a time closer to the mid-twenty-first century than to Neustadt’s “midcentury”? Second, is Neustadt still relevant? Recent scholarship points to major changes over time that would render “midcentury” conditions inapplicable to today. However, exploring that scholarship in this essay leads to the conclusion that Neustadt is still relevant, albeit with some important contemporary considerations.

Digital Tocqueville: Democracy in the Information Age**Jennifer Joines***University of Alabama**Page 109*

What sort of insight does Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy provide us in the twenty-first century? In the introduction of *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville lays out a gradual historical progression of equality in Western society, one that culminates in the development of democratic regimes. Over the course of his analysis on America, Tocqueville shows that the progression toward equality and the stability of democracy is neither guaranteed nor inevitable. For Tocqueville, the future of democracy seemed uncertain in this burgeoning industrial society. We are now experiencing a new shift from an industrial society to a postindustrial, information-based society. The Internet has a particular, complex history that allows it to be used for both liberation and oppression. Because of the great potentiality of the Internet and the almost "universal" desire for democracy, Tocqueville's concern for democratic despotism is still relevant today. This article looks at some of the pathologies of American democracy presented in Tocqueville's analysis in conjunction with the political and societal pressures that have arisen in the Internet age. It also looks at recent social movements (the 2003 Iraq War protest, the Occupy and Tea Party movements) as examples for rethinking political participation and what democracy could look like when we utilize the Internet as a productive political tool. I believe that Tocqueville's analysis is useful today to push us toward an alternative mode of "doing" democracy in order to deviate away from the path toward democratic despotism.

**China's Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:
A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany****Thomas Nisley***Southern Polytechnic State University**Page 129*

This article compares China's rise in Asia today with Germany's rise in Europe in the early twentieth century. In both cases, the regional

hierarchy exhibited rapid change and a power transition, with Germany surpassing Great Britain and China surpassing Japan. To understand the implications and the consequences of the changing relative power hierarchy, I examine both cases through the lens of the Power Transition Theory. With an understanding of the possible outcomes of a regional power transition, this study engages a debate as to the correct direction of U.S. foreign policy. I argue that the United States should adopt a strategy of engagement. The proposed U.S. military “pivot” toward Asia is most likely to prevent a regional great power conflict.

Lost at Sea: How Past Disagreements in the U.S. Senate Continue to Block Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty

Julia Schast

Elon University

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The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) is a major, international convention aimed at creating a global set of rules governing the oceans and modernizing existing international law from previous international marine agreements. LOST entered into force in 1994, despite the United States not ratifying the treaty. As part of a larger project, this article examines why the United States sometimes rejects or fails to affirm international agreements. It presents a case study of the Senate consideration of the various incarnations of the Law of the Sea treaties from the 1960s through the present day. The article analyzes why the Senate, in 1960, formally rejected the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes that was part of the Law of the Sea Treaty at the time. This was one of only four multilateral treaties rejected by the Senate in the twentieth century. The article examines the extent to which the reasons behind the original Senate rejection of this treaty shaped future failures to secure advice and consent to ratification of the updated LOST over the last thirty years. These questions are especially timely and relevant given the ongoing discussions pertaining to whether the Senate will hold a formal vote on LOST before the end of President Obama’s second term.

The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: Perceptions from Administrators in Masculine and Feminine State Agencies**Beth M. Rauhaus***University of North Georgia**Page 183*

The dynamic relationship between politics and administration has long been examined in the field of public administration because politics has a significant impact on the policy process and administration. Classical scholars have often argued for a strict dichotomy, where administrators are neutral and should be isolated from politics. However, over time, scholars have developed new, more practical approaches to explain the influence politics and administration have on one another. Politics has a significant impact on distributive policies and agencies due to the political nature of these policy decisions. Therefore, this case study examines perceptions of state-level administrators in redistributive and regulatory agencies to explore practical means of defining the contemporary dichotomy. This analysis also identifies gendered elements of a dichotomy, as regulatory agencies tend to be classified as masculine, while redistributive agencies have feminine traits. In conclusion, this case study illustrates that there are differences in the politics-administration dichotomy by administrators in gendered agencies.

Examining the Factors That Lead to Student Departure at Aiken Technical College**Jameka N. Jackson***Georgia Regents University**Page 201*

The purpose of this research is to describe the factors that contribute to student departure at Aiken Technical College (ATC) while concurrently offering a model for other organizations to utilize in improving their retention efforts. The study uses a nonexperimental research design with content analysis and secondary data analysis of the Wal-Mart Press Grant Survey (WPGS) and the Non-Returning Student Survey (NRSS) that were previously administered by the Planning and Research Department at ATC. Academic, financial, social, and institutional issues were the

four key areas examined because previous literature identifies these as the most common reasons students drop out of college. More than half of the unrepresentative sample reported having no issues at all with retention at ATC. These students claimed that they accomplished their goals while attending. However, a majority of the students revealed having problems with financial and institutional issues at the college, specifically with work demands and policies and procedures. The data also suggested that very few students in the sample had frequent experiences with campus involvement and student support services.

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Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan

Arild Schou

Buskerud University College, Norway

Territorial autonomy design has during the last decades been proposed or adopted as a solution to self-government conflicts in several countries around the world. The sustainability of such designs, however, have been highly disputed among scholars; some claim that they are a recipe for further conflicts and—in extreme cases—secession, while others see them as the only viable way to accommodate autonomy claims at that same time as they preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The most recent discussion, however, is geared toward conflict management mechanisms within the autonomous units themselves. The stability of units with relatively large minorities is particularly challenging because these minorities may have the power, collective self-consciousness, and international legitimacy to resist designs where they have become a minority in a unit whose population has been granted protection from national majority rule. This article examines the stability of three recent autonomy settlement deals in the light of the recent discussion on ethnic conflict management within such units; focusing on the Gayos in Aceh, the Serbs in Kosovo, and the indigenous peoples in Sudan. It concludes by challenging the present idea that local or national power-sharing is essential for coming to a conflict settlement, adding on two dimensions that would be relevant; the nature of the ethnic minority and the degree of power that are devolved to the concerned units.

Ethnic minority conflicts have often been solved by offering the minority territorial autonomy. The 2012 framework agreement between the Moro Islamist

Liberation Front and the Philippine government is a recent case in point (Government of the Philippines 2012). The sustainability of such solutions, however, has been highly disputed among scholars. Some claim that they are a recipe for further conflicts and in extreme cases secession, while others see them as the only viable way to accommodate autonomy claims at that same time as preserving the territorial integrity of the state (Hannun 2004). One of the fiercest critics, Roeder (2009), claims that many autonomy arrangements such as ethno-federalism and territorial autonomy represent a quick quasi-solution to the current conflict. Yet the intermediate and longer-term consequences of these settlements contain the great likelihood that another round of conflict will occur that has higher stakes. The possibilities include re-escalating conflict, re-centralization, democratic failure, and an ultimate state breakdown. Others, however, point to the fact that there are several settlements that have proven relatively stable over time and that it is worthwhile examining the conditions under which these cases are, or have been, stable, instead of concentrating on the failures (Choudhry 2008; McGarry and O'Leary 2009; Weller and Metzger 2008; Wolff 2009). Much of the focus in this literature has been on conflict regulation mechanisms at the national level, such as national power-sharing arrangements, substantive democracy and rule of law (Lijphart 2004; McGarry and O'Leary 2009; Wolff 2009, 10).

However, part of the most recent discussion is geared toward conflict management mechanisms *within* the autonomous territorial units themselves (Weller and Metzger 2008; Wolff 2009). The post-conflict settlement of units with relatively large local minorities is particularly challenging because these minorities may have the power, collective self-consciousness, and international legitimacy to resist designs where they have become a minority in a unit whose population has been granted protection from national majority rule. Such negotiations have sometimes been monopolized by representatives from the local majority, and consequently the local minority insists on a new round of negotiations after the settlement regarding their interests (Schou 2014). This often delicate situation has been termed the "minority within minority" problem associated with territorial autonomy arrangements; the argument is that such arrangements lead to unfair treatment of regional/local minorities and thus lead to new conflicts between the new majority and minority. This has been one of the classical integrationalist criticisms of the supporters of power sharing. The counterargument from the power-sharing theorists is that rather than denying stateless nations territorial autonomy, one should rather implement accommodationalist arrangements for these new regional minorities (Choudhry 2008, 81).

Minority Protection in Newly Autonomous Units

Because of the “minority within minority” problem, some minorities in newly autonomous areas are excluded from influence in government both at the national and regional levels. At the national level, their region becomes represented by the majority ethnic group. In such cases, these minorities may have a reduced stake in the decisions of the national government unless there are constitutional provisions that ensure some kind of minority influence at this level. At the regional level, the existence of majority rule may leave little room for local minority influence. Thus, these minorities may easily be subject to majority tyranny. Consociationalism may ease this problem centrally and in the regions—in federal as well as in unitary states.

McGarry and O’Leary (2009) have found that multiethnic federations are more durable if they are practicing consociational forms of democracy at the center. This form of minority accommodation may take different forms such as: cross-community executive power sharing in the form of minority representation in federal executive or legislative bodies; proportional representation of groups throughout the public sector; and/or constitutional guarantees for the right of ethnic expression for minorities. As for conflict management options in unitary states, the Macedonia experience may serve as an illustration. Here, several consociational mechanisms at the national level were introduced in the new power-sharing arrangement after a brief civil war in 2001. The Ohrid Agreement, signed on August 13, gives Macedonian and Albanian representatives mutual vetoes on all legislation of cultural or linguistic significance; such legislation requires a two-thirds majority in parliament plus a majority of the affected minorities’ representatives. It also guarantees proportionate appointments of the groups in administration and the police force (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2001).

Ghai (2004) provides a list of minority accommodation mechanisms that can be implemented at the regional level: central government law enforcement authority for the protection of minorities, for example, an ombudsman; a role for central government in protecting local minorities by being empowered to veto legislation, targeting regions that have a discriminatory practice; consociational practices at the regional or district levels; or constitutional guarantees for the right of ethnic expression for minorities.

Several additional governing mechanisms have been introduced to make sure that all major ethnic groups will be represented in power-sharing arrangements more generally (Roeder and Rothchild 2005, 32). Territorial devolution of power is one. Yet others are related to the electoral system. For example, power-sharing authors have argued for elections based on proportional representation rather than single-member districts because it

lowers the barrier for ethnic groups to enter into the legislature. Yet another mechanism is legislative elections that permit voters to list their first, second, and third candidates. The purpose is to broaden the candidates' appeal beyond the demands of a single ethnic group.

Wolff (2009) has studied the *effect* of minority accommodation at the regional level. Based on a survey of eighteen cases, he found that conflict resolution in heterogeneous units—in units where minorities comprise more than 10 percent of the population—power-sharing mechanisms would be necessary at the national or the local level “to come to a conflict settlement” (Wolff 2009, 10).¹ Although he does not make definite conclusions about the sustainability of such settlements, he predicts that the lack of such arrangements will be a source of instability. Thus, the presence—and potential conflict reducing affect—of power-sharing mechanisms will be a key dimension in the analysis that follows. However, Wolff's concept of minority seems to be too static for an in-depth analysis of the exact mechanisms that leads to stability/instability, because the mobilization capacity of minorities matters when it comes to challenging the interests and power of government at a central and a local level.

De Juan (2012) provides a fruitful conceptualization in this regards. He distinguishes between three types of ethnic groups: “contested,” “fragmented,” and “dominated.” The first category is “strong enough to have realistic chances of enhancing their access to political power by leaving the current arrangement and attempting to negotiate a new settlement” (De Juan 2012, 18). The second category refers to groups who are too culturally fragmented internally, while the third category refers to groups that are weak in terms of group cohesion and organizational capacity. It is obvious that the groups in the first category have the strongest mobilization capacity and thus the best chances of getting their grievances met.

The implications of mobilization capacity for stability, however, are not obvious. It may seem obvious that a large contested ethnic group that does not succeed in getting access to power may be a permanent source of instability. If true, this would confirm Wolff's observation. A more problematic aspect of his scheme would occur if or when dominated or fragmented groups do not

¹ The cases involved the following examples: (1) devolved government—one country, two cases (Scotland and Northern Ireland in the UK); (2) autonomy—seven countries, seven cases (Aceh in Indonesia, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, Mindanao in the Philippines, Gagauzia in Moldova, Brčko in Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Tyrol in Italy, Crimea in Ukraine, Albanian Districts in Macedonia, and Metronitza in Kosovo); (3) federation—four countries, seven cases (Brussels Capital Region, Flemish Region, Walloon Region in Belgium, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, Kurdistan Region in Iraq, and South Sudan).


succeed in getting access to power and simply give up. This would also lead to stability. Thus, in analyses of local conflict management processes, it is relevant to introduce *type* of ethnic group, not only size; this seems to be Wolff's main criterion, as a potential interaction variable (with institutional design) for explaining stability.

Empirically, the article takes its point of departure in three recent territorial settlements of ethnic conflicts and their respective local minorities: the Gayos in Aceh, the Serbs in Kosovo, and the Furs, Funji, and Nuba peoples in Sudan. The latter three groups are the largest ones in three of Sudan's regional states, Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. The original autonomy solution in Aceh was signed in 2004, in Kosovo in 2008 (and in 2013, in an amendment for the Serbian minority) and Sudan in 2011, respectively. What these cases have in common is that local minority groups not associated with the self-government project have resisted a local autonomy deal that does not accommodate their claim for autonomy within the concerned territorial boundaries. However, there are also differences between the cases, which make a strict comparison more complex. One important difference is that Sudan is a federal state, while the others are unitary states. One may argue, with ample historical evidence, that regional states in multiethnic federations, like Sudan, have a high tendency of becoming breakaway states (Snyder 2000). This phenomenon is highly relevant in contemporary politics. Breakaway tendencies in Eastern Ukraine forms a real worry, both in the government in Kiev and among its Western allies, after Russia insisted on reforming the Ukrainian constitution in a more federal direction.

Another and related difference is the legal status of the contested territorial autonomy areas. Aceh is an autonomous province in Indonesia, while the Sudanese entities are federal regional states. Kosovo, however, has a contested legal international status. Serbia claims to still have it under its sovereignty, while at the same time, 107 UN member states recognize it as a sovereign state. Another particularity of the Kosovo case is that there are oppositional parties at the national center (in Belgrade) who support the local minority's interest, which is not the case in Sudan and Aceh. Such parties have proved important in a few cases (Schou 2014). However, in most cases, the actors determining the conflict dynamic in connection with post-local autonomy settlements are the national governments and the local elites associated with the self-government project. The major elite groups in such dynamics are listed in Figure 1.

Of course, this simple diagram hides the fact that the degree of internal cohesion enjoyed by these aggregate actors may be higher or lower, leading to a real possibility that each of the aforementioned categories may be represented by

Figure 1: Diagram Showing the Interests of and Relations between Major Players Who Determine the Conflict Management Regime in Post-Local Autonomy Settlements



several organizations or institutions that take different standpoints in the local self-government disputes.

Taking Wolff's arguments together with the above modifications as a point of departure, this article will focus on the level of conflict between the actors (as illustrated in Figure 1) in the Sudan, Kosovo, and Aceh areas after the signing of the deals. It will examine whether the conflicts are related to the situation of the local minorities not associated with the self-government project and their claim for local power. If so, has local power-sharing arrangements been introduced, and do they have a bearing on the level of conflict? In the following, in part three, I will first analyze the conflict dynamic in the three countries after the signing of the deals. In part four, I will analyze differences and commonalities between the three cases in light of the above framework. Then finally, in part five, I will conclude and identify areas that need to be explored further in future research.

Local Minority Concerns—Spoilers or Legitimate Claims for Minority Self-Government

As a part of the autonomy settlement deals the government concerned did introduce territorial decentralized designs—in Aceh, territorial autonomy; in

Kosovo, a separate unitary state; and in Sudan, a separate federal state. These concessions were designed to partly acknowledge, at least temporarily, the claims of the respective nationalist movements; the Aceh, Kosovo, and South-Sudanese nationalist movements. At the same time, the territorial designs induced concerns among minorities who were included in these territories in terms of land rights, resource rights, representation, and nondiscrimination. In the following, these concerns and the newly autonomous regional government's response to these concerns are outlined.

The Gayos in Aceh

Aceh is the northernmost province on the Indonesian island of Sumatra. For several decades, it has been the scene of a political and military conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the central government in Jakarta. The demand for regional autonomy was on the agenda among Aceh leaders as early as 1952, but the claim enjoyed substantial popular support first after the establishment of GAM in 1976. GAM's demand was partly met by the government in Jakarta, which introduced various autonomy arrangements such as the 1999 Law on the Implementation of the Special Nature of the Province of Aceh and the 2001 Special Autonomy Law for Aceh. However, it was not until the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami—which brought massive devastation to the province—that the parties reached a joint peace agreement; a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in Helsinki on August 15, 2005. This ended a nearly thirty-year insurgency. The MoU provides for Aceh's special autonomy, as opposed to the self-government GAM originally had been seeking. The form of autonomy was subsequently elaborated upon in the Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA) adopted in 2006 (Ehrentraut 2010).

The Gayo minority is the largest of the smaller (mostly) indigenous minority groups in Aceh. The group comprises 12 percent of the population, while the second-largest group, Alas, comprises 4 percent. The Gayo people live in the highlands of Aceh in three regions: Aceh Tenggara, Bener Meriah, and Gayo Lues. Their "homeland" lies in the Barisan Mountains, which have elevations of over 12,000 feet and extend more than 1,000 miles. The Gayonese language has three dialects: Lut, Serbejadi-Lukup, and Luwes. They pass down folk tales, stories, and poetry via strictly oral means, as their language does not include a writing system. The Gayos are known for their thriving cash crop economy in vegetables and for their effective production of coffee (Jushua Project 2011).

A Gayo regional autonomy movement first emerged around the year 2000. The movement, Aceh Leuser Antra (ALA), advocated the creation of a new province that included Aceh's five highland regions, which includes the

three above-mentioned ones. A few years later, the movement was joined by another regional autonomy movement, Aceh Barat Selatan, which advocated a new province in the southern part of Aceh. Between the signing of the MoU in 2005 and passing of the LoGA in 2006, these two movements both held rallies in Jakarta to make the declaration of their respective provinces (ICG 2006)

Some years later, the ALA movement received a new boost. In January 2008, the government introduced a draft law in the parliament recommending the creation of ALA and ABAS. This was done despite widespread opposition in the Aceh provincial government and in the parliament itself. Not surprisingly, the draft laws disappointed those in the movements because they never became part of the parliamentary agenda that year. However, the ALA reappeared at the forefront of Aceh politics in the runup to the April 2009 elections. In many locations in the highland districts, the pro-ALA banners were displayed prominently (Ehrentraut 2010).

The third boost emerged five years later, in 2013, when the Aceh provincial government decided to adopt the banner of the former self-government movement as its official provincial flag. The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. The leaders' governing party in the province council, Partai Aceh (a political party set up by former GAM fighters), saw the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilization in the upcoming elections in 2014. The party refused to make any changes, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognized Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki Peace Agreement in 2005 (Ehrentraut 2010).

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the highlands, particularly the Gayos. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast, which also has been seen as belonging to highlanders like the Gayos. Thus, for many Gayos, the flag represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. In the province of Tenggara, Aceh organized motorbike convoys singing nationalist songs. Moreover, local leaders were once again calling for the establishment of the ALA region (ICG 2012). However, after the government issued a statement saying that local authorities were prohibited from flying the flag, the conflict eventually calmed down (Wardi 2013).

The Serbs in Northern Kosovo

Kosovo is an impoverished region south of Serbia with a mainly Albanian population. The Serbian minority of 100,000 people numbers approximately 10 percent of the Kosovo population. Presently this minority lives in separate areas in the north of the country, watched over by a NATO-led peacekeeping

force, the Kosovo Force (KOFOR). This force was established in 1999 after the bombing of Serbia following allegations of a planned genocide on the Albanian population on Kosovo.

The post-1999 negotiations between the Kosovo government in Pristina and the Serbian government in Belgrade finally succeeded in 2006 with the introduction of the Ahitisaari plan. This plan suggests that the Serbian minority should be given substantial autonomy in Kosovo. The plan derived a formula that would allow Serbs to have their own local institutions and communal life with continued linkages to Serbia, but within the framework of a multiethnic Kosovo. It called for the establishment of new Serb-majority municipalities—including North Mitrovica—with important elements of self-rule in health, education, and social issues, plus a role in choosing the local police chief. These municipalities would have the right to their own funding and to block grants from central government and funding from Belgrade. They could form associations with other municipalities, including those located in Serbia. The intent was clear: to allow Serbs in these municipalities to live in two worlds at once, in both Kosovo and Serbia. Nonetheless, there were issues left to be defined by further agreement or in practice (ICG 2007).

Developments immediately after 2006 moved in a less favorable direction in terms of autonomy. The first setback happened in 2008 when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. It immediately won recognition from the United States and major European Union countries. But Serbia, with the help of its powerful ally Russia, vowed to block Kosovo from getting a United Nations seat. This declaration implied weaker ties between Kosovo and Belgrade. The second setback occurred in April 2013, when the Serbian and Kosovo governments reached an accord (the Brussels Accords) for a formula for Serbian autonomy in Kosovo. This accord was later endorsed by the respective governments. The underlying goal was to allow both sides to move on with plans for membership of the EU.

The accord stipulates that the four Serb-majority municipalities north of the divided town of Mitrovica—Leposavić, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and Novo Brdo—will enjoy far-reaching autonomy regarding the judiciary, police, education, health, and economic development. They will unite in an association or community of Serb-majority municipalities, which can be dissolved only by decision of the municipalities. They will have their own, ethnic Serb police chief. However, the police and the courts are supposed to apply Kosovo law. Serbian judicial entities are to be eliminated, and public-sector salaries will be paid by Pristina rather than Belgrade. The association/community will have some sort of representation toward the authorities in Pristina and will have their own appeal court. In exchange, Serbia implicitly recognizes Kosovo's independence, 100 years after Serbian

forces occupied the former Ottoman province in the Balkan Wars of 1912–913 (Vogel 2013). Although the 2013 accord implies some devolution of task to the Serbian-dominated councils, their financial autonomy is less pronounced compared to the one envisaged in the Ahitisaari plan. Moreover, the financial ties to Serbia are significantly eroded; there is a decline in the number of financial sponsors in Belgrade, and their access to Serbian government funding has been drastically reduced.

The formula has received mixed reactions amongst the political forces in Belgrade and within the Serbian minority in Kosovo. On the one hand there are those who endorse it, and on the other hand there are those who argue for secession from Kosovo (Cani 2013). This split has continued after the local government elections in November 2013. Some Serbs were boycotting the elections with the slogan, “Kosovo is Serbia,” asserting that the area still belonged to Serbia. The majority, however, voted the Belgrade-backed Serbian Civic Initiative (Gradjanska Inicijativa Srpska; GIS) into power. The party won nine out of the ten Serb-majority municipalities (the exception being Strpce in southern Kosovo). GIS’s victory meant that political groups favoring boycott of the Brussels Agreement have been marginalized.

Despite relative successful elections, there is a bleak outlook for implementing the agreement during 2014 (Malazogu et al. 2014). The Serbs fear a unitary state where their small numbers, despite power-sharing arrangements, may not warrant sufficient protection. Disagreement continues over a range of points, including the arrangements surrounding the ministerial posts in Pristina that the constitution guarantees to the Serb community. Lack of trust and interethnic interaction increases the demand for added features of protection. This raises alarm bells in Pristina and in Belgrade, but for different reasons; Pristina fears that they will end up with quasi-independence, while the ultranationalist Serbs in Belgrade find additional reasons to support their fellow Serbs in the north in their disobedience campaigns against the Albanian majority (Malazogu et al. 2014).

The Minorities in Sudan’s Troublesome South: Fuhrs, Nubas, and Funjies

After almost thirty years of fighting (1983–2005) what has been termed the Second Sudanese Civil War ended in 2005 with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which granted autonomy to what was then the southern region of the country, now South Sudan. The CPA is a set of protocols signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)—the South Sudanese nationalist movement—and the government of Sudan in Khartoum (in the northern part of the country). The agreement was aimed at developing democratic governance and sharing oil revenues on an equitable

basis. The agreement also set a timetable by which southern Sudan would conduct a referendum on its future. Following a referendum held in January 2011, South Sudan seceded on July 9, 2011, with the consent of Sudan.

The “Sudan Problem” has not gone away with South Sudan’s secession. Chronic conflict driven by concentration of power and resources in the center, and autonomy claims in the periphery continue to plague the country. Ever since the partition, Sudan has experienced war, genocide, and massive displacement of people in the southern part of the country. While it is true that the fighting in Darfur has decreased somewhat over the past three years, it still persists. And with the renewed conflicts in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile after the partition in 2011, we are witnessing the continuation of the more-than-twenty-year pattern of almost unremitting fighting and human misery in the troubled south (ICG 2001).

Hard-liners in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum tend to believe that concessions on federalism and greater autonomy could lead to separatism and state collapse, while the political forces in the war-torn region argue that the root cause is economic, political, and cultural marginalization combined with domination by the center at the expense of the peripheries. The Darfur conflict is the newest, and the most tragic, of the three largest minority conflicts in Sudan.

Darfur

The Darfur regional state is located in the southwestern part of Sudan. The estimated population is around four million people, which comprises around 10 percent of the Sudanese population. The largest ethnic group is the Fur, hence the name Darfur (Dar = abode, darfur = abode of the Fur). However, two other groups, the Zaghawas and Masalits, have also been heavily involved in the fighting with the government forces and their main ally, the Janjaweed militia (“Darfur” n.d.).

The war in Darfur began in 2003 when non-Arab tribes took up arms against the Arab government in Khartoum, accusing it of political and economic marginalization. In response to the attack, the pro-government forces carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the state’s non-Arabs, resulting in the death of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of civilians. This led to the indictment of Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir for genocide and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (Human Rights Watch 2010). The situation eased somewhat with the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006. The agreement was signed by the NCP and the Sudan Liberation Movement, the largest rebel faction in Darfur. The agreement includes power-sharing issues, a system of federal wealth sharing, and a referendum of the future status of

Darfur. However, two other influential rebel factions refused to sign the agreement, alleging that its power-sharing agreements were inadequate.

Only five days after the creation of South Sudan, July 14, a new peace agreement for Darfur was signed. However, the agreement—Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)—was signed only by a minor rebel coalition, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). The proposed settlement includes provisions for a Darfuri vice president and radical regional autonomy (United Nations Mission in Darfur 2014). Three other groups continued to fight: two small factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, and one of the main rebel groups—Justice and Equality Movements (JEM). In late 2011, the three joined up with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which is now also fighting the Sudanese government in Blue Nile and South Kordofan regional states (Copnall 2013). Then finally in April 2013, after two years of diplomatic stalemate, a large splinter group of JEM, the JEM-Bashir, signed a framework agreement with the government based on the DDPD. The rest of JEM together with the Sudan Liberation Army has not yet laid down their arms. However, most recently, the “rest of JEM” group has together with SPLM-N called for a comprehensive peace agreement also involving the two other regions (Security Council Report 2013). Thus, presently a warlike situation exists in the Darfur region.

South Kordofan

Unlike the Darfur conflict, which has been ongoing since 2003, the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile calmed down in the mid-1990s but flared up after the partition of the country in 2011. The South Kordofan regional state has slightly more than one million inhabitants. It is the only state that produces oil, and the ethnic Nubans who live there are being targeted by the northern military guerilla groups who want to take control of the oil. Although South Kordofan is part of Sudan, it is home to many pro-South Sudan communities, especially in the Nuba Mountains, some of whom fought alongside southern rebels during the Second Civil War (ICG 2013b).

The state took part in Sudan's Second Civil War. This war was a conflict between the central Sudanese government and the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). SPLM was founded as a guerrilla movement in 1983 and was a key antagonist of the government in Khartoum. Throughout the war, it was led by John Garang de Mabio. Following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the military arm of the SPLM, the Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA) became the regular army of the new southern republic, South Sudan. The war largely ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which led to the 2011 referendum resulting in the secession of South Sudan.

The conflict in South Kordofan flared up again after the partition in 2011 because provisions of the CPA were not adequately implemented. SPLM leader John Garang's death in July 2005, three weeks after he was appointed Sudan's vice president, raised many questions about the agreement. Between 2002 and 2005, the Nuba Mountains' support for the SPLM was largely based on Garang's personality, stance for unity, and promises that he would not abandon the Nuba in exchange for South Sudan's independence. His death left Nuba fearful that the new SPLM leadership would not honor promises, that without a strong guarantor such as Garang, the CPA was too weak an agreement for them to achieve their goal of self-government, and that the protocol might not ever be implemented. Another reason was that the CPA's power-sharing arrangements, which gave 55 percent of legislative and executive power to the NCP and 45 percent to the SPLM, were implemented slowly, with long delays at the senior level. Lastly, the promised popular consultations to address long-held grievances (such as self-government) were not implemented. As a last-ditch attempt to stop the spiraling conflict, the government and the SPLM signed a Framework Agreement in June 2011 that included political and security arrangements. However, this agreement turned out to be unacceptable to the hard-liners within SPLM (ICG 2013b). The consequence is that the war between the government and South Kordofan presently shows every sign of having settled into a strategic stalemate.

Blue Nile

The Blue Nile state in the southeast of Sudan shares an international border with Ethiopia and South Sudan. The latest conflict in the Blue Nile started in September 2011, three months after the revived war in South Kordofan. This state took part in the Second Civil War for the same reasons as South Kordofan: political marginalization, land dispossession, and broken promises. The Blue Nile state, comprising 1.4 million people, was once part of the Funji dynasty, which had its golden age during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries alongside the upper Blue Nile in the borderlands between Ethiopia and the Sudan. Today, the Funji identity straddles the divide between communities supporting the government and those close to the rebels (Al-Shani, 2013).

As in the two other cases, the cause of the revival of the war is that the concentration of power and resources in Sudan's center at the expense of its peripheries had not been resolved by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The area has long been marginalized, with its natural wealth mostly enriching elites in Khartoum without their sharing power and redistributing resources for the economic development of the region.

Many people in the Blue Nile had hoped the CPA would lead to a more inclusive and devolved Sudan. In 2011 the CPA process allowed 76,000 Blue

Nile citizens to air their grievances, and the SPLM used this opportunity to push for more “self-rule” for the regional state. On the other hand, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum believed that the self-rule claim was a pretext for a future claim of self-determination for the Blue Nile. The consultations were supposed to be finalized before South Sudan’s July 2011 independence, but once that deadline passed, Khartoum was less inclined than ever to share power, let alone to allow local autonomy for the state (ICG 2013c). Thus also here, the war shows sign of having settled into a strategic stalemate.

A conclusion that applies to all three ethnic minority groups is that Khartoum’s attempts at unifying and centralizing the country with a dominant Arab-Islamic identity has not only led to the partition of the country in 2011, it has strengthened the claims of all three groups for a more inclusive and devolved Sudan. The demand for complete independence, however, has been most vocal amongst the population in the Blue Nile state and least vocal amongst the population in Darfur.

Analysis: The Limitations of a Bipolar Approach to Settlement of Multipolar Conflict

The post-autonomy conflict dynamic accounted for above is symptomatic of many of the challenges that arise when the interests of those actors determining the autonomy settlements themselves, the national governments and the local elites associated with the self-government project, also dominate the post-autonomy power struggle. Several of the current underlying long-term internal differences in the regions concerned came to the surface with renewed strength after the signing of the settlements, illustrating the limitations of a bipolar approach to settlement of multipolar conflicts.

There are several differences between the conflict dynamics in the cases discussed above, but they have all one thing in common—after the signing of the territorial autonomy settlements, there has been considerable instability related to the interests and grievances of the local minorities. The *level* of instability, however, varies considerably among the cases. The conflict that has been most prolonged and militarized is the one in the southern part of Sudan. The Aceh case is on the other end of the spectrum—a low-intensity conflict that seems to have burned out after some minor protests in 2013 in connection with the adoption of the GAM flag. The Kosovo case stands in the middle. The Albanian conflict with the Serb minority has been tense but not completely out of control. The key question here is whether the conflict levels are related to the local power-sharing arrangements or to the lack of such arrangements.

Questions of power-sharing seem to explain differences between the cases when it comes to the degree to which power sharing forms part of the

settlement. In the Aceh case, it seems that the conflict has burned out without any substantial minority concessions, let alone power-sharing arrangements, on the part of the Aceh regional authority. This has to be seen in the light of the fact that the claims of the ALA movement were more about devolution of power to the identified region rather than local power sharing.

In the Kosovo case, both power sharing and devolution of power are key provisions of the Brussels Agreement. This has contributed to a relatively stable situation in the area during the last year. The prospect of more radical local power-sharing arrangements in the future has contributed to calming down the situation. The Brussels Agreement states that the association of the five Serb-majority municipalities will have some type of representation with regard to the authorities in Pristina and have their own appeal court. These provisions, however, are not yet spelled out in detail. Thus, the potential longer-term stability of these arrangements is yet to be seen.

The Sudan case stands in a class by itself; the minorities are at war with Khartoum, and the war logic in terms of deaths, displaced peoples, and lost economic opportunities has in itself created obstacles to a viable peace settlement. The government in Khartoum fears that if it gives in to demands for more autonomy for the states concerned, this may ignite a chain reaction of similar claims in other regional states. In this case, local power-sharing arrangements have been relatively high on the agenda in the peace negotiations in two of the conflicts. In the case of South Kordofan, John Garang claimed that 45 percent of the representation was to be earmarked for SPLM, which represented all the concerned minorities in the south. In the Darfur case, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur from 2013 included provisions for a Darfuri vice president in Sudan. In the case of Blue Nile, more devolution of power has been the major claim since Sudan's independence in 2011. However, since the situation in the war-torn region is very far from being settled, and power sharing is one of several claims on the part of the local minorities, it would be premature to speculate about the potential effect of power-sharing arrangements.

As for the implication of the nature of the ethnic minorities, the Aceh case most clearly illustrates that the size of an ethnic group is not necessarily decisive for power-sharing mechanisms to be introduced to handle such conflicts. It is a paradox that the Gayos group, the largest minority (approximately 12 percent of the population) in this study, has given up its ethnic claims without any concessions on the part of the Aceh provincial authority.² The reason may be that the Gayos is not a "contested" ethnic group

² Darfur and Serbs comprise 10 percent, while Kordofan and Blue Nile are both below 2 percent.

in De Juan's (2012) typology. It bears resemblances with the fragmented and denominated type of ethnic group because it has weak ethnic markers; the language has four dialects, and there is no written language system. Moreover, its organization, ALA, has been weak in terms of larger-scale mobilization and military power. An additional element is that the geographical region that it dominates is blessed with a relatively well-functioning coffee economy. This means that it, economically speaking, does not live in a particularly marginalized area. Thus, it has only a moderate amount of economic grievances against the Aceh regional authority.

The ethnic minority mobilization dynamic in Kosovo has some of the same characteristics. This may be due to the medium intensity of the conflict due to the powerlessness of the Serb minority. It is a "denominated ethnic group" both in terms of population strength and organizational capacity. Moreover, there are particular contextual factors. The Kosovo Serbs have their allies in Belgrade, but they have not yet been strong enough to push for stronger minority guarantees for their fellow Serbs. This has partly to do with the terms of the Brussels Agreement, which were negotiated with the Kosovo and Serbian governments' prospects of becoming EU members in mind. This gave the protagonists an incentive to come to terms with each other not found in the two other cases. Many Serbs in Kosovo are claiming that their interest was sacrificed on the EU-membership altar.

The minority mobilization in Sudan has its own particular dynamic. Here, the minorities are not particularly strong demographically. Nevertheless, they are well organized militarily and thus have a considerable power to enhance their claims for more self-government. However, although power sharing and devotion of power has been relatively high on their agenda in the peace negotiations, the government in Khartoum has not been particularly responsive to these claims.

Conclusion

This article has examined the role and interests of local minorities in post-local autonomy settlement and how the regional governments have responded to their claims for more self-government in the form of devolution and power sharing. I have selected three cases for comparison and contrast: (1) the Gayos in Aceh after the signing of the Aceh autonomy agreement in 2004; (2) the Serbs in Kosovo after the signing of the Kosovo autonomy agreement in 2008 (and in 2013 and in amendments for the Serbian minority); and (3) the Furs, Funji, and Nubas in Sudan after the secession of South Sudan in 2011. The analysis shows that there are both similarities and differences in terms of stability, power-sharing arrangements, and the characteristics of the concerned

minorities. However, the differences are the most striking. Although there has been considerable instability associated with the local minorities in all three cases, the level of conflict intensity has varied considerably, from low-intensity conflicts to all-out war.

As for the introduction of local power-sharing mechanisms and their potential implication for stability, the cases do not provide unambiguous answers. In one case (Aceh), the situation has become more stable without such mechanisms being introduced. In the second case (Kosovo), the parties are about to implement such mechanisms. In the third case (Sudan), the parties are at the negotiation table, but the arrangements are far from being implemented due to an all-out war. In the Sudan and Kosovo cases, power sharing is at least on the table as one of several disputed points between the regional authorities and the local elites. However, there are several other minority claims on the agenda. Thus, power sharing seems to be one of several aspects that need to be addressed adequately in order for the parties to move in the direction of reconciliation.

Another aspect pointed at in this study is subgroup identity constellations, which most probably have important bearings on institutional arrangements meant to end or prevent conflicts. A third aspect is related to devolution of power; perhaps more radical devolution of responsibilities means more for local minorities than power in decision-making processes at the local center.

The initial observations presented in this article demonstrate that it may be worthwhile to include factors other than local power sharing more systematically when studying stability in post-autonomy settings. I have pointed at identity constellations and degree of devolution of power. The relative importance of these factors in various historical settings needs to be explored further in future research.

The findings from this study might be put to a test in the newly Russian-annexed Crimea region. The regional power holder's policy toward the local Ukrainian (25 percent of the population) and Muslim Tartar (12 percent of the population), respectively, is yet to be seen, but there are no indications that the new Crimean power holder's relations to these minorities will be an easy one ("Crimea Profile" 2014). They may face minority claims for new forms of local self-government and, in contrast to the option Russia forced upon Ukraine, they are likely to respond with an integrationalist strategy. The nature of the mobilization pattern among the minorities will depend on the level of suppression, but also on the form and content of the ethnic mobilization. The mobilization will be forceful if the Ukrainian minority receives strong support from their fellow Ukrainians in Kiev and if international jihadists decide to flock in Crimea in defense of their fellow Muslim brothers, the Tartars (Ehrenfeld 2014).

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Questions in Politics

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From Armed Struggle to Peaceful Change: ETA's Role in a Basque Peace Process

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This article examines the process by which Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) transitioned from terrorism to nonviolence in the pursuit of policy goals. This article, part of a larger project examining how and why non-state actors utilizing violence engage in a political process, addresses three issues contributing to ETA's adoption of peaceful tactics: (1) domestic political and institutional context, (2) international political and institutional context, and (3) the role of public opinion and the media. This article offers policy relevant generalizations explaining why ETA sought alternatives to violence. It argues that the birth of Basque political parties that offered nonviolent outlets for Basque nationalism changed the political environment to one favorable to the ETA moving away from violence. This article seeks to place ETA's political interaction within a larger framework of how terrorist organizations end, with the hope of contributing to scholarship from a perspective linking policy, theory, and history.

Historical grievances often provide the perceived justification for violence by non-state actors. European homegrown terrorist organizations have long been subjects of academic research oriented on ethnic and minority group self-determination, demonstrating that “long-standing grievances have been a source of European terrorism” (Henderson 2010, 38; Hoffman 1998, 70). The Basque Country, a contested autonomous region in the northern corner of Spain, is the territorial homeland for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), an internationally recognized terrorist organization that operated through the

use of political violence for nearly four decades. Terrorist organizations are “fundamentally and inherently political,” perpetrating violence with the end goal of attaining a “political aim” (Hoffman 1998, 3). ETA began in the 1960s and renounced its violent agenda with a cease-fire statement in 2011. Despite the official cease-fire, conflict between militant Basque nationalists and the central Spanish government continues to jeopardize the full dissolution of ETA. The organization remains armed and actively seeks the opening of political dialogue or engagement with the Spanish government.

This article seeks to contribute to the growing discussion of terrorism-focused literature by examining how a terrorist organization renounces violence in order to pursue its policy goals through exclusively politically engaged initiatives. Research on how terrorist organizations terminate further examination because, given the number and variety of global terror threats, it is important to understand the historical factors contributing to a terrorist organization’s peaceful termination. The goal of this article is to examine the factors that incentivized ETA to engage in politics, ultimately placing ETA’s renunciation of violent tactics within a larger framework of how terrorist organizations end, with the hopes of contributing to scholarship from a perspective linking policy, theory, and history.

Historical Background of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna and the Peace Process

Between the southwestern border of France and northeastern border of Spain lies the Basque polity. Historically, the political status of this autonomous region has been a source of contention between the Basque people, a minority group within the Spanish state, and the Spanish central government. Due to “a proper collective name, shared myths of origin, and cultural characteristics” that are exclusive to the Basque minority, such as the Euskera language, history has witnessed organized attempts by Basques to protect their heritage from cultural extinction in the face of threatening policies instigated by Spain in the mid-twentieth century (Wolf 2011). Decades of violence within Spain engendered a protectionist reaction from the Basque minority, pushing nationalist ideology into popular discourse (Llera 1999, 101).

In 1936, internal violence emerged with the Spanish Civil War. With the victory of Francisco Franco, the Spanish political agenda concentrated on repressing pluralism throughout the country with the goal of promoting a fabricated, homogenous “Spanish” identity. As a result of this brutal political agenda, the Spanish central government systematically targeted the Basque culture as a threat to the solidarity of the Spanish state. Franco’s culturally discriminatory policies against the Basque minority are perceived as genocidal in the framework of the Basque historical narrative, further legitimizing the

articulation of Basque nationalism (Encarnación 2008, 97). In 1959, Basque university students, upset with existing political schemes to confront the oppressive dictatorship, created Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). The perseverance and growth of Basque nationalism throughout the past two centuries provided ETA with an ideological foundation firmly rooted in the Basque historical narrative of oppression. Deriving its operational legitimacy by drawing upon prior reasoning for the existence of Basque nationalism, the ultimate goal for the creators of ETA was to obtain a geopolitical state encompassing the Basque region, where Basque culture in its entirety could be preserved and promoted without the threat of a non-Basque mother government. Since ETA's first public attack in 1961, terrorist strikes perpetrated by ETA have claimed over 825 civilian and noncivilian, Spanish and non-Spanish lives (Stewart 2009).

After the death of Franco in 1975, Spain underwent a dramatic transition by remodeling its former dictatorship into a democratic government. The years directly following this political transition mark the several years of ETA's terrorist violence yielding the most deaths up until 1980 (Pestana Barros 2003). In 1980, Spain's new democratic government granted greater political freedom to the Basque polity by allowing the region to establish its own parliament, which in turn led to a short-term reduction of violence (Douglass and Zulaika 1990, 246). This abrupt decrease in terrorist violence may suggest that the greater degree of autonomy granted to the Basque polity directly mitigated ETA's strategic use of violence. However, the transition to democracy did not lessen ETA's violence in the long run because they "were not driven by a desire for democracy, but by their opposition to what they [saw] as foreign domination" (Gause 2005). The initial unwillingness to compromise territorial control is inherent in ETA's slogan, "*Euskadi ala hil*" ("Basque Country or death") (Douglass and Zulaika 1990, 252). Therefore, despite the transfer of the Spanish government from a dictatorship to a democracy, the underlying problem causing the Basque conflict still remained because the Basque region was still under Spanish control.

Currently, ETA upholds a 2010 cease-fire as a definitive cessation of terrorist violence. The group reaffirmed this declaration in 2011, by assuring that future forms of violence will not be included in ETA's strategic agenda. However, ETA has yet to disband and surrender its weapons, theoretically maintaining the military capability to commit violent attacks as a dormant organization (Stewart 2009). Furthermore, the Spanish government openly rejected the possibility of future negotiations with ETA in November 2012 ("Spain Rejects Basque Separatists ETA Talks Offer" 2012). The key to successful conflict resolution between the Basque Country and Spain is in the active inclusion and political recognition of the newly formed pro-

independence Basque political parties, which have provided a nonviolent, political outlet for Basque separatism.

Literature Review

Terrorism has increasingly become a leading subject of academic inquiry in political science. Within this field of research, there has been a significant amount of scholarship that examines the origins and strategic capabilities of terrorist organizations. However, there has been considerably less research on the closing phases of terrorist organizations. Jones and Libicki note that there is limited literature qualitatively examining the final phases of a terrorist organization and that in general, “there has been little systematic analysis of how terrorist groups have ended in the past” (Jones and Libicki 2008). The failure to examine how and why terrorist groups end would appear to have significant theoretical and practical implications for better understanding and countering terrorism. According to the European Commission, one possible reason for the dearth of research on how terrorist groups end is that the “lack of attention given to the subject must be seen in the light of the event-driven nature of most terrorism research” (*TTSRL-Policy Brief* 2008). The limited academic literature regarding the decline in terrorist activity is correlated with the output of violence that the organization sponsors. This unfortunate pattern eliminates the opportunity to collect research describing how terrorist organizations disband, which is a lesson of utmost importance in the modern world because lessons can be extrapolated from historical cases to provide insight into contemporaneous events (Krepon and Caldwell 1991).

Assembling an effective strategy to combat terrorism requires a comprehensive understanding of the grievances that initially sparked the formation of the group, according to D. R. Kaarthikeyan (2005, 131). Successfully eliminating a terrorist organization depends on addressing the root causes of the group with the aim of crafting a practical solution that targets the catalysts of the particular group (131). Scholars agree that addressing the underlying grievances and the *raison d’être* of each terrorist organization should be a key strategy to resolving conflicts utilizing terrorism.

Policy makers and academics alike employ the ambiguous term “peace process” to describe a politically designed solution to a violent conflict. Paul Wilkinson (2011, 72) suggests that a peace process is the “concept of peaceful methods of conflict resolution to prevent or terminate terrorist violence in democratic societies while ensuring that democracy is safeguarded in the process.” In this article, “Basque Peace Process” is an inclusive term used to encompass all peaceful and democratic activities linked to resolving the Basque conflict. It describes the complicated process between state and non-

state actors in the ongoing resolution of the political violence and turmoil in northern Spain.

This study specifically examines armed ethnonational struggle where the meaning of “ethnonational” reflects the nature of the terrorist actors. Ethnonational terrorism can be considered the violent activity perpetrated by groups such as ETA, who “seek to establish an independent state for the ethnic, linguistic cultural or national community with which they are affiliated” (Bale and Ackerman 2004). Adhering to Rudolph’s definition of ethnonationals, Basque nationalists will be categorized as “perceiv[ing] themselves to share a common (national) identity, different from that of other nationalities in their country” (Rudolph 1977). While ethnonationalist organizations may enjoy great longevity due to strong public support in their respective territory of origin, their limited policy goals aimed at “territorial change” also mean that they have a greater chance for a successful peace settlement than terrorist groups who demand a wide range of concessions from the government (Jones and Libicki 2008, 20). To this end, this research seeks to contribute to the void in literature on the Basque peace process and of ETA, and to provide useful insight, applicable to this turning point in Basque history, as political dialogue becomes the chosen tool to fight for independence.

Research Methodology

This study utilizes Alexander George’s research methodology of “structured, focused comparison,” which is a format widely utilized in foreign policy analysis and security studies (George and Bennett 2005, xii). This framework was chosen for its rigorous, standardized approach to analyzing case studies, coupled with its value in producing policy-relevant generalizations derived from analysis. In this research methodology, a set of questions is generated and applied to case studies in order to conduct a systematic comparison in evaluating the same phenomenon. According to George and Bennett (2005, 70), “the use of a set of general questions is necessary to ensure the acquisition of comparable data in comparative studies” in order to best explain the overall research objective of systematically examining why the ETA renounced violence. As such, this article systematically examines the ETA’s decline as an internationally recognized terrorist organization by critically evaluating what factors led to its definitive cease-fire through a framework of thematic questions. Each question was specifically designed to reflect the overall research objective by exploring internal and external factors catalyzing ETA’s transition to nonviolence. Given that terrorist campaigns often involve strategic actors that profoundly influence their transition into the political realm of negotiations, this case study examines ETA’s deliberate

adjustment to nonviolence by evaluating three issues concerning the transition: (1) domestic institutional responses and political context; (2) international institutional responses and political context; and (3) role of public opinion and media coverage (Zariski 1989, 253). These three areas will be systemically addressed through adherence to the following questions.

Domestic Institutional Responses and Political Context

- What role did the host country government play in offering the terrorist group democratic channels to adopt nonviolence?
- How willing was the government to negotiate?
- Was a particular political leader instrumental in this transition?
- What governmental actions inhibited the establishment of peace negotiations?
- Did other contemporaneous domestic events positively or negatively affect the political process?

International Institutional Responses and Political Context

- What role did the international community play in triggering the terrorist group to look toward politics as a tool?
- Did other unrelated international terrorist events help or hinder the peace process of this group?
- Did other international contemporaneous events positively or negatively affect the political process?

Role of Public Opinion and the Media

- How did domestic media influence the peace process?
- How did international news coverage affect the peace process?
- In what ways did public opinion influence the transition of these terrorist groups?
- What is the correlation between media coverage and public support?

Analysis

This article employs a methodological, qualitative analysis in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of ETA's cessation of violent activity. Because it seeks to *explain* why ETA has gradually become more amenable to peaceful tactics over time, this study relies on explanatory evidence. Descriptive and explanatory evidence is preferred over empirical data because qualitative assessments are used in order to analyze holistically the history of the ETA through a systematic approach. While a descriptive study "sets out to

collect, organize and summarize information about the matter being studied.” an explanatory study seeks to explain the collected information (Punch 2006, 33). Much of this case presentation will be descriptive in order to clearly describe the historical and contemporary events that have shaped the development of the ETA. Additionally, graphical data will be utilized in a descriptive manner. The latter portion of the case presentation will rely on an explanatory structure in order to provide insight into the internal and external triggers that have influenced the ETA’s departure from political violence. This article draws heavily from social science literature and subsequent analysis of these materials.

For the purposes of this article, qualitative research can be defined as “the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials,” or a variety of texts that I have organized and described (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, 4). Research was collected from existing literature obtained from publicly available sources in a variety of academic formats—books, academic journals, press releases, news articles, and existing data—in order to approach the research objective from a variety of academic perspectives. According to Baxter and Jack (2008), “a hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, a strategy which also enhances credibility,” and this research paper aims to approach the research objective from a breadth of perspectives for this reason.

Terrorism: A Definition

Because this article focuses on the study of terrorism and because the definition is contested within the academic and policy-making communities, the following section defines this term with reference to the behavior of ETA. The term “terrorism” is debated in political science. International organizations and governments in charge of crafting counterterrorism policy also operate according to different definitions, furthering the definitional predicament. A number of definitions of terrorism are utilized that address the wide variety of forms in which terrorism manifests itself and the specific missions of the agencies. The subjectivity of what constitutes an act of terror is problematic because there is no universal standard for categorizing an organization as systematically invoking terror amongst a target population. Cronin (2009, 7) argues that the subjectivity of terrorism stems from the fact that it is a strategy that “is intended to be a matter of perception,” and therefore different audiences will view the “terrorist” act differently. The majority of definitions that scholars accept emphasize the political motivations behind the policy aspirations of each group. For this article, the definition of terrorism follows the scholarship of Weinberg, Pedazhur, Hirsch-Hoefler, and Cunningham: “terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in

which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role” and is perpetrated by “subnational groups or clandestine agents” (Pruitt 2006, 371; Spencer 2013).

Because both ethnonationalist organizations under examination here emerged in Western Europe, the European Union’s definition of terrorism offers perspective into the counterterrorism policies enacted by Britain and Spain. According to the Council Framework Decision of 2002 on Combating Terrorism, the act of terrorism is defined as an act including: “1) seriously intimidating a population, 2) unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 3) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation” (Council of the European Union 2002). Jones and Libicki contribute to this section of literature by crafting a separate definition for a terrorist *group*, as “a collection of individuals belonging to a non-state entity that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives” (Jones and Libicki 2008, 3). It is widely accepted that terrorist attacks are premeditated, but not intended to be predictable. Political scientists also generally accept the notion that terrorist groups are rational non-state actors who strategically employ violence to reach an articulated goal. All in all, Cronin (2009, 74) concisely defines terrorism as “the violence of the underdog.”

Although ETA has been internationally recognized as a terrorist organization by foreign governments, it is important to note a dissenting opinion that does not acknowledge this group as a terror group. Prospects for the creation of a universal definition of this term are remote because of the diametrically different perspectives on “freedom fighters” versus “terrorists.” Cynthia L. Irvin argues that while both groups pursued strategies that did instill terror among a targeted group of people, the ETA is an insurgent organization seeking to “achieve the withdrawal of foreign troops and national independence,” suggesting that the violence cannot solely be considered an unjustified act of violence (Paletz and Schmid 1992, 64). Although opposing opinions exist characterizing certain internationally recognized terrorist organizations, this article examines the tactical and structural evolution of the ETA as a terrorist organization, based on the broad range of research that accepts this group as a terrorist group.

Domestic Institutional Responses and Political Context

Since ETA’s consolidation in the early 1960s as an operational unit capable of terrorist attacks, it has only recently begun to acknowledge a peace process as a legitimate avenue in the pursuit of policy goals by issuing a handful of cease-fires. Although ETA occasionally pursued democratic alternatives to violence, proposed cease-fires historically dissolved before

formal negotiations took place. When the peace process stalled or strayed from the framework desired by ETA, the organization retaliated by subsequently declaring the existing cease-fire void and then instigating a series of violent attacks (Darby and MacGinty 2003; Shepard 2002). This strategic interaction between ETA and the Spanish government suggests that ETA has viewed negotiation as a plausible route, considering cease-fire statements have been connected to a set of demands. However, the recent development of the Spanish government's unwillingness to negotiate with ETA undermines the prospects for a definitive termination and illustrates the Spanish state's rigidity and hesitance in conferring democratic legitimacy upon the organization.

ETA has considered politics as an acceptable channel to promote the Basque separatist agenda for at least three decades. Since 1978, ETA has advocated the "legalization of all political parties including those espousing separatism" (Douglass and Zulaika 1990). In terms of creating a space for legitimate dialogue, the presence of Basque political parties enhances the possibilities for a sustainable peace process. In the past, the sustained popular support for ETA translated into the political sphere with ETA's ideologically similar political party and alleged political wing, the former Herri Batasuna, which obtained about 15 percent of the Basque vote on average until its forced suspension in 2001 (Woodworth 2001, 7). In 2002, the Spanish government introduced the *Ley de Partidos Políticos*, legislation that outlawed all political parties that either endorsed violence or did not explicitly reject violence as a means to achieve political goals, indirectly targeting political parties supported by ETA (Iglesias Barez 2009, 138).

In 2009, Basque radical parties occupied only four of the seventy-five seats in Parliament (Stewart 2009). The demographic of the Basque parliament has fundamentally changed from this composition since the most recent election in 2012, when leftist nationalist parties gained substantial electoral support. Euskal Herria Bildu, a legal political coalition advocating Basque self-determination, won twenty-one seats out of the seventy-five available seats in Parliament, proving a tremendous and unparalleled victory for the Basque liberation movement through a democratic medium (Nichols 2012; "Análisis Comparativos n.d.). EH-Bildu is composed of separatist politicians and "former members of ETA's political wing" (Tremlett 2012). Given the rise of a pluralistic political climate in Parliament, the electoral progress made by EH-Bildu post-active ETA suggests that the 2011 definitive cease-fire has had a beneficial impact on the political influence that Basque separatists exercise in Parliament. New pro-independence Basque political parties were able to exercise legitimate political power and yield electoral results because the dissolution of ETA further justified their existence as the most viable option for Basque separatists to attain success. As ETA has

faded and become less relevant to the Basque separatist cause, the Basque parties with separatist platforms have become more powerful. The past three years have seen the highest rate of electoral success for Basque political parties (“El País Vasco Espera un Primer Paso Hacia El Desarme de la Organización Terrorista ETA” 2014).

While historical governmental initiatives in building an inclusive peace process in the Basque Country have failed to produce any form of bilateral or multilateral settlement, institutions exogenous to the government have proved more capable of facilitating dialogue. Lokarri, a Basque nongovernmental organization, played an instrumental role in spurring ETA’s latest cease-fire declaration. In October 2011, Lokarri collaborated with similar grassroots organizations in organizing an international conference aimed at promoting dialogue between different Basque political parties, ultimately calling for ETA to release a cease-fire in a press release (“Our Work” n.d.). ETA responded to the conference’s written declaration by issuing its latest affirmation of nonviolence (Khatami 2013, 204). The terrorist group said, “ETA considers that the International Conference...is an initiative of enormous significance...dialogue and agreement should outline the new cycle, over violence” (Khatami 2013, 206). The success of Lokarri in motivating the ETA to respond positively to a democratic solution to Basque conflict may reinforce the concept that when the terrorist group perceives that progress is being made toward a resolution, then the organization will acknowledge the efforts at peaceful initiatives by responding in a rational manner. Effectively, Basque society has played an increasing role as a protagonist in a peace resolution alongside the decline of ETA.

International Institutional Responses and Political Context

Events outside of the Spanish political environment have affected the Basque Peace Process and ETA’s role in it. In 2004, ETA was forced to reassess its operational tactics as a consequence of an internationally calculated terrorist attack on the Madrid train system. It is generally accepted that a group affiliated with al-Qaeda is responsible for the attack, causing mass casualties. In the context of the ETA’s existential strategy, the ETA would not compete with the level of violence perpetrated by transnational terrorist organizations, which have emerged “as the leading threat to global security in the modern world” (Ripsman and Paul 2010, 50). It can be argued that the dawn of new global terrorism and the mass civilian casualties associated with the attacks by these transnational terror organizations persuaded the ETA to “radically [reassess] their traditional positions in the new environment” that lent publicity precedence to larger terrorist organizations capable of inflicting

more damage (Woodworth 2001, 66). Furthermore, after the Madrid bombings in 2004, Spain took immediate action against future transnational terrorist attacks. The government created hundreds of new law enforcement and police positions within the Guardia Civil and also created a counterterrorism center to enhance intelligence collecting (Reinares 2009, 371).

While the 2004 Madrid bombings undeniably stripped operational leverage from ETA, the consequential War on Terror declared after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States more broadly influenced terrorism policy and political rhetoric on the international stage, such that “society as a whole has come to regard acts of political violence as disgusting and atrocious” (Khatami 2013, 100). Adjustments within the European Union’s political agenda reveal another dimension to the implications of 9/11 indirectly affecting what existed of indigenous European terrorist organizations. The European Union’s reaction to 9/11 included the restructuring of existing counterterrorism policies and the implementation of additional policies to combat terrorism (Cortright and Lopez 2007, 219). Directly after 2001, European governments created a counterterrorism task force and supplied the EU police agency (Europol) with more resources (Keohane 2005, 18). The refreshed focus on combating terrorism and the nascent organizations that came to fruition in the EU to counter political violence illustrated that terrorism would not be tolerated. This new focus on maximizing Europe’s political framework used to combat terrorism could have provided additional impetus in persuading the ETA to repeatedly declare cease-fires.

Another paramount international event that seems to have catalyzed ETA’s approach to tactical nonviolence is the 1998 Good Friday Agreement of Northern Ireland, which outlined the closing phases of the Irish Republican Army through its disarmament. In 1998, ETA issued a cease-fire statement after the democratic management of the Northern Ireland peace process produced a peace agreement (Barker 2003, 53). The culmination of the IRA’s peace process into the Good Friday Agreement paved the way for ETA’s exploration of nonviolent politics as an option to pursuing their policy goals. Historically, ETA has responded to international events by adjusting their agenda to emulate democratic engagement.

Media Coverage and Public Support

A key factor in guiding ETA toward its 2011 declaration of permanent nonviolence was the diminished Basque support of the organization. Public support is fundamental in sustaining a terrorist organization. A solid support system provides a terrorist group with morale, fiscal assistance, and new members (Kegley 2003, 112). In 2011, the statement regarding the definitive

cessation of terrorist attacks by ETA specifically mentioned that the Basque populace openly embraced the announcement (“Basque Ceasefire Statement: Full Text” 2011). In other words, the political violence promoted by ETA did not represent the ideology shared by the majority of the Basque citizens. It is important to note that Basque civil society has been very active in organizing street demonstrations and protesting against acts of terror committed by ETA, tangibly illustrating the decline of public support (Kegley 2003, 112). Without a popular mandate, an ethnonationalist terrorist organization will not survive, due to its inherent nature as a minority group fighting in an asymmetric conflict.

The media too can play a critical role in shaping civic attitudes by influencing public perception of an event through contextual bias, because the media itself is an “instrument of propaganda for the simple reason that [it] find[s] terrorist actions newsworthy” (Mahan and Grist 2008). Furthermore, according to Jose Desantes Guanter, “terrorism today is an ‘information crime’; it cannot operate without the modern social communications media” (Paletz and Schmid 1992, 65). Governments want the media to advance their political agenda and not the actions and agenda of the terrorist group. *El Pais*, one of the largest newspaper organizations in Spain, presented the bombing of the Madrid airport in 2004 by implicitly suggesting that stalled negotiations involving ETA catalyzed the tragedy (Alonso 2011, 196). This connotation implies that dialogue between ETA and the central government is popularly viewed as pragmatic, since *El Pais* is such a large publication and would not print an opinion that greatly deviates from what their target audience looks to read.

Cumulative Analysis

The case presentation provided an abbreviated examination of critical events that played an instrumental role in facilitating the most recent cease-fire of ETA. This section will highlight the events most significant in ushering ETA’s final cease-fire in order to provide a brief overview of factors that have the potential to change the course of a terror group constructively. The three main factors that appeared to be significant causes of renunciation of violence for ETA include: the emergence and intensification of global terrorism, the noticeable effect of decreased public support for both groups (focusing on the decreased public support for a variety of reasons), and the search for political legitimacy through the formation of political wings, such as the various groups linked to the former party of Batasuna.

ETA was affected by international events, specifically in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As previously discussed, the emergence of transnational terrorist organizations, like al-Qaeda, with the ability and mission to perpetrate mass-casualty terrorist attacks on a global level undermined

domestic groups, like ETA, which would not compete with the same level of violence that large, network-style organizations perpetrated. However, the broader implication of the concept of the newest wave of global terrorism affecting ETA is in the strategic calculus of the group. As a domestic organization with a strong desire to separate from their mother government, ETA relied on a strong sense of public support. Therefore, organizations like ETA have an unwritten limit of violence that they are able to perpetrate without losing their sympathetic public backing. Thus, ETA is not willing to sacrifice public support in order to increase their number of victims.

This idea of maintaining a public mandate ties into the related notion that the perception of the terrorist group affects the level of support they receive. Public support not only provides the legitimacy for the group to operate, but support is crucial in financially funding the organization's missions. The decreasing levels of public support in favor of violence had a discernable impact on the amounts of violence that ETA committed. An interesting concept related to public support as the lifeblood of the terrorist organization is the attention that the terrorist group receives in the news media. The press attention given to stories about wider global threats, such as al-Qaeda, hindered ETA's media presence because ETA was unwilling to compete on the same violent scale of larger organizations garnering media attention. In turn, the diminished media presence that these organizations received weakened their power as terrorist organizations, since the sentiment of "terror" was much greater in describing the latent threat of al-Qaeda. Thus, the decrease in media attention paralleled the decrease in ETA's strength, illustrating a possible linkage between the likelihood that a terrorist group will seek political legitimacy (as it becomes weaker) with less media attention.

The large takeaway behind this important concept of public support is that for ethnonational, separatist, and domestic organizations, efforts to reduce the violence should not surgically target the terrorist organization. The motivation behind the violence stems from a larger sentiment espousing separatism. ETA consists of a group of individuals who have chosen to articulate a stronger sense of nationalism on an extreme level. As stated in the earlier section reviewing relevant scholarship, D. R. Kaarthikeyan (2005, 131) emphasizes the importance of eliminating terrorist organizations through solutions aimed at targeting the individual grievances of the organization. In relation to ETA, the solutions to the terrorist violence must come in the form of targeting the ideas that have driven the creation of the organization, not the organization itself. Counterterrorist policies should seek to address the existing sense of nationalism by working to incorporate the reality of the situation into governmental policies. In the Basque Country, the increase in autonomy granted to the region in the early 1980s significantly decreased

ETA's violence, indicating that by addressing the underlying grievance of the terrorist organization and the population supporting the organization, violence was reduced.

This generalization leads into the third important contributing factor to the decline of ethnonationalist terrorist violence: the creation of political parties. According to the Spanish Interior Ministry, the Spanish government's multipronged strategy toward dealing with ETA reflects political, social, and economic policies, encompasses the judiciary and legislation, and relies on the intelligence and police community (Garcia 2010, 65). While this article does not deny that this multifaceted approach to dealing holistically with ETA through a variety of means does indeed influence the group, key factors in ETA's decline that merit more academic recognition are the political activity within Basque civil society as well as ETA's strategy. One cannot understand ETA's movement away from violence without considering the fundamental role that Basque political parties have played in this process. ETA's involvement in the political sphere has evolved with the organization's initial political branch transforming numerous times, under different names and different leadership. Notably, the former political party that gained the most political sway was Batasuna, one of the parties that became banned when the Spanish government promptly outlawed through the *Ley de Partidos Políticos* all parties allegedly linked to violent ideologies.

Ultimately, ETA's multiple attempts at involving itself in politics paved the way for other unaffiliated Basque political parties to form under the premise of separatism. In order to solidify their political legitimacy, current Basque nationalist parties have articulated strong stances against violence, in order to distance themselves from illegal nationalist parties like Batasuna. To this end, the creation of political parties linked to the ideological motivations driving the terrorist organization (i.e., nationalism and separatism) address these underlying grievances through political engagement and provide an opportunity for civic participation. It is therefore important that the opportunity for nonviolent political involvement exists, because the creation of political parties signals the terrorist group's willingness to participate in politics. The terrorist organization probed into politics through a political wing, Batasuna, which, in the long run, contributed to the political climate conducive to the political engagement of Basque civil society.

The creation of new, recognized political parties advocating for self-determination and a Basque socialist state—two key ideological pillars formed by ETA—represent ethnonationalists and Basque separatists through political, nonviolent channels. As mentioned earlier, evidence for this supposition is shown in the 2012 electoral results within the Basque parliament, just one year after ETA's permanent cease-fire. The historically unparalleled victory for

Euskal Herria Bildu, a pro-independence political party, demonstrates the sustained salience of nationalism through nonviolent democratic means, when ETA is pushed out of the Basque theater. Simply put, ETA's announced decision to cease violent attacks forever as so-called freedom fighters has advanced Basque nationalists' political agenda. This transfer of power, thanks to democracy's framework for political parties, was made possible by ETA's push for political legitimacy through political parties when ETA realized that the Spanish state was not going grant them sovereignty solely as a result of terrorist attacks. This rational decision was informed by the increasing loss of support from previous ETA sympathizers, in combination with the dawn of new, global terrorism, which undermined ETA's power and presence as a terror group. ETA's original purpose of its violent attacks was to erode the resistance of the Spanish government and "compel [it] to make far-reaching concessions" of independence (Kegley 2003). The Spanish governmental capacity to withstand this threat has been a double-edged sword for national security because, as of 2013, the Basque peace process has culminated into a delicate stalemate between ETA and the Spanish government.

While undeniable progress was made when ETA formally renounced violence in 2011 mainly due to the aforementioned pressures, the terrorist organization has not physically decommissioned its weapons and still remains armed. Thus, ETA should still be considered a threat to Spanish national security—albeit a dormant threat—until the organization disassembles their operational and military capacities by surrendering their arms, in accordance with the unilateral demands of the Spanish government. Spain's unwillingness to offer a space for dialogue since 2012 could hypothetically unravel past progress, unless ETA agrees to disband. Although the 2011 declaration of permanent nonviolence differs from past cease-fires because of its nature as an affirmation of a past cease-fire, it must be noted that ETA has a history of nullifying peace agreements when negotiations, or any form of political dialogue, are not carried through with the Spanish government.

Conclusion

New, global terrorism poses a catastrophic threat to the international community, pushing domestic belligerent non-state actors further down the political agenda of many countries. In the face of the rapidly changing global environment, it is important to expand upon existing scholarship examining political and peaceful avenues to mitigate political violence. Policy makers too routinely dismiss dialogue and negotiation as a legitimate route in managing a violent group of mobilized citizens despite the literature, which shows that a large amount of terrorist organizations do end through nonviolence. This

unfortunate disconnect between the academic and policy worlds inhibits the construction of informed policy making in the niche of terrorism studies. Therefore, an updated examination of the factors that pushed ETA to cease violent activities is an insightful and worthwhile addition to terrorism studies. This article sought to provide a detailed overview of the significant factors, both external and internal to the Basque Country, that motivated ETA to abandon the use of violence. Future scholarship examining this topic could expand on the analysis of ETA within a larger framework of ethnonationalist terrorism. Future research projects could elaborate on how terrorist organizations end by incorporating a single-case study of ETA into a cross-case comparison involving another ethnonational terrorist organization, such as the IRA or PLO, which both sought similar strategic ends. The conclusions generated in this single case-study examination can be transferred into a larger analysis in order to develop policy-relevant generalizations about how terrorist organizations end, thereby contributing to academic literature and offering potential policy prescriptions for counterterrorist strategies.

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Questions in Politics

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The Critical Elections of 1968 and 1992¹

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Many scholars have accepted that southern whites shifted their political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, and that the northeastern United States is no longer GOP territory. But were the 1968 and 1992 elections really “critical elections”? Both contests are analyzed to see if they meet the timing, turnout, third parties, and trends in regional voting criteria that would qualify them as a critical election. Then both are studied to see if such regional variations with the past led to subsequent national voting changes.

Ever since V. O. Key Jr.’s seminal work “A Theory of Critical Elections” appeared in the *Journal of Politics* in 1955, scholars have been captivated by the notion of a few key electoral contests setting the tone for party power dynamics and policies. Key argued that these elections occur at somewhat regular intervals, have a higher voting turnout, experience a group shifting sides from one political party to another, and lead one party to dominate most subsequent contests until the next critical election. Other scholars have identified critical elections from the past (1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, 1932) and noted the importance of a third political party in many of these cases. This article examines whether the 1968 and 1992 elections were critical elections, using the criteria put forth by Key and others, looking at the actions of southern whites in the former case and northeastern voters in the latter.

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The Concept of Critical Elections

The term “critical elections” is credited to Harvard Professor V. O. Key Jr. Though better known for his analysis of politics of the South, Key published the article “A Theory of Critical Elections” in the *Journal of Politics* in 1955. Key writes:

Even those most fleeting inspection of American elections suggests the existence of a category of elections in which voters are, at least from impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate. Moreover, and perhaps this is the truly differentiating characteristic of this sort of election, the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections. All these characteristics cumulate to the conception of an election type in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed. (Key 1955, 3–4)

Walter Dean Burnham continued to examine the question in his book *Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics*. Burnham wrote: “Some elections have more important long-range consequences for the political system as in a more clear-cut way. There has long been agreement among historians that the elections of those of 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932, for example, were fundamental turning points in the course of American electoral politics” (Burnham 1970, 1). Burnham’s research, building on Key’s theory, concluded that critical elections are different from other contests in that the critical election (1) disrupts traditional voting patterns, (2) leads to high participation and ideological polarization, (3) occurs at somewhat regular intervals, and (4) involves durable changes in the behavior of voting groups (Burnham 1970).

Gerald Pomper (1967) added a contingent factor—third-party campaigns might occur in conjunction with realignment. Not all scholars have accepted this factor as a necessary condition for the presence of a critical election because of its absence in at least two critical elections. Even so, Sundquist (1983) has also argued that third parties do play a role in realignment. They challenge existing parties ill-equipped to handle new issues that emerge. Even

if they do not last long, they have enough attraction to wrench groups from their traditional partisan leanings.

Critical elections have been shown to represent a shift in party dynamics. After the 1800 election, the Democratic-Republican Party leapfrogged the Federalists, in terms of political power. The 1828 election produced the stamp of Jacksonian Democracy upon the political landscape. The 1860 election saw the Republicans replace the Democrats as the dominant political party in America. After a period of electoral instability (1884–1892) where the two parties traded narrow victories, the 1896 contest saw the reemergence of the Republican Party as well as the regionalization of political parties from Northeast and Midwest (GOP) to West and South (Democrat).

The 1932 election saw the triumph of the Democrats, after which they dominated politics for much of the next 30 years. Of course, this Democratic domination was not monolithic. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower won two terms in the 1950s. But he had little involvement in the Republican Party prior to 1952. Furthermore, the victory of Democrats in all of the other elections (1932, 1936, 1940, 1944, 1948, 1960, 1964), often by wide margins (in five cases), produced a Democratic victory in seven of nine cases during that time frame (Nardulli, Dalager, and Greco 1996).

The next section will examine the election of 1968 to see if it meets the requirement to be a critical election in terms of: (a) the timing, making this critical election a regular interval, (b) elevated levels of political participation, (c) the presence of a third party, and, (d) a change in voting patterns with a key group.

Was the 1968 Presidential Contest a Critical Election?

Timing

The search for a critical election following the 1932 contest began after Key's (1955) work was published. Burnham (1970, 27) speculated about the possibility of 1968 as a critical election, which had occurred while he was writing his book. Because critical elections theory required knowledge of trends that occur after the election, Burnham could not have known in 1970 whether it qualified or not. Richard Nixon won the election, but only with 43 percent of the vote in a three-way contest. It not only reversed the Johnson landslide, it also occurred 34 years after the last critical election, making it the perfect time for another one. Nixon would win easily in 1972. Prior research on critical elections finds that they occur roughly every two to three decades.

Table 1: National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections, 1960–2006

Year	Voting-Age Population	Voter Registration	Voter Turnout	Turnout of Voting-Age Population (percent)
2006	220,600,000	135,889,600	80,588,000	43.6
2004	221,256,931	174,800,000	122,294,978	55.3
2002	215,473,000	150,990,598	79,830,119	37.0
2000	205,815,000	156,421,311	105,586,274	51.3
1998	200,929,000	141,850,558	73,117,022	36.4
1996	196,511,000	146,211,960	96,456,345	49.1
1994	193,650,000	130,292,822	75,105,860	38.8
1992	189,529,000	133,821,178	104,405,155	55.1
1990	185,812,000	121,105,630	67,859,189	36.5
1988	182,778,000	126,379,628	91,594,693	50.1
1986	178,566,000	118,399,984	64,991,128	36.4
1984	174,466,000	124,150,614	92,652,680	53.1
1982	169,938,000	110,671,225	67,615,576	39.8
1980	164,597,000	113,043,734	86,515,221	52.6
1978	158,373,000	103,291,265	58,917,938	37.2
1976	152,309,190	105,037,986	81,555,789	53.6
1974	146,336,000	96,199,020	55,943,834	38.2
1972	140,776,000	97,328,541	77,718,554	55.2
1970	124,498,000	82,496,747	58,014,338	46.6
1968	120,328,186	81,658,180	73,211,875	60.8
1966	116,132,000	76,288,283	56,188,046	48.4
1964	114,090,000	73,715,818	70,644,592	61.9
1962	112,423,000	65,393,751	53,141,227	47.3
1960	109,159,000	64,833,096	68,838,204	63.1

Source: Election Turnout, Michael McDonald, George Mason University, http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm

Turnout

Another key component of a critical election involves a voting turnout that is higher than usual. In 1968, the voting turnout was 60.8 percent. However, the turnout in 1968 was not as high as the turnout in the 1960 election (63.1 percent) and the 1964 election (61.9 percent), showing a slight decline (FEC 2011), as reported in Table 1.

Nevertheless, the voting in 1968 produced a higher turnout than in subsequent elections. In 1972, only 55 percent went to the voting booth, and

only 53.6 percent went to the polls four years later. Never again would an election produce a turnout of 60 percent for the voter age population (VAP) measure.

Third Party

Pomper and Sundquist argue that third parties play a role in shaking up the political system, enabling changes in voting patterns among groups and increasing the likelihood of a critical election. Not all critical elections, however, have a third party. There were multiple candidates for the presidency in 1800 (John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr) but that was a function of the pre-Twelfth Amendment political system, even if there were only two political parties, Federalists and Democratic-Republicans. The 1860 election had four candidates: a Republican (Abraham Lincoln), two Democrats (Stephen Douglas and John C. Breckenridge), and one from the Constitutional Union Party (John Bell). But the 1828 and 1932 elections did not have a significant third-party presence; while the 1824, 1912, and 1948 elections, which were not critical according to definition, did. In the 1960s, Democrats and Republicans who set their agenda during the economic battles of the Great Depression were unable to handle the new issues emerging of civil rights, environmentalism, the Vietnam War controversy, gender politics, and others (Sundquist 1983). A new party emerged that focused on populism and the politics of race, while others wrestled over the direction of the traditional political parties. As a result, Sundquist finds that the presence of that new party helped usher in a realignment of electoral politics. While not required, the election of 1968 includes this element. American Independence Party candidate George Wallace, the Alabama governor, ran for president in 1968. And Wallace's presence, like other third-party candidacies connected with critical elections, did help wrench one group away from its traditional voting moorings: southern whites.

Trends in Regional Voting

The shift of a group from one political party to another is often what gets political scientists excited about critical elections. Campbell (2006) contends that such group changes can be regional, and need not be national. In the case of the 1896 election, the South and West became Democratic Party territory, whereas the Northeast and Midwest were firmly in the hands of the Republicans (Samuelson 1996). Though the issue was framed as one of "gold vs. silver" (monetary policy), the regional results were all too clear (Veit 2011; Williams 2010). In 1932, the shift to Roosevelt generated a national critical election (Nardulli 1995) cementing the defection of African Americans from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party (Ladd and Hadley 1975).

Similarly, Sundquist (1983) and Campbell (2006) argued that southern whites shifted from Democrats to the Republicans in the late 1960s. Until then, southern whites were loyal Democrats for the same reason that blacks used to be loyal Republicans: the GOP was the party of Lincoln. Stung by the Civil War and angered by Republican Reconstruction efforts that involved an occupation of the South by the North, southern whites loyally supported Democrats to the hilt. Even when the national party adopted a more liberal candidate (Al Smith, Adlai Stevenson), the South was the one region these Northern liberal Democrats could capture. Of course, the Democrats would put southerners on the ticket to ensure support from their base—Joe Robinson from Arkansas in 1928, “Cactus Jack” Garner of Texas in 1932 and 1936, John Sparkman of Alabama in 1952, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee in 1956, and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas in 1960. Even the “border states” from the Civil War (with southern sympathizers) could make their way on the vice presidential slot (Harry Truman of Missouri in 1944 and Alben Barkley of Kentucky in 1948).

Some scholars have claimed the makeup of the Democratic Party changed with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Black and Black 1992). This legislation, along with the targeting of southern states’ rights policies by national law enforcement, led to a series of battles between Washington, D.C., and conservative southern states and their Democratic Party governors, even though a southern Democrat (Johnson) was in charge for much of that time frame (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994, 88).

Some argue that the trend began earlier. That is because in 1960, Virginia Democratic senator Harry F. Byrd, although he was not officially a candidate, won the electors from the state of Mississippi; he also received a split in the Alabama electoral votes and an elector from Oklahoma. This had more to do with slates of “unpledged electors” who would vote for whomever they wanted, even if all their state’s ballots went for Kennedy on Election Night. Nevertheless, Nixon won three Southern states—Florida (51.51%), Tennessee (52.92%), and Virginia (52.44%)—as well as Kentucky (53.59%).

Even though he lost by a landslide in 1964, Barry Goldwater was able to make inroads among Democrats in the South and took five southern states in that election (Stonecash 2000). But there are two points that are noteworthy. First of all, the states that the Arizona senator won were different than those that Nixon captured four years earlier in 1960. Secondly, unlike Nixon’s narrow margins of victory in those states, Goldwater won them by safer margins (Georgia, 54.2%; Louisiana, 56.81%; South Carolina, 58.89%; Alabama, 69.45%; and Mississippi, 87.14%). Those 1964 totals for states that had gone for Kennedy and Johnson in 1960 showed stronger evidence for the role of the civil rights debate in the South.

Table 2: Time Frames between Critical Elections

Critical Election	Time Frame	Years between One Critical Election and Another
1800	1800–1828	28
1828	1828–1860	32
1860	1860–1896	46
1896	1896–1932	36
1932	1932–1968	36
1968	1968–1992	24


In 1968 (Leip 2012), George Wallace nabbed five states (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, plus one vote from North Carolina) for a total of 46 electoral votes. Nixon took Tennessee, Florida, North and South Carolina, and Virginia, leaving only Texas for the Democrats by a narrow score (41.4%–39.87%). In 1972, Nixon won in a landslide, winning every southern state. Clearly, much had changed since prior elections, when the GOP struggled to win even a majority of southern states. Republicans had never swept the South; this was something unthinkable in the post-Civil War era, or even the New Deal. Johnson’s support of the civil rights movement, the nomination of a northern liberal (Humphrey), and the presence of a conservative southern Democrat running as an independent (Wallace) played a critical role in finally wrenching the South from its traditional Democratic Party moorings, putting it in play for Nixon, Reagan, and future GOP candidates.

Was the 1992 Presidential Contest a Critical Election?

Timing

The phenomenon of Southern whites shifting to the Republican Party is well established in the literature (Stonecash 2000; Sundquist 1983), as is the description of the 1968 presidential vote as a possible critical election. But since then, nobody has made a credible case for a post-1968 critical election. There are several reasons for this. One comes from critiques of the critical elections theory. One vein of criticism purports not to find huge sweeping national trends in presidential contests. They argue that little statistical evidence supports the claim of significant change (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980).

Another comes from the much-discussed trend of dealignment and the rise of the independent voter (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Ladd and Hadley 1975). These critics argue that a partisan realignment cannot take place

Figure 1: Electoral Turnout (FEC Data)

Source: Federal Election Commission (2010)

if there is little in the way of partisan attachments, according to the logic. This dealignment argument will be addressed later in the paper, along with secular (rolling) realignment. The previous gaps between critical elections are all relatively close to 30 years, as displayed in Table 2. The election of 1992 is twenty-four years after the last critical elections. The 1860 case in actuality lasted until the 1884 contest (Cleveland vs. Blaine), which triggered a period of electoral instability (1884–1892). This would make the post-1860 trend only 24 years. The average therefore is 31.2 years, so 1992 is a little short in terms of years, but not too far off of the average.

Turnout

Critical elections are also defined by a higher turnout than other elections. As data from the Federal Elections Commission reveals in Figure 1, the turnout for the 1992 election was 55.1 percent (the vertical axis indicates the percentage who voted, while the horizontal axis shows the presidential elections from 1968 to 2008).

When compared to other years before and after the election in 1992 (1980–2000), it is the highest mark. In fact, the turnout was 50.1 percent in 1988. This election also reversed the long trend of voter decline that had been occurring since 1960.

Third Party

Some of that boost in turnout was the result of H. Ross Perot's independent candidacy, a factor Pomper and Sundquist associate with critical elections. Perot may not have taken a single state, but by getting nearly 20 percent of the vote (more than most third-party candidates, including Wallace), his presence may have altered the political landscape, giving voters an extra choice that may have helped them move away from years of Republican voting to pick a businessman who called for deficit reduction.

Trends in Regional Voting

The Northeast has been the subject of scrutiny in prior studies of critical elections. Though associated with research on southern politics, V. O. Key focused his 1955 research on New England. Burnham (1970, 5) wrote of secular (slow-moving) changes from the 1930s through the 1960s for the Democrats in that region. Evidence shows that except for a narrow victory for Jimmy Carter and the Democrats in 1976, the region remained solidly in the hands of Republicans from 1972 through 1988 in presidential contests. This persisted, even with New York congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro serving on the Democratic ticket in 1984, and Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis as the party standard-bearer in 1988.

A complete shift in partisan identification took place in 1992. That year, Democrats won the region by a 12-point margin (47% to 35% for the GOP and 18% for the independent candidate). By 1996, that margin of Democratic Party dominance (55%–34%–9%) was a complete reversal of the 1972 election, where Republicans won the Northeast by a lopsided 59–39 percent imbalance (*New York Times* 2008).

A critical election needs several factors to be considered as such. Such an election needs a change in group voting, high turnout, to occur within a temporal cycle, and sometimes a strong third-party presence to shake up the system. Each of these factors contributes to winning an overwhelming majority of subsequent elections. The 1992 voting contest satisfies all of these. Northeasterners, in general, and whites from the region in particular, shifted from the Republicans to the Democrats. That election had an above-average turnout for its time. And it occurred roughly within the time pattern of other electoral cycles. It has also enabled Democrats to halt the string of Republican landslides. But did it help the party win post-1992 elections?

Critical Elections and Future Elections

In the preceding section, this study found that the 1968 and 1992 ballot box battles have several characteristics of critical elections. They occur at

intervals in close enough proximity to a critical election time frame (every 24–36 years), have somewhat higher voting turnouts, see the presence of third parties, and include a regional group that switches sides from one party to another. But there is another key element of a critical election: the ability to win most subsequent elections. In this section, this study evaluates whether the 1968 and 1992 elections count as critical by influencing the voting that occurred afterward. This will be measured by which political party (1) wins in the national Electoral College, (2) wins in the popular vote of the regional group that supposedly defected, and (3) wins in the states of the regional group that allegedly switched sides. For the purposes of comparison, this study defines both regions as consisting of eleven states. The South is the “Old South,” which includes the eleven states that seceded from the Union before the Civil War. Those include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. For the Northeast, this study includes the New England states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine, adding in other northeastern states such as New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware.

Did the 1968 Election Signal Republican Victories in Subsequent Elections?

Nationwide Victories in the Electoral College

Between 1968 and 1988, Republicans won five of six elections (83.3%), often by Electoral College landslides and comfortable popular-vote margins. Now many American political scientists routinely include 1968 as another critical election, dealing a death blow to the New Deal coalition and paving the way for a Republican resurgence in presidential elections (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Sabato 1988).

Electoral College Vote for the Southern States

The data support the view of prior southern dominance by the Democratic Party before 1968. The Democratic-Republican Party took 100 percent of southern states from 1796 to 1824 (American Presidency Project n.d.). The Democratic Party won 80 percent of them from 1828 to 1852 and 79.3 percent from 1856 to 1892. From the next two electoral periods of time, the Democrats continued their southern stranglehold, taking 94 percent of Dixie states in the Electoral College from 1896 to 1928 and 82 percent of the tally between 1932 and 1964.

But after the 1968 election, it was a different story. Republicans gained the upper hand after 1968 and through 1988 (taking 80% of these states in

Table 3: Electoral College Trends in the South and Northwest, 1972–1988 and 1992–2012

Election Cycle	Region	Party	# of States	States Won in the Electoral College	Pct. Won
1972-1988	Northeast	Republican	11	43/55	78.2%
1972-1988	South	Republican	11	44/55	80%
1992-2012	Northeast	Democratic	11	65/66	98.5%
1992-2012	South	Republican	11	53/66	80.3%

presidential contests) as well as after the 1992 election (another 80 percent during this time), as seen in Table 3, which shows the election cycle for the Northeast and South, the number of states, how many states were won in the Electoral College, and the percentage of the region’s states won by the prevailing party in the presidential elections during that time frame. Such a strong reversal of electoral fortunes is what may be expected from a critical election.

Popular Vote for the Southern States

Moreover, the South generally favored the Republican Party after the critical election of 1968 in the popular vote as well. The GOP won the South in all years between 1972 and 1988, with the exception of Carter’s nine-point victory in the polls in 1976. For that matter, the trends continued past 1988, where the Republicans won all of these elections, except for a one-percentage-point loss in 1996.

The trend was even stronger among southern whites. The defection of southern whites from the Democratic Party to the Republicans occurred after the 1968 presidential election. They picked Republicans every year from 1972 through 1988, often by double digits or by twice as much. It was the same case with the 1992 through 2008 elections, where the margins of victory were 15 percentage points to 41 points in 2004 or 38 in 2008. Clearly the trend is strong, even persisting well past the last critical election.

Whereas Democrats won seven of nine elections between 1932 and 1964, Republicans became the new ascendant party. The GOP won elections in 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984, and 1988 (Black and Black 1992). They not only won five of six contests, but they won them all in convincing fashion, losing only the 1976 election narrowly (Ford won more states that year and almost took the popular vote). Clearly the southern shift and high turnout in 1968 (relative to subsequent years) and the results make a strong case for 1968 to be a critical election.

Did the 1992 Election Lead to Democratic Party Wins in Subsequent Elections?

Nationwide Victories in the Electoral College

But how did the 1992 election impact future presidential choice? This study demonstrates that 1992 exhibited several elements of a critical election. It occurred within the time frame since the last critical election. It had a higher turnout than previous years or even the following election or two, reversing a downward trend for the American voter. There was also a viable third-party challenger. And this study established that the Northeast in general, along with whites in the region, defected from the Republicans to the Democratic Party.

Did these elements all lead to some sort of future Democratic Party hegemony in presidential contests? Democrats won the 1992 election, as well as the 1996, 2008, and 2012 elections. They lost the 2000 contest as well as the next one four years later. But the Democrats finished first in the popular vote (albeit narrowly) in 2000, giving them five of six wins in the popular vote column.

It is perhaps easier to recognize the Republican southern shift, because so many of their wins were so decisive. After all, Republicans went from winning fewer than 10 percent of the Electoral College votes in 1964, to taking 55.9 percent of them four years later, to garnering a whopping 96.7 percent of the state votes in 1972. Reagan also posted victories, taking in more than 90 percent of the Electoral College, while George H. W. Bush got nearly 80 percent in his victory in 1988.

In contrast, Democratic victories seem narrower, mostly because people look at the closer popular vote totals. Even in the Electoral College column, Clinton and Obama get between 60 and 70 percent of the state votes in each of their two wins (sandwiching two very narrow Bush wins). But when you go from mustering little more than a state or two on two occasions, and ten or fewer states in two other defeats, taking four elections and five popular-vote ballots is quite a reversal of fortune.

Electoral College Vote for the Northeastern States

But what has happened in the Northeast? Table 4 shows which parties captured a particular region, South or Northeast. Bright red shading indicates a Republican Party triumph in that region in the Electoral College for that time frame. Bright blue shading means the Democratic Party convincingly won the region in the presidential contests during that time. Light-blue or light-red shading means a narrow win for Democrats or Republicans, respectively, while white shading shows a tie.

Table 4: Electoral College Trends in the South and Northeast, 1796–2012

Northeast States In The Electoral College			Southern States In The Electoral College		
Election	Total Dem	Total GOP	Election	Total Dem	Total GOP
1796-1824	33*	33**	1796-1824	38*	0**
1828-1852	32	55***	1828-1852	60	15***
1856-1892	34	76	1856-1892	65	17
1896-1928	14	85	1896-1928	93	6
1932-1964	53	46	1932-1964	77	17
1968-1988	19	47	1968-1988	12	49
1992-2012	65	1	1992-2012	13	53

* = Democratic-Republican Party, ** = Federalist & National Republican Party, *** = Whig Party

* = Democratic-Republican Party, ** = Federalist & National Republican Party, *** = Whig Party

In earlier time periods, votes were split evenly between the Federalist Party and Democratic-Republican Party (McCormick 1966). But this is tempered by two factors. First, the Federalist Party weakness after the 1800 election meant the party won few states, if any. As Ranney (1975) writes: “In the 1790s the two original parties were almost even in strength, with the Federalists having a slight edge at the national level. However, the smashing triumph of Jefferson and his Republicans in the watershed election of 1800 dealt the Federalists a blow from which they never recovered. Thereafter their numbers steadily dwindled in Congress and in most state and local governments. All their presidential nominees lost, and after the crushing defeat of Rufus King in 1816 they nominated no more. Soon thereafter their organization, if not their ideas, disappeared altogether” (Ranney 1975, 14). Second, those it did capture were almost entirely in the Northeast. Third, the Federalist Party did better in New England than the Mid-Atlantic states or places like New York or Pennsylvania.

After the 1824 election, the Whigs performed much better than the Federalists did from 1804 to 1820. Even though the Democratic Party did better overall in contests (taking five of seven elections), the Whigs won nearly two-thirds of the Northeast states (63.2%). Republicans did even better, getting 69.1 percent of the Northeast states in the Electoral College from 1856 to 1892 and 85.9 percent of those states in presidential contests between 1896 and 1928. From 1932 to just before 1968, the results do not support the theory so much, because Democrats took 53.5 percent of Northeast states, but this

occurred during the dominance of FDR in four elections. It is noteworthy that even with a New York governor who won his contests by strong majorities, some of the only states that stayed with Republicans were in the Northeast. Just as the South shifted to the GOP after 1968, so too did the Northeast begin to return to its place as a region for Republicans. The Republicans captured 71.2 percent of the states in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and large states such as New York and Pennsylvania through 1988.

That all changed after the 1992 election. After this period of time, the Democrats took 98.5 percent of all Northeast states in the Electoral College, losing only New Hampshire narrowly in 2000. Such a change reflects a 169.7-percentage-point swing, slightly greater than the 162-percentage-point swing Republicans experienced when they went from losing to gaining the South (before 1968 to after 1968).

Popular Vote for the Northeastern States

Table 5 looks at all four regions, and which candidate won the popular vote for president in each election. In 1972, 59 percent of northeasterners voted for Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate, as opposed to 39 percent for South Dakota senator George McGovern. Over the next four elections, Republicans won three of the four popular vote totals for the region, losing only in 1976 (where Ford and Carter nearly split the number of states in the region).

But it was a different story in 1992, when Bill Clinton won the northeastern vote by 12 percentage points in a three-way race. Four years later, he took the region (55%–34%–9%). In fact, Democrats won the Northeast by double digits in each election after 1992, even taking the Northeast with 59 percent of the vote in 2008.

This phenomenon has not gone completely unnoticed by the scholarly literature. Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie (2006, 504) write: “The GOP’s decline in the Northeast is almost as spectacular as its gains in the South ... From the peak of GOP strength in 1946, when it held more than 70 percent of the seats, to the mid-1960s, its share of seats falls about 30 points. Since 1964, GOP strength has been at 50 percent or below, with rare exceptions.” The only difference is that these authors focus on congressional seats, not presidential elections. Moreover, they do not identify 1992 as a critical election, but rather argue that it is part of a long secular decline.

Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie (2006) are not the only ones concluding that the Northeast regional trend shifted from the GOP to the Democratic Party. Reiter and Stonecash’s (2011) book *Counter Realignment: Political Change in the Northeastern United States* maps out the regional transition from the early 1900s through the early 2000s.

Table 6: White Vote by Region, New York Times Exit Polls, 11/5/2008

Race and Region		1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008
16% of the electorate	Whites in the Northeast	34	49	38	42	45	44	51	52	50	52
	Democrat										
	Republican	65	50	52	57	54	36	37	44	49	46
	Independent	-	-	10	-	-	19	10	4	-	-
20	Whites in the Midwest	32	46	37	35	42	40	45	44	43	47
	Democrat										
	Republican	65	52	55	64	57	39	43	53	56	51
	Independent	-	-	7	-	-	22	10	2	-	-
22	Whites in the South	23	47	35	28	32	34	36	31	29	30
	Democrat										
	Republican	76	52	61	71	67	49	56	66	70	68
	Independent	-	-	3	-	-	18	8	1	-	-
16	Whites in the West	36	44	32	33	41	39	43	43	45	49
	Democrat										
	Republican	60	54	55	66	58	37	44	51	54	48
	Independent	-	-	10	-	-	24	9	4	-	-

Just as prior elections were linked to regional differences (1800, 1828, and 1896) and the Civil War (1860, 1932, and 1968), the case of the 1992 election has its own regional connection and Civil War link. The most likely explanation offered for the Northeast shift could be the migration of African Americans from the South to places like the Northeast, altering the electoral distribution of power; migration plays a central role in Louis M. Seagull's (1980) partisan realignment theory. Reichard (1990) notes how Jimmy Carter united the industrial Northeast and minority voters, particularly blacks, along with his southern connections, to prevail in the New Hampshire primary and narrowly carry the Northeast in a very close fall contest (decided by 27 Electoral College votes and two percentage points in the popular vote). This model foundered four years later, and Democrats could not replicate the success for several elections. But this migration also long predates the 1992 election (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994, 87). As the data from *New York Times* exit polls show in Table 6, whites in the Northeast made the shift from Republican to Democrat in 1992, something they did not do in 1976. Like Table 4, this table shows which presidential candidate won the regional vote, but includes only the exit poll results from white voters.

The astute observer will note that Democrats may have "captured" the white vote in the Northeast, but it is actually one percentage point less than the 45 percent white Northeast vote of the 1988 election (*New York Times* 2008). This is true, but several factors must be considered in explanation. First, Democrats won 55 percent of the two-party white northeastern vote, as the independent candidate Perot won 19 percent of that amount in 1992. Second, Democrats won every northeastern state in 1992, a marked improvement over their weak Electoral College standing in this region in 1988. Third, Democrats ran a white northeasterner (Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis) in 1988, who only won two New England states: his home state and Rhode Island, and one other northeastern state: New York (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994, 83–84). In 1992, neither the Democratic presidential nor vice presidential candidate was from the Northeast. Bill Clinton was an Arkansas governor, while Al Gore was a U.S. senator from Tennessee. On the other hand, Republicans had George Herbert Walker Bush on the ballot in both 1988 and 1992, who had very strong ties to several states in the Northeast.

Clinton's victory is often hailed for its southern outcome rather than for its success in the Northeast. Black and Black (1992) argued that Democratic Party candidates need to continue to appeal to the core base of black and white Democrats, but must also woo the South's "swing whites." Certainly Clinton did take four southern states in 1992 and again in 1996 (swapping Florida for Georgia at that time), but this meant that he won barely a third of all southern states, hardly the decisive edge in either contest. Meanwhile, Clinton's success

in taking 22 northeastern states in Electoral College contests in 1992 and 1996 went largely unnoticed while people marveled at how the Arkansas governor won eight southern states. Moreover, Clinton in two elections outperformed his Democratic nominee predecessors in the Northeast from 1968 to 1988.

So how could 1992 be a critical election for Democrats? And how could a southern governor be the one who pulled it off, whereas a New England governor could not? In a foreign policy analogy, this could be a “Nixon to China” moment. And it all goes back to the Civil War.

Many of the abolitionists came from the Northeast. For them, a Democrat was a slave-owning secessionist. From the Reconstruction Era through even the 1960s, Democrats were the party of the KKK as far as the northeastern Republican was concerned. Democrats usually had southerners on the ticket with some strong conservative credentials, even segregationist at times, to keep their base intact. This was the case even when a northeasterner was on the top of the ticket.

But Bill Clinton was different. He was a southerner who actively courted the African American vote. Though he did condemn Sister Souljah’s lyrics, he made a point of reaching out extensively to the African American community (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994, 172). He kicked off the previously unknown practice of candidates going on late-night talk shows by appearing on the African American talk show host Arsenio Hall’s show, wearing shades and playing a saxophone with the band, along with a chat involving himself, his wife, and Hall that was much discussed during the 1992 election. “As a Southern Baptist and as a Democrat in the post-Voting Rights Act era, Clinton communicated effectively with black voters. According to exit poll results, 70 percent of blacks who voted in the Democratic primaries supported Clinton, while only 15 percent voted for Brown and 8 percent for Tsongas” (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1994, 38). It also showed a marked contrast between Clinton’s style and the Jimmy Carter-Andrew Young firing fiasco. It was also an improvement over the awkward relationship nominees Walter Mondale and Michael Dukakis had with rival Jesse Jackson in the 1980s.

This convinced the northeastern white voter that the Democratic Party had indeed changed. It was no longer the party of segregation, coded phrases, or giving lip service to the race issue. It took a southern Democrat to “prove” it. This, coupled with the poor state of the economy, gave Clinton the victory among white northeasterners, and many of the states in the region. Four years later, he boosted his share of this regional group’s vote to 51 percent. Fellow southerner Al Gore, also publicly teamed up with African Americans and gave a much-publicized rousing MLK speech, which led him to get 52 percent of the white northeastern vote. This paved the way for Massachusetts senator John Kerry to not only prevail with this group (ironically by a narrower

margin) but for Barack Obama to win the white northeastern bloc by 52 percent to 46 percent, a final stamp of approval from white northeasterners. In fact, of all four regions, it was the only place where whites gave Obama a majority.

Clinton was not the only southern governor who ran between 1972 and 1988. In 1976, southern governor Jimmy Carter led the ticket. He almost won the Northeast white vote, en route to the White House. Ford still won five northeastern states, including New Jersey, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Connecticut. Carter's strength in 1976 came from winning 10 of 11 southern states (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994, 88).

Four years later, the high price of heating oil as well as the nasty firing of U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young may have led white northeasterners to conclude that not only was Carter overmatched economically, but he was just another southern governor, concerned more with reelection than defending one of his few African American appointees. Carter's support among white northeasterners dropped from 49 percent to 38 percent, with independent candidate John Anderson picking up the slack. The Northeast would not go to the Democrats again until Clinton was on the ticket, despite several elections with northeasterners on the top of the ticket (Dukakis in 1988) or as running mates (Muskie in 1968, Shriver in 1972, Ferraro in 1984).

The post-1992 trend of Democratic success in the Northeast has persisted. As noted earlier, Democrats have won five of six popular vote contests from 1992 through 2012, and four of six elections, after losing all but one election between 1968 and 1988. Northeasterners like Joe Lieberman, John Kerry, and Joe Biden were on the ballot in four cases, but the trend of the Northeast flipping to the Democratic Party occurred with two elections featuring a pair of southerners, so placing regional candidates cannot account for this trend alone, given that a greater number of northeasterners were on the ticket from 1968 to 1988, when the Republicans dominated northeastern states in the Electoral College.

Rival Explanations: Dealignment and Secular (Rolling) Realignment

Not all scholars are convinced that critical elections exist (Lichtman 1976; Mayhew 2004). Some explanations revolve around waning political party power, claiming that dealignment is taking place in American politics. Others contend that shifts in party power occur, but they do so gradually, a concept known as "secular" realignment or "rolling" realignment.

Dealignment

One possible counterargument to the critical election theory is dealignment. According to this theory, parties are being weakened by a lack of

popular support. Split-ticket voting is on the rise, where voters choose a candidate from one party for the executive branch, and a candidate from a different party for the legislative branch. Moreover, voters are making choices based upon preferences for candidates, not parties (Stonecash 2000, 114). Even Burnham (1970) thought this was a possible future outcome.

Sabato (1988, 2) admits, “it is undeniable that few average citizens appear to care deeply about the political parties ... yet a substantial majority of ‘political elites’—activists, ideologues, officeholders, opinion molders—do care, because they recognize the importance of the parties and appreciate the stability and order these organizations bring to American politics.” Sabato (1988, 7) goes on to add that “political scientists have found repeatedly that an individual’s party identification is perhaps the most crucial voting determinant of all.” As for caring about candidates, “60 percent could not even name the two Senate candidates from their state ... the same candidates whose records and positions on SDI so seemingly interested the respondents.”

Moreover, “one would certainly expect a president’s job approval rating to be a function of a citizen’s party affiliation, and indeed it is” (Sabato 1988, 8). Sabato goes on to explain how President Reagan’s job performance was evaluated based upon party preference, with GOP supporters liking his job and Democrats giving him lower marks. Similarly, Sabato (1988) finds that “evaluations of economic times are colored by party preference. Cynics will be amazed to discover that about two-thirds of the promises in the victorious party’s presidential platform have been completely or mostly implemented ... the party platform also has a great influence on a new administration’s legislative program and the president’s State of the Union address” (Sabato 1988, 19). The political system is, indeed, dominated by the Democrats and Republicans, as it has been since the 1860 election (Sabato 1988, 32–33).

On the other hand, Stonecash (2000, 115) does not find support for dealignment in recent trends. “The levels of party-line voting in the 1990s do not reach the levels of the 1950s, but there has been a general rise in party-line voting since the 1960s.” As for split-ticket voting, “as party electoral bases and concerns began to change during the 1960s and party images became less clear, the degree of split-ticket voting steadily increased. As these party images sorted out, the degree of split-ticket voting began to decline. ... by 1996, it had returned to the lower levels of the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Since the 1970s, class voting has increased, as has party-line voting, whereas split-ticket voting has declined” (Stonecash 2000, 116). Sundquist (1983, 48) writes “there has been an extraordinary degree of institutional continuity through all the changes. The basic two party system has prevailed with only occasional brief interruptions for 15 decades.” And Sundquist adds that these

parties have also changed little during that time in terms of organization, institutions, rules, etc.

It seems that at one point, dealignment was occurring in the United States in the 1960s and maybe the 1970s. But in subsequent contests, support for party politics has returned. Even as voters express preferences for political independence and profess not to care about parties, their actions and responses on more probing surveys show otherwise.

Secular (Rolling) Realignment

Secular realignment is defined as “a more gradual rearrangement of party coalitions” (Sabato 1988, 133), also known as “rolling” realignment. Reiter and Stonecash (2011) claim that the argument applies to the Northeast region. But Table 4 shows that every time period but one from 1828 to 1992 was dominated by Republicans. Even during the exception, 1932–1964, the Northeast went only narrowly for Democrats. While FDR was dominating contests, some of the only states to oppose him could be found in the Northeast, even though the GOP candidates were not from the region (except for Dewey), and Roosevelt was.

Further evidence shows that during these eight electoral contests (from 1932 to 1960), Republicans won the Northeast in four of them, including three of the four from 1948 to 1960 (Tures 2014). Only Goldwater’s disastrous showing in 1964 gave the region to the Democrats from that 1932–1964 time period. During the next time frame (1968–1988), 71.2 percent of northeastern states cast their vote for a Republican candidate for president. That GOP support fell to 1.5 percent of northeastern states from 1992 to 2012, making the case for a rolling realignment hard to support.

A Quick Note about Legislative Elections

One of the critiques of critical elections is that they do not apply to legislative elections. Certainly, a strong argument against 1992 being a critical election for Democrats is what happened two years later in Congress. Republicans did very well, capturing the House of Representatives and Senate in 1994, ending decades of Democratic control (*U.S. News and World Report* 1994). Since 1994, the GOP has controlled both houses of the legislature for twice as many years as the Democrats have. Contemporary studies (Bullock, Hoffman, and Gaddie 2006) have emphasized legislative contests in critical election studies. Looking at legislative elections since 1992, this study finds that the GOP took more seats in four of these elections (1994, 2002, 2004, and 2010), while Democrats did better in five (1998, 2000, 2006, 2008, and 2012),

with 1996 serving as a split. Again, even a split seems to work against the thought of 1992 as a critical election.

The 1992 presidential election is not the only historical example that witnessed a subsequent congressional reversal. The GOP gains of 1968 seemed undone by the Watergate election of 1974. FDR and his allies suffered a strong legislative setback in 1938. Even Democratic gains in 1862 challenged Lincoln's party's win in 1860. Of course, 1994 was a worse outcome for the party in power in the White House, but it shows that not all gains from a critical election cover all subsequent cases. .

The question remains whether the Democratic gains in the Northeast from the 1992 election have any parallel in Congress, as other realignment scholars have found (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980). It is more difficult to ascertain shifts in the House of Representatives, owing to the reapportionment and redistricting process, but what about the fixed boundaries of the U.S. Senate? Though congressional realignment is not a necessary condition for a critical election, it is worth analyzing how the shift in party alignment for the states also occurred in the Senate. This is shown in Table 7, which compares party strength in the U.S. Senate from the South and the Northeast.

First, research shows the 1968 election reflected strong trends in the regional shift from the Democrats to the Republicans. Whereas Democrats controlled 77.2 percent of all southern Senate seats in 1972, Republicans currently possess 72.7 percent of those same seats in the upper branch of the legislature from the South. Second, the 1992 election generated a similar change in the Northeast from one party to another. Today, Democrats hold 17 seats in the U.S. Senate from the Northeast region, and have a pair of independents (Vermont's Bernie Sanders and Maine's Angus King) who currently caucus with Democrats. That gives the Democrats 19 of a possible 22 (86.4%) northeastern Senate seats. That may not surprise the reader. But learning that Republicans wielded 15 of 22 (68.1%) of those same seats as recently as 1972 shows a more dramatic swing than the Southern shift in the Senate (149.9 percentage points for the South and 154.4 percentage points for the Northeast).

Conclusion

Critical elections do exist in American politics. Their role cannot be ignored, especially considering their impact on subsequent elections. But, as Sundquist notes, their role in realignment cannot be immediately known since it is difficult to detect their durability until subsequent elections. One of the weaknesses of research on realignments is that the authors doing this research presume that all critical elections are massive national shifts in voting behavior, something difficult to achieve in politics. "The assumption that critical

Table 7: Senate Shifts in the South and Northeast, 1972–2013

	Republican Senators (South)	Democratic Senators (South)
1972	05	17
2013	16	06
	Republican Senators (Northeast)	Democratic Senators (Northeast)
1972	15	07
2013	03	19 (2 = Democratic Party- Caucusing Independents)

elections, or realignments, occur across the whole nation at the same time can severely distort reality ... Understanding the realignment process requires that national data be disaggregated” (Sundquist 1983, 10). Even Key (1955) admitted there were some limits to the critical election theory, and both the 1968 and 1992 cases cannot explain everything.

Research from this article has confirmed that 1968 was a critical election. It fit the historical timing pattern, witnessed the presence of a third party, and even resulted in a group shifting sides: the South, from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. The voting turnout for 1968 was lower than in the prior two elections, but it was still higher than those of subsequent elections. And, most importantly, this regional shift enabled the GOP to win subsequent electoral contests, often by wide margins.

This research has also uncovered evidence that 1992 was a critical election as well. Like 1968, it occurred at the proper electoral interval and included a noteworthy third-party challenge. The argument for 1992 being a critical election is even stronger than in 1968 when looking at voting turnout, because the 1992 election had a higher voting turnout than prior or succeeding contests. The 1992 election also saw a historic shift of the northeastern United States away from its traditional Republican leanings to the Democratic Party. Such a party shift in the Northeast was even stronger before and after 1992 than it was for the South before and after the 1968 election. Moving the South from the Democratic to the Republican column also meant that the Republicans dominated subsequent presidential contests, from 1972 to 1988.

Did this shift among white northeasterners to Clinton in 1992 make an electoral difference in future contests? Clinton’s triumph within this group made the Northeast Democratic territory. Considering that Democrats were shut out of the region in 1984, it was a truly remarkable comeback for the Democratic Party. Since 1992, only one state (New Hampshire) has gone

Republican, which occurred in 2000. And Democrats were able to turn the tables nationally on Republicans with the change in the Northeast (especially among whites). Democrats won the 1992 and 1996 elections. While they barely lost the 2000 election in the Electoral College and Supreme Court, Democrats led by Gore did win the most votes in the popular vote contest. Kerry did narrowly lose to Bush in 2004 (the narrowest successful reelection bid for a president since 1916), while Obama prevailed over McCain in 2008 and against Romney in 2012.²

Scholars recognize the southern shift after 1968, but are only now becoming aware of the events unleashed by the 1992 election. The Northeast trend was critical, not secular (or rolling), as it had been dominated by the Federalist-Whig-Republican parties from the origins of the United States as an independent country through 1988, with a narrow exception during the New Deal years (when the only pockets of support the GOP could count on were in New England). But all that changed after the critical of election of 1992. The Northeast has gone from Republican territory during the late 1960s through the late 1980s to a Democratic bastion since 1992. And that change may well have paved the way for the historical choice America made in 2008, and again in 2012.

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² Some have tried to make the case for 2008 to be a critical election (Davis 2008), but while that contest produced an historic moment in terms of the winner, it did not qualify as a critical election (Marsico 2008). Turnout was not significantly higher than in 2004, and no group switched sides to realign itself with a new party.

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About the GPSA



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Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

Questions in Politics is the official journal publication of the GPSA.

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Questions in Politics

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Preface

The Editors-in-Chief of *Questions in Politics* (*QiP*) welcome readers to Volume I.

QiP is the scholarly journal of the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) that was formerly titled *The Proceedings of the Georgia Political Science Association*. The articles in this volume began as papers presented at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the GPSA. The authors then submitted the manuscripts to the journal, where they were initially reviewed twice by anonymous reviewers. Further review and editing commenced, and out of twenty-five manuscripts submitted, ten are published here.

We are also pleased to announce that the first article in Volume I, “Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan” by Professor Arild Schou of Buskerud and Vestfold University College in Drammen, Norway, is the McBrayer Award winner for 2013. The McBrayer is given annually to the best paper presented at the Annual Meeting. The winning author or authors have traditionally received a certificate and a cash award. To further recognize this achievement, the McBrayer winner will be the first article in this and each successive volume.

The GPSA was founded in 1968. The organization’s publication of papers presented at the Annual Meeting began almost immediately thereafter. Dr. J. Larry Taulbee, Associate Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University, worked on those early volumes and continues to serve the GPSA as the editor of *QiP*. In 1973, the GPSA formalized its journal, titling it *Southeastern Political Review*, and until the early 1990s published it with covers that were the color of Georgia clay. *SPR* sought manuscripts beyond the GPSA, and the journal was eventually titled *Politics & Policy* as it became focused on all fields of scholarship within political science, with support coming from a variety of state political science organizations. In 2005, *P&P* was transferred to the Policy Studies Organization.

Dr. Joseph S. Trachtenberg, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Clayton State University, was the driving force behind the rebirth of *The Proceedings*, and they were relaunched online in 2005. As Founding Editor, Dr. Trachtenberg returned the journal to a refereed, reviewed, and edited compilation of papers presented at the Annual Meeting. He continues to serve the *QiP* as Editor Emeritus.

The change of this journal's name to *Questions in Politics* reflects a broadening in scope of scholarship in political science. The source of the articles remains the same—papers presented at the GPSA Annual Meeting—but the articles cover all the fields of the discipline, as well as issues in public policy and teaching and learning in political science. All of these topics are addressed in a scholarly manner, and the larger and enduring questions in politics, as well as the discipline of political science, are considered in each volume.

Thomas E. Rotnem and Adam Stone

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Abstracts

Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan

Arild Schou

Buskerud University College, Norway

Page 1

Territorial autonomy design has during the last decades been proposed or adopted as a solution to self-government conflicts in several countries around the world. The sustainability of such designs, however, have been highly disputed among scholars; some claim that they are a recipe for further conflicts and—in extreme cases—secession, while others see them as the only viable way to accommodate autonomy claims at that same time as they preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The most recent discussion, however, is geared toward conflict management mechanisms within the autonomous units themselves. The stability of units with relatively large minorities is particularly challenging because these minorities may have the power, collective self-consciousness, and international legitimacy to resist designs where they have become a minority in a unit whose population has been granted protection from national majority rule. This article examines the stability of three recent autonomy settlement deals in the light of the recent discussion on ethnic conflict management within such units; focusing on the Gayos in Aceh, the Serbs in Kosovo, and the indigenous peoples in Sudan. It concludes by challenging the present idea that local or national power-sharing is essential for coming to a conflict settlement, adding on two dimensions that would be relevant; the nature of the ethnic minority and the degree of power that are devolved to the concerned units.

From Armed Struggle to Peaceful Change: ETA's Role in a Basque Peace Process

Cleo Dan

Elon University

Page 21

This article examines the process by which Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) transitioned from terrorism to nonviolence in the pursuit of

policy goals. This article, part of a larger project examining how and why non-state actors utilizing violence engage in a political process, addresses three issues contributing to ETA's adoption of peaceful tactics: (1) domestic political and institutional context, (2) international political and institutional context, and (3) the role of public opinion and the media. This article offers policy relevant generalizations explaining why ETA sought alternatives to violence. It argues that the birth of Basque political parties that offered nonviolent outlets for Basque nationalism changed the political environment to one favorable to the ETA moving away from violence. This article seeks to place ETA's political interaction within a larger framework of how terrorist organizations end, with the hope of contributing to scholarship from a perspective linking policy, theory, and history.

The Critical Elections of 1968 and 1992

John A. Tures

LaGrange College

Page 41

Many scholars have accepted that southern whites shifted their political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, and that the northeastern United States is no longer GOP territory. But were the 1968 and 1992 elections really "critical elections"? Both contests are analyzed to see if they meet the timing, turnout, third parties, and trends in regional voting criteria that would qualify them as a critical election. Then both are studied to see if such regional variations with the past led to subsequent national voting changes.

The Natural State's Unnatural Politics: Democratic Dominance in an Otherwise Red State

Nicholas A. Rudnik

Valdosta State University

Page 67

At midcentury, Arkansas was solidly under one-party Democratic control. In recent decades, state Republican functionaries have slowly eroded the one-party Democratic lock. Arkansas is often seen as a special case in

the politics of the former Confederate states; to that end, this is still true. While the erosion of the Solid Democratic South has had much less of an appreciable impact in Arkansas, the Republican Party is finally beginning to cement itself as the more dominant party in the state. Empirically, state politics is well within a level of two-party competition. If current trends hold true, the Natural State may still be viewed as a special case, though a special case where two-party politics could evolve into complete one-party Republican domination—reminiscent of the old Democratic politics at midcentury. The momentous political changes in the state can largely be attributed to shifts in the economy and demographics.

**Presidential Power and “Midcentury Conditions”:
An Analytical Essay Remembering Richard Neustadt
and Reevaluating His Ideas**

Carl D. Cavalli

University of North Georgia

Page 91

Richard Neustadt’s *Presidential Power* took us from the constitutional, legalistic, and structural studies prevalent in political science at the time full-bore into the behavioral revolution. Presidential power is not the power to command, Neustadt said, but rather “the power to persuade,” dependent upon the choices presidents make. He based his work on what he termed “midcentury” conditions: a common setting “marked by a high degree of continuity,” which he summarized as “emergencies in policy with politics as usual.” Presidential scholars rode his work well into the twenty-first century. This raises important questions. First, do “midcentury” conditions still hold at a time closer to the mid-twenty-first century than to Neustadt’s “midcentury”? Second, is Neustadt still relevant? Recent scholarship points to major changes over time that would render “midcentury” conditions inapplicable to today. However, exploring that scholarship in this essay leads to the conclusion that Neustadt is still relevant, albeit with some important contemporary considerations.

Digital Tocqueville: Democracy in the Information Age**Jennifer Joines***University of Alabama**Page 109*

What sort of insight does Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy provide us in the twenty-first century? In the introduction of *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville lays out a gradual historical progression of equality in Western society, one that culminates in the development of democratic regimes. Over the course of his analysis on America, Tocqueville shows that the progression toward equality and the stability of democracy is neither guaranteed nor inevitable. For Tocqueville, the future of democracy seemed uncertain in this burgeoning industrial society. We are now experiencing a new shift from an industrial society to a postindustrial, information-based society. The Internet has a particular, complex history that allows it to be used for both liberation and oppression. Because of the great potentiality of the Internet and the almost "universal" desire for democracy, Tocqueville's concern for democratic despotism is still relevant today. This article looks at some of the pathologies of American democracy presented in Tocqueville's analysis in conjunction with the political and societal pressures that have arisen in the Internet age. It also looks at recent social movements (the 2003 Iraq War protest, the Occupy and Tea Party movements) as examples for rethinking political participation and what democracy could look like when we utilize the Internet as a productive political tool. I believe that Tocqueville's analysis is useful today to push us toward an alternative mode of "doing" democracy in order to deviate away from the path toward democratic despotism.

**China's Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:
A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany****Thomas Nisley***Southern Polytechnic State University**Page 129*

This article compares China's rise in Asia today with Germany's rise in Europe in the early twentieth century. In both cases, the regional

hierarchy exhibited rapid change and a power transition, with Germany surpassing Great Britain and China surpassing Japan. To understand the implications and the consequences of the changing relative power hierarchy, I examine both cases through the lens of the Power Transition Theory. With an understanding of the possible outcomes of a regional power transition, this study engages a debate as to the correct direction of U.S. foreign policy. I argue that the United States should adopt a strategy of engagement. The proposed U.S. military “pivot” toward Asia is most likely to prevent a regional great power conflict.

Lost at Sea: How Past Disagreements in the U.S. Senate Continue to Block Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty

Julia Schast

Elon University

Page 155

The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) is a major, international convention aimed at creating a global set of rules governing the oceans and modernizing existing international law from previous international marine agreements. LOST entered into force in 1994, despite the United States not ratifying the treaty. As part of a larger project, this article examines why the United States sometimes rejects or fails to affirm international agreements. It presents a case study of the Senate consideration of the various incarnations of the Law of the Sea treaties from the 1960s through the present day. The article analyzes why the Senate, in 1960, formally rejected the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes that was part of the Law of the Sea Treaty at the time. This was one of only four multilateral treaties rejected by the Senate in the twentieth century. The article examines the extent to which the reasons behind the original Senate rejection of this treaty shaped future failures to secure advice and consent to ratification of the updated LOST over the last thirty years. These questions are especially timely and relevant given the ongoing discussions pertaining to whether the Senate will hold a formal vote on LOST before the end of President Obama’s second term.

The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: Perceptions from Administrators in Masculine and Feminine State Agencies**Beth M. Rauhaus***University of North Georgia**Page 183*

The dynamic relationship between politics and administration has long been examined in the field of public administration because politics has a significant impact on the policy process and administration. Classical scholars have often argued for a strict dichotomy, where administrators are neutral and should be isolated from politics. However, over time, scholars have developed new, more practical approaches to explain the influence politics and administration have on one another. Politics has a significant impact on distributive policies and agencies due to the political nature of these policy decisions. Therefore, this case study examines perceptions of state-level administrators in redistributive and regulatory agencies to explore practical means of defining the contemporary dichotomy. This analysis also identifies gendered elements of a dichotomy, as regulatory agencies tend to be classified as masculine, while redistributive agencies have feminine traits. In conclusion, this case study illustrates that there are differences in the politics-administration dichotomy by administrators in gendered agencies.

Examining the Factors That Lead to Student Departure at Aiken Technical College**Jameka N. Jackson***Georgia Regents University**Page 201*

The purpose of this research is to describe the factors that contribute to student departure at Aiken Technical College (ATC) while concurrently offering a model for other organizations to utilize in improving their retention efforts. The study uses a nonexperimental research design with content analysis and secondary data analysis of the Wal-Mart Press Grant Survey (WPGS) and the Non-Returning Student Survey (NRSS) that were previously administered by the Planning and Research Department at ATC. Academic, financial, social, and institutional issues were the

four key areas examined because previous literature identifies these as the most common reasons students drop out of college. More than half of the unrepresentative sample reported having no issues at all with retention at ATC. These students claimed that they accomplished their goals while attending. However, a majority of the students revealed having problems with financial and institutional issues at the college, specifically with work demands and policies and procedures. The data also suggested that very few students in the sample had frequent experiences with campus involvement and student support services.

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The Natural State's Unnatural Politics: Democratic Dominance in an Otherwise Red State

Nicholas A. Rudnik
Valdosta State University

At midcentury, Arkansas was solidly under one-party Democratic control. In recent decades, state Republican functionaries have slowly eroded the one-party Democratic lock. Arkansas is often seen as a special case in the politics of the former Confederate states; to that end, this is still true. While the erosion of the Solid Democratic South has had much less of an appreciable impact in Arkansas, the Republican Party is finally beginning to cement itself as the more dominant party in the state. Empirically, state politics is well within a level of two-party competition. If current trends hold true, the Natural State may still be viewed as a special case, though a special case where two-party politics could evolve into complete one-party Republican domination—reminiscent of the old Democratic politics at midcentury. The momentous political changes in the state can largely be attributed to shifts in the economy and demographics.

When V. O. Key (1949) wrote of Arkansas at midcentury, he regarded the Natural State as a special case. The Old Confederacy had long been home to one-party Democratic electoral dominance, though the level of electoral homogeneity and undiluted allegiance to one particular party had been otherwise unseen in the American South. Devoid of strong and high-profile factional or regional cleavages—which continued to embattle the remainder of the one-party south—Arkansas stood alone as sufficiently united within the Democratic camp. While state leaders throughout the American South employed hysteria over the race question in order to advance their political

agendas, Arkansas's African American population was nearly one in four, very low compared to the rest of the South during the mid-twentieth century. Key (1949, 183–84) notes that one-party political institutions in the state created a precarious situation where “the people have lain ignored in the confusion and paralysis of disorganized factional politics.” Under one-party rule, government in Arkansas progressively produced fiduciary and administrative mismanagement, as well as rampant corruption. This in turn, facilitated mechanisms for continual electoral gains on the part of the Democratic Party.

In the half-century since Key penned his seminal 1949 work on the politics of the American South, Arkansas still remains a special case in the states of the Old Confederacy. Arkansas Republicans have made significant and strong inroads in recent decades, yet the southern Democratic “Yellow Dog” archetype still persists well into the twenty-first century. Following the election of former Arkansas governor William J. Clinton to the presidency in 1992, Democrat Jim Guy Tucker won the governor's office, succeeding the newly elected president as the state's 43rd chief executive. A political newcomer, Republican Mike Huckabee, was elected to the lieutenant governorship. Huckabee would win the race for governor in 1996 (Dowdle and Giammo 2010, 208). Democrat Mike Beebe would win in 2006. Both empirical and intuitive evidence suggests that the same national electoral forces which have been in play in the rest of the American South have had significantly less impact on Arkansas. Despite its conservative electorate, voters and political leaders have resisted defecting into the GOP ranks. This article will employ Key's analysis of Arkansas, contrasted against contemporary electoral changes, recent scholarship, and empirical evaluation, in order to discern the future political prospects of this once-blue bastion. Despite the historical fealty of Arkansas voters to the Democratic Party, the Natural State may finally realign wholly to the Republican Party.

Key's Analysis: The Natural State at Midcentury

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the politics of Arkansas was that of consensus. Gubernatorial and legislative elections were focused toward the “best qualified” candidate rather than issues of public import. The Natural State was devoid of substantial minority party opposition; thus elections degenerated into rivalries due to a general consensus as to what “ought to be done.” Subsequently, elections developed into mere issues of competence as to which candidate would be elevated to the statehouse or to the governor's office (Key 1949, 184–86). With the persistence of issueless elections, and an absence of dominating statewide personalities (e.g., the Talmadges of Georgia, the Longs of Louisiana, and the Byrds of Virginia) for

factions to coalesce around, one must recruit local leaders who can deliver votes. When issues become blurred, as with the case of urban precinct captains, rural leaders seem to exert the most influence, and it consequently becomes immaterial how voters cast their ballots on Election Day (Key 1949, 195).

With the proliferation of nuanced factions and low-information elections, the one-party electoral system of Arkansas acted as an incubator for corruption and general mismanagement of the institutions of state government. In fact, following the conclusion of the Second World War, returning servicemen from the conflict set out to oust local political machines and corruption from state government. Key (1949, 201) notes that, “two-party election machinery is built on the principle that if two would-be thieves watch each other, an honest count will result.” With the absence of a large and substantial minority party seeking to defeat the governing majority party, corruption can and will persist due to a lack of political and electoral alternatives. Despite many successes of the GIs, notably with the election of Sid McMath—a well-known GI movement leader—to the governorship in 1948, state political machines continued to resist reform, and county leaders even excluded the GIs from the ballot during the 1948 Democratic primary (Key 1949, 204).

Arkansas’ persistent and “pure” one-party system, lack of substantial partisan electoral opposition, issueless elections, and nuanced factions gave way to fiscal mismanagement in Little Rock and political corruption. To summarize Schattschneider’s (1942) contention, when one political party becomes too successful at holding onto the reins of government and thus reducing the size of opposition to a minimal or nonexistent level, the penalty for the majority’s success is disunity. Arkansas’ disunity is nuanced. Under a one-party system, the major party will continue to hold the reins of government, yet individual actors within the party apparatus will begin to coalesce around factions; albeit, in the case of Arkansas, less cohesive and less clearly defined factions. With the elimination of institutionalized opposition, intraparty strife transgresses. Such is the case with Arkansas, solidly under the umbrella of Democratic control, yet lacking the unity to undertake a cohesive agenda. Hence, with the lack of issue-salient elections, personality prevails over issue; such is the very nature of disunity.

Shifts in Party Competition, Midcentury to the 2006 Midterms

During the age of V. O. Key, Arkansas was solidly under Democratic control. In order to quantify statistically the degree of statewide partisan control, the Ranney Index is employed. The Ranney Index—developed by twentieth-century American political scientist J. Austin Ranney—actualizes several empirical criteria in order to output a coefficient reflecting the

aggregate level of partisan competition within a state. The index score, as formulated by Ranney, is calculated as noted below:

1. *Proportion of success*: The percentage of votes won by the parties in gubernatorial elections and the percentage of seats won by the parties in each house of the legislature.
2. *Duration of success*: The length of time the parties controlled the legislature.
3. *Frequency of divided control*: The proportion of time the governorship and the legislature were divided between the two parties (Woodard 2006, 237).

The coefficients range between 0 and 1, with any value between .85 and 1.0 reflecting one-party Democratic control; .65 and .8499, modified one-party Democrat; .35 and .6499, two-party competition; .15 and .3499, modified one-party Republican; and .00 and .1499, one-party Republican. The Ranney Index, originally designed as a measure of state party competition, was adapted by Woodard (2006) in order to quantify party competition for federal offices within a state. Additionally, Woodard (2006) developed a third combined measure of both state and federal competition.¹ In order to deduce the overall level of party competition in Arkansas, the combined measure will be the primary focus of inquiry on state party competition. Table 1 displays the Ranney Index from 1948 to 2013 with state, federal and combined measures of party competition. Two other metrics of statewide party competition found in Table 2 are state legislative seats, both the State House of Representatives and the State Senate, with the number of Republicans serving within the chamber in four-year increments.

Several conclusions can be gleaned from the Ranney Index values. The Arkansas Democratic Party has maintained its strength in lower-information, statewide elections than in larger federal contests, although both have historically and traditionally favored Democrats. Since 2004, it appears that, with a Ranney coefficient of .5488, voters in federal elections have begun to elect Republican candidates and erode the Democratic electoral lock in favor of a more two-party competitive structure. What is even more striking, in the latest calculation of the Ranney Index for 2013 at the state level—with an outputted score of .4642—the Natural State is well within a level of two-party competition. Furthermore, the latest calculation of federal and combined party competition places Arkansas solidly within the range of two-party competition with a combined Ranney coefficient for 2013 of .4240 and a federal competition coefficient of .3837.

¹ The combined measure is the arithmetic mean of the state and federal Ranney composite values.

Table 1: Ranney Index of Federal, Statewide, and Combined Measures of Party Competition in Arkansas, 1948–2013

	1948– 1954	1956– 1962	1964– 1970	1972– 1978	1980– 1986
State	.9461	.9362	.7518	.8539	.7984
Federal	.7720	.7534	.6863	.6353	.6385
Combined	.8591	.8448	.7191	.7446	.7185
	1988– 1994	1996– 2002	2004	2007– 2011	2013–
State	.8413	.6715	.7191	.7542	.4642
Federal	.5888	.5488	.5488	.6403	.3837
Combined	.7147	.5595	.6339	.6973	.4240

Key:

- .8500 to 1.000: one-party Democratic
- .6500 to .8499: modified one-party Democratic
- .3500 to .6499: two-party competition
- .1500 to .3499: modified one-party Republican
- .0000 to .1499: one-party Republican

Source: For 1948–2004, calculations by Woodard (2006); for 2007–2011, calculations by LaPlant and LaPlant (2011); for 2013, calculation by author.

Table 2, which lists the number of Republican legislators in the Arkansas General Assembly since 1952, also affirms the more competitive nature of state politics. In fact, the Arkansas State Senate, which from 1952 to 1964 was devoid of a single Republican legislator, forty years later, had thirty. The same is true for the State House of Representatives, where at midcentury, only a handful of legislators identified as Republicans; by 2004, twenty-eight were serving in the State House in Little Rock. While Woodard's (2006) research clearly conveys a significant Republican surge, there has also been significant Democratic response and resistance. The Ranney Index from 1996 to 2002 produces an outputted coefficient of .5595 in Woodard's (2006) combined measures and, by 2004, shifted favorably toward state Democrats, resurging to

Table 2: Number of Arkansas General Assembly Seats Held by Republicans, 1952–2012

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
House	3	2	1	1	4	1	4	7
Senate	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
House	9	11	10	14	30	28	46	<i>51</i>
Senate	4	4	5	7	8	8	15	<i>21</i>

Source: Woodard (2006, 234–35); Southern Legislative Council (2004); National Conference of State Legislatures (2012)

Note: *Italics* denote majority party status.

.6339. Despite minor Democratic upswings in the past, the trend had been consistently downward for the Democratic Party toward a two-party alternative. A significant decline in 1996–2002 and a notable uptick in Democratic control in 2004 can be explained by the election of Texas governor George W. Bush to the presidency in 2000. Bush's electoral victory ushered in a large wave of Republican legislators in 2000, and the top-down support Bush brought to the polls led to a decrease in the Ranney coefficient. In succeeding years, the coattails effect proved to be negative for Arkansas Republicans due to the general unpopularity of Bush in the latter years of his presidency (Dowdle and Giammo 2010, 208).

Arkansas has seen a dramatic and exhibited shift from the consensus and low-participation elections of midcentury to the relative two-party competitive structure presently. Seagull (1975, 130–32) notes that progressive reform, in a state characterized by the Democratic Party of segregationists Orval Faubus and Jim Johnson, was catapulted by Republican and New York native Winthrop Rockefeller. Rockefeller was the Natural State's first flirtation with GOP politics, and a member of the well-heeled, northeastern Standard Oil Company family dynasty. In 1966, Rockefeller won election to the governorship, largely by drawing on the traditional northwestern Arkansas

Republican strongholds, forming a biracial coalition with Black Belt county voters (those counties along Arkansas' alluvial plain), and campaigning on progressive reform (Blair 1988; Seagull 1975). Despite Rockefeller's electoral success—largely facilitated by a staunch segregationist and unlikable Democratic opponent in Jim Johnson—when presented with a moderate Democrat, Arkansas voters still coalesced around the party of Jackson, electing dark horse candidate Dale Bumpers to the governorship in 1970.

That is not to understate the greater role of Winthrop Rockefeller in Arkansas politics. Democratic governor David Pryor noted that it was Rockefeller who catapulted Arkansas out of the “dark ages” of state politics (Reed 1983); the dark ages, characterized by Key (1949) as machine politics, corruption, issueless elections, and low voter-participation. Rockefeller capitalized on the backward and declining perception of the pro-segregation state Democratic Party. Though Arkansas Republicans, without the profile and statewide recognition of Rockefeller, were not able to defeat his moderate, populist Democratic successors typified in the Arkansas “Big Three”—Bumpers, Pryor, and Bill Clinton (see Blair 1995; Blair 1988, 49). The Big Three epitomized and held the sentiments of colloquial twentieth-century life in the Natural State and were viewed by voters as “favorite sons.” They governed throughout the 1970s and 1980s as progressive moderates only to become more ideologically liberal throughout their second and subsequent terms as state and federal functionaries (Black and Black 2002, 112).

Certainly, in this very conservative state, the post-Reagan era of Republican lawmakers have a much more appreciable impact on the electorate. As with the example of Winthrop Rockefeller and Jim Johnson in the 1966 gubernatorial contest, Arkansas voters repudiated the pro-segregationist platform of Democrat Johnson in favor of progressive Rockefeller. Arkansas—throughout the antebellum era—was devoid of a strong, affluent, and erudite planter class (Blair 1988, 31; Woodard 2006, 106). Though even without a sufficient landed aristocracy and small black population,² racial hysteria was deeply entrenched in the nonparticipatory old state politics by the few political elites following federal Reconstruction.³ Due

² African Americans account for roughly 9 percent of the aggregate Arkansas population (Black and Black 2002, 286). “Black flight” from the state reduced the aggregate percentage of African Americans in the state. Blair (1988, 51) notes that a quarter through the century (1926), the African American population was roughly 26.9 percent.

³ The old politics of Arkansas is marked with segregationist demagogues like Jim Johnson, 1966 gubernatorial candidate and ardent organizer of White Citizens' Councils; its segregationist past forever encapsulated in Governor Orval Faubus and his

to a decreasing black population and subsequent federal judicial rulings, the sociopolitical and demographic nature of the state had changed. Throughout the High Sixties, Nixon's southern strategy (see Murphy and Gulliver 1971) failed to animate the segregationist sentiment in the same way as the rest of the Old Confederacy. Blair (1988, 53) posits this is among the most critical contributions of Winthrop Rockefeller—the biracial coalitions he forged during his 1966 gubernatorial bid. Juxtaposed against a hyper-segregationist, Rockefeller attracted not only African Americans but also scores of whites, who held that Rockefeller's opponent was not only a racial extremist—even for the states of the Old Confederacy—but also a resounding symbol of the archaic and arcane old state politics.

A remaining question is, why did Arkansas voters repudiate reformist Rockefeller despite his significant contributions to statewide reform? The answer likely lies in Democratic cooptation of Rockefeller's reformist and moderate platform. This is demonstrated in the "Big Three"—Clinton, Pryor, and Bumpers's moderated tenures in political office. It also speaks to the Yellow Dog Democrat label of Arkansans. Rockefeller's coattail effect was minimal (as Table 2 affirms); his governorship was not an anomaly per se, though he effectively laid a foundation for—somewhat ironically—Democratic candidates campaigning on moderate positions and forming biracial coalitions. Blair (1988) notes that when faced with a choice between a moderate Republican and a moderate Democrat, Arkansans still favored the Democratic candidate.

In 1996, Tim Hutchinson would become the first Republican elected to represent Arkansas in the U.S. Senate since federal Reconstruction. Black and Black (2002, 285) posit that at the end of the century (1996), when Hutchinson won his Senate seat, Arkansas had the weakest Republican Party base in the Rim South. In fact, only 28 percent of the electorate identified as Republicans. Though, when you add independent conservatives into a broader "conservative coalition," 41 percent of the electorate leaned toward or favored GOP candidates. Democrats claimed only 39 percent of the electorate; thus with a well-funded Republican candidate, the GOP could stand to challenge the party of Jackson in statewide contests.⁴

resistance to school desegregation—most notably, the Little Rock Nine of 1957 (see Blair 1988, chap. 3).

⁴ Black and Black (2002, 285–86) posit that Hutchinson also excelled in interpersonal politics. One-on-one politics, or a candidate's frequent and casual engagements with mass publics, was extremely important to Hutchinson's presentation of self (see Fenno 1978, 54–100), and central to his electoral victory in 1996. Interpersonal politics are extremely important in Arkansas generally. It is undeniable

In 2002, Mark Pryor, son of former U.S. senator and governor David Pryor, successfully campaigned to represent Arkansas in the U.S. Senate, unseating incumbent Republican Tim Hutchinson. The following election cycle, despite President George W. Bush's reelection bid, incumbent Democratic senator Blanche Lincoln was subsequently reelected against Republican Jim Holt, a state legislator with little name recognition. Once again, during the 2006 midterms, due largely to the low national approval ratings of congressional Republicans and President Bush, former Republican congressman and Drug Enforcement Agency administrator Asa Hutchinson launched a campaign for the governorship and was consequently defeated by state Attorney General Mike Beebe. Beebe outspent Hutchinson by nearly \$3 million (Dowdle and Giammo 2010, 208–9). Despite significant gains made by Republicans in this otherwise conservative state, the statewide Democratic machine made a significant resurgence in the early 2000s; the Ranney coefficients support this conclusion (see Table 1).

The Election of 2008 and the Natural State

During the 2008 general elections, Arkansas exhibited peculiarities that inhibit the Natural State from being generalized into a single electoral typology. Despite many observers regarding the 2008 presidential race as being a significant wave election nationally, in 2004, Senator John Kerry received 44.5 percent of the statewide vote, which decreased to 39 percent for then-Senator Barack Obama in 2008. In fact, Obama's 2008 showing in Arkansas, compared to that of the 2004 Democratic nominee Kerry, was the worst in the nation in terms of raw votes trailing the previous Democratic candidate. Much of this electoral loss in terms of national support is due to a significant reduction of support for Obama in rural portions of the state. Obama's statewide support rested almost solely in the Black Belt; see Figures 1, 2, and 3 (Dowdle and Giammo 2010, 211–12).

Critical Democrat supporters have historically resided in the sparsely populated and agrarian regions of the state. Republican surges and success are due to significant electoral margins in the Little Rock, Fort Smith, and Fayetteville suburbs. Yet this trend of continued Democratic success in this relatively conservative state has been due to the lack of major metropolitan areas, and hinges on a significant population of the state residing in rural areas—

that a plethora of other Arkansas candidates have employed this form of politicking, though it would be impossible to test the extent that a candidate's vote share was due to "handshaking and kissing babies." What can be gleaned from Black and Black's analysis is that, in Hutchinson's case, it was critical to his electoral success.

Figure 1: The Black Belt and Obama: 2008 County-Level Electoral Analysis



Source: New York Times (2008); U.S. Census Bureau (2013)

traditionally loyal to Democratic candidates. While throughout the rest of the American South, there has been a relatively significant trend toward rural voters joining the GOP camp, in Arkansas, the archetypal “Yellow Dog Democrat,” those white southern voters who have been loyal to the Democratic Party over the course of generations still coalesce around the party of Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson (Woodard 2006, 345–48).

In both the 2008 and 2012 presidential contests, Barack Obama failed to win critical rural counties historically needed in order to secure Arkansas’ electoral votes for Democratic candidates. In each election cycle, Obama’s county-level victories were largely limited to Arkansas’ alluvial plain, the region of the state bordering the western bank of the Mississippi River, and the counties in which Little Rock and Pine Bluff are situated (see *New York Times* 2012). Conversely, in 2004, Democratic nominee Kerry of Massachusetts not only secured nearly all of the counties won by Obama, but he additionally secured counties in southwestern Arkansas and in the northern

Figure 2: The Black Belt and Obama: 2008 County-Level Electoral Analysis (Continued)




Source: *New York Times* (2008); U.S. Census Bureau (2013)

and northwestern alluvial plain (see *New York Times* 2008). Figure 1 exhibits counties won by Obama in 2008; Figure 2, majority African American counties won; and Figure 3, counties with a high plurality of African Americans won.

As Key (1949, 5) asserted at midcentury, “The politics of the south revolves around the position of the Negro.” The Black Belt is critical to understanding Democratic electoral outcomes in 2008 and 2012. The Black Belt consists of those counties named for their rich, dark arable soil; and where, prior to and throughout the nineteenth century, the plantation economy thrived. Today, the Black Belt—those counties in which a majority (or more broadly, a high plurality) of its residents are African Americans—is plagued with social iniquity and high levels of poverty, their citizens lacking any significant levels of socioeconomic mobility (Woodard 2006, 69). Figures 1, 2, and 3 clearly exhibit that 2008 electoral gains for Obama are nearly completely

Figure 3: The Black Belt and Obama: 2008 County-Level Electoral Analysis (continued)



Source: *New York Times* (2008); U.S. Census Bureau (2013)

aligned with the Black Belt in Arkansas. As previously posited, while Kerry was able to expand beyond the Black Belt, Obama was not. Table 3 lists Arkansas counties with African American populations exceeding 35 percent and the percentage of their residents who voted for Obama in 2008 and 2012.

Table 3 upholds the notion that Obama’s principal base of support was found in Black Belt counties. While a Democratic presidential nominee has not carried the state since Arkansas native Bill Clinton’s 1996 presidential reelection bid, that is not to say Democrats are irrelevant in the Natural State. While statewide trends in national presidential elections have continually favored Republican candidates, other federal posts such as congressional elections as well as state executive and legislative positions have been much more competitive for the Democratic Party in recent decades.

**Table 3: Arkansas Black Belt County Analysis:
2008 and 2012 Presidential Elections Compared**

County	% of Pop. Black	% for Obama, 2008	% for Obama, 2012
<i>Chicot</i>	53.8	59.7	60.7
Columbia	36.6	37.4	37.6
<i>Crittenden</i>	50.9	54.9	58.6
Dallas	42.0	44.3	43.4
Desha	47.9	55.0	55.5
<i>Jefferson</i>	54.8	62.0	63.8
Lafayette	36.9	39.0	40.1
<i>Lee</i>	54.4	60.1	61.5
Monroe	40.6	47.3	49.0
Ouachita	40.2	44.2	44.9
<i>Phillips</i>	62.7	63.5	65.6
Pulaski	35.1	55.1	54.7
<i>St. Francis</i>	52.1	57.2	58.0

Source: *New York Times* (2008, 2012); U.S. Census Bureau (2013).

Note: Traditional Black Belt counties, those with black populations exceeding 50 percent, represented in *italics*.

Recent Trends in Subnational Elections

Among the most striking congressional races in the 2008 general election was the reelection of Senator Mark Pryor, having previously defeated Republican senator Tim Hutchison in the 2002 midterms for the Senate seat his father—former popular governor David Pryor—previously held. Pryor won his 2002 contest with a relatively small margin of approximately 54 percent. Many observers hypothesized that a tight race for the seat would transgress. Pryor was the only incumbent senator in the 2008 election cycle to run unopposed in both the primary and general election. Concomitantly, every incumbent U.S. representative went without a challenger from the other major

party (Dowdle and Giammo 2010, 213).⁵ Furthermore, voters elected Democratic majorities of over 70 percent in both legislative chambers in the statehouse and in their U.S. congressional delegations in Washington; additionally, then-incumbent U.S. senators Mark Pryor and Blanche Lincoln are both Democrats (Dowdle and Giammo 2010, 215).

This trend of sustained Democratic dominance in what may appear to be the last holdout in the Old Confederacy may finally succumb to the same partisan realignments as the rest of the American South. During the 2010 midterm elections, Republican candidates commanded historic gains in the U.S. House of Representatives, which had a substantial impact on the Arkansas congressional delegation. With three of Arkansas' four U.S. House members either retiring or seeking higher office, the only incumbent running in the 2010 U.S. House midterms was Democratic representative Mike Ross; Ross would handily win his bid for reelection, yet the seats of the two other outgoing Democratic incumbents were picked up by Republican candidates. Three of the four House seats were now controlled by Republicans, a complete reversal from 2008 (Associated Press n.d.). Additionally, Democratic senator Blanche Lincoln sought reelection against a formidable challenger, Republican U.S. representative John Boozman, seeking to elevate his position. According to FiveThirtyEight (2010), in October, Boozman had outraised Lincoln by over \$8 million. Furthermore, FiveThirtyEight had Boozman defeating Lincoln with a 59.1 percent likelihood of victory. The model proved to be very accurate, with Boozman beating Lincoln by a 58–37 percent margin. This current trend suggests a sufficient Republican ascendancy in the state. Yet, at the same time, running against the grain of Republican upheaval—the governorship stayed in Democratic control with the reelection of popular incumbent governor Mike Beebe, garnering a substantial 64.5 percent vote share (FiveThirtyEight 2010).

In 2012, the Arkansas Republican Party reinforced its continual electoral successes in the previous decade. For the first time since the state's admission to the Union in 1836, the entire Arkansas U.S. House delegation was in Republican control. Former Republican Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney handily defeated incumbent President Barack Obama by a 60–37 percent margin in the aggregate statewide presidential vote (Statewide Election

⁵ Being the progeny of popular former governor David Pryor, it is likely there is a generational “coattails” effect to Senator Pryor's benefit. It would be impossible to determine how much of his electoral vote share is due to the fealty state voters have to his father. Though it suffices to say that, given recent electoral trends in the state yielding significant Republican gains, any coattails effect from father to son would be much less appreciable presently.

Results 2012). Among the most striking Republican gains in the 2012 general elections was control of the statehouse in Little Rock. The GOP gained control of the State Senate with a 21–14 margin and the State House with a narrow majority; fifty Republicans to forty-nine Democrats.

This change in control of the legislature has been the first such occurrence since the era of federal Reconstruction; the party of Jackson had continually controlled the state legislature since 1874 (Sturgis 2012). The recent Republican electoral gains in a onetime island of blue in a sea of red appears to have precipitated to every level of government. During the 2014 midterms, incumbent Democratic senator Mark Pryor will seek a third term in the Senate (Rothenberg 2013), and with a term-limited Mike Beebe, there will be an open-seat contest for the governorship. Both are races to examine closely, and if current trends continue, 2014 will likely culminate into an uphill fight on the part of state Democrats in controlling these critical civic offices. Undoubtedly, Mark Pryor is seen as one of the most vulnerable Democrats seeking reelection to the U.S. Senate in the 2014 cycle (Tolbert 2013).

The Yellow Dog Democrat Archetype in the Twenty-first Century

Arkansas, for decades, has served as the quintessential bastion of the “Yellow Dog” Democrat; a label given primarily to white southern voters who exhibited steadfast fealty to the Democratic Party, due largely to the Great Depression of the 1930s and subsequent New Deal policies enacted by the Roosevelt administration. These policies greatly benefitted the rural South, and Arkansas is no exception (Woodard 2006, 312–13). Following the Great Depression—principally, throughout the 1940s until the 1960s—displaced farm workers emigrated from the Razorback State, and those who remained behind coalesced around the Democratic Party. These midcentury Democrats emerged as a steadfastly loyal white Democratic voting base (Woodard 2006, 345). With continual Republican gains at the end of the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century, as well as electoral success for Democrat Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 largely limited to the Black Belt, those counties primarily on the banks of the Mississippi River, it is questionable whether these rural white Democratic voters still persist in twenty-first-century Arkansas.

In order to quantify Democratic support in Arkansas, the percentage of white state legislators in both chambers of the Arkansas General Assembly are evaluated against the remaining ten states of the Old Confederacy. The research question is whether Arkansas exhibits heightened levels of white Democratic legislators serving in the statehouse compared to the rest of the south. Both major party caucuses are listed with the percentage of white

legislators within each respective party. Latino and Hispanic legislators are categorized as white, and all other legislators who are not either Caucasian or African American are not included.⁶ The twofold methodology for discerning a legislator's race is listed below:

1. Legislators are first evaluated based on photographic evidence to determine a lawmaker's race.
2. If race is not able to be sufficiently determined by photographic evidence, the legislator's caucus and voluntary associations are taken into consideration (i.e. a legislator may belong to the NAACP or a legislative black caucus.)

The results are compiled in Table 4.

What is evident is that Arkansas, with 77.42 percent of their Democratic legislative caucus composed of white state representatives and senators, the white southern Democrat still persists within the state Democratic Party. It is important to note that the percentage of white legislators in Florida and Texas are inflated by the presence of Hispanic and Latino lawmakers included under the "white" umbrella. The Republican caucuses throughout the statehouses in the South offer much less diversity and are largely a homogenous and monolithic white voting bloc. Arkansas has a small black population. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's State and County QuickFacts (2013), Arkansas is over 80 percent white, a circumstance infrequent throughout the states of the Old Confederacy.

Evaluating legislators in order to discern racial party composition throughout the aggregate statewide electorate can be problematic. Though, to paraphrase Milbrath (1965): in the hierarchy of political participation—gladiatorial activities—those activities that are the most intensive in terms of political engagement tend to be cumulative. Those members seeking public office are likely to solicit others for their support. Consequently, political backers are likely to donate campaign funds, contribute economic and social capital to political campaigns, attend meetings, etc. Successful political actors—

⁶ It has been suggested that the methodology ought to be modified in order to account for Latino, Hispanic, or other ethnic or racial minorities. While this may be important if a multiracial study is to be conducted for the entire South, in this case, the biracial trends and cleavages are most important. This exercise is merely testing the proportion of white and black legislators in order to infer the extent of white Democratic support in the aggregate electorate; thus Hispanic and Latino legislators are considered to be a subtype of the overall white racial demographic.

Table 4: Percentage of White Legislators within Respective Southern State Legislative Party Caucuses, 2013 (Both Legislative Chambers Combined)

State	% of Democratic Caucus	% of Republican Caucus	% Difference between Caucuses
<i>Arkansas</i>	77.42	100	22.58
Texas	67.16	96.49	29.33
Virginia	66.67	100	33.33
Florida	51.72	100	48.28
<i>Louisiana</i>	51.67	100	48.33
Tennessee	51.43	100	48.57
North Carolina	45	100	55
<i>Mississippi</i>	41.77	100	58.23
<i>South Carolina</i>	39.39	100	60.61
<i>Alabama</i>	33.33	100	66.67
Georgia	24.39	98.68	74.29

Source: Calculated by author. Photographic data from Project Vote Smart, State Officials

Note: Traditional states as categorized by Woodard's (2006, 18) methodology represented in *italics*.

those elected to civic office—require a substantial base of support in order to maintain or elevate their position. Considering that until 2012, Arkansas Democrats held legislative majorities in the statehouse, and devoid of a substantial minority population, it can be assumed that the Yellow Dog Democrat still persists in the Natural State over a decade into the twenty-first century. Though, it suffices to say that white voters are not nearly as homogenous in the Natural State as at midcentury.

County-Level Analysis of the 2008 Presidential Election

Due to strong similarities between the 2008 and 2012 county-level election returns for then-Senator and now-President Barack Obama, a county-

level analysis of the 2008 election was conducted in order to discern general voting patterns and cleavages within the statewide electorate. The OLS regression utilized employed the seventy-five Arkansas counties as units of analysis. The dependent variable is the county-level vote share garnered by Barack Obama in 2008. Five demographic and socioeconomic criteria were selected as independent variables of analysis at the county level: percentage of the population identifying as African American; percentage with a bachelor's degree—in order to stratify the population in terms of highest level of education attained and to discern cleavages in voting patterns relating to a voter's level of education; homeownership rate—to detect economic mobility among county residents, those who own homes tending to exhibit increased economic security and financial stability; median income—another economic indicator to determine general affluence of a county; and the number of building permits issued in 2011—to detect economic growth within a county and as evidence of a rebounding and growing housing market and manufacturing sector.⁷ A detail listing of each hypothesis for the model is listed below:

- H1: As the percentage of the African American population increases in a county, the percentage of the vote for Obama will rise. Arkansas African Americans should be more likely to vote for then-Senator Obama than the general population.
- H2: As the median household income in a county increases, the vote for Obama will decline. Those higher earners on the socioeconomic spectrum are less likely to vote for Obama.
- H3: A rising homeownership rate will cause support for Obama to decline. Another indicator of socioeconomic well-being; those with lower incomes and relatively limited economic capital or mobility are less likely to own their own homes. Thus, as income was predicted to be negatively correlated with the vote for Obama, so is the homeownership rate.

⁷ Building permits issued is an important independent variable because it is employed as a heuristic for a rebounding or prosperous economy. There is an exhibited disparity in, say, Benton County (where Wal-Mart Stores are headquartered), and the counties on the banks of the Mississippi River. Scores of building permits within a county would imply economic growth in the region. To illustrate this point, county *x*, with ten times the number of permits issued in a single year than county *y*, would be much more economically developed than county *y*. Thus building permits are an interesting measure of economic growth.

H4: As the number of building permits in a county increases, as will the vote for Obama. Those counties with sufficiently less economic development may have manufacturing and building sectors that have not fully recovered from the financial crisis of 2007–2008. These hardest-hit and most impoverished counties may exhibit increased support for Obama.

H5: An increasing percentage of county residents with a bachelor's degree will cause the vote for Obama to rise.

The very robust statistical model yielded a coefficient of determination or R^2 value of .8; 80 percent of the variance in the Obama vote in Arkansas is explained by these five criteria.⁸ Among the most consequential findings of the model was the racial composition of an Arkansas county and its relationship with the vote for Obama in 2008 (see Table 5). The percent black independent variable returned a coefficient of .309. The predicted change in a 10 percent increase in the African American population of a county yields a 3.09 percent increase in the vote in favor of Obama.

Further, support for Senator Obama in 2008 was directly tied to race. A highly significant, positive relationship exists between the presence of African Americans within an Arkansas county and its vote for Obama. Yet another telling conclusion from the model was median income, for a \$1,000 increase in a counties' median income, the predicted change in the 2008 vote for Obama was a decrease of one percent in terms of countywide support. The model clearly conveys that those Arkansans lower on the socioeconomic continuum are more likely to support Obama than the Republican nominee, Senator John McCain of Arizona. Additionally, a negative relationship between homeownership and the vote for Obama exists. For a 10 percent increase in the homeownership rate in an Arkansas County, the predicted change in the vote for Obama was a 3.29 percent decrease, once again conveying the notion that those with lower levels of socioeconomic capital are more likely to support Obama.

These trends in Arkansas are in line with the rest of the nation. In the 2008 general election, groups lower on the socioeconomic continuum favored then-Senator Obama over Senator McCain; in a study conducted by the Roper Center, earners between \$15,000 to \$30,000 favored Obama by a 60–37 margin. Those individuals who grossed under \$15,000 favored the now-president by an

⁸ Due to an abnormally high coefficient of determination, the dataset was subject to multicollinearity diagnostic tests. The diagnostic analysis yielded a variance inflation factor (VIF) within normal and acceptable limits.

Table 5: County-Level Predictors of Support for Obama in Arkansas, 2008 Presidential Election

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Percent Black	.309***	0.040
Percent with Bachelor's Degree	.179	0.167
Homeownership Rate	-.329*	0.104
Median Income	-.001***	0.000
Number of Building Permits Issued in 2011	.004	0.002
R ²	.800	
Adjusted R ²	.786	
N	75	

OLS Regression estimate. * indicates significance at $p < 0.05$; ** at $p < 0.01$; *** at $p < 0.001$

even greater margin—73–25. African Americans heavily favored Barack Obama over his opponent, garnering 95 percent support within the racial group (“Demographics of How Groups Voted” n.d.). Nationwide trends in voting are echoed in the Razorback State, those with lower incomes and African Americans were more likely to vote for Obama than his opponent. This revelation, that African Americans and the impoverished supported Barack Obama in 2008, is not by any means remarkable; in fact, it is largely expected. Though, what is to be gleaned from the OLS analysis is the impact the three statistically significant independent variables have on the Obama vote. The three statistically significant independent variables of percentage black, the homeownership rate, and median income, combined with the non-statistically significant variables of building permits issued and percentage with a bachelor’s degree explain 80 percent of the variation of the Obama vote. The Obama vote in Arkansas is almost wholly explained by five factors.

Discussion

Truly, political and electoral considerations fail to explain fully the dynamic nature of Arkansas’ shift from one-party Democratic politics. Among the most poignant explanations for the rise of Arkansas Republicans lies in the economy and demography. Woodard (2006, 108) articulates that northwestern Arkansas, the portion of the state confined in the Ozark

Mountains (for a map, see Blair 1988, 22), has been a longtime Republican stronghold. This region has also seen immense economic growth due in large part to two multinational firms headquartered there: Wal-Mart Stores, the large retail corporation in Bentonville; and Tyson Foods, the poultry company and agribusiness in Springdale. Arkansas, in the waning decades of the twentieth century, has undergone a transformation from a feudal, subsistence agrarian economy to a white-collar, service-based, and management-centered system (Blair 1988, 51).

The populated metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of Little Rock, Fort Smith, Hot Springs, Rogers, and Bentonville have undergone substantial urbanization during the latter half of the twentieth century. A byproduct of urbanization is the emergence of middle-class suburbanites—largely in white-collar management. These Arkansans have emerged as steadfast Republican supporters. Arkansas' MSAs are the epicenters of Republican growth in the state (Woodard 2006, 288–91). The rise of incomes in Arkansas has, somewhat concurrently, led to an increase in statewide Republican support. Blair (1988) states that in 1940, statewide incomes were 40 percent of the national average; by 1980, Arkansans' incomes accounted for 75 percent of the national average. It seems the populist Democrat “poor dirt farmer” archetype, so effectively employed by Huey Long in Louisiana and Eugene Talmadge in Georgia, would have a much less appreciable impact in this more affluent and less agrarian twenty-first-century electorate. The historical importance of the rural Democratic vote share must not be understated (Woodard 2006). Blair (1988, 50–51) posits that by 1984, Arkansas had become more urban than rural; a majority of the state's population now lived in cities or towns. Concomitantly with an increase in electoral participation, economic growth, in-migration, and urban and suburbanization have all led to significant gains for Republican candidates.

The very essence of what makes the state's current politics so intriguing—its conservative southern electorate, and significant white population which has only begun to elevate significant scores of Republican candidates to office, can also, potentially, relegate the state Democratic Party to an almost irrelevant status. In the old southern politics, African American electoral nonparticipation led to unfettered one-party Democratic control of the institutions of government (Hayes and McKee 2008). Though, as Hayes and McKee (2008, 4) so poignantly posit, “the overwhelming Democratic support from African Americans places an upper limit on Republican hegemony, which prevents the sort of one-party dominance exhibited by southern Democrats from 1880 through the 1950s.” Arkansas Democratic politics should heed this warning: the fervent African American electoral contributions to Democratic candidates throughout the South cannot be actualized in the

Natural State. For most of the twentieth century, Arkansas has had a very minute African American population. Hayes and McKee (2008) note that it is the aggregate African American vote that places a limit on absolute Republican electoral domination. Without it, Republican growth will continue to persist and, potentially, manifest into one-party control—resonant of the one-party politics of Arkansas’ “dark ages” (see Blair 1988, 38–48; Key 1949; Reed 1983).

Conclusion

Arkansas has been viewed as a special case in the politics of the American South in recent decades. The Yellow Dog Democrat archetype still persists, though that is not to understate there have been highly significant Republican gains in the Natural State. Historically, the key to Democratic success, particularly at the presidential and congressional levels, is the agrarian and rural vote (Woodard 2006). Figure 1 clearly conveys the rural vote did not support, with the exception of the Black Belt, then-Senator Obama in 2008 and in his reelection bid for the presidency in 2012. Currently, the U.S. House delegation is entirely under GOP control, and in 2014, tight races for the U.S. Senate and governorship wait. As the latest output of the Ranney Index in Table 1 suggests, in terms of combined, federal, and state competition, Arkansas has entered into a period of two-party competition. While many other southern states are well within a level of two-party competition or modified one-party Republican control, Arkansas may hold out as a competitive playing field for statewide candidates in years to come. While most would conclude the presidential race is an uphill climb for Democratic candidates, significant inroads remain for Democratic control of federal legislative seats and control of the statehouse. Yet it is important to note that the state Republican Party has continually gained momentum in recent years with no signs of slowing.

Arkansas has seen tremendous demographic changes in its inhabitants. The rural vote has a significantly less appreciable impact on statewide races, compared to previous decades. The rise of MSAs in this once-very rural state has caused a socioeconomic change in the state’s electorate. With MSAs came scores of white-collar employment and rising incomes, thus creating suburban Republican strongholds and an erosion of one-party Democratic politics to a more competitive two-party condominium. National Democratic success may be limited to the banks of the Mississippi River for the foreseeable future. Further research and inquiry should be conducted following the 2014 midterm elections.

Particularly, observers should take note of the gubernatorial and Senate races. While Mark Pryor has an uphill climb in fending off a challenge from

Republican U.S. representative Tom Cotton, Mike Ross is proving to be a formidable opponent to former congressman Asa Hutchinson. Hutchinson is in his fourth statewide contest and has failed to win a single statewide contest to date. In the coming decades, Arkansas may prove to be an interesting case study. If Hayes and McKee (2008) are correct, Arkansas may find itself as the first southern state under complete one-party Republican control. It is completely feasible that the lone holdout to Republican ascendancy in the Old Confederacy may very well succumb to the same electoral shifts the rest of the south has in previous decades.

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Presidential Power and “Midcentury Conditions”: An Analytical Essay Remembering Richard Neustadt and Reevaluating His Ideas

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Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power took us from the constitutional, legalistic, and structural studies prevalent in political science at the time full-bore into the behavioral revolution. Presidential power is not the power to command, Neustadt said, but rather “the power to persuade,” dependent upon the choices presidents make. He based his work on what he termed “midcentury” conditions: a common setting “marked by a high degree of continuity,” which he summarized as “emergencies in policy with politics as usual” (Neustadt 1990, 5). Presidential scholars rode his work well into the twenty-first century. This raises important questions. First, do “midcentury” conditions still hold at a time closer to the mid-twenty-first century than to Neustadt’s “midcentury”? Second, is Neustadt still relevant? Recent scholarship points to major changes over time that would render “midcentury” conditions inapplicable to today. However, exploring that scholarship in this essay leads to the conclusion that Neustadt is still relevant, albeit with some important contemporary considerations.

Just over a decade ago, we lost Richard E. Neustadt, eulogized by Godfrey Hodgson (2003) in *The Guardian* as “the pre-eminent scholar of the American presidency” (para. 1). Neustadt’s 1960 book, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* was a watershed moment in presidential studies. It is the work that presidential scholars consider “as the seminal book on the American presidency—the one that still influences not only their thinking and research...but also that of presidents and their advisers” (Shapiro et al. 2000, ix). It took us from the largely constitutional, legalistic, and structural studies prevalent in political science at the time full-bore into the behavioral

revolution. Neustadt knew the existing scholarship lacked the insight he had gained from his work in the executive branch during much of the Truman administration (e.g., see Jones 2003, Kessel 2004). He set about to correct this in the mid-1950s with a series of articles that would form the basis for *Presidential Power*. He would devote much of his life to this book, seeing it through several updated editions over the next three decades.

For presidents under the conditions of the mid-twentieth century, presidential power is not the power to command, Neustadt (1990) said, but rather “the power to persuade” (11)—dependent upon the choices presidents make. This relatively simple pronouncement became one of the most prominent focal points of presidential studies in the last half-century. It secured Neustadt’s place atop presidential scholarship. In 1989, the American Political Science Association recognized this by naming its annual award for the best book on executive politics after him.

We are closer now to the mid-twenty-first century than we are to the period at the middle of the twentieth century—a period of time Neustadt called “midcentury” (Neustadt 1990, 5)—that was central to his analysis. It is fitting, then, to compare “midcentury” to our own time and to examine presidential power in light of current conditions.

The Presidency at “Midcentury”

Neustadt based his work on what he termed “midcentury” conditions. He called this a common setting throughout the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, “marked by a high degree of continuity” (Neustadt 1990, 5). These administrations fall under “the shadow of another, Franklin D. Roosevelt” (4). In this conception it is clear that Neustadt is examining what many have come to accept as the “modern presidency.” This is a fitting place to begin.

The Modern Presidency

“By almost all accounts, the presidency as we know it today begins with Franklin D. Roosevelt” says historian William Leuchtenburg in the first chapter of Fred Greenstein’s book, *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Leuchtenburg 1988, 7). This is the consensus of many of the most prominent presidential scholars (Cronin and Hochman 1985, Landy and Milkis 2000, and Pederson and Rozell 1997, among many others). In the wake of the national crises of the Great Depression and World War II, FDR expanded the range and power of the presidency to meet the needs of a world that was vastly different than the one his predecessors experienced. Russell Renka (2010) provides us with a good description:

The term “modern presidency” proclaims a sharp line of demarcation separating Franklin D. Roosevelt and his twelve successors since 1933 from the thirty men who preceded FDR as American presidents in the 36 presidential terms from 1789 to 1933. The modern presidency differs from its historical predecessor in fundamental ways, all making it far more powerful and important, more reliant upon use of political rhetoric, and far better defined in terms of institutional possibilities and constraints.

The modern presidency differs from its predecessor in power. That enhanced power in turn derives from four related factors. These are: 1) rise of the United States to world power status, 2) rise of the central government within the American federal system, 3) creation of modern electronic communication networks enabling the rhetorical presidency to expand, and 4) creation of a modern administrative apparatus for the president and the White House. (para. 1, 2)

Part of this connection between the “modern presidency” and FDR’s term in office may be a lasting effect of two simple facts:

- Franklin Roosevelt served as president longer than anyone else; and,
- The world changed markedly during his tenure.

At the beginning of Roosevelt’s time in office, the United States was a midlevel international power with a largely laissez-faire capitalist economy mired in a severe economic depression. At the end of his tenure, the United States was on its way to becoming one of only two international “superpowers.” It was also a more heavily regulated capitalist economy that supporters praised as delivering us from the depths of the Depression and critics denounced as “creeping socialism” (e.g., see Hayek 1944).

The post-FDR modern presidency is the setting for Neustadt’s analysis of presidential power under “midcentury” conditions. It is, as he said in one of his early articles, “a setting bounded on the one hand by the final phases of the last World War and on the other by the unknowns of the next decade [the 1960s]” (Neustadt 1956, 609). He would explore those unknowns in later editions of *Presidential Power*.

Midcentury Conditions

To begin his analysis, Neustadt suggests that we compare 1949 to 1959. He points to the continuity of the political and policy environment of this era. Of course, almost by definition, any changes during that period could not be as

pronounced as the changes from 1939 to 1949 (or certainly from 1929—the years just preceding Roosevelt—to 1949). It is difficult to conceive of Neustadt *not* perceiving that later decade as the relatively stable one he termed “midcentury.” The combination of events in the previous two decades—the global depression of the 1930s and the world war of the 1940s—dwarfs almost any other era, before or since, in global impact.

However, the end of the Roosevelt years—of modern presidency’s adolescence—did not, according to Neustadt, signal a return to some sort of preexisting “normalcy.” Instead, the uniqueness of the crises of the Roosevelt era gave way to the uniqueness of midcentury. He summarized the conditions of this new era as “emergencies in policy with politics as usual” (5).

Of the policy emergencies, he said,

Save for the issue of domestic communists, the subject matter of our policy and politics [from 1949 to 1959] remains almost unchanged. We deal as we have done in terms of cold war, of an arms race, of a competition overseas, of danger from inflation, and of damage from recession. We skirmish on the frontiers of the welfare state and in the borderlands of race relations. Aspects change, but labels say the same. So do dilemmas. Everything remains unfinished business. Not in this century has there been comparable continuity from a decade’s beginning to its end. (5)

Of the politics as usual, he said,

Our politics has been as usual, but only by the standard of past crises. In comparison with what was once normality, our politics has been unusual. The weakening of party ties, the emphasis on personality, the close approach of world events, the changeability of public moods, and above all the ticket splitting, none of this was usual before the Second World War. The symbol of midcentury political conditions is the White House in one party’s hands with Congress in the other’s.... Nothing really comparable has been seen in this country since the 1880s. (5, 6)

Certainly a *prima facie* case may be made that, even into the twenty-first century, the conditions still hold. Neustadt (1956) himself suggested that midcentury conditions “will not endure forever” and that “what has been described here may be wholly out of date” by the 1970s (639). However, substitute terrorism for “communism and cold war,” and his words appear fitting even today.

Presidential Power at Midcentury

To Neustadt, the effect of these conditions on the presidency appears profound. Whereas Woodrow Wilson (1908) once noted that the president can be “as big a man as he can” (70), Neustadt (1990) adds, “[b]ut nowadays he cannot be as small as he might like” (6). He suggests that the formal powers of the office are insufficient to attend to midcentury conditions. The key to true presidential power is not command, which may only be successfully exercised under limited conditions; it is persuasion. This means that a president “must watch every act he makes in order to be effective” (Bailey 1981, 351). Command is of limited use because power and authority are not fixed and discrete; they are fluid and shared. To use Harry Bailey’s (1981) vivid and visceral characterization, the system of power and authority “is, for Neustadt, a goey mass” (352). As Neustadt (1956) himself says,

If this is an “era of permanent crisis,” it is one in which Presidents must engage without benefit of crisis consensus (615).

Yet presidential engagement is a must. Neustadt (1956) suggests that the development of the modern presidency and the growth of the “executive establishment...made a matter of routine the President’s responsibility to take the policy lead” (611). This is because the “innovations” developed to address earlier crises by presidents like FDR “have now been set by statutes as requirements for office. And what has escaped statutory recognition has mostly been absorbed into presidential...custom” (611).

A Synopsis of Neustadt’s Theory

My purpose is not to reiterate all of Neustadt’s ideas. So, rather than detail his work in its entirety, let me summarize. To Neustadt, true presidential power under midcentury conditions is not the power of command, it is the power to persuade. To him, this is equivalent to bargaining power. The status and authority of both presidents and those with whom they must bargain yields advantages to each side. On the president’s side, status and authority are enhanced by both *professional reputation*, defined as the perceptions of “Washingtonians” (Neustadt 1990, 52), or those whom we might today say are “inside the Beltway”; and *public prestige*, defined as the perceptions of everyday Americans—those outside Washington, D.C.

Professional reputation is affected by the president’s prior choices (e.g., to act or not act, to tolerate or not tolerate insubordination or inactivity, to steadily pursue a course of action or to change direction). Public prestige is affected both by how these prior choices are reflected in the media and in

public opinion polls, and by how well the president can act as a teacher to a habitually inattentive public.

The foundation of presidential power under midcentury conditions then, consists of presidents’ choices and ability to teach the public (see Appendix A for a graphic representation of Neustadt’s power theory that I use in my presidency class). Presidents must consider how their choices contribute to their influence. Presidents must also be effective teachers to an inattentive public to guard their public prestige.

Presidential Power Reassessed

Many presidential researchers, including myself, rode Neustadt’s work throughout the end of the twentieth century and well into the twenty-first. Robert Shapiro, Martha Joynt Kumar, and Lawrence Jacobs (2000) proclaimed that it is still “the seminal book on the American presidency” (ix). The amount of time that *Presidential Power* has survived at the pinnacle of presidential scholarship raises an important couple of questions, however:

- First, do “midcentury” conditions still hold at a time that is closer to the mid-twenty-first century than it is to Neustadt’s “midcentury”?
- and second, Is Neustadt still relevant?

Critiques

Even though Neustadt’s work is consistently hailed as one of the most significant works on the presidency, there are nonetheless many critiques of *Presidential Power* and its theory (e.g., see Cronin 1979; Edwards 1980, 2003; Hart 1977; Miroff 1998; and Sperlich 1975). Most of these critiques suggest other sources of presidential power beyond just persuasion and bargaining. Key to this essay, though, is that few either directly address the premise of “midcentury conditions” or question its relevance to more contemporary times.

One that *does* address these is a late-twentieth-century, Clinton-era essay by Bruce Miroff (1998). He argues that power at midcentury “was about imagery as well as resources” (186). More important for our considerations, he claims that

the vision of presidential leadership that Neustadt and others generated at “midcentury” no longer seems believable in fin-de-siècle America. At century’s end, the image of the energetic executive appears exhausted. (185)

He departs from Neustadt’s notions of professional reputation and public prestige in significant ways that present consequences for their contemporary relevance:

Washingtonians were not just individual judges of presidents; they were denizens of institutions with historically conditioned perspectives on presidential authority. Members of Congress, for example, were more respectful of the image of presidential leadership in foreign policy in 1960, when *Presidential Power* was published, than they would be after the war in Vietnam turned sour. Similarly, the public prestige of the president depended on more than attitudes toward the incumbent. A “midcentury” president faced a mass public that had larger veins of deference and smaller veins of cynicism than the mass public of fin-de-siècle America. (186–87)

He continues,

The presidency at “midcentury” enjoyed a vital image of leadership. It could easily be cast by presidential aspirants in dramatic terms—terms so grandiose, in fact, that they would draw jeers from fin-de-siècle commentators. (187)

There is no subtlety here. Miroff clearly contends that midcentury conditions are no longer applicable. Indeed, use of the word “jeers” even hints that any such notion is laughable.

In later editions of *Presidential Power*, Neustadt (1990) observed “events aplenty” from the 1960s through the mid-1970s, highlighted by Vietnam and Watergate. However, he did say that “these do not appear to have altered very much the general character of presidential power” (183). Miroff could not disagree more. He sees significant change within a few years after the first edition of *Presidential Power* was published, as the “heroic imagery of the presidency...began to collapse with the twin disasters of Vietnam and Watergate” (Miroff 1998, 188). He asserts that, at the end of the twentieth century, Bill Clinton “hollowed out” both the presidential image and meaning of success (192), and points to a disconnect between professional reputation and public prestige on the one hand, and “the power and purpose that Neustadt was advocating” (195) on the other.

A related but more focused critique comes from George Edwards. Over several works, Edwards produced systematic analyses that maintain the persuasive power of presidents is often overstated. He finds little or no evidence of public, media, or congressional movement favorable to presidents after their public appeals (Edwards 2003; Edwards and Wood 1999). For

example, in a 1993 conference presentation, Edwards examines the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, often referred to as “the great communicator,” suggesting that

[i]f we cannot find evidence of the impact of the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, then we have reason to reconsider the broad assumptions regarding the consequences of rhetoric. (Quoted in Klein 2012, para. 8)

He finds that “people were less persuaded by Reagan when he left office than they were when he took office” (Klein 1012, para. 8). In a more comprehensive study, Edwards finds that virtually no presidential rhetoric—including FDR’s—has been able to affect public opinion significantly (Edwards 2003). He concludes that “presidents typically do not succeed in their efforts to change public opinion,” suggesting that “[e]ven ‘great communicators’ usually fail to obtain the public’s support for their high-priority initiatives” (241).

Similarly, Edwards and Wood (1999) find little causal movement in Congress and the media from presidential pronouncements:

Our findings regarding the ability of the president to set the agenda of Congress and the media are mixed. Most of the time, all three react to events and issues, even in the foreign policy arena. This broad conclusion is consistent with the work of others (Edwards 1989, Jones 1997, 1995), who urge skepticism regarding the president’s ability to dominate the political system. (341)

Is Neustadt Still Relevant?

This brings us to the reason for pursuing this essay. While teaching American government and presidency courses over the past couple of years, I came across a pair of articles in the *New Yorker* magazine that pursue the doubts raised by Miroff and Edwards. In fact, one of the articles is built upon Edwards’s critique and includes the studies noted above along with an original interview of Edwards.

That article, written by Ezra Klein (2012), not only presents Edwards’ doubts about the effectiveness of presidential attempts at persuasion, but also provides recent examples from the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. Klein points out that each of these presidents believed “in the power of Presidential rhetoric” (14). Of Clinton, he says this:

No President worked harder to persuade the public... Between his first inauguration, in January, 1993, and his first midterm election, in November, 1994, he travelled to nearly two hundred cities and towns,

and made more than two hundred appearances, to sell his Presidency, his legislative initiatives (notably his health-care bill), and his party. (para. 12)

Yet this effort to persuade—to teach the public—failed. Klein notes that “his poll numbers fell, the health-care bill failed, and, in the next election, the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives for the first time in more than forty years” (para. 12).

He notes that George W. Bush

turned to the longtime conservative dream of privatizing Social Security [after the 2004 elections]. Bush led the effort, with an unprecedented nationwide push that took him to sixty cities in sixty days. “Let me put it to you this way,” he said at a press conference, two days after the election. “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it.” (para. 13)

However, contrary to Bush’s belief that he can use his political capital to build public support for this privatization effort, “the poll numbers for privatization—and for the President—kept dropping, and the Administration turned to other issues” (para. 13).

He suggests that President Obama possesses a similar belief that he can move public opinion:

After watching the poll numbers for his health-care plan, his stimulus bill, his Presidency, and his party decline throughout 2010, he told Peter Baker, of the *Times*, that he hadn’t done a good enough job communicating with the American people: “I think anybody who’s occupied this office has to remember that success is determined by an intersection in policy and politics *and that you can’t be neglecting of marketing and P.R. and public opinion.*” (para. 14; emphasis added)

If presidents’ persuasive measures do not move public or congressional opinion, do they have any effect? Klein points to the work of Frances Lee (2009), whose research of Senate voting from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s suggests that presidents have become partisan polarizers. Her analysis reveals that “over the period, each president’s agenda occupied roll-call voting in the Senate to a greater extent than his predecessor’s, without respect to unified or divided party control” (Lee 2009, 94). Klein (2012) notes that Lee’s data shows that when presidents took positions on issues, the amount of party-line voting in the Senate rose from “just a third of the time” to “more than

half” (para. 20). In other words, “a President’s powers of persuasion were strong, but only within his own party” (para. 20). The other party actually appears to marshal forces in opposition to the president. Klein (2012) concludes that

Edwards’ work suggests that Presidential persuasion isn’t effective with the public. Lee’s work suggests that Presidential persuasion might actually have an anti-persuasive effect on the opposing party in Congress. And, because our system of government usually requires at least some members of the opposition to work with the President if anything is to get done, that suggests that the President’s attempts at persuasion might have the perverse effect of making it harder for him to govern. (para. 26)

This brings us to the second *New Yorker* piece. In it, Ryan Lizza (2013) states that the “boring fact of our system is that congressional math is the best predictor of a President’s success” (para. 13). He suggests that we like to *believe* “the notion that great Presidents are great because they twist arms in backrooms and inspire the American people to rise up and force Congress to bend to their will” (para. 13). The reality, though, is the reality of the math.

In other words, Lizza agrees with Lee’s conclusion that presidents can act as partisan leaders, but not as leaders of Congress and/or the public in general. He points to a spring 2013 press conference by President Obama focusing on the budget cuts that have come to be known as “the sequester.” Lizza notes that

after he explained the negative effects of sequestration, he cast blame on the Republicans, and a reporter challenged his analysis. “It sounds like you’re saying that this is a Republican problem and not one that you bear any responsibility for,” she said to the President.

Obama seemed taken aback. “Well, Julie, give me an example of what I might do.” (para. 3, 4)

He suggests this represents a rare public acknowledgment of the limitations of presidential power. Toward the end of his commentary, he concludes that a “fundamental fact of modern political life is that the only way to advance a coherent agenda in Washington is through partisan dominance” (para. 12).

Neustadt’s Last Words

In his last published writings, Neustadt appeared to emphasize the choices made by presidents. When asked to address the value of presidential scholarship, he advises that presidents would be wise to consult it:

Presidents newly in office—by that I mean during their first two years, at least—will not yet have lived through enough to recognize the relevance of many things we [scholars] possibly could tell them. Experience is by far their best teacher. (Neustadt 2000, 460)

He appears to believe that scholarship can provide that “institutional memory” sorely needed by presidents.

In his final publication, a book chapter published shortly after his death, he considered the special challenges faced by Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, “and the one that comes after”¹ (Neustadt 2004, 12). His exploration of those challenges was rooted in the same “choices” he talked about over forty years earlier in *Presidential Power*.

One challenge was that of transition “from an experienced incumbent...to an inescapably inexperienced outsider, especially if from the other party” (13). He saw two important choices here. One was in the proper staff. Where Presidents Carter and Clinton failed, he suggested that “the second George Bush, from Texas, appears to have been notably successful, using senior associates from previous Republican regimes to inject precisely the experience he lacked” (13). The other choice was in policy. He warned against “[p]aranoid reactions against predecessors, which have boomerang effects” (14), especially in foreign commitments. He suggests that “the foreign consequences of indulging in those feelings have been quite severe enough [for the Bush administration] so that Bush’s successor in ’09...ought to take note and endeavor to do differently” (14).

He saw another challenge in the prerogative of war powers. He asserted that the choice to invoke those powers has consequences. He specifically warned that Bush’s

War on Terror is to be a conflict of indefinite duration. By its nature it frequently will be ambiguous in its results. By the laws of probabilities it will produce more setbacks, perhaps terrible defeats....Yet historically Americans have never tolerated long wars well. We begin in blazing patriotism....Then we start to criticize. And soon enough we splinter into factions of the super-patriotic, the increasingly indifferent, the aroused opponents, and the violent peaceniks. (15)

In this warning, he appears to have accurately predicted the last several years.

¹ The Democratic Convention speech in 2004 that vaulted Barack Obama to public prominence as a potential presidential candidate would not occur until approximately ten months after Neustadt’s passing.

A fourth challenge lies in the doctrine of preemption, or the “intent on reshaping other countries in the interest of American security and world stability” (17). He cautioned that this choice, pursued by the Bush administration (or, as he specifies, the “Neo-conservatives” within the administration) comes at the peril of both “the inwardness of the American psychology and the separateness of Congress” (18).

Again, these final writings involve the consequences of choices made by presidents. Right up to the end, Neustadt made a strong case for the enduring nature of *Presidential Power*.


Twenty-first-Century Conditions

As noted earlier, the issues and conditions of what Neustadt called “midcentury” appear to remain largely intact—especially if terrorism is substituted for communism and the Cold War. However, more recent scholarship points to important exceptions to consider, most notably the growth of cynicism and partisan polarization in the public, Congress, and the media (e.g., see Gallup.com and Keith Poole’s Voteview.com data). Miroff (1998) certainly tapped into something worth considering when he suggested that deference to leaders has clearly weakened.

These exceptions are worth considering further. For, while the political conditions of Neustadt’s “midcentury” do appear remarkably applicable today, that appearance may be deceiving. Recall his description: “The weakening of party ties, the emphasis on personality, the close approach of world events, the changeability of public moods, and above all the ticket splitting” (Neustadt 1990, 5–6). Much of that *does* hold true today. However, the similarity masks some important changes that form much of the basis of the research presented earlier.

It is true that less of the public today identifies with a major party even than during “midcentury” (e.g., see Gallup.com). Focusing only on party *identification*, though, fails to address the growing partisan and ideological polarization in the country, which is as easily documented as is the decline in party identification. While there is a debate about how much this polarization has affected the public in general (e.g. see Abramowitz 2013; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005), most all research documents increasing polarization within the parties themselves and within Congress. Keith Poole (2014) documents this growing polarization in both chambers of Congress.

Figure 1 illustrates this growing polarization. In it, Poole uses NOMINATE scores to calculate the ideological distance between the parties in the House and Senate over time. I boxed the periods encompassing Neustadt’s “midcentury” and the twenty-first century to illustrate this growth. It is clear from this data

Figure 1: Keith Poole’s Voteview Data on Party Polarization, 1879–2013

Source: Keith Poole, “Polarization of the Congressional Parties,” Voteview.com, http://www.voteview.com/political_polarization.asp

that *Presidential Power* spoke of a time when partisan polarization within Congress was near historic lows—and remained relatively low (though increasing) through the several updated editions of the book. It is equally clear that, currently, polarization is at historic highs. This lends support to both Ryan Lizza’s commentary regarding congressional “math” and to Frances Lee’s suggestion that contemporary presidents are partisan polarizers. Surely this has consequences for any modern president’s power to persuade.

In addition, while Morris Fiorina (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Fiorina and Abrams 2008) makes a good case that the public is much more independent than is Congress (with political independents leading the way among the public, while moderates and bipartisanship in Congress are decreasing), this is more of a “pox-upon-both-your-houses” independence and not a “we’ll-listen-to-both-sides” openness. For example, Gallup polling shows a 10- to 20-point decrease in public support for the major parties over the last twenty years (Gallup 2014). Both parties have declined from a majority of the public approving in 1993 to a majority disapproving in 2013.

Another relevant consideration is that this polarization plays out against a backdrop of technological innovation in communication, which has heightened immediacy and dampened consideration. Rapid response has gone from being an innovative strategy in Bill Clinton’s era (e.g., see Seelye 1998) to a universal

“must” today. Even more important is that “rapid response” in Clinton’s era meant a one-day news cycle turnaround, whereas in today’s social media it is often measured in minutes or even seconds. With little time for thought, hyperbole and emotional content often dominate political discourse in blogs and on Twitter and Facebook. With far more outlets for discourse than ever before (not just three broadcast networks, but hundreds of cable and satellite stations; and fewer newspapers, but a whole new and almost limitless area of Internet outlets—including direct, interactive communication via social media), we have far fewer common experiences. Selective exposure and selective perception (or “confirmation bias”) rule the day. That is, we are now able to construct our own information flows—or “hear what we want to hear” (e.g., see Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2011). Most of the new media are very willing to cooperate with this, often “microtargeting” very narrow audiences. Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) notion of medium as message has never been truer.

Consequences for Presidential Power

There is little doubt that all this affects a president’s ability to communicate—and thus bargain and persuade. You might say that today, for every presidential message, there is an equal and opposite reaction (and often *many* reactions). The increasingly polarized political environment guarantees this. Combine that with an explosion of narrowly focused media, and presidents’ words are now consistently and routinely countered by other pols, and by Fox News or MSNBC, or Rush Limbaugh or Rachel Maddow, or *The Huffington Post* or *The Drudge Report*. Many of us now choose to accept the adversarial arguments.

Whether they want to be or not, presidents *are* now, in Lee’s terms, “partisan polarizers.” The tactics for presidents *must* adapt to this new reality. However, it is not at all clear that this new reality means a change from the *strategy* of persuasion and bargaining. There has been no fundamental change to our system. It still requires consensus to achieve results. Persuasion may be different, and possibly even harder, for presidents today, but persuade they must. In other words, these changes do not suggest abandoning Neustadt. They suggest a greater need to focus on presidents’ *abilities* to persuade and adapt to rapidly changing conditions.

Conclusion


Neustadt’s own final words, discussed earlier, constitute a considerable defense on his part. Under *any* conditions, presidents must continue to consider how their choices affect their influence. Presidents must continue to act as teachers to the public. However, the growths of cynicism and partisan

polarization have profound effects for these tasks—especially in today’s media environment. While less of the public today identifies with a political party than during “midcentury,” those that do are far more partisan. The public that the president must teach and the Congress that the president must persuade is more divided today than at the dawn of *Presidential Power*.

Lee and Edwards document the difficulties faced by contemporary presidents as a consequence of this. Congress is no longer simply open to persuasion. The public is no longer simply inattentive. The twenty-first-century challenge to presidents is that portions of both are openly hostile to their approaches. In Congress, the other party is more likely to be called to arms than to be won over. As Ryan Lizza noted, we must consider the congressional math. Again, this does not suggest abandoning Neustadt’s theory, but it does suggest that the jobs of president-as-persuader and president-as-teacher are different today from during his time. Indeed, Lizza’s math critique is, in some ways, actually supportive of Neustadt. It is really another way of framing a central part of *Presidential Power*: that “persuasion is a two-way street” (Neustadt 1990, 31). In fact, Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) classic work, *Essence of Decision*, references this in their “Governmental Politics Model” of policy, which suggests a process of bargaining and competition among several actors (259).

We have gone just over a decade without Neustadt. However, his work is still worth considering as a guide to understanding the presidency. His focus on choice (again, right up to his final writings) appears to be something that presidents best consider carefully. It is something that we, as academics, ought to strongly impress upon presidents, their subordinates, and their rivals. Remember that Neustadt himself suggested that “midcentury conditions” would not last forever. Yet, with the important considerations of cynicism and partisanship in mind, they have remained largely applicable to a far greater degree than even he may have appreciated a half-century ago when his work first appeared. The choices presidents make under these conditions still influence the success of their presidencies.

Appendix A: A Graphic Representation of Neustadt’s Theory of Presidential Power



Source: Author.

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Questions in Politics

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Digital Tocqueville: Democracy in the Information Age

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What sort of insight does Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy provide us in the twenty-first century? In the introduction of Democracy in America, Tocqueville lays out a gradual historical progression of equality in Western society, one that culminates in the development of democratic regimes. Over the course of his analysis on America, Tocqueville shows that the progression toward equality and the stability of democracy is neither guaranteed nor inevitable. For Tocqueville, the future of democracy seemed uncertain in this burgeoning industrial society. We are now experiencing a new shift from an industrial society to a postindustrial, information-based society. The Internet has a particular, complex history that allows it to be used for both liberation and oppression. Because of the great potentiality of the Internet and the almost "universal" desire for democracy, Tocqueville's concern for democratic despotism is still relevant today. This article looks at some of the pathologies of American democracy presented in Tocqueville's analysis in conjunction with the political and societal pressures that have arisen in the Internet age. It also looks at recent social movements (the 2003 Iraq War protest, the Occupy and Tea Party movements) as examples for rethinking political participation and what democracy could look like when we utilize the Internet as a productive political tool. I believe that Tocqueville's analysis is useful today to push us toward an alternative mode of "doing" democracy in order to deviate away from the path toward democratic despotism.

In the introduction of *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville lays out a gradual historical progression of equality in Western society, which culminates in the development of democratic regimes. Despite this particular account, America was the only democratic regime that existed in the West.

Over the course of his analysis on America, Tocqueville shows that the progression toward equality and the stability of democracy is neither guaranteed nor inevitable. The “love for equality” coupled with our representative institutions could ultimately lead to a kind of “democratic despotism” (Tocqueville 2004). For Tocqueville, the future of democracy in this burgeoning industrial society seemed uncertain.

While much of the way Tocqueville describes American representative democracy still holds true today, we are witnessing seismic shifts culturally, socially, and economically. As several scholars point out, we Americans are witnessing a shift from an industrial-based society to a postindustrial, information-based society (Bell 1999; Cohen 2009; Hassan 2008; Webster 2006). Historically, this shift occurred with the democratization of the personal computer, the creation of the Internet and the World Wide Web. In the wake of the development of these information and communication technologies, new cultures, norms, and values have arisen—most strikingly the value of freedom and the culture of speed. The Internet has allowed for almost instantaneous access to information from all corners of the globe, and has also given people the freedom and anonymity to contribute to these flows of information. People are also more interconnected than ever before, and people and things are able to move around the globe quickly and easily.

In part, the Internet seems to foster democratic norms and values, and it can lead to further equality and liberation. However, much like American democracy itself, the democratic nature of the Internet is not inevitable or guaranteed, either. The Internet has a particular, complex history that allows it to be used for either liberation or repression. On the one hand, this technology allows for people to document atrocities committed by governments or for the organization of mass protests. On the other hand, this is the same technology that is used to connect hate groups, support the Silk Road and the sale of illegal contraband, and allow for governments to monitor their citizens’ daily lives or to control access to information and ideas.

More importantly, the Internet has revealed ruptures and fault lines within America’s current form of representative democracy. America’s particular configuration of the democratic process does not seem capable of keeping up with the diverse demands of constituents. The culture of speed has led to desires for instant gratification and demands for politicians to respond and act immediately. As a result, the system appears inefficient, ineffective, and incompetent. Voters do not see the government as representing their interests or being able to get anything accomplished. Therefore, they lose trust and faith in the system, become politically apathetic, and further withdraw from political life and political participation. The American representational system

cannot adequately handle the diversity and volume of interests that exist today, nor can it respond quickly to meet the needs of the people.

The Internet shows these challenges most starkly; however, it also presents a potential path toward direct democracy or a more democratic society. In fact, America has already seen several examples of this in recent decades. Since 1999, there have been several broad-based, heterogeneous social movements that have used the Internet to quietly organize large groups of people across space before taking political action outside cyberspace. This article looks at the 2003 Iraq War protest and the Occupy and Tea Party movements to explore how the Internet can be used as a politically productive resource and how we might rethink the way America “does” democracy.

Because of the diversity and rapid mutation of interests, American democracy will need to be reimagined. Currently, America’s political reality is mismatched with its social, economic, and cultural ones. As I will show below, the American representative democratic system still operates within the archaic framework laid out by the Founders in the eighteenth century. The Internet has revealed that this system cannot adequately handle the desires, values, or realities of the American people in the twenty-first century. Therefore, the face of American democracy must change if it is going to be able to handle challenges and pressures in the future.

Tocqueville’s Understanding of Equality and Its Role in American Democracy

According to Tocqueville, democracy developed out of a historical progression toward greater societal equality. Gradual and universal leveling of social classes occurred in Europe over several centuries; power transferred from the hands of the few to those of the many. In the feudal era, political power was acquired through ownership of property. With the Enlightenment era, power became less concentrated and slowly dispersed to other classes. The development of science and technology further contributed to the leveling of society—the ability to mass-produce information put power within reach of the people (Tocqueville 2004, 5).

The printing press allowed for fast, cheap, widespread communication. Such communication technologies played a pivotal role in the practices and organization of politics (Barney 2004, 108). Because of these events, Tocqueville believed that equality was an inevitable desire of modern societies. However, he believed that this progression toward equality did not necessarily guarantee a democratic outcome, only that it made the establishment of democratic states possible. The possibilities of equality on society could have dynamic effects—Tocqueville admitted to a kind of “religious terror” that

equality brought him (Tocqueville 2004, 6–7). As a result, he calls for the need of a “new political science” for a “world that is totally new”—one that could best handle these revolutionary changes (Tocqueville 2004, 7).

For this reason, Tocqueville found it necessary to study American democracy. France’s attempt to implement equality into its society during the Revolution ultimately failed because it could not establish the political institutions needed for such a society to function (Manent 1995, 104). At the time of his excursion in 1831, America was a flourishing democratic society. While Tocqueville recognized that America’s form of government was not the only configuration of democracy, it was the first to implement successfully a stable democratic society (Tocqueville 2004, 14). Therefore, he wanted to use the American experiment as a way of understanding the future development of democracy in France, “if only to find out what to hope from it, or to fear” (Tocqueville 2004, 14–15).

Of all of his observations made in America, “none struck [him] more forcefully than the equality of conditions” (Tocqueville 2004, 3). However, this term “equality of conditions” can lead to a variety of interpretations. Max Lerner (2007) believes that Tocqueville uses it in one of two ways: as “only the abolition of hereditary class distinctions and privileges,” and, less often, as an “equality of material conditions which enabled an individual to feel equal to others” (717). These definitions of equality of conditions are helpful in determining to what extent the American people were equal. But what is more important is how such equality of conditions influenced American society and its political structure. Tocqueville believed that America had a remarkable distinction from its European counterpart. The settlers “separated democratic principles from all others and transplanted it alone...there it could mature under conditions of liberty and develop peacefully within the law” (Tocqueville 2004, 14). For Tocqueville, equality’s influence on America was so great that it “permeated not only political life but civil society, customs, and the very emotions as well” (Mancini 1994, 27). Manent adds that the equality of conditions is “the ‘creative principle’ at the source of all American social and political realities and...exercises an ‘immense influence’ on all aspects of American life” (Tocqueville 2004, 3). Therefore, one can see that only through the historical progression of equality could American democracy have developed.

But what exactly is democracy? It is commonly defined as a government in which leaders are chosen by popular election, and citizens have a direct or indirect power over how they are governed. Others, like Charles Tilly, recognize that this kind of definition cannot describe or explain the variations of democratic regimes we see around the world. As Tilly (2007) notes, definitions such as the one initially provided relies on a procedural definition,

and fails to take account for such things as the conditions of life (7–11). Still other choose to define democracy most basically as government by the people or government by the representatives of the people, and from here further define democracy by its rules and procedures (Lijphart 2012). Most basically, American democracy is understood as rule by the people through majoritarianism. Therefore, I will focus on one central quality understood of American democracy—majority rule. I will discuss not only how equality shaped majority rule, but how a pathology of equality, centralization, could lead to despotism according to Tocqueville.

Majority Rule

One effect of the equality of conditions is the one fundamental principle of American democracy: majority rule through popular sovereignty. The first settlers adopted popular sovereignty instead of allowing the formation of an aristocratic or elite class. However, popular sovereignty could lead to an inequality in the electorate in that there is a risk that the majority could oppress the minority. The Founders who drafted the US Constitution recognized that the abuse of power by the majority could be dangerous, and instituted a representative government and various institutions to deter this potentiality. In order for popular sovereignty to have legitimacy, it must act properly, as dictated by the limitations placed upon it by various political institutions (Commager 1993, 827).

Despite the attempts made by the Founders, Tocqueville still saw “the power of the majority not just predominant but irresistible” (Tocqueville 2004, 284). He believed that majority rule became “incorporated into the nation’s mores, and its influence extends to the least significant of life’s daily routine” (Tocqueville 2004, 284). However, the majority could operate only through the numerous institutions established by the Constitution. In early nineteenth-century America, the legislature exercised the most power—Tocqueville believed, however, that it had this power only because it was directly subjected to the whims of the majority through the frequent voting cycle. However, Tocqueville understood that through the normalization of majority rule in the American polis, the minority do not challenge the majority because it hopes to “someday exercise those rights” (Tocqueville 2004, 285). This is “tyranny of the majority”—the manipulation of the minority by the majority that Tocqueville finds problematic.

In looking at voting statistics, “majority rule” seems to be a misnomer. Popular sovereignty was established in order for more people to be involved in the political system. However, the popular vote for presidential elections was not established until 1828 (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 2012, 87). Because

of the immense effect that equality has on American society, one might think that voting qualifications would reflect such conditions. In Tocqueville's day, suffrage was not nearly as broad as it is today. Voting qualifications did not allow for a majority of the population to vote. It was limited to white males over the age of 21, alongside whatever other stipulations the individual states enforced (Commager 1993, 829). While some states allowed some women the right to vote, in most cases they were excluded from the voting booth. As a result of voting qualifications, nearly half of the voting-age population was excluded from the right to vote, representing great inequality in the most basic of American democratic institutions.

Depending how one chooses to determine who voted—either based on percentage of votes cast by voting-age population or percentage of population that was eligible to vote—can greatly impact the understanding of majority rule. For example, in 1832, if one were to look at the statistics of the percentage of the voting-age population who voted, one would find that only 20 percent actually did so (Johnson 1980, 2). However, if one looks at the statistics of percentage of persons eligible to vote who voted, then one would clearly find a majority of 57 percent (Burnham 1987, 113–14). These two statistics show a huge discrepancy in what is called majority rule.

Based on these statistics, it appears that “majority rule” is a problematic concept from the inception of the American democratic government. Rather, voting eligibility created an inequality in the electorate, meaning that from the beginning there was not an equality of conditions, or not a true equality of conditions. Because of this actual inequality, I think that it undermined the political climate that developed in the United States from the very beginning and established a precedent for the rest of the history of American democracy.

Despite this, it was not the tyranny of the majority that Tocqueville fears most for America, but rather the majority's exercise over public opinion. Several scholars dispute this claim made by Tocqueville, believing that his fear of the majority “makes more sense in light of France's revolutionary history; or his prognosis and understanding of the majority were “speculative” (Tocqueville 1980, 26; see also Commager 1993, 829–31). Neither interpretation of Tocqueville refutes the validity of these claims, especially in the early to mid-twentieth century (Commager 1993, 833). This tyranny of opinion exercised by the majority was unlike any tyranny that people in Europe could understand. This sort of tyranny was particular to democracies. Instead of exercising control and power over people's bodies, it exercised a more sophisticated control over their minds; “it was moral, it was intellectual, it was psychological” (Commager 1993, 829). Tocqueville (2004, 285) writes, “And once it has made up its mind about a question, there is nothing that can stop it or even slow it long enough to hear the cries of those whom it crushes in passing.”

The majority derives this manipulation of public opinion through the equality of conditions, a quality that Americans hold most dear. Since the American public is endowed with the equality of conditions, each individual sees himself as equal to every other person. Simultaneously, the individual does not believe that any one person or group of people should rule over him because of their equal status. Because of this, they hold no faith in each other and instead look to the majority opinion because “greater truth should go with the greater number” (Noelle-Neumann 1993, 91). Only because the American public puts almost unlimited faith in the omnipotence of the majority is it able to exercise power over opinion. Tocqueville believes that ultimately, tyranny of the majority is worse than any other kind because “it ignores the body and goes straight for the soul” (Tocqueville 2004, 294). Tocqueville explains that majority rule is so powerful because those with the power will loudly and openly criticize the dissenters and will also make an example of them to others, causing them to not speak out of fear of the same fate. In Book 1, Tocqueville believes that the tyranny of the majority will be the “greatest danger” to American democracy (Tocqueville 2004, 298). However, he also believes that the American legal system and the ability for the American people to form free associations are ways to counteract this monolithic tyranny (Mancini 2006, 49)

The power of associations was greater in America than anywhere in Europe. For Tocqueville, associations consisted “solely in the decision of a certain number of individuals to adhere publicly to certain doctrines and to commit themselves to seek the triumph of those doctrines in a certain way” (Tocqueville 2004, 216). Americans associate because they know that they must be self-reliant and overcome any obstacles in their way on their own. However, the American people also know that the best way to do this is to unite under their common interest. Combining with other people propels them all toward the same goal more efficiently and effectively. Political associations are like mini-governments, or “a government within a government” (Tocqueville 2004, 216). People join together and choose representatives to speak for them. This is not the same as the representatives who are elected to represent popular sovereignty. However, while these associations have a certain amount of power in the political realm, they do not have the same power as the majority. These delegates “do not have the right to make law, but they do have the power to attack existing laws and propose new ones” (Tocqueville 2004, 217). This sounds very similar to the corporate and NGO lobbyists of today.

In fact, Tocqueville (2004, 219) says, “nowhere are associations more necessary to prevent either the despotism of parties or the arbitrariness of the prince that in countries whose social state is democratic.” However, people

associate in order to gain numbers for their minority interests, in attempts to weaken the overall power of the majority. At the same time, the minority hopes to attract a majority so that they can wield the power (Tocqueville 2004, 220). Because association is legally established in the United States, political associations are “peaceful as to their purposes and legal as to the means they employ” (Tocqueville 2004, 221). Tocqueville believes that universal suffrage is the most important deterrent of violence among political associations. It legitimizes the majority because “no party can reasonably portray itself as the representative of those who did not vote” (Tocqueville 2004, 221).

According to Tocqueville, the ability to vote forces people to concern themselves with public affairs. This causes them to realize that they still need each other even though the equality of conditions does not by itself foster any sort of real relationship between people who see each other as equals (Tocqueville 2004, 590). This adequately combats the individualism that occurs because of the equality of conditions. This general representation created through the structure of the democratic government “foster[s] political life [among people] so as to create endless opportunities for citizens to act together and remind them daily of their dependence on one another” (Tocqueville 2004, 591). The electoral system “permanently brings together a multitude of citizens who would otherwise remain strangers” (Tocqueville 2004, 591).

Centralization

Equality triumphs over liberty ultimately. Tocqueville believes that this occurs because the tradition of equality outweighs that of liberty. He says that equality breeds the love of equality, and this spurs on the development of equality in such a democratic society (Tocqueville 2004, 582). So, while liberty allows for people to do whatever they want or pursue whatever interest, passion, or desire they want, it can create inequality of conditions. In the event of the slightest disparity in the equality of conditions, the people are offended that others are more privileged than they are (Tocqueville 2004, 795). Americans are also more sensitive to the ills of liberty than to ills of equality. The people recognize ills of liberty because they are immediate and blatant (Tocqueville 2004, 583). However, the ills of equality take more time to develop and become apparent. By the time that they are revealed, those ills have already been incorporated into society and normalized (Tocqueville 2004, 583).

Centralization occurs because of the desire for the equality of conditions. Tocqueville explains that when a man looks around at his fellow men in a democratic society, he sees them as equal to himself. This same theory applies to legislation: people in a democratic society desire uniform legislation because they find it “difficult why a rule that applies to one man should not apply equally

to all the others” (Tocqueville 2004, 789). Uniformity, not just in laws but throughout the entire society, is held with much importance by the American people. As the equality of conditions progress toward ultimate equality, the people recognize that their equality and see “nothing...but the cast and magnificent image of the people itself” (Tocqueville 2004, 790). Equality skews their perception, making them believe that society is greater than the individual. Because societal interests outweigh those of the individual, the individual concedes that the “power that represents society possesses far more enlightenment and wisdom than any of the men who compose of it and that its duty as well as its right is to take each citizen by the hand and guide him” (Tocqueville 2004, 790). Tocqueville seems to imply that the concentration of power occurs only because of the people’s desire for the progression of equality (Tocqueville 2004, 790).

The other reason centralization of power occurs is because of the American people’s “love of public tranquility.” “This naturally inclines citizens to grant or surrender new rights to the central power, which alone seems to have the interest and the means to defend them” (Tocqueville 2004, 794). I believe that because equality causes all people to be held together without any personal bonds, this causes them to put their trust in the state. They cannot rely on each other. The feelings of equality and individuality strip individuals of their ability to turn to each other in matters of social and political consequence. As a result, these individuals have nowhere to turn to for support but to the state.

The hatred of the slightest inequality, desire for uniformity, and need for security “encourages the gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of the sole representative of the state (Tocqueville 2004, 795). Ironically, the representative that holds such power desires these qualities from its citizens. Uniformity allows the state to subject “all men indiscriminately to the same rule” and the people’s need for security give the state its legitimacy (Tocqueville 2004, 795). Equality of conditions and the freedom fostered by individualism causes the individual to fear his fellow man. He willingly gives up the power granted by popular sovereignty to the state in order to be able to keep the democratic qualities that he holds most important to him, provided that the state represents the interests that he holds most dear. They come to see the central power as doing their bidding because it mimics their interests and instincts (Tocqueville 2004, 801).

Tocqueville claims that “the most important condition for centralizing public power in a democratic society is to love equality or to make a show of loving it” (Tocqueville 2004, 802). In this final part of *Democracy in America*, he retracts his previous concern for tyranny of the majority, a quality he saw as the most problematic in American democracy. After several

years of reflection, he comes to the opinion that it is in fact the centralization of power into the hands of a sole representative (state) that is most to fear. Equality creates this centralization of power that can, according to Tocqueville, lead to despotism (Tocqueville 2004, 802).

Democracy in America: Despotic or Not?

Tocqueville believes that centralization of government “can lead to despotism in democratic social states like that in America” (Tocqueville 2004, 816). While initially it might seem improbable in the land of the free, Tocqueville argues otherwise. He sees a direct lineage from equality to despotism. He argues that it is because of the equality of conditions, a quality held higher than any other in the United States, that despotism could occur. The love for equality creates the desire within each individual for this trait to continue, and therefore it leads people to cede their power to a sole, central government. The equality of conditions establishes a blanket of moderate and modest norms over the people. It is within these parameters that the despot must function. The despot must be equally as moderate and modest with his rule. The implementation of despotic rule must be slowly developed (Tocqueville 2004, 818). For Tocqueville, what is most alarming about this is that it leads to extending the rule of power over all aspects of individual life. It establishes itself in such a way as to not alarm the people, but it causes them to become completely dependent on that power. The despot would uphold the uniformity and equality that the democratic people so deeply value, while making him omnipotent in other ways.

Over time, the sovereign is given the power to “assume sole responsibility” for “securing pleasures and watching over fates” (Tocqueville 2004, 818). The desire for equality but not at the expense of liberty creates a division between each individual where they turn their back on each other and look to the state to “provide their security, foresee and take care of their needs, facilitate their pleasures” (Tocqueville 2004, 818). They put their trust in the central power, and come to depend on it. The sovereign power seems to be held similarly to the way that Tocqueville describes the tyranny and omnipotence of the majority on the American people. Initially this was Tocqueville’s biggest fear. Upon further reflection, he comes to see that centralization is the most troublesome effect of American democracy, as it results in despotism. I believe that this “democratic despotism” that Tocqueville described is a result of the equality/liberty tension:

Our contemporaries are constantly wracked by two warring passions:
they feel the need to be led and the desire to remain free. Unable to

destroy either of these contrary instincts, they seek to satisfy both at once. They imagine a single, omnipotent, tutelary power, but one that is elected by the citizens. They combine centralization with popular sovereignty. This gives them some respite. They console themselves for being treated as wards by imagining that they have chosen their own protectors. Each individual allows himself to be clapped in chains because he sees that the other end of the chain is held not by a man or a class but by the people themselves. (Tocqueville 2004, 819)

This is Tocqueville's understanding of American democracy. He had no idea about the direction in which it was headed, or how it was going to develop. Tocqueville's observations were made prior to the boom of the Industrial Revolution in America and the growth of the nation-state. Tocqueville, however, ends his book on an optimistic note. While equality is inevitable, it was up to the people to "determine whether equality will lead them into servitude or liberty, enlightenment or barbarism, prosperity or misery" (Tocqueville 2004, 834). The history of equality led the people to having more autonomy than ever before—they ultimately determine their fate.

It is not my purpose to determine whether the United States has realized Tocqueville's vision of democratic despotism or not. What Tocqueville's analysis does provide is a framework for understanding democracy today in the information age. Tocqueville's concerns are during a period of transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one. Like with any major change, this proved to be a monumental strain on the American political structure. Today, the United States has moved from this industrial society to one that is based on information and knowledge. Much like in Tocqueville's era, America is experiencing a shift that can change the way we understand democracy and equality, and the political, economic, and social changes could direct democracy toward the realization of either a more oppressive or more liberating path.

The Information Age: Democracy in America?

The information age is defined by a shift from industrial-based society to information-based society. This shift was set off primarily by the development of the Internet. Much like the Industrial Revolution did, this new age is bringing and will continue to bring about a variety of social, economic, and political changes. In order to understand the breadth of changes that are occurring in the information age, one must understand the transition from agrarian/feudal societies to industrial societies. While there are a variety of unique approaches that tell this history (Anderson 2006; Bell 1999; Brotton 2006), information technologies seem to be one influential factor correlated

with seismic political shifts. For example, the invention of the printing press in the fourteenth century created a new outlet for information and communication. This provided a cheaper and more efficient way of producing exact duplicates of books, monographs, and newspapers. Prior to this invention, only the clergy and few elites had sole access to written information. This technological ability for mass communication, which has been refined over the course of 500 years, led to a democratization of access to information. As Tocqueville points out in his quick European history of equality, such an information and communication technological invention played a pivotal role in the historical progression toward more democratic societies.

The information age has added to the abundance and breadth of information available for people worldwide, continuing the traditions found during the industrial age. What is interesting about the development of what we now call the Internet is its unique genealogy. I believe that the Internet's dual history characterizes its political potentiality in the future. It was initially developed in 1960s America by the Department of Defense in the form of ARPANET. Such technology was going to be used as a tool or weapon in the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, academics became independently involved in the development of this new digital communication technology. These academics wished to create a network in which people could share and exchange ideas and information freely. Such democratic desires can be interpreted as maintaining the continuous progression of society toward ultimate equality.

Because of this genealogy, the Internet has vast potential. It is the first vehicle developed during the democratic era that does not have a component for complete control. Instead, it is a network that contains almost limitless information and provides endless opportunities for anyone wishing to contribute to the well of information. The attempt to control it results in a backlash, undermining the power of those that attempt to do so, and reveals obvious violations against democratic principles. As we have seen with the Arab Spring and Occupy movements in 2010, the Internet can be used as a tool to undermine the legitimacy and sovereignty of leaders in power.

Such social changes during the information age reveal the dire need for political and institutional change. Our current political structure still operates within an archaic political framework of our eighteenth-century founding. Although America is a modern, postindustrial society that developed the Internet, our political institutions have not been updated to handle the pressure and need for such a society (Barney 2004). Therefore, the face of democracy must change in order to meet people's needs.

In considering Tocqueville's warning and my analysis of his work above, we can begin to question some of these archaic political principles. As I have

shown, Tocqueville's analysis surveys and diagnoses a particular type of democracy (majoritarian democracy) with a particular type of structure (representative government). Exploring these concepts of American democracy will allow us to imagine how an information-age democracy could function and what it could look like. Tocqueville's diagnosis and ominous warning to us Americans is not fatal to our belief systems and way of life. Instead, it demands that we be vigilantly self-critical and reflective about how we "do" democracy in America. For my purposes, I will only address the impact that the information age has had on our understanding of democracy and compare the observations and concerns made by Tocqueville—majority rule, individualism, and centralization—in order to provide some sort of insight to the future of American democracy.

What Happens to Majority Rule?

That fundamental principle that gave democratic government legitimacy in the industrial age has come into question in the information age (Castells 2001, 2003). In today's political system, it seems that there is no majority rule—instead, there are hundreds of minority interests that lack representation. The social movements of the 1960s led to a shift in focus for individuals. Blatant inequalities were challenged, and this era set new precedents. Marginalized groups began to demand equal rights through the civil rights, women's, and LGBT movements. As America thundered into the information age, more aspects of society were revolutionized. When we look across the American societal landscape, we notice that, despite the changing needs and interests of the American people, no similar change has occurred within our political system.

Because the majority has fractured into hundreds of small, complex single-issue interests, the current political system cannot adequately represent all of these interests or satisfy the voters. While representatives chose to address these issues through the current system, people see their inability to address these single interests as a lack of representation. Voters become alienated from the system and each other because of this factional politics. When they look out at their communities and the country, they do not see many others that share their same goals and values and much of the time see no one in office that represents them, either. The Internet further exacerbates this. In other aspects of their lives, people are used to fast, efficient, and instantaneous service. The Internet provides people with outlets to get the information and goods that they want when they want it. Because these other aspects of their lives seem to run well and effectively, a monolithic political system that is slow to respond to constituents' needs or to pass bills comes under suspicion and creates attitudes of distrust, apathy, anger, or frustration.

People become less likely to participate in traditional avenues of political life and seek representation and answers elsewhere. All these factors lead to increased fragmentation across the political spectrum, causing the government to all but grind to a halt.

This is not to say that we necessarily need to change the system because the people want things to go faster, but rather that the Internet could be a positive and productive technology that allows for more direct democratic participation and involvement (Castells 2012; Giddens 1987; Webster 2006). The lack of trust because of the seemingly inefficient, monolithic specter of the government could lead to certain antidemocratic desires and practices. For example, if a decision needs to be made quickly that would require politicians to circumvent constitutional checks and balances, people could be more likely to support antidemocratic and deliberative practices because of the culture of speed, and because it seems that the government does not represent them and their interests. The problematic concept of majority rule still perpetuates with decrepit political institutions that have not been changed since their inception. Now we are witnessing less political efficacy and more frustration within the electorate. In America, this frustration can be seen most obviously with the rise of the Occupy and Tea Party movements after the 2008 financial crisis (Dionne 2012). People on both sides of the political spectrum believed that the actions taken by the government in the aftermath of the financial crisis did not represent the interests of the American people but those of corporate America.

While society has experienced revolutionary change, political institutions have not. Eighteenth-century political institutions attempt to represent and respond to the twenty-first-century issues that they were not created for. Majority of interests and issues are not and cannot be addressed through a two-party system. However, political elites cling vehemently to these obsolete institutions because they legitimate representative power. If interests have replaced majority rule, then majority rule is no longer a useful tool for legitimizing rule (Barney 2004). This creates an interesting phenomenon—the system does not work effectively, and this undermines the power of the political elite. But even if this elite were to promote change to the system, they might not have power after it is reconfigured (Barney 2004). As a result, no action is taken toward making the system work better.

When Tocqueville wrote his book, the idea of majority rule made sense—the majority was made up of poor immigrants (Tocqueville 2004). While this was meant to promote the equality of conditions, Tocqueville showed how majority rule could lead to tyranny of the majority and manipulated public opinion. Today, it is unclear exactly what type of “rule” America has. However, we can look to the rise and organization of recent social movements to provide an inspiration for a possible democratic future.

Today's activism is unlike anything witnessed before. Instead of trying to change the "current forms of domination," activists are opting for something new by "creating alternatives to the forms themselves" (Day 2005, 19). David Graeber (2002, 62) agrees with this statement—today's activists are "rejecting a politics which appeals to governments to modify their behavior." Most recent examples of direct political activism in the United States would include the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, the 2003 protest against the Iraq war, and the post-2008 financial crisis movements, the Occupy and Tea Party movements (Barney 2004; Day 2005, 28–29; Castells 2012; Dionne 2012). People from all over the country with different motives were able to assemble in solidarity because of the Internet. In fact, the Internet provides the network structure that can be seen today in new social movements (Barney 2004, 125). These groups are spatially separated, but can instantly connect and communicate with other groups—it is through the Internet that they are able to "accomplish a range of functions that are central to their operation and impact" (Barney 2004, 126).

Much like any technology, there are a variety of downfalls that can come with the free and democratic nature of the Internet. These same technologies that are used for more democratic groups also allow a wide range of voices to be expressed and interests to collect. These same technologies can even allow for voices and causes that we disagree with or are highly antidemocratic. This does not necessarily mean that these are good, or that the Internet is inherently good, but that the visibility of these other voices (sometimes angry and hateful) are necessary and allow for more robust democracy (Dahl 2000; Held 2006). But the scholarly consensus is that "digital networks have done more help the proliferation and effectiveness of new social movements"—it has "amplified their political voice" (Barney 2004, 127).

However, the Internet is also creating a realm for "political expression at the fringe of civil society" (Hassan 2008, 205). Robert Hassan (2008, 206) believes that the forms of political activism are reflective of the age it operates in—it is "advanced, complex, and more multifaceted." His defining example of the potential of the Internet in social and political activism is apparent in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War protests. Globally, hundreds of thousands of people organized local antiwar protests for February 15. The Internet allowed for these activists to provide an alternate source of information—people were able to compare notes on what their media sources or their government was telling them (Hassan 2008, 207). What is most significant about this protest in particular is that it was orchestrated solely through alternative media and that the global scope of such a demonstration could have only taken place "through networked communication and the creation of an alternative public sphere" (Hassan 2008; Hassan 2004).

The Occupy movement and the Tea Party also serve as examples of information-age social movements. Whatever one might consider the outcomes of these two movements, the events leading up to them represent some of the problems of representative democracy and America's archaic political institutions. Manuel Castells identifies four specific events that influenced the need for an American social movement: the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign, the rise of the Tea Party, and the demonstrations in Tahrir Square (Castells 2009; Castells 2012, 157–58). The US government's response to the 2008 financial crisis seemed to be out of touch with the needs and concerns of the American people. These two prominent movements that sprung up were both responses of frustration to the US government bailing out Wall Street while the American people suffered the ramification of predatory financial practices.

Chronologically, the Tea Party was the first of the two movements to emerge in the United States. The movement burst onto the scene in February 2009 in the form of a viral video of CNBC's Rick Santelli condemning the Obama administration and the US government's mortgage rescue plan (Dionne 2012, 29). He believed that the government was "promoting bad behavior" by bailing out the people after the financial crisis (Dionne 2012, 29). Santelli suggested that traders of the Chicago Stock Exchange hold a tea party on July 1 and dump the derivatives in the Chicago River. Overnight, the Tea Party emerged as a right-libertarian group with a very similar organizational structure as the earlier 1999 WTO and 2003 Iraq War movements. The movement supported less government intervention in people's lives. The Tea Party had a horizontal, decentralized organizational structure. There was no head or leader of the movement. Instead, it thrived initially as a network of grassroots nodes where each node had autonomy over its specific agenda (Dionne 2012). This organizational structure allowed for the Tea Party movement to focus on specific needs of communities, as well as to resist initial cooptation by the Republican Party and other outside influences. While the Tea Party remains a controversial yet influential factor on the American political scene, its beginnings are important to note because they follow the general organizational trend of other information-age movements. What we should note about the Tea Party taking up this organization type is that it shows that it is a nonpartisan organizational structure.

The Occupy movement was another social movement that was a response to the 2008 financial crisis. The protests and the immediate aftermath of Tahrir Square ignited the imaginations of many around the world to call for their very own social movement. What was particularly influential about Tahrir Square was that the Egyptian students were using social media—particularly YouTube and Twitter—to report the events occurring there and the violent

response of Hosni Mubarak's regime. In late summer 2011, *Adbusters* magazine issued a blog on their Web site calling for America's very own Tahrir Square in lower Manhattan on September 17. In the blog, *Adbusters* made one simple demand:

[It is the one] that gets at the core of why the American political establishment is currently unworthy of being called a democracy: we demand that Barack Obama ordain a Presidential Commission tasked with ending the influence money has over our representatives in Washington. It's time for DEMOCRACY NOT CORPORATOCRACY, we're doomed without it. (Castells 2012, 160)

Despite only about a thousand people showing up to the protest on the 17th, the movement began to gain steam through the use of social media at the occupied location of Zuccotti Park. Much like with the events the world witnessed at Tahrir Square, the Occupy Wall Street movement digitally documented their demands, progress, failures, and the violence of the state. What we see happening in these new social and political movements is evidence of two things: (1) the people are looking to work outside of the system, something that did not exist in Tocqueville's day; and (2) that such movements are more focused on single issues or identity interests.

Beyond these social movements, we can see through some of the failed attempts made by the American government to cope with democracy in the information age. With the increased use of the Internet over the past two decades, more people are connected than ever. This also includes politicians and citizens. Because of the high connectivity to other individuals, this gives direct contact for voters to politicians (Hassan 2008). Initially, this was seen as a positive resource that the government and politicians could exploit—they could be “more connected and relevant” to those they are supposed to be representing (Hassan 2008, 203). This gave the government a certain amount of controlled transparency and connection with the people.

While it may seem that the government is promoting a certain amount of transparency by having accessible information, it has created a number of problems. Hassan does not believe this instantaneous connectivity creates transparency. Instead, he believes that it has led to political gridlock. This transparency provided by the Internet can cause representatives to be seen as inept by their constituents. This in turn can lead to a lack of interest or participation in the political system. Those representatives are bombarded with every issue from both sides of the political spectrum and from single-interest groups, so that ordinary citizens do not understand that there is almost too much information flowing from various factions. David Shenk

(1997, 135) believes that the “increased speed [of time and of information] reduces leaders to followers.”

Because average citizens are no longer required to go through the formal institutions of representative democracy, they are given access to politicians that was once limited to lobbyists and other high power groups. The end result has meant that the people do not see their representatives as being more connected or more relevant. Instead, the transparency might alienate people further (Hassan 2008). Hassan (2008, 205) adds that this creates two issues: they are only providing information that is meant to make them look good in the public eye; and, as a result, is so transparent that they are not providing transparency, or are actually less connected to the people because the information is filtered through the vast dimensions of the Internet. The Internet also allows for the people to obtain and share information that undermines the actions and character of government officials (Hassan 2008, 210).

The Future of the Information Age?

Because of the information age, a needed fundamental change has been brought to the debate about the basic tenets of democracy. It appears as though interest politics has replaced majority rule—democracy can still be, basically, defined as rule by the people, but where interests dominate. This in effect changes Tocqueville’s understanding of the effects of equality in a democratic society. He believed, in the most simplistic terms, that equality inevitably leads to centralization because of how majority rule disfigures the understanding of equality. By changing from majority rule to interest rule, it eliminates that similar path that Tocqueville saw happening. It also changes the relationship between equality and liberty. Instead of their being in tension, they are able to exist together mutually. This would satisfy the two main passions of Americans. By replacing majority rule, all interests would be able to express themselves equally without being marginalized by any one domineering opinion. At the same time, people could pursue whatever self-interest they desire. In effect, equality and liberty exist together.

It is impossible to tell the direction of American democracy. What is clear is that it will have a different face from that created in 1787. Because the information age is rooted in a democratic society, it has some innate democratic qualities that need to be harnessed. By turning back to Tocqueville, we can get at the roots of some of our political problems in order to move forward—to produce a new political theory or a new form of democracy that can adequately cope with the ever-fluctuating information age.

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About the GPSA



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Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

Questions in Politics is the official journal publication of the GPSA.

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Questions in Politics

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Preface

The Editors-in-Chief of *Questions in Politics* (*QiP*) welcome readers to Volume I.

QiP is the scholarly journal of the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) that was formerly titled *The Proceedings of the Georgia Political Science Association*. The articles in this volume began as papers presented at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the GPSA. The authors then submitted the manuscripts to the journal, where they were initially reviewed twice by anonymous reviewers. Further review and editing commenced, and out of twenty-five manuscripts submitted, ten are published here.

We are also pleased to announce that the first article in Volume I, “Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan” by Professor Arild Schou of Buskerud and Vestfold University College in Drammen, Norway, is the McBrayer Award winner for 2013. The McBrayer is given annually to the best paper presented at the Annual Meeting. The winning author or authors have traditionally received a certificate and a cash award. To further recognize this achievement, the McBrayer winner will be the first article in this and each successive volume.

The GPSA was founded in 1968. The organization’s publication of papers presented at the Annual Meeting began almost immediately thereafter. Dr. J. Larry Taulbee, Associate Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University, worked on those early volumes and continues to serve the GPSA as the editor of *QiP*. In 1973, the GPSA formalized its journal, titling it *Southeastern Political Review*, and until the early 1990s published it with covers that were the color of Georgia clay. *SPR* sought manuscripts beyond the GPSA, and the journal was eventually titled *Politics & Policy* as it became focused on all fields of scholarship within political science, with support coming from a variety of state political science organizations. In 2005, *P&P* was transferred to the Policy Studies Organization.

Dr. Joseph S. Trachtenberg, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Clayton State University, was the driving force behind the rebirth of *The Proceedings*, and they were relaunched online in 2005. As Founding Editor, Dr. Trachtenberg returned the journal to a refereed, reviewed, and edited compilation of papers presented at the Annual Meeting. He continues to serve the *QiP* as Editor Emeritus.

The change of this journal's name to *Questions in Politics* reflects a broadening in scope of scholarship in political science. The source of the articles remains the same—papers presented at the GPSA Annual Meeting—but the articles cover all the fields of the discipline, as well as issues in public policy and teaching and learning in political science. All of these topics are addressed in a scholarly manner, and the larger and enduring questions in politics, as well as the discipline of political science, are considered in each volume.

Thomas E. Rotnem and Adam Stone

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Abstracts

Post-Local Autonomy Settlement and Local Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Minority Accommodation in Aceh, Kosovo, and Sudan

Arild Schou

Buskerud University College, Norway

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Territorial autonomy design has during the last decades been proposed or adopted as a solution to self-government conflicts in several countries around the world. The sustainability of such designs, however, have been highly disputed among scholars; some claim that they are a recipe for further conflicts and—in extreme cases—secession, while others see them as the only viable way to accommodate autonomy claims at that same time as they preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The most recent discussion, however, is geared toward conflict management mechanisms within the autonomous units themselves. The stability of units with relatively large minorities is particularly challenging because these minorities may have the power, collective self-consciousness, and international legitimacy to resist designs where they have become a minority in a unit whose population has been granted protection from national majority rule. This article examines the stability of three recent autonomy settlement deals in the light of the recent discussion on ethnic conflict management within such units; focusing on the Gayos in Aceh, the Serbs in Kosovo, and the indigenous peoples in Sudan. It concludes by challenging the present idea that local or national power-sharing is essential for coming to a conflict settlement, adding on two dimensions that would be relevant; the nature of the ethnic minority and the degree of power that are devolved to the concerned units.

From Armed Struggle to Peaceful Change: ETA's Role in a Basque Peace Process

Cleo Dan

Elon University

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This article examines the process by which Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) transitioned from terrorism to nonviolence in the pursuit of

policy goals. This article, part of a larger project examining how and why non-state actors utilizing violence engage in a political process, addresses three issues contributing to ETA's adoption of peaceful tactics: (1) domestic political and institutional context, (2) international political and institutional context, and (3) the role of public opinion and the media. This article offers policy relevant generalizations explaining why ETA sought alternatives to violence. It argues that the birth of Basque political parties that offered nonviolent outlets for Basque nationalism changed the political environment to one favorable to the ETA moving away from violence. This article seeks to place ETA's political interaction within a larger framework of how terrorist organizations end, with the hope of contributing to scholarship from a perspective linking policy, theory, and history.

The Critical Elections of 1968 and 1992

John A. Tures

LaGrange College

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Many scholars have accepted that southern whites shifted their political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, and that the northeastern United States is no longer GOP territory. But were the 1968 and 1992 elections really "critical elections"? Both contests are analyzed to see if they meet the timing, turnout, third parties, and trends in regional voting criteria that would qualify them as a critical election. Then both are studied to see if such regional variations with the past led to subsequent national voting changes.

The Natural State's Unnatural Politics: Democratic Dominance in an Otherwise Red State

Nicholas A. Rudnik

Valdosta State University

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At midcentury, Arkansas was solidly under one-party Democratic control. In recent decades, state Republican functionaries have slowly eroded the one-party Democratic lock. Arkansas is often seen as a special case in

the politics of the former Confederate states; to that end, this is still true. While the erosion of the Solid Democratic South has had much less of an appreciable impact in Arkansas, the Republican Party is finally beginning to cement itself as the more dominant party in the state. Empirically, state politics is well within a level of two-party competition. If current trends hold true, the Natural State may still be viewed as a special case, though a special case where two-party politics could evolve into complete one-party Republican domination—reminiscent of the old Democratic politics at midcentury. The momentous political changes in the state can largely be attributed to shifts in the economy and demographics.

**Presidential Power and “Midcentury Conditions”:
An Analytical Essay Remembering Richard Neustadt
and Reevaluating His Ideas**

Carl D. Cavalli

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Richard Neustadt’s *Presidential Power* took us from the constitutional, legalistic, and structural studies prevalent in political science at the time full-bore into the behavioral revolution. Presidential power is not the power to command, Neustadt said, but rather “the power to persuade,” dependent upon the choices presidents make. He based his work on what he termed “midcentury” conditions: a common setting “marked by a high degree of continuity,” which he summarized as “emergencies in policy with politics as usual.” Presidential scholars rode his work well into the twenty-first century. This raises important questions. First, do “midcentury” conditions still hold at a time closer to the mid-twenty-first century than to Neustadt’s “midcentury”? Second, is Neustadt still relevant? Recent scholarship points to major changes over time that would render “midcentury” conditions inapplicable to today. However, exploring that scholarship in this essay leads to the conclusion that Neustadt is still relevant, albeit with some important contemporary considerations.

Digital Tocqueville: Democracy in the Information Age**Jennifer Joines***University of Alabama**Page 109*

What sort of insight does Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy provide us in the twenty-first century? In the introduction of *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville lays out a gradual historical progression of equality in Western society, one that culminates in the development of democratic regimes. Over the course of his analysis on America, Tocqueville shows that the progression toward equality and the stability of democracy is neither guaranteed nor inevitable. For Tocqueville, the future of democracy seemed uncertain in this burgeoning industrial society. We are now experiencing a new shift from an industrial society to a postindustrial, information-based society. The Internet has a particular, complex history that allows it to be used for both liberation and oppression. Because of the great potentiality of the Internet and the almost "universal" desire for democracy, Tocqueville's concern for democratic despotism is still relevant today. This article looks at some of the pathologies of American democracy presented in Tocqueville's analysis in conjunction with the political and societal pressures that have arisen in the Internet age. It also looks at recent social movements (the 2003 Iraq War protest, the Occupy and Tea Party movements) as examples for rethinking political participation and what democracy could look like when we utilize the Internet as a productive political tool. I believe that Tocqueville's analysis is useful today to push us toward an alternative mode of "doing" democracy in order to deviate away from the path toward democratic despotism.

**China's Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy:
A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany****Thomas Nisley***Southern Polytechnic State University**Page 129*

This article compares China's rise in Asia today with Germany's rise in Europe in the early twentieth century. In both cases, the regional

hierarchy exhibited rapid change and a power transition, with Germany surpassing Great Britain and China surpassing Japan. To understand the implications and the consequences of the changing relative power hierarchy, I examine both cases through the lens of the Power Transition Theory. With an understanding of the possible outcomes of a regional power transition, this study engages a debate as to the correct direction of U.S. foreign policy. I argue that the United States should adopt a strategy of engagement. The proposed U.S. military “pivot” toward Asia is most likely to prevent a regional great power conflict.

Lost at Sea: How Past Disagreements in the U.S. Senate Continue to Block Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty

Julia Schast

Elon University

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The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) is a major, international convention aimed at creating a global set of rules governing the oceans and modernizing existing international law from previous international marine agreements. LOST entered into force in 1994, despite the United States not ratifying the treaty. As part of a larger project, this article examines why the United States sometimes rejects or fails to affirm international agreements. It presents a case study of the Senate consideration of the various incarnations of the Law of the Sea treaties from the 1960s through the present day. The article analyzes why the Senate, in 1960, formally rejected the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes that was part of the Law of the Sea Treaty at the time. This was one of only four multilateral treaties rejected by the Senate in the twentieth century. The article examines the extent to which the reasons behind the original Senate rejection of this treaty shaped future failures to secure advice and consent to ratification of the updated LOST over the last thirty years. These questions are especially timely and relevant given the ongoing discussions pertaining to whether the Senate will hold a formal vote on LOST before the end of President Obama’s second term.

The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: Perceptions from Administrators in Masculine and Feminine State Agencies**Beth M. Rauhaus***University of North Georgia**Page 183*

The dynamic relationship between politics and administration has long been examined in the field of public administration because politics has a significant impact on the policy process and administration. Classical scholars have often argued for a strict dichotomy, where administrators are neutral and should be isolated from politics. However, over time, scholars have developed new, more practical approaches to explain the influence politics and administration have on one another. Politics has a significant impact on distributive policies and agencies due to the political nature of these policy decisions. Therefore, this case study examines perceptions of state-level administrators in redistributive and regulatory agencies to explore practical means of defining the contemporary dichotomy. This analysis also identifies gendered elements of a dichotomy, as regulatory agencies tend to be classified as masculine, while redistributive agencies have feminine traits. In conclusion, this case study illustrates that there are differences in the politics-administration dichotomy by administrators in gendered agencies.

Examining the Factors That Lead to Student Departure at Aiken Technical College**Jameka N. Jackson***Georgia Regents University**Page 201*

The purpose of this research is to describe the factors that contribute to student departure at Aiken Technical College (ATC) while concurrently offering a model for other organizations to utilize in improving their retention efforts. The study uses a nonexperimental research design with content analysis and secondary data analysis of the Wal-Mart Press Grant Survey (WPGS) and the Non-Returning Student Survey (NRSS) that were previously administered by the Planning and Research Department at ATC. Academic, financial, social, and institutional issues were the

four key areas examined because previous literature identifies these as the most common reasons students drop out of college. More than half of the unrepresentative sample reported having no issues at all with retention at ATC. These students claimed that they accomplished their goals while attending. However, a majority of the students revealed having problems with financial and institutional issues at the college, specifically with work demands and policies and procedures. The data also suggested that very few students in the sample had frequent experiences with campus involvement and student support services.

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China's Rise in a Changing Regional Hierarchy: A Comparison of 21st-Century China to 20th-Century Germany

Thomas Nisley

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This article compares China's rise in Asia today with Germany's rise in Europe in the early twentieth century. In both cases, the regional hierarchy exhibited rapid change and a power transition, with Germany surpassing Great Britain and China surpassing Japan. To understand the implications and the consequences of the changing relative power hierarchy, I examine both cases through the lens of the Power Transition Theory. With an understanding of the possible outcomes of a regional power transition, this study engages a debate as to the correct direction of U.S. foreign policy. I argue that the United States should adopt a strategy of engagement. The proposed U.S. military "pivot" toward Asia is most likely to prevent a regional great power conflict.

In early 2014, at an international conference in Davos, Switzerland, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan declared that the increasing tension between China and Japan was similar to the competition between Germany and Britain before World War I (Perlez 2014c). The prime minister's comparison elicited a strong response from Chinese officials who argued that the analogy is false and that Japan was simply trying to overturn the verdict on its past aggressions (see Wong 2014). History does not repeat, and a span of 100 years separates the case of Britain and Germany and Japan and China. Nevertheless, both cases are similar enough to warrant further investigation.

This article compares China's rise in Asia today with Germany's rise in Europe in the early twentieth century. Some scholars use the analogy of Germany's rise, and the Anglo-German rivalry, as a device to understand

China and its relationship with the United States (Haddick 2008). Joseph Nye dismisses the analogy, arguing that it exaggerates China's strength vis-à-vis the United States. Nye (2006, 75) correctly points out that China's military lags far behind the United States, whereas "the Kaiser's Germany had already passed Great Britain in industrial production by 1900, and launched a serious military challenge to Britain's naval supremacy."

I argue that a better application of the analogy of Germany's rise and the Anglo-German rivalry is the regional rise of China and its relationship with Japan. Given that Germany's rise in the regional power hierarchy and its attempt for hegemony in Europe led to cataclysmic wars, any lessons gleaned from that earlier case are relevant for our understanding of the relationship between China and Japan today. China, like Germany, is a land power with a history of disunity and victimization by its neighbors. In 1914, Germany was the strongest power on the continent. Nevertheless, German leaders felt threatened and encircled and pursued a military buildup coupled with bellicose rhetoric. China is beginning to act similarly. In both cases, we find continental great powers that confront an offshore regional great power, Great Britain for Germany and Japan for China. An arms race, alliance formation, high levels of trade, increasingly aggressive behavior of the rising power, and disputed territories characterize both cases.

There are striking differences in these two cases. As Chinese officials like to point out, Germany was a novice power in 1914, whereas China has a long history as a great power (Perlez 2014a). In the early twentieth century, William II directed German foreign policy. Kaiser William II was a leader "whose histrionic demeanor gave observers the uneasy sense that the ruler of Europe's most powerful nation was both immature and erratic" (Kissinger 1994, 170). Fortunately, no "Kaiser William" has arisen in China today. Since the end of World War II, Japan has taken a pacific stance in world politics and has constrained itself with an antiwar constitution. This was not true of Great Britain.¹ The rise of these regional powers takes place in a different time with China rising in an era of liberal globalization. International trade levels were high before the First World War, yet trade today is vastly different with internationalized production. The liberal economic order promulgated by the United States has changed the character of the global economy. These factors must be considered in the analysis to assess whether China's rise will mimic Germany's.

The one striking similarity between the two cases is the presence of a regional power transition. The regional power dynamic exhibited in Asia today

¹ I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention. Also, I thank Sean Giovanello for his helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

is reminiscent of the regional power dynamics in Europe 100 years ago.² In both cases, the regional hierarchy exhibited rapid change with a power transition. To understand the implications and the consequences of the changing relative power hierarchy, I examine both cases through the lens of Power Transition Theory (PTT). Originally developed by A. F. K. Organski, the PTT posits that the likelihood of war increases as a rising challenger begins to approximate the power of dominant state.

With an understanding of the possible outcomes of a regional power transition, this study engages a debate as to the correct direction of U.S. foreign policy. Christopher Layne (2006) argues that United States should adopt a strategy of “offshore balancing,” only engaging in regional great power politics to prevent the rise of a regional Eurasian hegemon. I conclude that an offshore balancing strategy will only result in a regional great-power war that will inevitably involve the United States. Instead, I argue that the United States should adopt a strategy of engagement. The proposed U.S. military “pivot” toward Asia is most likely to prevent a regional great power conflict.

I begin this article with a review of PTT. Secondly, I conduct a comparison between the two cases, Germany’s rise in the early twentieth century and China’s in the early twenty-first century. Next, I examine the policy recommendation of a strategy of offshore balance and show how such a policy, given the dynamics of a power transition, is faulty.

Power Transition Theory

Power Transition Theory is one of the most important scholarly constructs in the study of world politics. It is a theoretical perspective that scholars of world politics have tested both empirically and through formal logical theory. As the theory has developed over the past fifty years, PTT became a powerful tool to explain war initiation and the dynamics of great power politics (Alsharabati and Kugler 2008; Howeling and Siccama 1988; Organski 1958, 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Tammen et al. 2000).³ PTT states that the likelihood of war increases as a rising great power begins to equal the power of the dominant state. The conclusion of PTT stands in direct contrast to the standard balance of power theory, which suggests that parity in power between or among great powers produces a stable political order.

² A region is a “subset of the international system reflecting the outcome of actual patterns of interactions—including the whole spectrum between conflict and cooperation—among countries in condition of geographic proximity” (Teixeira 2012, 18).

³ PTT also has applications at the regional level (see Tammen et al. 2000, chap. 3).

The balance of power tradition has a long pedigree in Western thought. In the eighteenth century, the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1752/1963) wrote eloquently of Europe's balance of power. Historians such as Edward Vose Gulick (1955) attributed the long period of peace in Europe in the nineteenth century to the management of the balance of power among the great powers. Scholars of international relations, such as Hans Morgenthau (1973), Hedley Bull (1977), and Kenneth Waltz (1979), all discussed the structure and function of the balance of power (see Little 2009). As scholars over the decades have pointed out, the concept of the balance of power has been taken to have different meanings (Haas 1953; Wight 1966). Even Waltz (1979, 117) conceded that "one cannot find a statement of the theory that is generally accepted."

PTT does not contradict balance of power theory as a process. It does not suggest that a state will not actively attempt to alter the distribution of power. States can use "internal balancing" by increasing military capabilities to counter a threatening state, or "external balancing" by developing an alliance with another state to counter a threat (Mearsheimer 2001, 156–57). For example, a dominant state may engage in balancing actions to prevent the rising state from approaching its own power.⁴ Therefore, PTT does allow for "balancing" as posited by some balance of power theories. The fundamental difference is in the conclusion.

Classical realists, like Henry Kissinger (1994, 79) suggest that a stable international order is maintained by an even distribution of power since a "balance of power reduces the opportunities for using force." Some claim that a multipolar distribution is the most stable because in a multipolar distribution, fluid alliances maintain equilibrium, often with one state acting as the "holder of balance" (Ray and Kaarbo 2005, 168). Waltz (1979) argues that equilibrium is best maintained in a bipolar distribution of power. Although theorists of the balance of power disagree as to which type of distribution is best to maintain equilibrium, all agree, whether bipolar or multipolar, that an even distribution of power inhibits the capacity to disrupt the international order.

In contrast, PTT argues that an even distribution of power provides states with the opportunity to disrupt the international order. States are more likely to fight under power parity (an even distribution in the balance of power) than under a preponderance of power (Organski 1968). An even distribution of power opens up the possibility that a challenger might prevail in the conflict. With its focus on power, one is tempted to cast PTT as a realist theory. However, important differences exist that makes the theory difficult to pigeonhole.

⁴ One policy suggestion coming out of PTT was for the United States to include Russia in NATO and to avoid a Russia/China alliance (Tammen et al. 2000, 138–39).

Fundamental to the study of world politics is the anarchical structure of the international system (Waltz 1979). No central world authority exerts its influence over the entire planet. The implications of a lack of a central authority vary from scholar to scholar (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992). In contrast, PTT posits that hierarchy rather than anarchy shapes the conduct of world politics. There is no suggestion in PTT of a central authority, but a hierarchy of power with a dominant power that presides over a world order. The dominant power “controls the largest proportion of resources within the system” (Tammen et al. 2000, 6). The dominant power is not hegemonic in that it is the only great power. Other great powers exist in the system, but most are content or “satisfied” with the world order maintained by the dominant power. Occasionally, one of the great powers will challenge the status quo. The challenger is “dissatisfied” with the current world order and the rules and norms that structure international affairs. Usually, a challenger rises to power after the dominant power establishes its vision of world order (Organski 1968, 366–67).

Power is central to the theory of Power Transition. PTT defines power as “the ability to impose on or persuade an opponent to comply with demands” (Tammen et al. 2000, 8). The fundamental source of this ability comes from the country’s population, economic productivity, and political capacity.

Population size is essential and fundamental for a country’s power. A large population on its own does not make a country powerful. The composition of the population is important. If a country has millions of poor, uneducated, and sick people, this reduces the power of the country and places limits on its ability to act in world politics. Nevertheless, a large population is the basis for other power capabilities. A large population provides a potential resource pool to mobilize for economic development (Tammen et al. 2000, 18). When a country has many workers, it also has many potential consumers. This can create a domestic market to sustain a country’s economy growth. Beyond that, a large population is a potential market for other countries. A state can use its large domestic market as a political tool, thus providing it political leverage in international relations (Organski 1968, 149).

A large population provides a resource pool for military forces. Although many advanced countries rely on smaller professional military forces, with a growing trend toward automated warfare and standoff weapon systems designed to reduce casualties (Singer 2009), the goal in war is to kill and subdue an opponent’s population. The larger a country’s population, the higher the casualties it can sustain and still have a resource pool upon which to draw, and a “large and densely settled population is more difficult to conquer and to hold once conquered” (Organski 1968, 148).

Another source of a country's power is its economic capacity and development. Powerful countries tend to have growing economies, often measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁵ A strong economy gives the country the resources to produce weapons for modern warfare. It also provides the state leverage in international affairs through trade and aid. A country's economy must grow faster than its population for it to escape "the poverty trap." Although a large population enhances a country's power, extremely large populations (like China and India) make leaving the poverty trap more difficult. Once a country escapes the poverty trap, it usually moves to a transition growth phase of rapid economic growth until it reaches a stage of balanced growth, which produces "sustained growth at moderate levels" (Tammen et al. 2000, 16). During the transitional phase of rapid growth, large sections of a country's population that once lived in poverty see their lives improve, and per-capita GDP rises.

A wealthier population allows for a more healthy population with widespread opportunity for formal education. Both health and education are essential for continued growth and innovation in economic development. This is the idea of human capital, which also includes the population's work ethic, achievement orientation, "capacity to engage in technical innovation, and its ability to advance the frontier of knowledge about science and technology" (Chan 2008, 17). Just as a large population alone does not make a country powerful, political capacity must exist for that productive economy to be harnessed to make a country powerful.

In the late nineteenth century, the United States became the world's most productive economy. In terms of pig iron production, the United States produced a million more tons a year than the second largest producer, Great Britain. By the turn of the twentieth century, the United States produced almost twice as much steel as the next largest producer, Germany (Kennedy 1987, 200). Yet, the United States would not translate its economic prowess into global political power until many decades later. The United States lacked political capacity. Political power was highly decentralized, with the bulk of political power distributed among the state and local governments. As the national government became stronger throughout the twentieth century, the United States transformed its wealth to power (Zakaria 1998).

Political capacity is "the ability of the government to extract resources from its society and the penetration of the society by central government elites to control as many subject/citizens as possible" (Feng 2006, 598). The political system extracts resources to create the infrastructure that allows

⁵ GDP is currently the preferred measure by economists and it represents the value of all goods and services produced in a country in a given year.

human and physical capital to reproduce (Organski et al. 1984). A state with a highly capable political system does not have to be free, democratic, or representative (Arbetman and Kugler 1997). If a political system can mobilize the country's resources and rule for the general benefit of the people of the country, it is a system with high political capacity. A state needs political capacity to mobilize for war.

Conflict can arise in the international system when a rising power from the ranks of the great powers begins to approximate the power of the dominant power in the system. This is the moment of parity. PTT defines parity as a point when the challenger develops more than 80 percent of the resources of the dominant power and ends when the challenger exceeds the resources of the dominant state by 20 percent (Tammen et al. 2000, 21). It is during parity that the likelihood of war dramatically increases.

The likelihood of conflict is mitigated if the challenger is satisfied with the status quo—that is, the existing world order established and maintained by the dominant power. For example, the power transition between the United States and Great Britain in the early twentieth century ended peacefully since the United States did not seek to disrupt the rules and norms of world politics. The Soviet Union was a dissatisfied power, but the Cold War remained cold because the Soviet Union never reached parity with the United States (Tammen et al. 2000, 55). Some scholars have sought to contrast PTT with institutionalist theory; however, this is a misrepresentation (Goldstein 2007). PTT can subsume the cooperation described by Robert Keohane (1984) as the cooperation of satisfied states. Satisfied states see things the same way.⁶ “Dissatisfaction is based on perceived real differences between populations in countries” (Tammen et al. 2000, 25).

While the United States and Great Britain peacefully managed their transition, the regional transition between Germany and Great Britain resulted in two major wars, World War I and II. This brings up another point of PTT, the “phoenix factor.” A rising power, even if defeated in war, will resume its growth trajectory within a generation and will challenge the status quo again if it remains dissatisfied. After World War II, the United States integrated Germany, Italy, and Japan into the status quo “through the Marshall Plan and the provision of a security umbrella through NATO and the Mutual Security Treaty” (Tammen et al. 2000, 129). Even with the end of the Cold War and the

⁶ As Tammen et al. (2000, 124) correctly point out, “Power Transition accounts for the democratic peace thesis.” The triad of the Kantian Peace, as described by Russett and Oneal (2001), of states sharing common democratic political institutions, a commitment to free trade, and a shared commitment to common international institutions is a peace of the satisfied.

disappearance of the threat of a dissatisfied Soviet Union, European countries have maintained satisfaction through a deep integration in the European Union and the status quo maintained by the United States.

As of this writing, Russia is disturbing the status quo in Europe with the annexation of the Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine. Russia is again a dissatisfied power. However, Russia is far from having power parity with the European Union, much less with the United States. With its declining population, Russia is not likely to increase its relative power. Russia can continue to be a nuisance in world politics, but on its own, it cannot overturn the status quo. The likelihood of China reaching parity with the United States in the coming decades, although not certain (see Chan 2008), is still high. Arguably, China has now reached parity with Japan. It is this moment of parity that has contributed to the present tensions between China and Japan, and the more aggressive behavior of China toward its neighbors in the South China Sea. To what extent will the regional rise of China mimic Germany's rise 100 years ago? The next section presents a close comparison of the two cases.

Germany and China Compared

The regional rise of Germany 100 years ago and the rise of China today are markedly different in the methods of economic growth. State-capitalism characterizes the Chinese economy rather than a free-market approach of Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. State-capitalism is a "system in which the state dominates markets primarily for political gain" (Bremmer 2010, 23). The political systems of twenty-first-century China and twentieth-century Germany are also noticeably different. Although no longer a communist country in its economic orientation, one political party still runs China. While Germany in the early twentieth century was not a liberal democracy, it displayed democratic features such as universal adult male suffrage, a competitive party system, and a legislature that had some control over budgetary decisions (see Anderson 2000). The two states that I have identified as its region's dominant power, Great Britain and Japan, are also different. Britain had been a global power and leader of the Pax Britannica; Japan never achieved such stature.⁷

Despite these differences, what is similar is the rapid relative rise in power of both Germany and China, and the dissatisfaction of the two emerging powers. Germany's rise began with the unification of German states in 1871, and within 30 years, Germany became the region's largest economic power. China's current rise comes after the death of Mao Zedong. When Mao ruled

⁷ I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

China, he “dragged the country through a series of catastrophic convulsions that destroyed its economic, technological, and intellectual capital” (Zakaria 2012, 101). Mao’s death in 1976 allowed the conservative pragmatist Deng Xiaoping to come to power. Deng and his colleagues developed programs for the modernization of industry, agriculture, and the armed forces. After 30 years of sustained growth, China has become the region’s top economic power.

The regional orders were established long before Germany and China rose. If other powers have established the current world order before the challenger’s rise, for the challenger this often will produce a “dissatisfied” stance toward the rules and norms that structure international affairs (Organski 1968, 366–67). The dissatisfaction comes from the perception that the established rules and norms are not in the interest of the challenger and may even be detrimental.

The consequences of Germany’s rise in power in the earlier twentieth century are well known. China’s rise may very well have similar consequences. The next section explores the similarities between these two great powers separated by 100 years. Both states are continental great powers that confront an offshore regional great power, Great Britain for Germany and Japan for China. A power transition characterized both cases, coupled with an arms race and alliance formation, high levels of trade, increasingly aggressive behavior of the rising power, and disputed territories. Finally, in both cases, the United States is the country with the world’s largest economy, and arguably the most powerful state in the international system.

The unification of Germany after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 created a powerful state on the continent of Europe, which continued to grow in power as the twentieth century approached. The creation of Germany led the British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, to remark that “[t]he balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which suffers most, and feels the effect of this great change most, is England” (quoted in Kennedy 1980, 27). By 1900, Germany surpassed Great Britain in steel production (Kennedy 1987, 200). In 1907, the German GDP exceeded that of Great Britain, although with its much larger population, Germany lagged behind Britain in GDP per capita (Tammen et al. 2000, 51). A year before the war, Germany eclipsed Great Britain in total industrial potential and in relative shares of world manufacturing output (Kennedy 1987, 201–2). Clearly, a power transition at the regional level was underway at the beginning of the twentieth century in Europe. A similar situation is taking place at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

With years of double-digit economic growth and a stable political system after the crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China continues to claw its

way out of poverty. In the year 2000, China became the world's largest producer of steel (Kupchan 2012, 81). According to the World Bank, 2010 marks the year that China's GDP surpassed that of Japan. Today, China's real GDP is \$2.4 trillion more than Japan, but China's GNI per-capita, purchasing power parity of \$9,060 lags far behind that of Japan at \$36,290. These economic indicators suggest that China and Japan are entering the period of parity as described by PTT.

With economic growth, states have more resources and money to spend on their militaries. In both cases, we see the rising powers spend more on their military as their economic power reaches parity with the region's dominant power. Additionally, we see the regional dominant power counter with increased spending. German military expenditures surpassed those of Great Britain in 1889. Britain regained its lead over Germany and held it until 1907. At the dawn of the First World War, Great Britain was spending 72.5 million and Germany 93.4 million sterling a year. Other great powers participated in the military buildup before the war. Measured in millions sterling, Russia spent 101.7, France 72.0, and the United States 68.9 (see Hobson 1993).⁸ Nevertheless, Great Britain and Germany engaged in a battleship arms race, which for Great Britain represented a direct threat and a challenge to the European order.

In 1898, Germany passed the First Navy Law, which authorized the building of the German high-seas fleet. At the time, "Britain had thirty-eight first class battleships, Germany seven" (Kennedy 1983, 131). Great Britain made the German shipbuilding program obsolete in 1906 when the British launched a new type of battleship, the HMS *Dreadnought*. Battleships before the *Dreadnought* usually had four 12-inch guns supported by guns of smaller caliber. The *Dreadnought* had ten 12-inch guns (Massie 1991, 468). By 1909, Germany completed its own dreadnought-type battleship, *Nassau*. At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, the British had launched 18 dreadnought-type battleships and Germany 15 (Massie 1991).

⁸ One may ask why I use Great Britain in the analysis and not France or Russia given their military spending. France and Russia had large military forces, but did not have the economic capability to support and sustain those forces. In the production of steel measured in millions of tons, in 1913, Germany produced 17.7 and Britain 7.7; France and Russia produced only 4.6 and 4.8, respectively. In energy consumption measured in millions of tons of coal, in 1913, Germany consumed 187 and Britain 195; France and Russia consumed only 62.5 and 54, respectively (see Kennedy 1987, 200–201). When war came to Europe, Russia was defeated by Germany, and France survived only due to British power. Without Great Britain, France would have met the same end it did in 1871.

Although an aggressive arms race has yet to materialize between China and Japan, China has been steadily modernizing its military forces and gradually increasing its military spending, as its overall economy grows. Measured in constant 2011 dollars, in 2003, China spent \$4 billion less a year than Japan. Two years later, the Chinese military budget exceeded that of Japan by \$10 billion (SIPRI 2012). The 2012 Chinese military budget was \$166 billion compared to Japan's \$59 billion. China's domestic military production capabilities have reached a point that they are now exporting high-tech hardware such as drones, frigates, and fighter jets, with sales valued at \$2.2 billion annually (Wong and Clark 2013).

In 2013, Japan announced that for the first time in eleven years, it would raise its defense budget by 0.8 percent and its Coast Guard budget by 1.9 percent. Japan's increased military spending follows China's deployment of its first aircraft carrier, a refurbished ship that China purchased from Russia (Perlez 2012). The Chinese government has announced that China intends to build its own aircraft carriers (People's Daily Online 2013). Japan has responded by building its largest ship since World War II, the so-called "helicopter destroyer" DDH-183 *Izumo*.⁹ China's *People's Daily* was sharply critical of the move and pointed out that the *Izumo* was the name of the flagship of the Japanese fleet during "the war of aggression against China" (Zhao and Cai 2013).¹⁰ Currently, the *Izumo* carries only helicopters and does not have a ski-jump or a catapult to launch aircraft. Nevertheless, with some deck modifications to support the weight of fighters and the blast of hot exhaust gas, the ship could easily accommodate the F-35 fighter aircraft that takes off and lands vertically (see Perret and Katz 2014).

In both cases we find "internal balancing" by increasing military capabilities to counter a threatening state. Both cases also exhibit "external balancing" in the development of an alliance with other states. The alliance formation pattern before the First World War is well known, and scholars such as John Vasquez (1993) argue that the alliance system was a major contributor to the war. In 1882, Germany persuaded Italy to join the Dual Alliance to form the Triple Alliance (Kissinger 1994, 160). Germany's rise sparked Great Britain to form its first alliance with a foreign power in many years with the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Gilbert 1997, 60). Although Great Britain did not join the Franco-Russo Alliance, it did conclude the Entente Cordiale of 1904 with France. According to Kissinger (1994, 189), the Entente was

⁹ The Japanese build their ships in pairs, and the sister to the *Izumo* is forthcoming (see Perret and Katz 2014).

¹⁰ To add another dimension to the emerging Asian arms race, India launched its own indigenously built aircraft carrier a week after Japan (Pasricha 2013).

formally a colonial agreement, “[y]et its practical effect was that Great Britain abandoned the position of balancer and attached itself to one of the two opposing alliance.”

Currently in Asia, the only formal alliances are the ones the United States has with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The United States also has a military alliance with Australia and New Zealand. Japan and the United States recently agreed to strengthen the alliance with an expanded role for Japan. Japan is presently considering a change in its constitution to allow its military forces to come to the aid of U.S. forces under attack (Fackler 2014). Although the United States has agreed to move U.S. Marines from bases at Okinawa to locations outside Japan, the United States is deploying new radar systems, surveillance drones, and P-8 antisubmarine warfare aircraft (see Steinhauer and Fackler 2013). Moreover, Japan has made recent overtures and military understandings to the Philippines, which has an active territorial dispute with China, and to Australia (Fackler 2013d).

China has many territorial disputes with its neighbors, including Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and India. As with Japan, other countries in the region have reacted with concern to China's rapid rise in power. Even the generals in Myanmar who were once very close to China have made domestic political reforms in an attempt to open to the West.

Russia is the exception in the region. As Russia has increased tensions with the United States, it has developed warmer relations with China. In July 2013, China held its largest military exercise with a foreign country as Russian and Chinese warships conducted war games in the Sea of Japan (Solash 2013). China and Russia agreed to a major energy deal in which Russia will provide natural gas from Siberia by pipeline to China (Perlez 2014a). The two countries have also been voting together to block U.S. interests in the UN Security Council. Although China and Russia have not concluded a formal alliance, their increasing political and economic cooperation may prepare the ground for the conclusion of one in the future.

Some studies have suggested that economic interdependence can reduce the likelihood of conflict (Oneal et al. 1996). However, Katherine Barbieri (1996, 2002) has found that economic linkages reduce the likelihood of states engaging in militarized disputes (violent action short of war), but does not affect the occurrence of war. The pacifying effect of trade usually occurs between jointly democratic countries (Russett and Oneal 2001). In both cases under review here we find a high level of trades. Neither pair of states (Great Britain/Germany and Japan/China) can be considered jointly democratic.

At the turn of the twentieth century, trade was important for both Great Britain and Germany. Great Britain had a 20 percent share of world trade, while Germany had 13 percent. British exports to Germany, as a percent of its

Table 1: Great Britain-Germany Trade (Pounds million)

	1890	1895	1900	1905	1910	1913
British imports from Germany	26.0	26.9	31.1	53.8	61.8	80.4
British exports to Germany including materials from British empire	30.4	32.6	38.4	42.7	54.8	60.4

Source: Kennedy (1980, 291–93)

total exports in 1913, were 9.5, and imports from Germany, as a percent of its total imports in 1913, were 12.2. German exports to Great Britain, as a percent of its total exports, were even higher than Great Britain's at 15.9 percent. German imports from Great Britain, as percent of its total imports in 1913, were lower at 11.2 percent. Table 1 summarizes the bilateral relationship. We see the volume of trade increasing year by year with the balance shifting toward Germany. A similar trade relationship exists between China and Japan.

Japanese exports to China, as a percent of its total exports in 2011, were 19.7. Japanese imports from China, as a percent of its total imports in 2011, were 21.5. The Chinese percentages are lower than Japan's with exports, as a percent of total exports, at 7.8, and imports, as a percent of total imports, at 11.2 for the year 2011 (CIA World Factbook 2013). Table 2 summarizes the bilateral trade relationship. Trade increases year after year.

In comparing the two cases, the patterns are very similar. However, trade between Japan and China dwarfs that of Great Britain and Germany. On the surface, the globalized world economy of the early twenty-first century looks similar to the globalized world economy of the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, fundamental differences exist. According to Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffery Williamson (1999, 97), "the commodity market integration in the Atlantic economy after the 1860s was due to the fall in transportation costs between markets and *none* was due to more liberal trade policy." In fact, except Great Britain, the European countries responded to increased trade levels with protective tariffs.

The current phase of globalization has been a product of conscious multilateral trade liberalization and not just a result of technological changes. Moreover, the nature of global trade in the twenty-first century is qualitatively different from the earlier twentieth century with internationalized production

Table 2: Japan-China Trade (\$ billion)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Japan imports from China	108	119	128	143	123	153	183
Japan exports to China	80	93	109	125	110	149	162

Source: United Nations (2014)

as opposed to country-specific production. Another important difference is the dominance of multinational corporations in the globalized economy of today.

Japan has pursued a deliberate policy of deepening commercial relations with China (Mochizuki 2007). Michael Green and Benjamin Self (1996) have argued that the logic of “commercial liberalism” has motivated this policy with the assumption that as China’s wealth increases, its relations with Japan would be friendlier. Problems exist with that assumption. Anti-Japanese sentiments and nontransparent commercial practices in the Chinese economy create an unfavorable environment for Japanese business (Mochizuki 2007, 766). State-capitalism, as practiced in China, encourages Beijing to exploit economic interdependence for geopolitical purposes. For example, in 2010, China “suspended the sale of rare earth metals to Japan during a row over the status of a Chinese fishing boat captain, whom Japan had arrested after he rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel in waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu” (Kupchan 2012, 186).

In both cases we find Germany and China developing ever more aggressive behavior as they enter power parity. Germany under Bismarck practiced restraint in its foreign policy. As Kissinger (1994, 170) points out, “Bismarck had taken great pains to downplay assertions of German power.” Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890 freed Kaiser William II to pursue his *Weltpolitik*—the German “world policy” aimed at transforming Germany into a global power. Germany conducted acts that threatened its neighbors, such as ending the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia (1890), the so-called “Kruger Telegram” (1896) that offered support to the Boers and antagonized the British, and the Morocco Crisis (1905) in which the kaiser himself landed at Tangier, Morocco, to support the sovereignty of the sultan and thus angered both the British and the French.

China, like Germany before, has taken advantage of a stable commercial system to advance its economic development. Deng Xiaoping advised China to “hide its light under a bushel” so that its rapid growth would not frighten its

neighbors (quoted in Zakaria 2009, 104). Even the term “peaceful rise” was considered too aggressive, and instead the Chinese leadership spoke of “peaceful development” (Zakaria 2009, 106). China’s policy of keeping a low profile changed, not surprisingly, as China moved into parity with Japan in 2010.

In 2010, China issued a statement that the South China Sea was an area of core interest, and in September of that year, a Chinese fishing vessel entered Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.¹¹ The fishing vessel collided with a Japanese patrol boat. This began a series of militarized encounters between China and Japan that continues today. The militarized encounters over these islands have included military ships of both countries aiming radar-directed weapons at each other, Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles making incursions into Japanese airspace, and Japanese threats to shoot them down (Fackler 2013c; Panda 2013). In late 2013, China declared an “air defense identification zone” over airspace already claimed by Japan (Ford 2013a). China has many outstanding disputes with countries in the region, including Vietnam and the Philippines (Fravel 2010).¹²

A major difference between the two cases is the number of territorial disputes. For Germany, the only important territorial dispute at the beginning of the twentieth century was with France over Germany’s possession of Alsace-Lorraine. China’s territorial disputes are many and vast, extending from the Himalayas to the South China Sea. The political status of Taiwan is also a major unresolved issue. China has control of some disputed territory, but not all. In a symbolic gesture that angered many countries in the region, China issued new passports imprinted with a map showing the disputed territories as part of China (McDonald 2012). Even Russia, which has been friendlier to China in recent years, still has many unresolved issues including China’s growing interest in Russia’s “near abroad,” those countries of the former Soviet Union in Asia (see Rotnem 2014). A strong association exists between territorial disputes and conflict (Krocs 1995).

The similarities between the two cases are strong. Both rising powers become more assertive as they enter the moment of power parity. However, four important differences exist in the current case, which suggests that the China/Japan transition may not mimic the German/Great Britain transition.

¹¹ The islands called Senkaku by the Japanese are controlled by Japan, but claimed by China. China, which calls the islands Diaoyu, lost them to Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).

¹² On May 3, 2014, China sent an oil rig into territory claimed by both Vietnam and China. The portable oil rig was accompanied by 80 Chinese ships. Vietnam responded by sending its own ships, which were reported to have rammed the Chinese ships (Jennings 2014).

The intensity of the arms race in Asia today does not match that between Great Britain and Germany. This is important. A positive and significant relationship exists between arms buildups and dispute escalation among major states (Sample 2012). Unlike Europe in the early twentieth century, Asia has not divided into two armed camps with solid alliances. This is also important. “The most important conclusion we can make based on previous scientific studies, although it is still tentative, is that alliances increase the probability of war rather than prevent it” (Kang 2012, 40–41). Third, trade levels between Great Britain and Germany were high as they are today with Japan and China; however, as argued above, the nature of international trade is far different, and so is the globalized world economy. Finally, unlike early twentieth-century Europe, Asia today has many multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Amitav Acharya (2014) argues that a combination of economic interdependence, multilateralism, and political pluralism will lead to a consociational security order (CSO) in Asia. A CSO does not infer that war has become “unthinkable” as in a security community. In a CSO, “competitive and cooperative behavior exists side by side, and the group holds together by a desire for avoiding system collapse” (Acharya 2014, 159).

One important difference exists that reduces our optimism that events will turn out differently today in Asia than they did in Europe 100 years ago—the presence of territorial disputes. Germany as a rising power had only one territorial dispute, and Germany was in control of the territory. China has multiple territorial disputes and is not in control of all of them. “Territorial issues seem to be especially likely to lead to armed conflict, accounting for over one-fourth of all armed conflict and at least half of the more serious forms of conflict” (Hensel 2012, 21). Any of these territorial disputes has the potential to escalate. As China grows stronger in power, it will likely become even more assertive in its claims to these disputed territories. Though a full-blown arms race does not exist now, an aggressive China will provoke countries of the region to “internally balance” against China with a military buildup. Given what we know about the security dilemma, China is likely to respond with even more weapons. The results will likely lead to “external balancing” and the formation of a strong alliance system.

How can the region and the world avoid the catastrophe of a major power war? To reduce the likelihood of war, the United States needs to remain deeply engaged in the regional politics of Asia and help manage China’s rise as a satisfied power.

Engagement or Offshore Balancing?

Despite China's growing economy and its increased military spending, the United States remains the preeminent military power in Asia, and will be for a long time. Some scholars, like Christopher Layne, do not think that it is wise for the United States to remain militarily engaged in Asia. The next section presents Layne's argument for a strategy of "offshore balancing." Giving the previous analysis using PTT, I will show that Layne's proposed strategy is wrongheaded. The current U.S. policy of shifting military assets toward the Pacific, the "pivot" to Asia, will be the most likely to prevent a major power war; while Layne's strategy will lead to conflict that will inevitably involve the United States.¹³

Layne (2012) argues that the American "unipolar moment" is over, and the era of American dominance in world politics that began in 1945 is ending. Therefore, he suggests that the United States should adopt a grand strategy of "offshore balancing." The offshore balancer's only interest in other regions of the world is to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon. Even a great power war need not involve an offshore balancer. Layne (2006) argues that the United States has not acted as an offshore balancer and instead has pursued a grand strategy of "extraregional hegemony," militarily engaging in other regions of the world with a goal of global hegemony. Layne asserts that the U.S. strategy of extraregional hegemony is dangerous, and in the past has produced outcomes that are far more undesirable than if the United States had practiced offshore balancing. For Layne, given the current U.S. economic condition with deficit spending and a growing debt, such a strategy is no longer financially feasible. Layne (2006, 162) argues that had the United States not intervened in World War I, that war would have ended in a compromise peace and "the revolutions that destroyed the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires and thereby destabilizing postwar Central Europe" would not have occurred. The economic chaos that facilitated Hitler's rise might not have transpired, and even if a second great power war in Europe did occur, it would have been far different and "might have been a war the United States could have avoided" (Layne 2006, 162). Although some may call the U.S. grand strategy from 1945 to 1991 (the Cold War) a success, for Layne, it was strategy that imposed serious risks on the United States and at a "cost of trillions of dollars diverted from other—arguably more economically productive and socially beneficial—uses to pursue U.S. global ambitions"

¹³ The U.S. strategy of a "pivot" to Asia includes plans to deploy 60 percent of U.S. warships to the Pacific by 2020 compared to the current 50-50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

(200). Finally, even if the United States continues to seek extraregional hegemony, the “fundamental weakness in the U.S. economy raise doubts about America’s long-term ability to sustain its hegemony” (Layne 2006, 199).

What specific policies does Layne suggest? As an offshore balancer, the United States should leave NATO and retract its military power from Europe, and in Asia, it needs to “terminate the mutual security treaty with Japan” (Layne 2006, 187). Layne sees no danger for the United States with China’s rise.

This poses no direct threat to U.S. security, however. Doubtless, Japan, India, Russia (and perhaps Korea) may be worried about the implication of China’s rapid ascendance. But, this is precisely the point of offshore balancing: because China potentially poses a direct threat to them—not to the United States—they should bear the responsibility of balancing against them. (Layne 2006, 187)

Layne’s argument sounds appealing since it offers a strategy that is not “isolationist” with the United States retreating from the world. Moreover, it reduces the U.S. financial burden of providing collective goods and bearing the cost of free riders. However, when we evaluate his recommendations through the lens of PTT, we can see that his strategy is a recipe for great power war in Asia, which will involve the United States.

Layne argues that the offshore balancer should stay on the sidelines of a great power war, unless it portends the rise of a regional hegemon. War is disruptive to world politics, and its precise trajectory is never certain. Imagining policy makers who, like soothsayers, can foretell if the outcome of the war will reveal a regional hegemon is absurd. Military intervention is the only way to make sure that the war does not lead to a regional hegemon emerging.

Although I would not suggest it, Layne’s strategy may work in Europe. Even with power parity among the European states, a general war is not likely since the countries of Europe are satisfied with the status quo.¹⁴ The U.S. strategy of a “pivot” to Asia is the correct policy to pursue, as the region is fraught with dissatisfied and powerful states. China’s rise in power and its more aggressive behavior is causing concern for countries in the region, particularly Japan. A fearful Japan will encourage a nationalistic Japan. For example, after seven years without a Japanese prime minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, on December 26, 2013,

¹⁴ As of this writing, Russia does not appear to be satisfied with the status quo, but Russia is not a rising power and cannot challenge the regional status quo maintained by the European Union. Despite the global recession, the European Union remains together, and no country was forced to leave the Euro Zone.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a visit (Ford 2013b). Visitations to the shrine by Japanese leaders angers countries in the region, like China, since many see the shrine as a symbol of Japan's lack of remorse for the crimes committed by the Japanese during World War II. Abe is not only making aggressive symbolic gestures, but he has called for changing the Japanese constitution to allow for the acquisition of offensive weapons, and for Japan to become a full-fledged military power (see Fackler 2013a, 2013b). Public opinion in Japan is opposed to making changes to the constitution. Nevertheless, Abe has reinterpreted the constitution to allow Japan to export weapons, and he has embraced a legal concept called "collective self-defense," which would allow Japan to come to the military aid of an ally (Fackler 2014).

A nationalistic and militarized Japan will only increase the dissatisfaction of China. The likely outcome will be an arms race, making Asia today look much like Europe 100 years ago. Military withdrawals by the United States from the region will only speed up the process of Japanese rearmament, thus reducing the likelihood that China will be satisfied with the status quo.

Conclusion

A sustained U.S. military presence will not produce a satisfied China. Greater liberal trade integration must be encouraged. The current Trans Pacific Partnership free trade agreement is a good first step, but it does not include China (Voice of America 2013). China does not include the United States in its free-trade agreement with ASEAN.¹⁵ Nevertheless, China and the United States should pursue a larger free-trade area. A major difference in the case of Europe in the early twentieth century and Asia today is not trade itself, but the nature of that trade. More open and liberalized economies in the region are important for reducing the likelihood of conflict.

Unfortunately, liberalism does not fully describe the Chinese economy. China is using market forces to serve the state's development goals, and state majority-owned companies dominate the Chinese economy. The Chinese government creates economic rules, like limitations of foreign control of companies and requirements for foreign companies to transfer technology and intellectual property to benefit state-owned companies (Bremmer 2010, 140). As the Chinese domestic market grows, it will be Chinese and the Chinese state-owned companies that will prosper. Thus, the liberal idea of economic interdependence and open trade as a factor to reduce conflict may not apply with China (Russett and Oneal 2001).

¹⁵ I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

The assumption that China will democratize because of its economic development may also not apply. An association exists between the development of market economies and increasing incomes with the development of democratic government structures (Przeworski et al. 2000). However, China's brand of state-capitalism will not likely have the same outcome. This would be unfortunate, since strong evidence exists that countries that are jointly democratic do not fight wars with each other (Russett 1993).

China's economic actions in the liberal economic order established by the United States are beginning to foment resistance from the other players in the world economy. Many anticipated China's entry into the WTO would "socialize" China to the rules of the liberal world economy (Bradsher 2011). However, China has systematically exploited the rules of the WTO, pursuing cases against those states that violate the rules against China, while violating trade rules when it is advantageous to China. In 2010, China maintained a \$198 billion trade surplus with the world, yet still filed more cases with the WTO "than any other country complaining about another's trade practices" (Bradsher 2010).

Except for the issue of Taiwan, M. Taylor Fravel (2010) has argued that territorial expansion by China is not likely since the payoff would be minimal. However, the waters around the Senkaku/Diayou and in the South China Sea contain deposits of oil. In 2013, China became the world's top importer of crude oil (Hornby 2013). With the political stability of the Middle East and access to Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi oil always a concern, control of oil reserves closer to home may compel China to act.

In the end, John Mearsheimer (2006) may be right in stating that war with China is inevitable. An American policy of offshore balancing will make that war come sooner rather than later. The military pivot toward Asia by the United States forestalls the war by moving China and Japan out of power parity. With the United States involved, China could not hope to prevail in a conflict with Japan. As PTT suggests, war is likely when a challenger who is dissatisfied rationally calculates that there is a possibility of victory. The power of China will continue to rise, but more time before parity will allow a longer opportunity for the world and China to reach a condominium. If the United States, as the world's largest economic power in 1913, had been a military power in Europe then, it might have shifted the balance of power to a preponderance of power on one side, and thus averting World War I and the negative consequences of that war.

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Questions in Politics

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Lost at Sea: How Past Disagreements in the U.S. Senate Continue to Block Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty

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The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) is a major, international convention aimed at creating a global set of rules governing the oceans and modernizing existing international law from previous international marine agreements. LOST entered into force in 1994, despite the United States not ratifying the treaty. As part of a larger project, this article examines why the United States sometimes rejects or fails to affirm international agreements. It presents a case study of the Senate consideration of the various incarnations of the Law of the Sea treaties from the 1960s through the present day. The article analyzes why the Senate, in 1960, formally rejected the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes that was part of the Law of the Sea Treaty at the time. This was one of only four multilateral treaties rejected by the Senate in the twentieth century. The article examines the extent to which the reasons behind the original Senate rejection of this treaty shaped future failures to secure advice and consent to ratification of the updated LOST over the last thirty years. These questions are especially timely and relevant given the ongoing discussions pertaining to whether the Senate will hold a formal vote on LOST before the end of President Obama's second term.

At the end of the Second World War, President Harry S. Truman issued two historic proclamations that changed the way individual countries conceptualized their control of the oceans. Influenced by domestic oil interests, President Truman first declared that the United States had “reasonable and just” inherent rights to the oceanic resources off of its coasts, which should be considered natural extensions of the nation itself (Truman

1945, Proclamation 2667).¹ In his second proclamation, the president called for the “establishment of conservation zones for the protection of fisheries in certain areas of the high seas” that would be regulated and controlled by the United States (Anand 1983, 164; Truman 1945, Proclamation 2668). These unilateral pronouncements of American jurisdiction over specific parts of the ocean breached the traditional freedom-of-the-seas doctrine² that the United States had long defended for its own benefit.

As a result of the United States’ disregard for the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine, other states soon asserted and exercised control over different parts of the sea that they determined fell within their national jurisdiction, “but the contents of these proclamations and the nature of rights claimed under them varied considerably” (Anand 1983, 163).³ The United States and other large maritime nations protested the claims of smaller states but had no recourse to legal standards or arbitration. At that time, no comprehensive international law governing the seas existed and there was no supranational organization to which states could bring complaints regarding other countries’ self-proclaimed marine boundaries. Within ten years of President Truman’s postwar declarations, international waters had become a sea of contention among states whose competing claims of ownership brought many countries to the brink of war. The United Nations responded to the situation by convening the Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1956 to discuss the development of a global agreement on the governing of the sea and its resources. This first conference concluded in 1958 with the creation of four individual treaties regulating different maritime issues and an optional dispute settlement protocol that established the procedure for resolving disagreements between two or more countries. These five treaties, collectively, were known as the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST).

Signed in September 1958 by President Eisenhower, LOST received bipartisan support in the Senate and came to a vote on May 26, 1960 (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11192). Surprisingly, the Optional Protocol to the treaty failed to gain a two-thirds majority of the vote and thus became the

¹ Truman’s assertions were primarily aimed at the undersea areas known as the “continental shelf” of the United States’ land mass.

² This doctrine, advanced in the early seventeenth century and widely accepted by the nineteenth century, effectively limited states’ rights and jurisdiction over the oceans “to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation’s coastline. The remainder of the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none” (Partridge 2011, 5).

³ For instance, a number of Latin American states—Chile (1947), Peru (1947), Costa Rica (1948)—claimed wide jurisdictions for their coastal fisheries that extended state sovereignty to ranges in excess of the so-called “traditional” three-mile limit, “with outsiders being excluded from fishing in those waters” (Anand 1983, 164–67).

third treaty ever formally rejected by the U.S. Senate (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11192–93). After the United States’ rejection of the Optional Protocol, the United Nations convened two additional conferences to discuss the future of LOST. These conferences resulted in an updated version of LOST, which supersedes the 1958 treaty. This new treaty entered into force in 1994 despite the United States’ refusal to ratify.

The history of LOST, from the defeat of the Optional Protocol in 1960 to the Senate’s inaction on the current version of the treaty, stands out as an anomaly worth understanding from the perspective of treaty ratification in the United States. This study is especially relevant today, given that President Obama has signaled his commitment to ratifying LOST during his time in office. This article analyzes why the Senate rejected the Optional Protocol by a direct vote and examines to what extent the reasons for that defeat shaped subsequent failures to secure advice and consent to ratification for the updated LOST over the past thirty years.

Treaty Ratification in the United States

The ratification process itself formally begins when the president signs a treaty and submits it to the Senate, where it is automatically referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations (CFR) for consideration (Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099). The treaty will remain in the CFR until its chairman schedules a vote to report the treaty out to the full Senate. At that point, “if a majority of the committee approves of the treaty, they draft a treaty ratification document pursuant to that treaty,” which is then sent to the Senate floor “for debate, possible amendment (and/or additional reservations), and perhaps a final vote” (Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099). Only if a two-thirds majority of senators present and voting approves the treaty ratification document is the treaty then sent to the president with official Senate advice and consent, at which point the president must decide whether to sign and proclaim the treaty in order for the United States to officially ratify it (Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099).⁴

⁴ Technically, a country can only “ratify” a treaty if the date for signature has not passed; otherwise, a country will be considered to have “acceded to” rather than “ratified” the treaty. Additionally, once the president chooses to sign and proclaim a treaty, he must then deposit the instrument of ratification with the appropriate international body, i.e., the United Nations. With regard to multilateral treaties, a treaty will only enter into force “when the number of parties specified in the treaty deposit their instruments of ratification at a specified location” (Congressional Research Service 2001, 12).

Historically, the Senate has frequently given its unconditional advice and consent to a vast majority of treaties; however, it is not uncommon for the Senate to refuse to vote on a treaty that does not have enough support to ensure its approval, thus blocking ratification⁵ without using the Senate's formal veto power (Congressional Research Service 2001, 3). Notably, the Senate has rarely used its veto by rejecting a treaty through a formal vote. Since the late nineteenth century, the Senate has reviewed over two hundred multilateral treaties, only five of which were rejected by a direct vote and never subsequently ratified at a later date.⁶

The Literature on Treaty Ratification

The research questions and variables to consider for the study of LOST are informed by a comprehensive review of the relevant scholarly literature on the subject of treaty ratification in the United States. As argued by Robert Putnam in 1988, treaty ratification can be conceptualized as a series of overlapping two-level games in the domestic and international arenas. At the domestic level, interest groups pressure the government “to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups” (Putnam 1988, 434). At the international level, state governments “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1988, 434). Putnam (1988, 431–32) concluded that “central decision-makers (‘the state’) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international pressures”⁷ during any policy negotiation or bargaining process, such as the debate over the ratification of a treaty.

In contrast to the core tenets of rational choice theory, Helen Milner (1997, 11) argued that “states are *not* unitary actors” functioning solely at the international level. Using Putnam’s theories as a starting point, Milner set up her own concept of the two-level game, whose outcomes “depend on *both* the international and domestic games” and which involves four sets of actors: “the

⁵ These treaties often remain pending within the CFR for long periods of time and are eventually “replaced by other treaties, amended by protocols and then approved, or withdrawn [from the Senate and] returned to the President” (Congressional Research Service 2001, 3).

⁶ The Treaty of Versailles (1919–1920); the World Court Treaty (1935); the Law of the Sea Treaty Optional Protocol (1960); the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1999); the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2012).

⁷ Particularly, taking into account “parties, social classes, interests groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements” (Putnam 1988, 431–32).

political executive of the home country, a foreign executive, the home country's legislature, and interest groups within the home country" (1997, 67). The take-away lesson is that policymakers must "understand their own domestic situation" and "find consensus at home first" before attempting to obtain the cooperation of international actors on policy initiatives (Milner 1997, 259).

In the early 1990s, Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell (1991, 400) identified what they called the "five keys to success," which highlight the ingredients they believe are necessary for a treaty's success, including the tangible benefits of a treaty, presidential popularity and perceived competence, cooperation between Congress and the president, and a positive relationship between the executive and legislative branches. A little over ten years later, Jeffrey Lantis (2009, 7) argued that ratification "may be more likely to occur in situations where the benefits to the state are perceived to outweigh the costs." Specifically, he found that treaties are less likely to receive ratification "when the executive commits few resources to their passage" and are more likely to be ratified "when executive strategies articulate clear reasons why agreements are in the national interest" (Lantis 2009, 216). Lantis (2009, 6) thus concluded that the ratifiability of any treaty in democratic states may be influenced by "executive strategies for ratification (developed by a president or PM), the type of electoral system (which conditions executive-legislative relations), interest group pressure, and public support."

Quantitative data-set research published by James Meernik and Elizabeth Oldmixon bolsters the conclusions reached by Krepon and Caldwell and by Lantis by showing that "Senators who (do not) share the same party affiliation as the President will be (less) more likely to support him on foreign policy roll call votes" (Meernik and Oldmixon 2008, 191). These findings suggest that there are certain times when treaty ratification might prove more difficult than others, as Putnam, Milner, and Lantis have all pointed out. As a result of the recurrence of a number of common factors in the scholarly literature, this article considers the effect of both international and domestic factors on the treaty ratification process in the United States when evaluating the causes of treaty rejection.

LOST Case Study

What Is LOST?

LOST is a major multilateral treaty designed to govern state regulation and control of the seas in a variety of areas. The treaty originated from the 1956 UNCLOS that itself arose to address the "multitude of claims, counterclaims, and sovereignty disputes" among states relating to the control of the water off their coasts ("The United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea” 2012). The first UNCLOS concluded in 1958 with the creation of four separate treaties⁸ and an optional dispute settlement protocol, collectively known as LOST. The purpose of LOST, as enumerated by the U.S. Senate in 1960, was “to codify existing international law and to establish additional international law” relating to governance of the seas (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-April, 1). The Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes was added to codify the procedures for resolving any disputes that would arise relating to issues covered in the four conventions.⁹ When the Senate held a vote on LOST in 1960, all four conventions received advice and consent, but the Optional Protocol was rejected.

By the time LOST entered into force, many of its provisions were outdated based on emerging maritime technology (Anand 1983, 236; Tuerk 2012, 43).¹⁰ Further, a number of important issues had been excluded from the treaty because the states involved had been unable to negotiate satisfactory compromises. A second UNCLOS convened in March 1960 to discuss concerns not addressed by the first LOST, but this conference failed to create any new agreements. The United Nations gathered again in 1967 for a third UNCLOS that culminated in an updated and comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea in 1982, which eventually entered into force on

⁸ The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas (“Four Conventions on the Law of the Sea” 1959).

⁹ The Optional Protocol specifically provided that states party to LOST resort: “In all matters concerning them in respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of any article of the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958, to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement is provided in the Convention or has been agreed upon by the Parties within a reasonable period” (Four Conventions on the Law of the Sea 1959, 61). The protocol also explicitly defined what constituted a “reasonable period” of time for settling disputes between parties by including in Article III and Article IV, respectively: “The Parties may agree within a period of two months after one party has notified its option to the other that a dispute exists, to resort not to the Court but to an arbitral tribunal. After the expiry of the said period, either Party to this Protocol may bring the dispute before the Court by an application...Within the same period of two months, the Parties to this Protocol may agree to adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the Court. This conciliation commission shall make its recommendations within five months after its appointment. If its recommendations are not accepted by the parties to the dispute within two months after they have been delivered, either party may bring the dispute before the Court by an application” (Four Conventions on the Law of the Sea 1959, 61).

¹⁰ Particularly, resource extraction from the continental shelf and subsoil.

November 16, 1994 (“The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” 2012; Partridge 2011, 8; “The Law of the Sea Convention and the United States” 2012).

The new LOST established a legal regime that superseded the 1958 LOST and governed the most controversial issues¹¹ of the seas. When the new LOST opened for signature in December 1982, “the United States and some other industrialized countries did not sign the convention, maintaining that important changes were needed to the parts that dealt with deep seabed resources beyond national jurisdiction” (“The Law of the Sea Convention and the United States” 2012). As a result of these complaints, an amendment to the treaty was added in 1994 that dealt specifically with deep seabed mineral resources, and it entered into force on July 28, 1996 (“The Law of the Sea Convention and Living Resources” 2012; “The Law of the Sea Convention and the United States” 2012). Despite multiple opportunities, the 1982 LOST and 1994 agreement have never received a vote for advice and consent in the Senate, thus leaving the United States a nonparty to the currently active treaty and relying on previous agreements about the control of the seas as the only protection of American maritime rights.

LOST Ratification Process, 1959–1960

Timeline of Key Events

The original LOST, consisting of four conventions with the additional Optional Protocol for dispute settlement, was submitted to the U.S. Senate on September 9, 1959. The CFR held a hearing on LOST on January 20, 1960, and drafted a report on April 27, 1960, referring the conventions to the full Senate without objection and recommending their ratification. One month after receiving LOST for consideration, the full Senate voted on whether to provide advice and consent to the treaty, relabeling the four conventions and the Optional Protocol as Executive J through N, respectively (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11192). The Senate vote on Executives J through N of LOST

¹¹ Namely, navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships through narrow straits, conservation and management of living marine resources, protection of the marine environment, a marine research regime, and a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between states (Partridge 2011, 8; Walker 2007, 487).

occurred en bloc¹² on May 26, 1960, and resulted in a favorable vote of 77–4 (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11192).

Immediately following the vote on LOST, Senator Johnson (D-TX) requested reconsideration without additional debate (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11192). Johnson specifically requested that the Senate take a separate vote on Executive N, which occurred almost immediately and resulted in a vote of 49–30, thus formally rejecting the Optional Protocol and representing the third time in U.S. history that the Senate vetoed a multilateral treaty by a direct vote (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11193). Following that vote, the United States submitted the instruments of ratification for the four approved treaties and LOST entered into force in increments between 1962 and 1966;¹³ but to this day, the United States has not ratified the 1958 Optional Protocol of the treaty (United Nations Treaty Collection 2013).

Debate over Dispute Settlement in 1958 LOST

With regard to the Optional Protocol, debate in the CFR focused on the extent to which LOST would be inconsistent with the United States' acceptance of the Connally Amendment, "which states that, in substance, the United States is to be the sole judge of whether the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction affecting its domestic law" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-January, 76, 304). Senator Long, for instance, expressed his conviction that "to depart from that reservation would leave to the World Court the power to wrongfully usurp jurisdiction...and there would have been no court to which a country could appeal if it thought the World Court had made a mistake" (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11195–96). This argument reflected the fear of many senators at the time that ratifying the Optional Protocol would strip away some of the United States' sovereignty. A number of senators believed that "over time the powers given will be abused, and the way to stop the usurpation is not to vote to make it possible in the beginning" (*Congressional Record* 1960, 11196). This fear, and the way to avoid its physical manifestation, was forefront in the minds of many senators who looked back to the ratification debate of the World

¹² A favorable outcome would signal approval of Executives J–N, but if two-thirds of the senators voting did not vote favorably, then all four conventions and the optional protocol would be considered rejected.

¹³ Convention on the High Seas (September 30, 1962); Convention on the Continental Shelf (June 1, 1964); Convention on the Territorial Sea (September 10, 1964); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas (March 20, 1966).

Court Treaty, nearly twenty-five years previously, that had centered on concerns of American sovereignty and that also ended in Senate rejection.

LOST Ratification Process, 1982–Present

Timeline of Key Events

As noted above, during Senate consideration of the 1958 LOST, the United Nations was already in the progress of hosting a second UNCLOS to resolve the issues not addressed in the first treaty. When this conference failed to yield any further international agreements, the United Nations hosted a third and final conference on the law of the sea, which culminated in a new and improved version of LOST. This updated treaty opened for signature in December 1982, at which point President Ronald Reagan, and other maritime allies of the United States, raised objections regarding certain provisions related to the mining of deep seabed resources (Khalifa 2012, 17).¹⁴ These objections and subsequent negotiations in the United Nations led to the creation of the 1994 Deep Sea-Bed Implementing Agreement. President Clinton signed this agreement on July 29, 1994, along with the 1982 LOST,¹⁵ despite the Senate’s release on July 19 of a concurrent resolution expressing its desire that the president refrain from signing the agreement (Song 2005, 263; Senate Concurrent Resolution 72 1994, 1). President Clinton submitted the treaty documents to the Senate on October 7, 1994, and urged the Senate to provide advice and consent to ratification (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1994, III).

The 1982 version of LOST entered into force on November 16, 1994, and the 1994 agreement entered into force on July 28, 1996, both without U.S. ratification, primarily due to the fact that the treaty had been held hostage by Republican senator Jesse Helms—chairman of the CFR—who actively opposed U.S. accession to LOST (The Law of the Sea Convention and Living Resources 2012; Song 2005, 263). During his tenure as chairman, Helms refused to hold any hearings on LOST in the CFR or to schedule a vote to report the treaty to the full Senate. When Helms retired from the Senate in 2002, and Senator Richard Lugar became the new chairman of the CFR, there was concern in the committee that non-ratification would prevent the United States from protecting its national interests by prohibiting attendance at the

¹⁴ Particular concerns included the perceived lack of adequate U.S. representation in the decision-making process for such mining activities and the burden of regulations on private companies seeking to mine deep seabed resources (Song 2005, 263).

¹⁵ Any further references to the 1982 LOST will henceforth refer to both the 1982 version of the treaty and the 1994 agreement.

upcoming conferences for review of amendments to LOST (Song 2005, 264). As a result of those concerns, the CFR held two hearings on LOST in October 2003 and voted, unanimously, on February 25, 2004, to send the resolution of ratification for the treaty to the full Senate for advice and consent (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 3).

In the April 27 report to the full Senate, the CFR voiced its conviction that U.S. accession to LOST should be completed promptly in light of the treaty's scheduled opening for amendments in November 2004 (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2004-March, 7). Aside from the timing consideration, the CFR also recommended that the Senate provide advice and consent to LOST because the treaty would advance U.S. economic and environmental protection interests as well as allow the United States to play a key leadership role in global oceans issues through full participation in institutions established by the treaty, namely the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2004-March, 6-7). Despite the CFR's support for ratification, the full Senate never scheduled a vote on the treaty, and at the end of the 108th Congress in January 2005, LOST automatically returned to the CFR (Khalifa 2012, 17).

When the 110th Congress convened in January 2007, the CFR reconsidered LOST and held another round of hearings in September and October 2007, which resulted in a December 2007 report from the CFR to the full Senate, once again recommending a vote to provide advice and consent to ratification (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 9). This report contained nearly identical information to the report from 2004, with the added consideration that U.S. failure to accede to LOST would increase the nation's energy vulnerability by constraining the opportunities of U.S. energy companies, particularly in oil and gas, to explore the ocean for resources beyond 200 nautical miles from shore (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 9). Despite receiving bipartisan support, the treaty failed yet again to come up for a vote by the full Senate and once more reverted back to the CFR at the end of the 110th Congress in January 2009 (McMillion 2012).

President Obama, in the years since 2009, has consistently signaled his administration's commitment to seeking U.S. accession to LOST. Despite the encouraging promises of White House staff, the momentum of Obama's first year in office did not result in Senate action on the treaty. However, Senator Kerry (D-MA), the chairman of the Senate CFR, has championed LOST. At Kerry's behest, the CFR held a series of hearings on LOST in May and June 2012 to push for ratification, but Kerry also made a point of declaring that he

did not “intend to bring the treaty to a vote before the November [presidential] elections” (McMillion 2012; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2012, 4). Although nearly two years have now passed since President Obama successfully won a second term in the White House, the CFR has not yet drafted a report sending LOST to the full Senate for a third attempt in ten years at scheduling a vote for advice and consent.

Debate over Dispute Settlement

The debate over the effect of LOST’s dispute resolution procedures on U.S. sovereignty and national security marked a clear divide between the pro- and anti-treaty ratification factions inside and outside of the Senate. These groups remained split over their fundamental disagreements regarding the extent to which specific LOST provisions were either consistent or incompatible with U.S. interests, particularly involving maritime activities. The primary area of contention surrounding the ratification debate centered on the cost-benefit analysis of American adherence to the treaty’s provisions and participation in the international regulatory institutions¹⁶ created by LOST.

To begin, treaty advocates argued that the United States needed to exert influence “from inside the Convention, rather than depending on other nations to represent our interests,” particularly in the case of maintaining navigational freedom (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 17). To do so, the United States needed to engage in the treaty’s administrative bodies as a fully participating member. Opponents of LOST, however, viewed such involvement as an unnecessary submission of American authority because the United States would receive no substantial gains from participating in any of LOST’s regulatory institutions. For instance, the United States has exercised its right to freedom of movement on the seas for the past twenty-five years without joining LOST because that right falls under customary international law (Pedrozo 2010, 156).¹⁷ These concerns of sacrificing American sovereignty in exchange for little to no benefit have solidified the oppositional stance of many Republican senators.

The tug-of-war between treaty advocates and opponents over American sovereignty also came into play with regard to the ability of the

¹⁶ Specifically, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

¹⁷ Similarly, the United States has not forfeited its jurisdictional claims to an extended continental shelf by not ratifying the treaty because the legitimate grounds for this claim revert to the United States’ historical rights in such matters as established by President Truman in 1945 (Predozo 2012, 152).

U.S. Navy to protect American security interests. In particular, the Department of State publicly approved the treaty's dispute settlement system because it provided "[p]arties the means of excluding from binding dispute settlement certain sensitive political and defense matters" (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1994, VII). This provision became extremely important in the ratification debate because it allowed a state to exclude from LOST's dispute settlement procedures any disputes concerning military and certain law enforcement activities (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1994, 86).

In both its 2004 and 2007 reports to the Senate, the CFR declared that "U.S. consent to accession is conditioned upon the understanding that, under article 198(1)(b), each State Party has the exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were 'military activities,' and that such determinations are not subject to review" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2004-March, 8; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 11). The CFR also clarified that U.S. maritime intelligence operations would be considered "military activities" for the purpose of excluding such activities from the treaty's dispute settlement mechanisms (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 11).¹⁸ By the end of the 2012 CFR hearings, treaty supporters viewed the declaration regarding U.S. compliance with LOST's dispute resolution procedures as an ironclad assurance that the United States could expand its maritime military operations without facing any international judicial repercussions. As a result, the consensus within the CFR was that the United States would benefit more from accepting the treaty's dispute settlement procedures than by taking its chances with customary international law, which was less flexible and more arbitrary.¹⁹

High-ranking members of U.S. military forces, in particular, saw accession to LOST as vital to protecting national security interests by

¹⁸ This assertion remained intact during the 2012 hearings, in which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton assured the CFR that the treaty would not prohibit U.S. intelligence activities because they fall under the "military activities" exclusion (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2012, 64). Therefore, "if a tribunal were nevertheless to second-guess a U.S. judgment as to what constitutes a U.S. 'military activity,' the United States would view that judgment as lacking a legal basis and invalid, and it would therefore have no legal effect on the United States" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2012, 64).

¹⁹ In particular, LOST allowed states to choose which mechanisms of resolution they wanted to use for the settlement of disputes, which, unlike the 1958 Optional Protocol, gave the United States the option of not choosing arbitration by the International Court of Justice (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1994, 83-84; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 32).

protecting the freedom of American strategic mobility both in the water and in the airspace above the seas (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2003-October, 104). Maintaining this mobility was considered especially important with regard to fighting the global war on terrorism and enforcing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).²⁰ According to treaty proponents, LOST, if ratified, would give the United States “greater rights to board than we have under the existing treaty to which we are a party”²¹ (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 117). Treaty opponents, on the other hand, found that the basic provisions of the PSI necessarily came into conflict with the concept of “innocent passage” on the seas, protected by Article 110 of LOST, which only permitted ship interception in instances of piracy, slavery, narcotics trafficking, and unauthorized radio broadcasting (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 85).

Even more troubling to treaty opponents was the fact that “LOST outranks PSI in the hierarchy of international law” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 86). Therefore, if the United States, as a party to LOST, intercepted and boarded a foreign vessel on suspicions of WMD transportation, the foreign state to which the vessel belonged could contest the actions of the United States in an international court through the treaty’s dispute settlement procedures. The possibility of such a dispute arising, that involved the issue of whether an activity was military in nature, was particularly worrisome because “the tribunals created by LOST are permitted to make that determination themselves”²² (Senate Committee on

²⁰ The PSI is a multinational security agreement launched in 2003 for the purpose of permitting the United States and other participants to stop and search foreign vessels suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction and WMD delivery systems in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 85). By 2012, ninety-seven nations in addition to the United States had adopted the PSI as a political alliance endorsed by the United Nations Secretary-General as well as to a large extent by the United Nations Security Council (Tuerk 2012, 121).

²¹ As set forth in the Convention on the High Seas (1958), a state ship is not justified in boarding a foreign vessel unless it possesses reasonable ground for suspecting “(a) that the ship is engaged in piracy; or (b) that the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or (c) that, through flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1994, 32).

²² In a 2012 letter to the CFR, the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) argued that, because the “opt out” clause in Article 298 “neither mentions nor defines military or intelligence operations, [then] if there is a disagreement over what is or is not a

Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 82). This restriction on U.S. sovereignty would undermine national security efforts by the U.S. military and was thus considered by treaty opponents to substantially outweigh any potential benefits of accession to LOST. As a result, nearly a third of the Senate's voting members in 2012 pledged their opposition to ratification of LOST should it come to the Senate floor within the next few years.

Analysis of LOST Case Study

Treaty ratification in the United States is shaped by a variety of factors, some of which bear a greater impact than others on the overall ratification process. The following analysis discusses what factors have shaped the United States' failure to secure advice and consent to ratification of LOST since 1982 for the purpose of providing policy-relevant generalizations useful for understanding and shaping the ratification process of multilateral treaties in the United States. This analysis progresses by focusing first on the effect of international events and second on the domestic context during the ratification debate. Specifically, the domestic context includes the following factors, in order: the role of public opinion and interest groups; the lessons learned from the rejection of the Optional Protocol in 1960, which shaped the ratification debate for the 1982 LOST; the nature of executive-legislative relations; and the internal Senate structure and debate.

A discussion of Senate treatment regarding LOST since 1982 begins with an examination of international politics. Specifically, consideration of the treaty raised the concern that accession to LOST would undermine American sovereignty. This became increasingly important after 9/11, especially with regard to the PSI.²³ On the other hand, the issue of energy security caused many senators and even members of the executive branch to advocate for ratification. In particular, the 2012 CFR hearing addressed the fact that:

military activity, LOST requires the matter to be resolved by an international agency" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2012, 166). Senator Vitter had voiced these same concerns five years previously when he addressed the CFR with the following question: "Isn't it true that there would be nothing to prevent another country, with a different understanding about U.S. military activities, to bring a dispute regarding what is, or is not, U.S. military activities to this mandatory arbitral process, to which we would be bound?" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-September and October, 43).

²³ Many senators worried that if another state challenged the United States' actions in carrying out the PSI, then LOST's dispute settlement clause might draw the United States into a case arbitrated by the ICJ rather than any of the other bodies preferable to the United States.

Russia and other countries are carving up the Arctic and laying claims to the oil and gas riches in that region. [The United States], on the other hand, can't even access the treaty body that provides international legitimacy for these types of Arctic claims. Instead of taking every possible step to ensure our stake in this resource-rich area, we are watching others assert their claims and doing nothing about it because we have no legal recourse. (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2012, 2–3)

The United States faced a unique position in which it could not rely on LOST to support its contention of other state's resource claims, but neither could it assert its own maritime interests solely through robust naval power because "the overwhelming majority of ocean disputes do not involve enemies or issues that warrant military action" (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2012, 7). By participating in LOST as a state party, the United States could both protect its own marine resource claims and also prevent competitor states, such as Russia and China, from surpassing the United States in terms of collecting these vital resources.

With regard to the domestic context of the LOST ratification debate, the first factor to consider is the role of public opinion and interest groups. These "outsider" forces in the ratification process come into play at both the executive and legislative levels. Specifically, presidents often attempt to mobilize public opinion in support of their policies in order to manipulate the opinions and actions of congressmen whose employment depends on the political preferences of the electorate (Dahl 1983, 108–9). Yet, even when Americans indicate their interest in a certain topic, their intellectual engagement often does not translate into action. This disconnect between opinion and action illustrates what James Lindsay (2000, 5) refers to as "apathetic internationalism." This phenomenon is reflected by "the great irony of the post-Cold War era [that] at the very moment that the United States has more influence than ever on international affairs, Americans have lost much of their interest in the world around them" as a result of United States preponderance, which gives most Americans a feeling of complacency and security (Lindsay 2000, 2–5; Walt 2000, 65). In fact, since the end of the Cold War, "only three percent [of Americans] name foreign policy concerns as the most important problem facing the country" (Lindsay 2000, 3–4).

Apathetic internationalism, when combined with the other factors discussed in this article, can have a devastating effect on foreign policy and successful treaty ratification because "politicians worry less about what the public thinks about an issue than about how intensely it cares" (Lindsay 2000, 2). It can be hard for congressmen to determine with any accuracy such levels

of intensity in public opinion because even if a majority of voters care about an issue, they are unlikely to act on their concerns. Additionally, public opinion polls about specific issues “almost never measure relative *intensities* of opinion [and therefore fail] to reveal whether the attitude is accompanied by sufficient emotional involvement to influence [congressional] conduct in a significant way” (Dahl 1983, 38). Taking both of these limitations into account, LOST reflects how having a great deal of public support, even bipartisanship support, does not guarantee the ratification of a treaty. As a result of these factors that restrict the effect of public opinion on congressional action, presidents have a harder time mobilizing forces that can assist in pushing forth White House policies.

Unlike the average American, members of interest groups actively voice their opinions in support of or opposition to government policies, thus increasing their ability to influence the opinions and behaviors of key congressmen. An examination of these other “outsider” forces reveals, in general, that nongovernmental interest groups have the ability to influence Senate debate on foreign policy by providing specialized information on different topics about which individual senators cannot be expected to know scientific or technical details, many of which bear directly on the interpretation and effect of treaties under consideration. These “outsiders” can influence treaty ratification debates at different stages: first, in the months leading up to a ratification vote, during which time the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community “can encourage executive branch supporters and senate champions to lead boldly, set the terms of debate, and help build public and media interests”; and second, in the last few weeks prior to a close vote, when “even small efforts can be significant for fence-sitting senators given the unpredictability of the outcome” (Krepon, Smithson, and Parachini 1997, 36).

During these two phases, NGOs may “seek to mobilize external public pressure on veto players to ratify the agreement” or may try “to persuade veto players of [the treaty’s] merits” (Oppermann and Röttsches 2010, 245–46). Throughout the 2007 CFR hearings on LOST, the committee received letters in support of ratification from affected industry and environmental groups, as well as assorted associations including the Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Shipping (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 10).²⁴ Then in 2012, treaty advocates launched the American

²⁴ Other affected associations included the following: “the National Foreign Trade Council, the American Petroleum Institute, the International Association of Drilling Contractors, the Independent Petroleum Association of America, American Exploration and Production Council, U.S. Oil and Gas Association, National Ocean Industries Association, the National Marine Manufacturers Association, AT & T,

Sovereignty Campaign—a diverse collection of government and private-sector representatives—in an effort to raise public awareness over the ratification debate and suggest that “in joining the Convention, the United States will invite economic opportunity, create U.S. jobs, and protect business and commercial interests at home and abroad” (Khalifa 2012, 16).

Although LOST enjoys broad support among relevant interest groups in the United States, the treaty “continues to be held up by a dozen right-wing Republican Senators backed by a coalition of national groups who see the Convention as another step toward global government” (Song 2005, 264).²⁵ In particular, the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation are conservative think tanks that oppose U.S. accession to LOST based on national security and sovereignty concerns. When looking at LOST, it becomes clear that the role of interest groups has impacted the ratification debate, especially by disseminating highly specific technical and scientific information, but this factor alone does not account for the treaty’s failure to receive ratification. Thus, the next domestic factor to consider is the context of the Senate’s rejection of the 1958 Optional Protocol.

The significance of the relationship between the past and the present stems from two events. First, the Senate provided advice and consent to ratification for the four conventions of the 1958 LOST, which the United States then ratified. Second, the third UNCLOS created an updated version of LOST in 1982 that included, in some manner, sections relating to the five parts of the 1958 LOST upon which the U.S. Senate had previously voted. Therefore, for the past thirty years, the Senate has debated a treaty consisting of parts that it either adopted or rejected in the past.

Unlike the 1958 LOST, however, “the [1982] Convention on the Law of the Sea is unique in that the mechanism for the settlement of disputes is incorporated into the document” instead of into an optional protocol, thus

Spring, Tyco Communications Inc., the North American Submarine Cable Association, Pacific Crossing Limited, Pacific Telecom Cable, the National Fisheries Institute, the U.S. Tuna Foundation, the Ocean Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, the Humane Society of the United States, the American Bar Association, the Council on Ocean Law, the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, the Center for Seafarers’ Rights, Citizens for Global Solutions, the League of Conservation Voters, the National Environmental Trust, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Pew Oceans Commission, and the Transportation Institute” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 10).

²⁵ The CFR has received letters in opposition to ratification from the American Conservative Union, State Department Watch, Freedom Alliance, American’s Survival, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute during the 2007 committee hearings (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2007-December, 10).

making the current treaty an unbreakable whole that must receive, in its entirety, two-thirds of Senate support in order for the United States to ratify it (“The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” 2012). This means that the Senate must consider together the aspects of the treaty that it supports in addition to those it opposes, and had opposed in the past, when deciding whether to provide advice and consent. Specifically, the single decisive factor that led to the rejection of the Optional Protocol in 1960 was the content of the treaty itself. In essence, the Senate rejected the Optional Protocol because it feared that adhering to the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms, including the ICJ, would strip the United States of its treasured sovereignty in critical areas of American interest and domestic jurisdiction. This debate was informed by the context of the Senate’s rejection of the World Court Treaty in 1935²⁶ and the Senate’s adoption of the Connally Amendment in 1946 to which the United States still adheres.

The reservations that the Senate held about joining the World Court in 1935 resurfaced when the Senate considered the ratification of LOST fifteen years later. While holding a hearing on LOST in January 1960, the Senate was scheduled within a week to consider a proposal concerning whether the United States should maintain, change, or withdraw from the Connally Amendment (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-January, 76).²⁷ This amendment was first adopted in 1946, making it the first “self-judging clause in the history of International Court jurisdiction” (Larson 1961, 87; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-January and February, 304). The “self-judging” part of the amendment comes from the words “as determined by the United States of America” which Senator Connally added to the end of Article

²⁶ The Senate rejected the World Court Treaty on January 29, 1935, with a vote of fifty-two in favor and thirty-six opposed (*Congressional Record* 1935, 1147). Although the treaty had been supported by Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt, “the opposition to the court was based chiefly on its connection with the League of Nations,” which the Senate had also rejected as part of the Treaty of Versailles fifteen years prior (Hudson 1935, 303). Specifically, opposing sentiments were based “on a fear of ratification as a step toward joining the League, on apprehension of loss of independence by the United States and of loss by the Senate of its share of control of our foreign relations” (Hudson 1935, 303–4). At the heart of the rejection of the World Court Treaty was the Senate’s refusal “to accept the optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction as provided in the statute of the Court” (“Still Out of the World Court” 1935, 18).

²⁷ The CFR held two hearings on the Connally Amendment, one on January 27, 1960, and one on February 17, 1960, in which arguments were presented both for and against Senate Resolution 94 to essentially abolish the Connally Amendment (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-January and February).

36 of the Statute of the ICJ, declaring that the ICJ would not have jurisdiction over “disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1946, 1; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-January and February, 1). By 1960, though, a number of senators questioned the benefits of the amendment’s continued use and proposed a resolution to effectively render the Connally Amendment void.

Ultimately, however, a majority of senators believed that passage of the proposed resolution against the Connally Amendment could supposedly “lead gradually to abdication by the United States of its sovereign power and that of the American people to a world government” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1960-January and February, 149). The belief that the Connally Amendment protected America’s right to assert its sovereignty still remained strong. Consideration of these arguments in early 1960 thus affected the debate on ratification of the 1958 LOST. In particular, the sentiments provided in support of maintaining U.S. adherence to the Connally Amendment reflect the opinions of the senators who opposed U.S. accession to LOST’s Optional Protocol.

Contemporary Senate concerns over American sovereignty with regard to the 1982 LOST have not occurred in a vacuum, but rather have evolved from domestic debate decades ago on the same topic. Specifically, the historical considerations regarding sovereignty that affected Senate debate over the Treaty of Versailles, the World Court Treaty, the Connally Amendment, and the 1958 LOST came into play again during consideration of the 1982 LOST. Even though the climate of international relations today differs from that of the first half of the twentieth century, issues of sovereignty remain founded upon a historical precedent of American exceptionalism and reluctance to relinquish decision-making authority. As a result, the reasons for rejecting the Optional Protocol in 1960 have affected the contemporary debate over the new LOST in addition to the other factors discussed below.

By examining the final two factors at play in the treaty ratification process—executive-legislative relations, and the structure of the Senate—it becomes clear that the noticeable lack of extreme partisanship in these areas reduced their overall impact on the ratification process of LOST since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Consider first the political climate during Clinton’s presidency when a high degree of partisanship poisoned relations between the executive branch and the Republican-controlled congress, especially on issues of foreign policy. Although Senator Helms strongly opposed LOST and held it hostage in the CFR, Helms’s actions prevented the treaty from facing outright rejection by a vote on the Senate floor and merely postponed its eventual discussion, which occurred as soon as

Helms retired. With Helms out of the way, the Senate actively considered LOST in a number of hearings before the CFR that resulted in favorable reports on the treaty sent to the full Senate. Yet, despite these actions, LOST never received a vote on the Senate floor. Contrary to the 1990s, the political atmosphere in the first decade of the twenty-first century appeared relatively calm and conducive to a bipartisan vote for ratification of LOST.

Notably, since its creation in 1982 and revision in 1994, Democratic and Republican presidents alike, as well as senators, have consistently supported LOST. For instance, in 2004, the CFR voted unanimously to send the resolution of ratification for LOST to the full Senate for a vote on ratification with the personal recommendation of the CFR chairman, Senator Lugar, and the support of President George W. Bush (Bandow 2005, 25; Song 2005, 261). Surprisingly, the Senate did not schedule a vote on the treaty and it reverted back to the CFR, where it underwent another round of hearings in 2007 and was again reported out to the full Senate accompanied by a statement from President Bush urging the Senate to provide advice and consent to ratification on the treaty (Walker 2007, 463). The fact that both Republicans and Democrats in Congress and the executive branch have supported LOST shows that the treaty's failure to receive ratification is not simply due to partisanship gamesmanship, but rather due to important concerns over the treaty's provisions, primarily the ones relating to dispute settlement and the question of American sovereignty.

It is important to note, however, that political polarization may be one of the reasons that LOST has not yet been submitted to the Senate for a vote even after President Obama won a second presidential term. A review of the CFR hearings from 2004 to 2012 reveals that debate over the treaty has increased over time. As a result, LOST's best chance of ratification may have been in 2004. In particular, it became clear to many treaty supporters in 2012 that a number of Republicans were inclined to oppose the president on foreign policy matters regardless of the specific policy at hand. Thus, the structure of the Senate in 2012 helped prevent LOST from being defeated by a vote that year because Senator Kerry, a Democrat sympathetic to the treaty, held the post of chairman of the CFR.²⁸

²⁸ Senators in key leadership positions, like Senator Kerry in 2012 or Senator Helms in the 1990s, have a disproportionate influence on when and how a treaty is handled in the Senate. Specifically, the chair of the CFR holds "a unique institutional position to determine whether and in what form a treaty will achieve Senate advice and consent" (Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1102). The chair of this committee is able to push for a treaty to move quickly through the process or prevent it from moving to a vote by the full Senate.

In the summer of 2012, Republican senator DeMint publicly announced that thirty-four senators, enough to kill the treaty, stood opposed to ratification of LOST (Wong and Lengell 2012). Therefore, with the unique power of his position in the CFR, Senator Kerry explicitly informed his colleagues that LOST would not be reported out of committee until sometime after the November 2012 presidential elections, thus giving treaty supporters time to round up enough votes to ensure that LOST would receive advice and consent to ratification from the full Senate. No further progress, however, has occurred on the treaty since Obama's victory in the 2012 presidential election, perhaps as a result of the Senate's surprising rejection of another multilateral treaty²⁹ in December 2012. It is unclear at this point whether the CFR will report LOST for a ratification vote before the end of President Obama's second term.

Conclusion

As shown by the analysis of the various factors above, the rejection of LOST's Optional Protocol for dispute settlement in 1960 significantly impacted subsequent debate on the updated version of the treaty that currently resides in the CFR awaiting further action. Although the original defeat of the treaty and its current failure to receive Senate advice and consent can be traced to concerns over the preservation of the integrity of American sovereignty, the ratification debates over LOST cannot be pinned to one set of circumstances, a single event, or an individual player. Rather, it is the interaction of different factors that have contributed to the current status of U.S. inaction on the contemporary LOST. These factors include consideration of the politics at the international level as well as at the domestic level in the areas of public opinion and interest group involvement, the tone of executive-legislative relations, and the structure of the Senate.

The potential international ramifications of ratification, both positive and negative, continue to affect domestic consideration of the treaty with regard to issues of national and energy security. Looking closer to home, the domestic debate over ratification centers on issues of American sovereignty not resolved since the 1960 rejection of the Optional Protocol. Outside of the Senate, LOST has received a great deal of bipartisan support, but the treaty's primary opponents are Republican senators with whom President Obama has not engaged to solicit support for ratification. Although LOST has not yet come

²⁹ The Senate rejected the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on December 4, 2012 by a vote of 61–38, five votes short of the required two-thirds majority (Blanchfield and Brouger 2013, 1).

before the Senate for a ratification vote following the 2012 CFR hearings, it is clear that a successful outcome for the treaty is far from guaranteed.

At the heart of the conflict over the current version of LOST is the basic disagreement between treaty supporters and treaty opponents over the benefits to be gained from ratifying the treaty and the consequences to be suffered from failing to provide ratification. Although it has not suffered any tangible costs as a result of non-ratification, the United States has missed opportunities to affect the application of LOST's provisions. Specifically, not ratifying the treaty has prevented the United States from playing a role in the treaty's regulatory bodies. While not participating in the decisions of these bodies has not yet jeopardized American interests, continuing to remain a nonparty to LOST will result in increasingly greater costs to the United States. In particular, as other countries, especially Russia and China, lay claim to maritime resources, the United States will lose out on the chance to deny those claims or put in their own request for the resources through the treaty's regulatory commissions. On the other hand, if the United States attempts to curtail the actions of other countries or legitimize any of its own maritime interests without recourse to LOST, then it will undermine the basis of international maritime law, including the four conventions ratified in 1960 as part of the original LOST.

Either of the above scenarios will make it harder for the United States to protect its interests through diplomatic measures and continued non-ratification of LOST will alienate the United States from its allies who already adhere to the treaty. Remaining a nonparty will ultimately hinder the United States' ability to carry out maritime operations designed to benefit American economics and national security. At this point, accession to LOST will only benefit the United States while the costs of not ratifying continue to rise.

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Questions in Politics

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The Politics-Administration Dichotomy: Perceptions from Administrators in Masculine and Feminine State Agencies

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The dynamic relationship between politics and administration has long been examined in the field of public administration because politics has a significant impact on the policy process and administration. Classical scholars have often argued for a strict dichotomy, where administrators are neutral and should be isolated from politics. However, over time, scholars have developed new, more practical approaches to explain the influence politics and administration have on one another. Politics has a significant impact on distributive policies and agencies due to the political nature of these policy decisions. Therefore, this case study examines perceptions of state-level administrators in redistributive and regulatory agencies to explore practical means of defining the contemporary dichotomy. This analysis also identifies gendered elements of a dichotomy, as regulatory agencies tend to be classified as masculine, while redistributive agencies have feminine traits. In conclusion, this case study illustrates that there are differences in the politics-administration dichotomy by administrators in gendered agencies.

The role and responsibilities of public organizations have long been a major concern of political science, policy, and public administration scholars due to the integral role public agencies play in providing and maintaining governance. Since Woodrow Wilson's work "The Study of Administration" was written in 1887, contemporary scholars have been interested in

understanding, reinventing, and modifying the politics-administration dichotomy. In Wilson's work as well as in other classical authors' contributions, there is an emphasis on highlighting the role of administrators in public organizations as having a responsibility to implement policy, but in a neutral, nonpartisan manner. Wilson (1887) asserted, "the field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics" (209). He further illustrated the separation of politics and administration by noting, "administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions," which spurred many to take Wilson's paradigm literally (210). According to Svava (2001), "even the politics-administration dichotomy that is a part of the traditional paradigm usually incorporated the ideas of accountability and responsibilities," which highlights the strict interpretation of an isolation between political and administrative actions (176). Therefore, the traditional paradigm suggests that politics could be isolated from administrative duties in order to provide good, efficient governance that would result in fairness throughout a democratic society. While the dichotomy is a widely discussed theory of public administration in classical and contemporary works, these theoretical conversations may have an important implication for practice.

Overall, the politics-administration dichotomy is an idea that implies a "division of labor and authority between elected and administrative officials increases the democratic accountability and planning ability of public administrators" (Demir and Nyhan 2008, 81). If democratic accountability and neutral competence are critical values of public administrators, it is necessary to examine how administrators actually view their responsibilities in administration and how they view the impact of politics on their individual roles.

Therefore, this research fills a void in the discussion of the dichotomy, by focusing on perceptions of political impacts from administrators at the state level of government. Also, this case study takes into account gendered¹ dynamics of organizations and the impact it has on individuals' perceptions of the politics-administration dichotomy. Hierarchical organizations, certainly the

¹ Gender is a term that is traditionally used to illustrate one's sex or sex role in society. However, organizations can also socialize individuals to behave in particular ways relating to masculinity or femininity. The concept of "gendered institutions" conveys that gendered dynamics are present in organizations. These gendered dynamics may include: "processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distribution of power" (Acker 1992, 567). For example, the dominance of male actors in organizations, processes, and leadership illustrate the presence of masculine approaches, which is illustrative of the gendering process.

administrative state, can be gendered, as Acker (1990) claims, “images of men’s bodies and masculinity pervade organizational processes, marginalizing women and contributing to the maintenance of gender segregation in organizations” (139). Gendered segregation in the administrative state is still found in both vertical and horizontal forms, which are termed glass ceilings and glass walls, respectively. While glass ceilings—a barrier to achieve equality in positions of power and authority—have been shattered in many organizations over time, women made up only 30 percent of the federal Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2009 (Goodsell 2015; Kahli, Gans, and Hairston 2011; Losey 2011).

Glass walls—horizontal sex segregation where women are dominant in traditional feminine areas of administration—still exist. In a recent study, Smith and Monaghan (2013) find that only 29 percent of agency heads whose mission was masculine were women, as compared to 45 percent where it is feminine-oriented. This illustrates that organizational missions encompass policy implementation functions that hold gendered values, which can make the organization more or less apt to a feminine leader and administrative styles.

An Evolving Understanding of the Dichotomy

While the traditional approach to the politics-administration dichotomy has substantial merit, contemporary scholars have recognized that the clear-cut separation of politics and administration is not feasible in modern governmental practices. For example, Dunn and Legge acknowledge that the orthodox or traditional dichotomy has either been misinterpreted or has been modified with a more practical view of the relationship between politics and administration. To support further a modified dichotomy, Montjoy and Watson (1995) argue that the traditional, orthodox approach interferes with local government managers’ ability to become involved in the policy-making process of government, even though in reality managers and other public administrators do so. Therefore, the myth of the politics-administration dichotomy has been argued and supplemented with many examples, particularly from the local level of government, to suggest that politics impact policy implementation, a main responsibility of administrators.

Goals of the Study

Many scholars have varying perceptions of how politics impacts administrators. Svara (2001) argues that “administrators help shape policy, and they give it specific content and meaning in the process of implementation” (180). Dunn and Legge’s study (2002) found that city managers reported an active role in policy making, which is an example of a modified or partnership

model. The modified or partnership model suggests that administration is not isolated from political activities or influences in practice. By applying the dichotomy to the local level of government, an entity furthest away from federal institutions and politics, scholars have been able to explain how politics impact the most isolated layer of governance. This study takes a different approach by examining the dichotomy at the state level, an area of government that has a dynamic relationship with, and between, the federal and local levels.

Additionally, this study contributes to our understanding of how administrators in political institutions—state agencies with unique traits and roles in governance—view their role in administering policy. Organizational theorists have certainly discovered many facets of political influences of and within governmental or public agencies. Power is often associated with politics and, of course, in dynamics of organizational behavior and leadership. However, power can also be a gendered concept.

Scholars have used the term “gender power” to encompass a variety of ideas of how gender and sex roles intersect with authority and power; while many researchers explore “gender power” by examining how men and women bring different perspectives of authority and power based upon their social experiences (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Fox and Schuhmann 2000; Hartsock 1983; Stivers 1994). Stivers (1994) and Newman (1995) both argue that the concept of power has a masculine approach and extend this theory to explore how public organizations can be patriarchal. For example, Kathlene (1995) implies that Mosher’s identification of professionalism is based upon a masculine notion that is entrenched in institutional norms of accomplishing tasks (see also Mosher 1968).

In order to apply gendered concepts to behaviors and organizations more fully, this study examines how gender is ingrained into organizations and, secondly, discovers if perceptions of the dichotomy vary by gender. Studying gendered dynamics of power and organizations are an important area of research; however, there is a gap in the literature when applying gendered theories to the dichotomy. For example, in Dunn and Legge’s (2002) analysis, “gender is slightly related at significant levels to identification with the orthodox dichotomy model,” which suggests that males were more likely to adopt a strict perception of the dichotomy as compared to females surveyed (415). This area of research is important as the scholars note, “some literature suggests that one should find differences between men and women, although none has examined the relationship between gender and definitions of the relationship between politics and administration” (Dunn and Legge 2002; Fox and Schuhmann, 2000; Gilligan, 1982; White 1999). While this area of research is not explored, classical and modern works have claimed that the state is gendered and, traditionally, patriarchy was clearly present. For example, Sawyer (1996)

claims, “the gender of the minimal state has almost always been masculine while the welfare state has been more likely to be seen as female” (118–19).

Therefore, this case study examines perceptions of administrators at the state level, in order to determine how administrators in public agencies view their respective roles. This study also examines if gender differences exist in defining the dichotomy. In addition to examining the dichotomy at the state level, two types of agencies—a redistributive type, which is a feminine form, and a regulatory type, which is classified as a masculine unit—are included in this study. It is important to extend this research to two types of agencies, as previous research is focused on studying gender differences in a masculine environment. In 1991, McGlen and Sarkees find that both men and women in high-ranking administrative positions in the Department of Defense and the Department of State share similar views of policy preferences and priorities. These findings can be attributed to a number of factors, including the socialization process. In order to further explore if there are gender differences in public agencies, it is important to examine administrators’ perceptions in different types of gendered organizations. This study attempts to extend the gender power framework to more than one agency type, as the socialization processes often vary by organization.

Political and Gendering Processes in Organizations

In order to fill the gap of understanding gender differences and gender power in public organizations, this case study examines perceptions of the politics-administration dichotomy from state administrators. According to Fox and Schuhmann (2000), “research and analysis of gender must take into account the political context of the environment being considered” (604). Therefore, it is first important to explore political components within organizations. There are many definitions of politics, which exemplify a decision-making process involving interests, power, and influence of individuals.

Once the presence of politics in public organizations is analyzed, the gendering processes of organizations can be taken into account. It is imperative to examine gender in public organizations due to the democratic ideals of inclusiveness. Gender can be found not solely by examining the sex of organizational employees, but in behaviors influenced by socialized organizational norms. Goodsell (2015) finds that gender parity has not been attained in the administrative state at all levels. Female employees in state and local government account for 45.5 percent of the total, with many females present in traditionally feminine sectors such as education and health (Goodsell 2015, 93). This phenomenon of females dominating traditionally feminine sectors is referred to as “glass walls,” which is a

different challenge as compared to “glass ceilings”—barriers hindering vertical mobilization in organizations.

Organizations have the ability to socialize individuals in various ways, which include setting gendered behavioral norms. According to Acker (1992b), organizations can be deemed gendered through “processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distribution of power” (567). For example, organizational processes and practices of public leadership can be gendered. Follett suggests that effective leaders do not rely on their personality or position to exert power and make decisions; rather, they focus on unity and facilitative leadership (Fry and Raadschelders 2014). Stivers (2002) offers further support of gendered images in public leadership, as she asserts “images of professional expertise, management, leadership, and public virtue” are filled with “dilemmas of gender” (3). The hierarchical nature of the administrative state is often viewed as a “masculine domain that privileges male values such as exercising power for its own sake and reducing all thought to ‘objective’ rational analysis” (Goodsell 2015, 96).

Lowi’s (1964) framework of administrative structure consists of a variety of different models that have unique agency characteristics, such as the political structure in which it operates and the political processes used in the agency. Among Lowi’s typologies, distributive agencies are most likely to be associated with politics, logrolling, pork barrel programs, and patronage politics, all ideas that deviate from the orthodox or traditional approach of a politics-administration dichotomy.

Therefore, an analysis of administrators’ perceptions of the dichotomy in regulatory and redistributive agencies will be unique, as politics is not readily found here; yet gendered elements are present. Regulatory agencies tend to be responsible for imposing rules on society and ensuring compliance with policy and laws. Here, there is potential for a distinct dichotomy, where administrators simply oversee activity and regulate behaviors and actions to conform to policy and law. According to Newman (1995), regulatory agencies regularly have a “truncated hierarchy than in Weber’s model of an ideal bureaucratic structure” and a relatively small number of employees with limited resources (145). Therefore, political processes of regulatory agencies are not necessarily clear-cut, leaving potential for politics to impact the administrative process, as administrators have the ability to use discretion due to the amount of decentralization given to units.

Redistributive agencies are responsible for redistributing wealth and providing public services. The policy process associated with redistribution often centers on fairness, beginning with a representative bureaucracy (a representative workforce or administration), as these policies will ultimately have winners and losers. Since the policy process is marked with “high

degrees of visibility and conflict,” there is a significant interest on effective and fair management, as well as “very narrow spans of control” throughout the hierarchical structure (Newman 1995, 146). Therefore, redistributive agencies have the potential to align themselves with the orthodox dichotomy, as administrators should have a high sense of ethics and fairness of distributing social services and are closely overseen by managers.

Since little is known about differences in agency type and political influences, it is important to explore administrators in each type of agency to determine how politics impacts administrators. The idea of behavioral differences in gendered organizations and institutions is important, as scholars find that individuals’ behaviors and values impact their decision making in governance. Scholars have argued that leadership and governance have been defined in terms of masculinity, which tends to devalue feminine traits and disadvantage those with feminine attributes of leadership (Acker 1990; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Ferguson 1984). Female administrators in redistributive agencies, which have masculine organizational components, often face barriers of masculinity or glass walls, which limit their ability to use feminine values and emotional labor, which illustrates that gendered behavioral norms are present in government (Guy and Newman 2004, Guy, Newman, and Mastracci 2008; Rauhaus 2014).

Gender dynamics at the local level of government are also important to examine, as scholarship aligns with state-level findings—that women have a “different voice” in the political system. In Fox and Schuhmann’s (2000) analysis of city managers, they find that female city managers tend to identify their role as one that is primarily responsible for community relations, whether it be maintaining open lines of communication or ensuring that the city council and the mayor coordinate their efforts. Melissa Deckman’s (2007) work highlights that female school board members were more likely than their male colleagues to center their responsibility on representing the public. Therefore, it is interesting to determine if female administrators will have a differing perception of the impact of politics at the state level.

It is equally important to take into account the gendering processes of public organizations. Theorists have supported the idea that organizations are gendered by their employees’ actions and behaviors, but also by structure and roles of the organization, which are often found in the mission. While scholars, such as Martin (1990), argue that organizations can be considered feminist, if the goals, membership, structure, outcomes, goals, values, and ideology can be classified as feminist, this research seeks to examine if feminine traits are found in organizational units. There is a distinction between feminist and feminine that can be made. Feminine organizations share some of the same traits as feminist organizations, such as having values

focused on cooperation, interpersonal relationships, and mutual caring and support within an organized bureaucracy; yet, feminine organizations do not prescribe solely to the feminist ideology or practices. Feminist organizations may lobby for a feminist agenda, while feminine public organizations should not lobby or cater to any particular group in society even though they may serve a particular demographic.

Another integral component of the gendering process can be explored by analyzing an organization's clientele. Identifying clientele is especially important in public agencies, as a major component of public administration is public service and meeting the specific needs of constituents. While public organizations are designed to serve the public as a whole, feminine organizations may have a majority-female clientele base, which in turn may impact the way administrators view their responsibilities.

Newman (1995) further uses Lowi's framework to illustrate that administrative agencies are gendered. She notes, "organizations are not created equal" and further states, "we can locate gender power in opportunity structures that differ according to an agency's mission and in the way we have come to think about agencies, especially through Lowi's typology" (141-42). Just as Lowi argued that organizations have varying types of politically influenced processes, Joan Acker shows that organizations have gendered processes. In organizations, gendered processes can be found in activities, in individuals' behavior, and how individuals view their responsibilities within the organization (Acker 1992a). For example, Acker notes, "real jobs and real workers are, of course, deeply gendered and embodied" and she further applies this gendering concept to organizational structure (485). Acker suggests that organizational hierarchies are gendered and Newman (1990, 142) furthers this idea by asserting "women continue to be compressed into the lower levels of public agencies and concentrated into traditionally defined female occupations, in other words, under glass ceilings and within glass walls," which suggests that gender power is maintained mostly by males.

Methods

This study discovers how differences in perceptions of the politics-administration dichotomy exist among state-level administrators in state redistributive, feminine agencies, such as the Department of Human Services and the Department of Social Services; and in state regulatory masculine agencies, such as the Department of Corrections or the Department of Public Safety. In order to obtain information in an objective manner, two forms of qualitative data collection occurred. First, document analysis was used to determine the distinctions in missions of both redistributive and regulatory

agencies being examined in this study. Next, semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted with administrators from South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi state agencies in 2011. The semi-structured interviews are an appropriate means of data collection, as this methodological approach can be used to gain direct access to ones' experience or as a narrative of activities (Silverman 2013). Questions used to initiate conversation with the administrators are included in Table 1. Supplemental, follow-up questions were posed based upon the responses received.

Individual respondents were selected by the position they held within the organization. Three types of positions were strategically selected. Personnel Directors are influential administrators, as these individuals often set the tone for diversity in organizations and may reflect on gendered components within the organization and structure. Legislative Liaisons or Governmental Affairs Directors also participated in the interview due to their role in policy and politics. Lastly, Program Coordinators were interviewed in order to determine how the institution as a whole relates to the public and how public programs are administered. In total, eighteen administrators were targeted for participation, while twelve interviews were conducted, with the average interview lasting twenty minutes.

Overall, this research explores three specific theoretical notions. First, the notion of gendered institutions was explored. Respondents were asked if they considered their agency to be gendered and how. All respondents were asked this initial question and were asked supplemental questions based upon their response to clarify previous statements in order to gather more explanatory information. Second, the politics-administration dichotomy was explored, by asking all respondents if they feel that politics impact their responsibilities and role as a public administration and how. "Politics" was intentionally not defined when framing the question, as it is important to use interviews as a methodology "to elicit respondents' perceptions" (Silverman 2013, 47). Finally, after analyzing responses and developing themes based upon common findings, the research can support how the perceptions of politics-administration dichotomy differ by organization type.

Findings

Document analysis was used to analyze all organizations' mission statements. Examining organizational mission statements is important for quite a few reasons. First, "organizational consequences flow from the peculiarities of mission," which indicates that mission statements are important guidelines that impact organizational behavior (Newman 1995, 141). Secondly, these consequences "manifest as structures of opportunity that impact career success,

Table 1: Interview Questions Used*Questions Used to Gather Information about Gendered Agencies:*

- Would you consider your organization to be a masculine, feminine, or gender-neutral type of agency? Why?
- Is diversity valued throughout this organization? Would you say that the demographics of this agency reflect those who you serve? If so, do those you serve (the public) recognize this?

Questions Used to Gather Information Regarding Politics in Administration:

- Do you think the environment in which you serve impacts your job performance? How so?
- Do you think the environment within the state political system impacts your job performance? How so?
- Of all the things you do in this job, what do you enjoy doing the most? What do you find most challenging?

especially women's advancement into positions of authority and power" (Newman 1995, 141–42). Mission statements may have an impact on organizations and the individuals within the agency, which illustrates the socialization process and setting the cultural norms of the organization. Therefore, it is interesting to look closely at how these overarching values impact the gendering process of organizations and how these factors may extend to serving the public.

Table 2 illustrates Lowi's typologies of function areas, Newman's gendering of Lowi's framework, and how state agency mission statements frame their goals, which align with both Lowi's and Newman's theories. Two distinct types of agencies in three states were analyzed by classifying values and goals important to each individual agency into themes. The mission statements are sorted by their function type. By sorting the mission statements into two categories, an evaluation was conducted of whether or not the organization's mission is reflective of Lowi's typologies for bureaucratic agencies as well as Newman's typology for gendered-bureaucratic agencies. After comparing the agencies' mission statements to the typologies, it became clear that the Departments of Corrections fall into Lowi's category of a regulatory agency. Newman's work shows that regulatory agencies are

Table 2: Evidence of Agency Type and Gendered Dynamics within the Organization

Agency Type	Characteristics of Agency Type*	Gendered Dynamics Present in Agency Mission**
Regulatory (Department of Corrections) <i>Masculine</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Control government policies• Implement and establish rules to be imposed on others• Provide punishment for noncompliance• Coercive process or rule making• Diminishes sources of conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Protect public• Secure environment• Promote safety• Provide opportunities for positive change• Work with integrity
Redistributive (Department of Health/ Social Services) <i>Feminine</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Manipulate allocation of wealth, property, or rights among class groups• Policymaking is marked with conflict, conflict that often upsets status quo• Recruitment within agency comes from the bottom of the hierarchy, internal promotions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Achieve stability• Protect vulnerable populations• Encourage traditional family values• Empower public and families

* Information obtained from Meredith A. Newman, “The Gendered Nature of Lowi’s Typology; or, Who Would Guess You Could Find Gender Here?” in *Gender Power, Leadership and Governance*, eds. Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1995.

** Information adapted from Beth Rauhaus, “Gendered Organizations, Care Ethics, and Active Representation” *Public Voices* 13, no. 1 (2014): 43–63.

typically masculine, which is the case in the Department of Corrections, as most mission statements included goals of *protect and serve*, as noted in Table 2.

Newman (1995) argues that gender power is also embedded in organizations in terms of clientele. From the demographics of those involved in crime, it is apparent that most clientele will be male in these agencies.

Hence, Corrections departments may be categorized as a masculine agency for two primary reasons. The first reason the Corrections departments are masculine is because of the clientele demographics, which is comprised mainly of males. Secondly, the Corrections departments can be considered a masculine agency type by the definition of regulatory functions, which is a coercive process, commonly driving regulatory agencies (Newman 1995).

Likewise, it was apparent that three Departments of Human or Social Services reflected values similar to those of redistributive, feminine agencies. The verbs used in mission statements, such as *encourage and empower*, are more hopeful in approaching governance. In addition to these optimistic goals, redistributive agencies tend to have a female clientele. Newman (1995, 148–49) argues that “women are more likely to need the service of redistributive agencies than are men.” Newman further suggests that men are more likely to be recipients of distributive policies, since they are owners or employees of companies (1995).

The second portion of this qualitative research began with telephone interviews with individual public administrators within these agencies. It is important to reflect on these missions in order to frame the telephone interviews, as organizational values may have a significant impact on employee’s behaviors, perceptions, and responsibilities. Specific questions regarding gendered dynamics in the organization and impact of politics were asked to participants, as noted in Table 1. Perceptions of the environment are important for two reasons. First, individuals shared that their responsibilities within the agency were reflective of the overall mission of the organization, which supports Lowi’s and Newman’s typologies of institutions. Second, respondents also reported that their organizations had gendered-elements present.

Gendered Dynamics in Organizations

Administrators discussed the gender of employees within the state agency and also commented on gendered dynamics in leadership and administration. Overall, respondents from the Departments of Human or Social Services were inclined to comment that their agency is diverse and runs on collaborative efforts, which reaffirms that redistributive agencies have feminine traits. Collaboration within organizations is a trait that is common in redistributive agencies and is often considered a feminine style of management. A male legislative liaison from the Department of Human Services said, “We have a diverse agency here. There is collaboration of individuals that deal with various issues, such as child abuse, aging, neglect, and incarceration.” Echoing his opinion, many female administrators from the redistributive agencies asserted that they are directly involved in collaborative efforts that impact women and children. Another public official from the redistributive agency

asserted, "I would say the whole Division of Family and Children's Services [is] mostly female. Being in child welfare in general for about nineteen years, I would say that there are more and more men today than there were twenty years ago, but still it is more predominately women." Of the redistributive agencies in all three states, feminine traits in the workforce were illustrated; and, most administrators in these units expressed that diversity was valued, but female public servants dominated the service area.

While administrators in the Departments of Human and Social Services clearly indicated that females are present in their organization, the responses from the Departments of Corrections varied. For example, a governmental relations director suggested that his organization "probably has an even distribution of males and females and same demographics of African Americans and Caucasians." A female respondent from the same organization responded in direct contrast, as she commented, "the Department of Corrections' working environment is characterized by more males than females." The personnel director explains that in her agency, "We have a lot of women in different job classes, more than 50% in several job classes. I have seen an increase in diversity throughout my sixteen years of service. I think women are increasing their numbers."

Overall, the responses from the Department of Corrections seemed to provide the inclination that females are becoming more present in the organization, but still have a void to fill. This is apparent for all three southern state agencies included in the study. There are no major differences among the three states in asserting that diversity is important to their agency.

Another element of finding gendered dynamics in organizations surfaced when respondents described their typical clientele. The Department of Corrections' clientele was predominately male, while the Department of Health and Human Services' clientele was characterized by more females than males. For example, a male personnel director from a regulatory agency referenced an annual report for his agency, where facts and figures of inmates clearly illustrate that males outnumber women in prisons. This evidence implies that males are the clientele for these regulatory agencies, which reaffirms Lowi's and Newman's classifications. On the other side, conversations with administrators from the redistributive agencies indicated that services were mostly administered to females. Public administrators of the three redistributive agencies asserted that they were responsible for women's issues.

It is clear that there is support for Newman's argument of gendered agencies using Lowi's typology, in that the redistributive agency appears to be more feminine through the use of collaboration and the presence of females in the agency. The demographics of the clientele for each agency are also very telling and supportive of Newman's theory. It is interesting to note that

although the regulatory agency is classified as a masculine agency due to the function and hierarchical structure, respondents from such agencies suggested that their organizations were becoming more diverse and integrating women. At best, such agencies may be encroaching upon gender neutrality. Since gendered dynamics are entrenched in organizations, and individuals are socialized to fit the norms of these organizations, it is interesting to analyze if perceptions of the politics-administration dichotomy will vary by agency type.

Exploring the Politics-Administration Dichotomy

Most respondents expressed the belief that politics impacted their role in one way or another, which led to various conversations that were analyzed by theme. Overall, the position an individual held within an organization signified varying amounts of political influence. For example, legislative liaisons and governmental relations directors in both types of agencies in all three states examined made it clear that their job was tied to politics. A respondent noted, “main portions of my job is [*sic*] attending legislative meetings concerning the agency, keeping track of all legislative bills affecting the agency, and relaying that information to agency heads and executive staff.” A respondent from the Department of Corrections declared, “Of course, we can’t get around politics. We get questions from legislators of why we do things certain ways and they may introduce legislation to change it if they don’t agree with it. Our director is appointed by the governor and that is an avenue for getting procedures and policy changed. Politics is just part of doing business—for good or bad.” A legislative liaison with the Department of Human or Social Services acknowledges that “politics definitely impacts my job in a variety of ways. Budgeting and mandates through legislation impacts our organization’s mission.” In supporting the influence of politics, a director of governmental relations in this same type of agency specified that each division within “our agency writes legislation packets and presents them to the director, then to the legislature. The director is directly involved in legislation. For example, one of our previous directors introduced about thirty bills, while another director introduced only four or five. These variations could be explained by his vision and the political climate.”

Although it is likely that the positions in which these individuals serve lead these respondents to believe that politics is directly tied to their job duties, a few other respondents holding different positions expressed similar attitudes toward the impact of politics. For example, a personnel director from the Department of Corrections asserted, “politics impacts the goals of my job because they set financial and operational goals. There is also politics within our organization.” When discussing the most difficult and challenging aspects of work, an administrator working in the Department of Human Services

specified that “the hierarchy and bureaucratic people at the Capital make things difficult when things don’t go right or you don’t please everybody.” Therefore, most administrators interviewed confirmed a contemporary interpretation of the dichotomy.

Administrators in the redistributive agencies were more likely to perceive politics as a means of either pleasing or failing to please the public. According to the document analysis, the missions of redistributive agencies specifically denote their clientele and mention their desire to serve their needs. These findings support the idea that individuals in feminine agencies are more concerned with community relations and clientele outreach rather than politics in the direct sense of legislation or lobbying. These findings align with research examining female officials at local levels of government using a “different voice”; but also extend to the organizational level. Feminine organizations tend to be more focused on public service and centering their work on clients, not political activities. For example, as with previous findings suggesting that females in various levels of government are more focused on public service and using collaboration rather than control and politics in decision making, administrators from the feminine agencies in this case study exhibit the importance of public service and less emphasis on politics.

Overall, most respondents from redistributive agencies were more inclined to refute the idea that politics impacts their individual job and organization. From the feedback on the impact of politics, it is apparent that individuals working directly with the legislature, attending committee meetings, drafting legislation, or working with the director to package legislative initiatives have a clear perception of how much politics impacts their work and agency. Administrators removed from this capacity were more reluctant or unwilling to acknowledge the direct impact politics has on their job. This finding supports the idea that hierarchies are gendered. Lower-level positions within the hierarchy, often associated with feminine positions, have a common trait in that the perception of the politics-administration dichotomy is not focused on political activities. Yet, the same respondents provided examples of how the law affects their work, illustrating that politics is impacting policy development and policy outputs in various ways.

Conclusion

Overall, this case study illustrates that gendered institutions have different meanings of politics and how individuals view their role as public officials. While this case study offers insight into gendered dynamics of public organizations, different definitions of the politics-administration dichotomy, and varying perceptions of politics, more research needs to be undertaken in

order to discover how the socialization process occurs and gender norms prevail in public organizations. From this case study, it is apparent that the politics-administration dichotomy in a classical sense may no longer exist; yet, a modified dichotomy is present, where administrators recognize their responsibilities lie in a political environment.

Many responses given during the interviews reflected the agency mission, which signifies a great deal of socialization is occurring. While gendered components of public organizations, such as collaboration skills and clientele demographics, are apparent, it is equally important to further explore how gendered dynamics become entrenched in organizations and how individual public administrators adopt these norms. Political climate is another important element in discovering if gender influences an individuals' view of political influences. Therefore, studies should continue to seek perceptions of administrators in different political climates.

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Questions in Politics

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Examining the Factors That Lead to Student Departure at Aiken Technical College

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The purpose of this research is to describe the factors that contribute to student departure at Aiken Technical College (ATC) while concurrently offering a model for other organizations to utilize in improving their retention efforts. The study uses a nonexperimental research design with content analysis and secondary data analysis of the Wal-Mart Press Grant Survey (WPGS) and the Non-Returning Student Survey (NRSS) that were previously administered by the Planning and Research Department at ATC. Academic, financial, social, and institutional issues were the four key areas examined because previous literature identifies these as the most common reasons students drop out of college. More than half of the unrepresentative sample reported having no issues at all with retention at ATC. These students claimed that they accomplished their goals while attending. However, a majority of the students revealed having problems with financial and institutional issues at the college, specifically with work demands and policies and procedures. The data also suggested that very few students in the sample had frequent experiences with campus involvement and student support services.

Society has increasingly realized the importance of a quality education and the subsequent implications on future opportunities. Enrollment numbers in higher education have increased over the years due to this realization. More than 18 million students are presently enrolled in some higher education institution, whether it is public or private, a four-year university, or a two-year community college (Dye 2013). However, as enrollment numbers are steadily increasing, graduation rates have decreased (Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner

2010). More students are enrolling in colleges, but few actually earn their degree. Various studies have been done to estimate the magnitude of this problem. A report prepared by American College Testing revealed that 25.9 percent of freshmen at four-year institutions across the nation never return after their first year; and the dropout rate is almost 50 percent for two-year community colleges (Seidman 2012).

As a result of the increasing dropout rates, educators and researchers have all focused their attention on retention initiatives that may help to solve this problem. In doing so, it is important to consider the changes in the overall higher education environment. Amaya (2010) discusses the increasing enrollment of special student populations like first-generation college students and minorities. Crisp and Nora (2010) have focused on the emergence of community colleges as a powerhouse in higher education. They claim that community colleges are one of the most vital developments in higher education because they serve as the largest and most important portal to postsecondary education. Most students start their postsecondary education in community colleges before they transition or transfer to a four-year university. Other scholars, such as Kalogrides and Grodsky (2011), agree on the importance of community colleges and regard them as a safety net for some students. Those who are not yet academically or financially prepared for bachelor's degree programs are more likely to attend these institutions. Due to an increase in enrollment at community colleges, it is essential that higher education focuses on retaining these students as the effects of not doing so could be detrimental to the students, institutions, and society as a whole.

The focus of this research project is on Aiken Technical College (ATC), one of sixteen postsecondary schools in the South Carolina Technical College System. As a result of the institution's commitment to student engagement and success, ATC has been recognized as a leader college by the national nonprofit organization Achieving the Dream (ATC State Accountability Report 2011). Only fifty-two colleges nationwide have earned that designation. Despite the college's recognition, enrollment numbers and retention rates are steadily decreasing (South Carolina Commission on Higher Education 2011). It is critical that steps be taken to increase retention at ATC because of its reputation as a leader and the possibility that other two-year institutions in the South Carolina Technical College System view it as a role model.

The purpose of this research is to describe the factors that contribute to student departure at ATC while simultaneously creating a model for institutions to use in seeking to understand their own retention issues. This article summarizes ATC's background as an institution with numerous accomplishments since its foundation, but it also discusses the constant problems it faces with enrollment and retention. Retention is important in

higher education due to its effects on students, institutions, and society. The topic is so significant that researchers over the past few decades have introduced retention models and theories to explain possible barriers students face from admissions to graduation (Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). The barriers described in the existing literature will be used in hopes of pinpointing some of the reasons why students do not persist at ATC.

The existing literature has suggested that academic, financial, social, and institutional issues can all play a determining factor in retention at any institution of higher education. As a result, this research design included subcategories based on the issues used to measure the factors that lead to student departure at ATC. Academic issues were subcategorized into not being prepared for college and problems with program entry/prerequisites. Financial issues were examined based on cost of college, financial aid, and job demands. Social issues were divided into transition from high school to college, relationships with faculty, staff, and classmates. Lastly, institutional issues were sub-categorized into problems with policies and procedures and student support services. Researchers from the past few decades have suggested that focusing on addressing these possible barriers could lead to an increase in enrollment and persistence. Surveys that were previously administered by the Planning and Research Department at ATC for other research purposes were utilized to pinpoint the exact issues that are unique to ATC in an attempt to improve its overall retention.

Background

It is important to understand the background and formation of ATC as an organization before attempting to address problems with retention. Founded in 1972 as a vocationally based training center, ATC is one of the sixteen schools that make up the South Carolina Technical College System (Aiken Technical College, 2012). It was first named Aiken Technical Education Center and began with only 177 students taking classes in three temporary facilities. With its accreditation in 1975 and the introduction of Dr. Susan Winsor as its new president in September of 1999, the campus expanded and the College now offers more highly demanded programs in addition to Associate Degrees and certificates in approximately fifteen other areas (ATC 2012). These academic offerings have served as a major contributor to ATC's growth and development in campus and enrollment size.

Despite past success in enrollment numbers, ATC, along with others in the South Carolina Technical College System, has currently been experiencing decreasing numbers in retention. The South Carolina Commission on Higher Education (2011) reported that the retention rate for the number of full-time,

degree seeking freshmen enrolled in fall 2010 was 53.8 percent, a slight decrease from 54 percent in the 2009–2010 academic year. The ATC State Accountability Report (2011) listed several reasons for the institution’s problem with retention, including significant increases in academically underprepared students enrolling; insufficient state assistance for additional faculty and classroom space paired with increased enrollment; and inadequate funding to provide new programs in response to community employment needs.

Barriers to retention have been recognized and acknowledged by the administration at ATC. Many improvements have been made in order to overcome these obstacles. Committees focused on retention and improving student barriers have been introduced to address nonpersistence, defined as the instance in which a student is not retained until graduation (Matross and Huesman 2001; Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). Major capital improvement projects, increases in the use of technology, and proposed changes in policies and procedures have also been initiated to improve the student experience and better customer service.

However despite all of the positive changes, ATC still struggles with retaining students. Reports from the Planning and Research Department (2013) indicate a loss of about 200 students across all levels from spring 2012 to spring 2013. This decrease in numbers paired with declining state funding has resulted in a major budget deficit for the institution, causing its administrative staff to take drastic measures. The reduction in tuition and fee revenue along with enhanced institutional spending and reduced state funding have contributed to the elimination of the athletic program and the Workforce and Investment Department, a 25 percent departmental budget cut for fiscal year 2014, and limited temporary/contract staff positions. Thus, the effects of poor retention extend to the daily operations of the institution.

Literature Review

Due to the domino effect of poor retention on a large scale, vast amounts of literature have been devoted to explaining the student departure puzzle. The purpose of this section is to review pertinent literature in an effort to better understand student retention. The section that follows will summarize common terminology, the importance of retention in higher education, and retention theories and models in regard to explaining why students drop out of college.

Terminology

Understanding certain higher education terminology is essential to describing enrollment and retention trends in the community college atmosphere. Retention, attrition, and persistence are terms that are often

utilized to describe student behavior in higher education. Although these terms have different connotations, they are very often used interchangeably. Inaccurate measures of retention often arise as a result of discrepancies between which students should be included and which students should not, based on the definitions of these words (Seidman 2012).

Retention

Retention is one of the most commonly used terms to describe student departure in higher education. Retention refers to an institution's ability to retain a student from admissions to graduation (McNeely, 1939; Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). Some researchers misinterpret this definition because they assume that there is only one variety. However, retention has four basic types: institutional, system, retention within a major or discipline, and retention within the course (Seidman 2012). Institutional retention, the most basic, is the measurement of students who stay at the same institution from one year to the next. System retention is when a student leaves one institution of higher learning but shortly enrolls at another; this type includes transfer students. Retention within a major or discipline is more limited and focuses on those students that initially enroll under one major or discipline and switched before they earn a degree. Lastly, retention within the course focuses on courses that are not completed even though the student is still retained at the institution. This measure of retention is used less frequently but helps to identify which types of courses a student may have trouble completing.

Attrition

Attrition is another term used to describe student departure behavior in higher education. Some regard it as the opposite of retention (Herzog 2005). Attrition refers to students who do not re-enroll at an institution in consecutive semesters (Herzog 2005; Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). Measuring attrition typically includes students who are referred to as stopouts, or someone who temporarily withdraws from a college. This can include transfers or dual enrolled/guest students who are oftentimes counted when measuring retention but whose intentions were never to remain at the institution until graduation anyway.

Herzog (2005) claims that understanding the difference between measuring retention and attrition can cause confusion, because the terms are often used interchangeably yet have different meanings. He further argues that studying attrition is one of the three most underdeveloped areas in retention studies including key freshman course challenges and fall versus spring financial support and subsequent-year offers. Researchers typically treat student enrollment as a dichotomous yes-or-no event. Either the student was

retained or not, which ultimately ignores transfer to another institution. Unfortunately, this relationship does not take into account the growing trend of students “swirling in and out of different institutions” to meet their unique needs (Seidman 2012). This behavior has become an increasingly present trend in community colleges and has also become a defining characteristic in the enrollment student pattern. Thus, it is essential that the meanings of retention and attrition remain distinct in researching student departure patterns.

Persistence

Persistence is used to define why students drop out of college. Persistence refers to a student’s willingness and actions to remain in the system of higher education from initial admission until they earn a degree (Matross and Huesman 2001; Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). This term focuses on the behavior and desires of the student wanting to persist and not on the institution’s notion of retention. In other words, persistence attempts to evaluate those students who actually want to be retained.

Matross and Huesman (2001) contend that there appear to be three syndromes to explain why students leave the university with regard to measuring persistence: underperformers, the disenchanted; and dropouts. When measuring persistence, researchers typically focus on dropouts, or those individuals whose initial educational objective was to complete any given degree but did not do so (Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). The literature on persistence trends advises researchers to take heed to understand the difference between how many of those dropouts were voluntary as opposed to involuntary. Put another way, a distinction must be made between those students that left the institution for reasons of their own versus those that departed due to not meeting institutional requirements, such as academic dismissal or financial holds that may have prevented them from registering for the next semester. Being cautious enough to examine these details can mean the difference between accurately measuring persistence versus retention.

Importance of Retention in Higher Education

After understanding common terminology, it becomes easier to comprehend the complex dimensions of retention. Retention has been a popular subject for researchers for decades because of its consequences on the student, the institution, and society as a whole. The topic has captured the attention not only of scholars, but also of colleges, parents, and employers who have begun to dedicate increasing amounts of effort to guide students toward graduating. The surprising domino effect of decreasing graduation rates has attracted members of society in joining the retention initiative (Symonds 2012).

Effects on the Student

Not obtaining a college degree has monetary, occupational, and economic consequences for students (Tinto 1993). Statistics indicate that the more education an individual has obtained, the more their lifetime income. The US Census Bureau (2012) estimates that on average, people with no degree make about \$727 a week; an associate's degree will help earn about \$785 per week; and a bachelor's degree and above will yield earnings of anywhere between \$1,066 and \$1,700 weekly. Individuals with a college degree also have better job opportunities. They tend to have careers in professional fields, such as finance; while people without a college degree are more likely to work in lower-paying occupations such as fast food (US Census Bureau 2012). Graduating from college also has economic rewards. Studies show that unemployment rates decrease as educational attainment increases. In 2011, the rate for people with a high school diploma was 9.4 percent; 8.0 percent for an associate's degree; and 4.2 percent for a bachelor's degree or higher (Seidman 2012). Persisting until graduation is the best monetary, occupational, and economical decision for students.

Effects on the Institution

The inability to retain students can have a detrimental effect on the institution as well. The most obvious effect is financial. Most institutions generate revenue on a per-capita basis and do not receive funding once a student leaves (Waters 2010). It is safe to assume, then, that it would be in the best interest of the college to retain students. Seidman (2012) concurs with this assertion and claims that colleges suffer immediate direct, immediate indirect, and long-term potential costs after a student leaves the institution. Immediate direct costs are costs that directly and immediately affect the revenue that the college takes in. Immediate indirect costs are faculty and staff salaries and the maintenance and upkeep of campus facilities. Salaries and personnel are the largest expenditures for most institutions, and salaries remain the same despite the number of individuals served (Seidman 2012; Waters 2010). Also, facilities such as library and recreation centers are costly to maintain, and costs do not decrease due to a lack of retention. Lastly, institutions can experience long-term potential costs, which are costs that are often hard to measure but have the potential to be greatly damaging if students do not persist (Matross and Huesman 2001; Seidman 2012; Waters 2010). These costs may be that dropouts typically do not donate money to an institution they did not graduate from; and they are more likely to not recommend other people to attend the institution. Both of these instances would be a loss of revenue for the college.

Effects on Society

Many researchers have expressed their concerns with retention due to the effects that it can have on society as a whole. Swail (2004) argues that college dropouts lead to costs in terms of postsecondary investment. Public education is largely financed by taxpayers. Only about 27 percent of total tuition and fees are accounted for by what students are actually charged to attend school; all other funding comes from state and federal governments as subsidized grants and loans (Swail 2004). So, taxpayers still pay the cost when students are not actually retained.

Symonds (2012) argues that not retaining students affects society in terms of social services. As mentioned earlier, students who do not obtain a college education are more likely to earn less income and live in poverty. People that live at or below the poverty line tend to need various social services, such as welfare or incarceration. These social services are largely publicly funded. The more students that do not graduate from college, the more public funding that will be spent on social services to assist them.

Webster and Showers (2011) further contend that the US economy will suffer tremendously if it does not improve student achievement and graduation rates. Prestigious companies looking to hire college graduates from the United States may not be able to fill their positions due to the lack of student graduates and expertise needed in particular careers. Companies such as Apple and Microsoft report many positions that are open but cannot be filled simply because there are not enough college graduates skilled in these areas to fill them (Webster and Showers 2011). As a result, they often have to outsource to foreign companies or hire immigrants who are trained in these fields to take the place of US graduates. This affects the economy in terms of unemployment rates in the United States.

Retention Theories/Models

Because of the individual, institutional, and societal effects of retention, researchers over the past fifty years have introduced retention theories and models to explain exactly why students do not persist until graduation. The topic is so complex that a consensus has not been reached. Research as far back as McNeely (1939) and as current as Seidman (2012) has attempted to provide several different perspectives to rationalize the student departure puzzle. These perspectives include: institutional and administrative; personal and environmental; and college as a social institution.

Institutional and Administrative Perspective

The institutional and administrative perspective was one of the earliest viewpoints in depicting student retention. McNeely (1939) conducted one of the earliest studies that used this perspective as its foundation. He was specifically interested in studying the factors that led to students withdrawing from college and believed that this understanding would further lead to institutional reorganization. Institutional mortality rates, or the failure of students to remain in college until graduation, were particularly important to his research. His studies set the stage for future retention models and established the empirical relationship between institutional and noninstitutional factors (Seidman 2012). However, they have often been criticized for their lack of generalizability and their focus on institutional effectiveness and efficiency.

Despite these drawbacks, many scholars still contend that retention has more to do with the institutional atmosphere than anything else. They argue that variables such as adaptation to college policies and procedures and satisfactory student support services play a vital role in student departure (Sparkman, Maulding, and Roberts 2012). The policies and procedures adopted at an institution can have a profound effect on how well the student views the school and whether or not they persist.

Higher education requirements and guidelines can often be overwhelming, especially to those that are first-generation college students. As a result, clear student guidelines and readily available student support services should be communicated to each student as early as possible (Fowler and Boylan 2010). These requirements should be written, available in different formats, and state the consequences for noncompliance (Fowler and Boylan 2010). Students should also be aware of the persons to contact should they have problems or concerns with the outlined policies. Wild and Ebbers (2002) claim that the most basic method to measure institutional success as it applies to retention is examining whether the services offered are meeting the distinctive needs of the student. An effective way to accomplish communicating this to students is to present the information in a mandatory new student orientation prior to registering for classes. Studies show that orientation is one of the best ways for students to become familiar with their new environment (Fowler and Boylan 2010).

Personal and Environmental Perspective

Other researchers like Summerskill (1962) and Astin (1985) recognized McNeely for his contributions to research on student attrition but believed that measuring this concept was much more complex than just institutional factors. Summerskill (1962) argued that there were psychological, sociological, and familial motivations that contribute to student withdrawal; he claimed that a student's collegiate behavior could be influenced by both external and internal

factors. Summerskill's research provided innovative insight into the complexities of student attrition. Astin also believed that there were complicated external and internal predictors of student retention. However, he added that personal and environmental factors were also to blame. In a longitudinal study in 1985, Astin found that personal factors, such as past academic grades, educational aspiration, and study habits, as well as environmental factors such as marital status, children, and jobs, both had a large effect on student persistence. For him, it was these factors that affected whether students would persist.

More specifically, academic issues have been regarded as one of the most profound indicators of student departure. Various studies have indicated that with regard to retention, the biggest problem facing post-secondary education is academic in nature (Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 2010; Brown 2012; Daley 2010; Herzog 2005; Rosenbaum and Person 2003). Herzog (2005) claims that traditional measures of student persistence do little to explain the completion rate decline. He further argues that the real dilemma is academic, because this issue accounts for over 90 percent of the total drop in retention rates. Students that are not prepared for college academically, and those who face problems meeting program entry requirements and prerequisites, have the greatest difficulty with completing their degrees.

Despite the evidence pointing to academic issues as the leading cause in declining retention rates, some scholars concur that most students drop out of college for financial reasons (Carlozo 2012; Mendoza, Mendez, and Malcolm 2009; Seidman 2012; "The Price Is Not Right" 2012; Tinto 1993; Waters 2010). With the cost of attendance steadily rising for both public and private institutions, affording a college education can be difficult. Affordability can oftentimes have a profound effect on accessibility. Costs of college, financial aid, and job demands can all cause financial barriers to students pursuing a college degree.

College as a Social Institution Perspective

In addition to academic and financial issues, social problems also affect student retention. Tinto (1993) was one of the biggest advocates of social factors as they apply to persistence. He argued that successful integration into formal and informal academic and social systems influenced individual persistence. Transitioning from high school to college; relationships with faculty, staff, and classmates; and involvement on campus all contribute to whether or not a student persists at an institution until graduation.

Some theorists further claim that institutions of higher education are socializing organizations and that experiences in these environments influence student retention (Kamens 1971; Meyer 1970; Seidman 2005; Spady 1970;

Tinto 1975). Perhaps the most influential of these models was the theory of individual departure by Tinto. He believed that a student's lack of persistence was a result of individual attributes, commitments, and interaction with members of the college. Tinto (1975) claimed that the most vital indicator was integration or the student's experiences within the college atmosphere. According to him, integration had three stages: separation from communities of the past, transition between communities, and incorporation into the college community. He based his theory on the findings of sociologists such as Van Gennep, who focused on processes of integration in tribal society, and Emile Durkheim, who studied suicide. Tinto's basic assumption was that the more a student is integrated into the social and academic environment of the institution, the more likely the student would persist until their academic goals were accomplished. Seidman (2005) agreed with Tinto's theory and claimed that institutions can increasingly retain students through powerful retention programs aimed at early, intensive, and continuous intervention. Despite the fact that Tinto's theory has been very influential in the study of retention, it is often criticized for the weak analogy it draws to Durkheim's suicide study and its heavy reliance on the college institution as a social organization (Bean and Metzner 1985).

Tinto (1993) argues that overall, these retention theories or models have been less effective in solving the actual problem institutions face with student departure. However, they have made it easier to pinpoint some of the reasons why students drop out of college. Longitudinal studies and surveys are the most common methodologies utilized. Using these tools, researchers have indicated that academic, financial, social, and institutional issues all affect whether a student persists until graduation. Typically, there is not just one factor that contributes to a student's decision to withdraw. Their choice could ultimately be the result of a mixture of reasons.

Due to the importance of student retention and its effects on the student, the institution, and society, researchers and educators have devoted much of their time since the 1930s trying to explain the complexities behind why students do not persist and what can be done to retain them. Past studies have greatly contributed to our understanding of student departure. It has created a broad foundation for explaining why students drop out of college. Institutions that have low levels of retaining students can use the literature, as well as this study, as models for improvement and make modifications to fit their own unique needs. Colleges that cannot find a model to adopt should explore other distinctive ways to create retention strategies that may increase persistence.

Despite the strengths of the retention literature, it does have its weaknesses. The literature is most commonly criticized for its methodology. Most researchers use cohort longitudinal studies and surveys to measure

retention. In these studies, a subpopulation of students at a particular college is followed from one semester to the next and given surveys to measure their persistence. The problem lies in not being able to generalize the findings to other institutions. Another problem lies in the complexities of measuring student retention (Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). Much of what we think we know about retention is misleading because of the intricate nature of human behavior. Typically, retention is measured in terms of dropouts. Dropouts are those individuals who leave college. The problem with measuring dropouts is that people leave college for various reasons. This definition describes the behavior of all that leave and does not differentiate between why they leave (Seidman 2012; Tinto 1993). Seidman (2012) argues that this could lead to the overestimation or underestimation of actual dropouts.

After examining the strengths and weaknesses of the literature, it is appropriate to isolate the factors that may help to explain why students leave ATC. The literature sets the foundation for the study as the descriptive categories used herein include the most common factors across all institutions. However, it is critical that a study is conducted for ATC to capture all its unique characteristics in its entirety (Halpin 1990). This study was designed to use retention theories and models along with the descriptive categories defined by the literature to explain ATC's distinctive patterns of student departure. Once these patterns are defined, the information obtained can further be used to discover ways to increase retention.

Conceptual Framework

Reading the literature pertaining to student retention on a larger scale made it easier to design the project and create a conceptual framework.¹ This research study is quantitative in nature and has a descriptive purpose. The guidelines for a descriptive research objective provided by Shields and Tajalli (2006) were used to help set the conceptual framework for the project. The study describes the factors that lead to student departure at ATC and uses categories that were derived from existing literature on student retention. The categories used to guide the study were: academic issues; financial issues; social issues; and institutional issues. Each category is further divided into subcategories that help to provide a more specific description of the reason for departure. Academic issues were examined based on not being prepared for college and problems with program entry/prerequisites. The cost of college,

¹ Access to the micro-conceptual framework and operationalization tables is available by e-mailing the author at jamekajackson24@gmail.com.

financial aid, and job demands were regarded as aspects describing financial issues. Social issues were broken down into transitioning from high school to college, relationships with faculty, staff, and classmates, and involvement on campus. Lastly, institutional issues were observed based on policies and procedures and student support services.

Methodology

The chosen methodology was selected to describe effectively the research conducted based on the aforementioned categories. This project used a nonexperimental research design with content analysis and secondary data analysis of surveys already administered by the Planning and Research Department at ATC. Data from both the Wal-Mart Press Grant Survey (WPGS) conducted in 2012 and the Non-Returning Student Survey (NRSS) distributed in 2013 were aggregated and analyzed based on the categories and subcategories outlined in the literature and organized in the micro-conceptual framework.² Each category was defined based on its subcategories. Subcategories that had specific questions present in the surveys to measure them were evaluated as secondary data analysis. Open-ended responses were examined using a content analysis approach for categories that did not have a specific question in either survey to operationalize them. The statistical techniques used are primarily descriptive in nature and include percentages, frequency distributions, and mode. These techniques made it easier to pinpoint what factors most contributed to student departure.

The unit of analysis in the WPGS was individual responses. The sample was collected via Survey Monkey an online tool used to create and distribute surveys. The WPGS survey was sent to students who had missed at least one semester of consecutive enrollment from fall 2010 to fall 2012 to ascertain their reason(s) for not returning. The survey was sent to 2,657 e-mail addresses with 199 responses. Thirty-eight opted out, and 132 e-mails were listed as invalid. The survey was open for two weeks. Four e-mails were sent over the course of the research project (the initial e-mail + three reminders). There was an 8 percent response rate (199/2,487). However, there were actually 291 total responses as a result of students listing multiple reasons for leaving ATC when answering this question.

Similarly, the NRSS was also created and distributed via Survey Monkey, with the unit of analysis being the individual student. The survey was sent to 814 student e-mail addresses that registered in the fall 2012 semester and had

² Access to the WPGS and NRSS surveys are available by e-mailing jamekajackson24@gmail.com.

not reenrolled for the following spring 2013 semester. The initial NRSS was sent out on February 21, 2013, and a reminder e-mail was sent out each week until the close of the survey on March 21, 2013. Thirty-one email addresses were not valid, four students opted out of taking the survey, and 758 students did not respond. Only fifty-six students with valid e-mail addresses responded, making the response rate for this survey 7.4 percent (56/762).

The responses were divided into three categories. The first category explored was academic issues. Responses to the WPGS and the NRSS that included not being prepared for college academically and problems with program entry/prerequisites were defined and categorized as such. The second category was financial issues. Responses from the surveys that included cost of college, financial aid, and job demands were treated as financial issues. The third category explored was social issues, which included transition from high school to college, relationships with faculty, staff, and classmates, and involvement on campus as departure reasons. The fourth category was institutional issues, which were measured based on responses that established policies and procedures or student support services as reasons for not persisting.

Results

Academic Issues³

Despite indications from the literature that not being prepared for college academically and problems meeting program entry/prerequisites are common factors that lead to student departure, neither played a determining role for the students in the sample. In fact, more students reported being satisfied with these areas than were dissatisfied.

Financial Issues⁴

On the other hand, financial issues played a more prevalent role in the student departure puzzle. Cost of college was the leading financial issue for students who did not return to ATC. Results from the NRSS showed that 21.2 percent said that the cost of college was the reason they could not reenroll at ATC for the next semester. Similarly, 22 percent revealed this same situation after taking the WPGS. Between the two surveys, about 21 percent of students had trouble with paying for their classes. Problems with financial aid were also a reoccurring theme for dropouts. However, this issue was not as prevalent as college affordability. Only about 8 percent of students from both surveys attributed cost of college as the reason they could not continue their education.

³ Results tables for academic issues are located in Appendix A.

⁴ Results tables for financial issues are located in Appendix B.

Despite claims of a strong connection between financial aid and retention, this relationship did not play a significant role at ATC.

On the other hand, a significant number of students claimed to have issues with working and finishing their degree at ATC. Results from the study show that 34 percent of the students surveyed using the NRSS were employed at this time; about 29 percent were enrolled at another institution while attending ATC; and about 38 percent were neither employed nor enrolled at another institution. The mode for this data set was “neither,” indicating that among the students surveyed, more were actually unemployed during the spring 2013 semester.

Despite the fact that more students were unemployed than employed, job demands still played a key part in departure reasons at ATC. About 13.5 percent of the sample who took the NRSS claimed that they had to drop out of classes due to work conflicts. Approximately 8.6 percent of responses for the WPGS indicated that working and attending classes led the student to completely withdraw. According to the NRSS, less than half of the students included in the sample were employed at the time (33.93 percent); and 13.5 percent of those employed claimed that they had to dropout due to work demands. This implies that about 40 percent (13.5 percent out of 33.93 percent) of the sample that worked left ATC because of work conflicts. Though significant for ATC, these figures were still slightly below those of Carlozo (2012), who reported that 50 percent of those sampled listed work conflicts as a reason for not being able to complete their degree.

*Social Issues*⁵

Socially based issues also affected student departure in the sample. Transition from high school to college did not play a huge role. However, many students reported having issues with relationships with faculty, staff, and classmates and campus involvement. In regard to the overall quality of academic advisement in particular, about 72 percent reported being “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with the overall quality of academic advising, while 22 percent were “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.” Two students skipped rating these areas. The mode was either “very satisfied” or “satisfied” for both subjects. A 22 percent dissatisfaction rating for academic advising is an important discovery due to the effects it can have on retention at ATC. No students reported leaving ATC as a result of issues with campus activities. However, this could still be an issue, because a large percentage (33.33 percent) of students reported not having any experiences with campus involvement. About 65 percent of students reported being “very satisfied” or

⁵ Results tables for social issues are located in Appendix C.

“satisfied” with student activities, while 1.85 percent said that they were “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.” The mode was both “satisfied” and “not applicable,” with 18 responses each. Astin (1985) argues that the potential of a student being retained largely depends on their involvement on campus. As a result, it is plausible that ATC may be experiencing problems with retention because a large percentage of its students (33.33 percent) have had no experiences at all with campus activities.

Institutional Issues⁶

Many students seemed to leave ATC due to institutional issues. Problems with policies/procedures seemed to be a dropout contributor for quite a few students. For the NRSS, 42.3 percent said they had problems with various policies/procedures at ATC, including schedule conflicts, courses not offered, and dissatisfaction with their overall experience. Results from the WPGS showed 10.3 percent of responses indicating similar problems. About 20 percent of students surveyed said they were “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” with the overall quality of the registration process. On the other hand, about 11 percent reported being either “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” with the overall quality of ATC.

Student support services did not play a profound effect in the departure puzzle at ATC. More students actually reported being either “very satisfied” or “satisfied” with these services. However, the mode for this area was “not applicable,” with 35.85 percent of students reporting that they had little or no experiences with student support services. Wild and Ebbers (2002) might argue that the reason ATC has faced a decline in retention is because a large majority of students have had little or no direct contact with student support services.

Discussion

Overall, more than half of the students sampled at ATC reported having no academic, financial, social, or institutional issues at all while attending the school. They simply left the institution after accomplishing their goals for being there. However, after analyzing the data, there were several findings that could affect retention at ATC. Cost of college seemed to be the biggest contributor to withdrawal, so it is imperative that ATC focus its attention on creating ways to help students meet the financial obligations that come along with attending the institution, in order to remain true to the accessibility and affordability concepts that are traditionally associated with the community college atmosphere (Bragg 2001).

⁶ Results tables for institutional issues are located in Appendix D.

Finding ways to accommodate students that are employed is also a way to assist students in meeting the expenses of higher education, as roughly 40 percent of the sample was not retained for various reasons associated with having to work and go to school. Due to the 22 percent dissatisfaction rate with the overall satisfaction of academic advising, ATC should focus its retention initiatives on improving the academic advising relationship. This can have a major influence on whether or not a student decides to continue their education at ATC, because the advisor-student relationship is oftentimes the first social encounter a student will have in college.

About 42 percent of students reported they dropped out due to issues with institutional guidelines at ATC. Most described having problems with the college's financial withdrawal policy, processing problems, and classes not being offered at a convenient time. ATC should probably address some of its policies and procedures, because almost half of the unrepresentative sample claimed that these were reasons for not returning. The findings in involvement on campus and student support services yielded unexpected results as well. The majority of responses showed that students could not report their overall satisfaction because they did not have enough experience with the two areas to do so. These were areas that students selected "not applicable" when asked to give their overall satisfaction.

Tinto (1993) asserts that campus involvement leads to decreased instances of student attrition, while Wild and Ebbers (2002) maintain that the most basic method to measure institutional success as it applies to retention is examining whether the services offered are meeting the distinctive needs of the student. It becomes very difficult for an institution to retain these students based on these guidelines if a large majority of students claim that they have not had any experiences with either area. Perhaps ATC should find ways to engage the student in campus activities and improve the outreach of student support services. Offering online-based campus activities and having student support services staff available by appointment after normal business hours could be a plausible solution for those students that commute or work. Empirical data suggests that similar practices could have a positive impact on retention (Fowler and Boylan 2010; Wild and Ebbers 2002).

Despite the factors that the literature outlined, several issues were unveiled that the literature did not sufficiently cover. Data from the NRSS survey showed that students reported having issues in several other areas. Some students claimed they had to drop out for personal issues such as transportation or relocation. About 6 percent listed these issues as departure reasons. Family obligations also played a role in making the decision to withdraw, as 13.46 percent reported dropping out of school to take care of

their families. More research needs to be done in these areas to determine if they could have a profound effect on student departure patterns at ATC.

Unfortunately, there were several drawbacks to this study. The sample was chosen in a way that limited student access and knowledge of the survey. Thus, the mechanism of delivery influenced the validity of the sample. The results could have been significantly different for a larger sample, limiting the explanatory power of the data for generalizable populations. Reliability issues were a concern as students were allowed to submit open-ended responses that could have easily been misinterpreted. Asking the question directly versus leaving the respondent responsible for interpreting it could result in a higher response rate. Depending on secondary data analysis could also be a validity issue, because the initial researcher's intentions may be different from the interests of the person analyzing the data. Analyzing data can become very difficult when relying on data collection from another person. This could also cause a methodological issue, as one researcher is depending on the data collected from a previous study. In this project, for example, academic preparedness and problems with program entry/prerequisites were initially measured by asking the students in a survey questions related to the issue and rating them as a departure factor based on their response. This could pose a problem, as most students do not have enough higher education experience to know whether they are academically prepared or whether they are successfully meeting program entry requirements. Relying on secondary data analysis almost forces the new researcher to accept these dubious claims.

Although it is difficult to extrapolate the results from this study due to the drawbacks and unique nature of ATC's environment, specific recommendations can be made based on the results of the study. Organizations should focus more on decreasing financial barriers for students, specifically those that are struggling with the costs of paying out-of-pocket expenses as well as those that work while seeking their degree. Research indicates that more and more students are forced not only to work and attend classes, but to also independently pay for college expenses (Seidman 2012). In addition, more should be done to improve the student-advisor relationship as the advisor serves a vital role in assisting the student with creating new relationships on campus. Programs should also be created to increase both campus involvement and interaction with student support services to ensure a smooth adaptation to the new environment. Institutions should also work hard to implement policies and procedures that are clear and effectively communicated to students to make sure expectations are understood. Other institutions, including nontechnical and noncommunity colleges, should use these recommendations as a foundation for tackling its own retention issues, as no two higher education settings are exactly alike.

Appendix A: Results Tables for Academic Issues

Responses by Percentage for Each Survey

	NRSS	WPGS
Not being prepared for college academically	0%	2.7%
Problems with program entry/ prerequisites	1.9%	6.5%

NRSS—Likert Scale for Problems with Program Entry/Prerequisites

	VS	S	NA	D	VD
Overall quality of academic program	18 33.33%	24 44.44%	5 9.26%	6 11.11%	1 1.85%
Overall quality of instruction in program area courses	23 42.59%	20 37.04%	7 12.96%	3 5.56%	1 1.85%
Overall quality of admissions into program	22 40.74%	21 38.89%	2 3.70%	7 12.96%	2 3.70%

Note: VS = Very Satisfied; S = Satisfied; NA = Not Applicable; D = Dissatisfied; VD = Very Dissatisfied
n = 54

Appendix B: Results Table for Financial Issues

Responses by Percentage for Each Survey

	NRSS	WPGS
Cost of College	21.2%	22%
Financial Aid	1.9%	7.9%
Job Demands	13.5%	8.6%

NRSS—Employment at ATC for Spring 2013

	Frequency	Percent
Employed	19	33.93%
Enrolled at another institution	16	28.57%
Neither	21	37.5%
n = 56		

Appendix C: Results Tables for Social Issues

Responses by Percentage for Each Survey

	NRSS	WPGS
Transition from high school to college	0%	1.7%
Relationships with faculty, staff, and classmates	1.9%	5.2%
Involvement on campus	0%	0%

NRSS—Likert Scale for Problems with Program Entry/Prerequisites

	VS	S	NA	D	VD
Overall quality of instruction of other courses (not program related)	20 37.04%	22 40.74%	6 11.11%	5 9.26%	1 1.85%
Overall quality of academic advising	21 38.89%	18 33.33%	3 5.56%	10 18.52%	2 3.70%

Note: VS = Very Satisfied; S = Satisfied; NA = Not Applicable; D = Dissatisfied; VD = Very Dissatisfied
n = 54

Appendix D: Results Table for Institutional Issues

Responses by Percentage for Each Survey

	NRSS	WPGS
Policies/procedures	42.3%	10.3%
Student support services	0%	0%

NRSS—Likert Scale for Problems with Program Entry/Prerequisites

	VS	S	NA	D	VD
Overall quality of campus safety	26 49.06%	25 47.17%	2 3.77%	0 0%	0 0%
Overall quality of counseling	18 33.96%	16 30.19%	15 28.30%	3 5.66%	1 1.89%
Overall quality of student development	15 28.30%	15 28.30%	19 35.85%	3 5.66%	1 1.89%

Note: VS = Very Satisfied; S = Satisfied; NA = Not Applicable; D = Dissatisfied; VD = Very Dissatisfied
n = 54

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