Questions in Politics

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Questions in Politics Editorial Staff

About the GPSA

Georgia Political Science Association

Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

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The Journal of the Georgia Political Science Association
Volume V

Contents

Questions in Politics
The Journal of the Georgia Political Science Association
Volume V

Preface

Questions in Politics (*QiP*), the scholarly journal of the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA), welcomes our readers to Volume V. The articles published here began as papers presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the GPSA. The authors then submitted the manuscripts to the journal, where they were anonymously and thoroughly reviewed by peers. After further review and editing, out of nine manuscripts submitted, three are published here.

We are pleased to announce that the first article in Volume V, "The Pathologies of Democracy: Mill and Winnicott on the Secret Ballot" by Dr. John LeJeune, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia Southwestern State University, is the McBrayer Award winner for 2017. The McBrayer is given annually to the best paper presented at the Annual Meeting. The winning author or authors have traditionally received a certificate and a cash award. To further recognize this achievement, the McBrayer winner is the first article in this volume.

Our articles for this volume range from political theory to public policy to the politics of higher education. The lead article explores the differing arguments for the prized institution of the secret ballot. Northam's article examines the politics and policymaking surrounding pollinators, which are "bees, butterflies, moths, bats, and various birds." Finally, Starling and LaPlant analyze the contributions of international students to higher education, a cluster of programs and policies that are somewhat at odds with the current presidential administration.

Following the 2016 presidential election, political science, as a discipline, was criticized for failing to predict correctly the winner. This indicates that a paradigm shift may be taking place within political science. Nearly 50 years ago, Thomas Kuhn (1970) argued that social sciences, including political science, were in a "pre-paradigm" period (160–61), moving toward clear paradigms with "universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers" (viii). The paradigms of political science used to both predict and explain American politics have become less accurate and relevant in recent years. The emergence of Donald Trump as a politician and his rise to the presidency have many observers of American politics doubting the relevance of these paradigms and, consequently, of political science.

This year's volume presents an approach to the study of politics and government that demonstrates the eclecticism, complexity, and diversity of analytical styles. It is not wedded to a theme linked to a paradigm or paradigms. Only time will tell whether a shift in paradigms is taking place in political science.

The home for *QiP* remains the web. Go to http://gpsa-online.org and click on "Questions in Politics." As of this year, paper copies may be purchased through print-on-demand. Copies of Volumes I through IV remain available. Contact either of us to purchase a copy or to arrange for print-on-demand.

Finally, we continue to thank our anonymous reviewers, as well as the Editor, James "Larry" Taulbee, and the Managing Editor, Matthew E. Van Atta, for their efforts to continuously improve this journal.

Thomas E. Rotnem and Adam P. Stone

Reference

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962) 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. 2nd ed., enlarged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Questions in Politics
Volume V Abstracts

Scholars have highlighted the great disparity between polling projections and actual voter behavior in the 2016 presidential election, attributing much of this difference to the secret ballot. Many Trump supporters, for example, did not reveal their true preferences to human pollsters but did support Trump in the private voting booth. While some pundits applauded this as precisely what the secret ballot is for, others voiced disgust that the ballot had freed voters to act "irresponsibly." The 2016 election thus raised an older normative problem regarding the role of the secret ballot in modern democracies. This article seeks to better understand normative arguments for and against the secret ballot by comparing the writings of D. W. Winnicott—one of its most thoughtful defenders—and J. S. Mill—one of its most provocative critics. Winnicott and Mill both support mass democracy but share an understanding of it as inherently pathological and, oftentimes, irrational. But where Winnicott embraces the secret ballot in representative democracy as a healthy and minimally destructive means of purging citizens' irrational drives, Mill argues that an open voting system more effectively persuades, if not compels, citizens to act reasonably and virtuously when making public decisions.

Given recent initiatives to make the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) more inclusive and diverse, thus upholding the title of "The People's Department," this study explores the evolving development of actor coalitions and policymaking brokers that impact a common public issue considered by many as a potentially harmful threat affecting our food supply. Politically and publicly acknowledged because the issues involve an impending crisis in the production of food crops resulting from pollinator collapse, the context of this crisis relates to the reported population decline of pollinators as reflected in

honeybee winter hive loss of 30 percent per year since 2006 to Colony Collapse Disease (CCD). Without pollinators, one-third of the overall US total food supply is at risk of being lost. Using the analytical tool advocacy coalition framework (ACF), the results of this study present the representative diversity of policymakers and the subsequent coalition formation that influences and directs policy development, implementation, regulation, and oversight of this multidisciplinary policy domain. Also, primary actor relationships are identified and evaluated using network analysis. The study finds evolving and conflicting policy positions of the USDA, the 2015–16 Obama Administration/EPA, and congressional action articulated in the Agricultural Act of 2014. The policy directions from the policy actors/brokers are found to have been more politically motivated than directed by CCD scientific research.

Coming to America for Higher Education:
An Analysis of the Predictors of International Student Enrollment at Colleges and Universities in the Southeast

David Starling, *Valdosta State University*
James LaPlant, *Valdosta State University* *Page 57*

International students enrich the educational and cultural environment on college campuses as well as contribute to the economic health of institutions of higher education and their surrounding communities. International student recruitment has never been easy at non-doctoral institutions, but it has become even more challenging in the age of Trump. Our study begins with a description of the enrollment trends of international students at US colleges and universities, with special attention given to the impact of President Trump. We explore the factors that influence the decision of an international student to study in the United States, focusing particularly on the role of cost (tuition and fees) for regional universities and baccalaureate institutions. The heart of our study examines the percentage of international students enrolled at almost 200 institutions of higher education in the Southeast. We investigate the impact of institutional diversity, academic classification, cost, and public vs. private status on the percentage of international students enrolled for 2015–16. We find significantly higher rates of enrollment at doctoral institutions when compared to those which offer only master's, bachelor's, and associate degrees. Significant differences also emerge by the type of research classification for doctoral institutions with those universities designated as highest research activity reporting an international student enrollment more than three times

greater than moderate research activity universities. Furthermore, the average percentage of international students enrolled in private institutions is more than double that of enrollees in public institutions. In a multivariate regression model, percentage white and percentage female are negative predictors of the percentage of international students, while the cost of tuition and fees is a positive predictor. In a truncated model of just public master's universities, the cost of out-of-state tuition is a negative predictor of the percentage of international students, but it does not attain statistical significance. We conclude with policy recommendations for college and university campuses as well as for policymakers at the state level.

Questions in Politics
The Journal of the Georgia Political Science Association
Volume V

The Pathologies of Democracy: Mill and Winnicott on the Secret Ballot

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Scholars have highlighted the great disparity between polling projections and actual voter behavior in the 2016 presidential election, attributing much of this difference to the secret ballot. Many Trump supporters, for example, did not reveal their true preferences to human pollsters but did support Trump in the private voting booth. While some pundits applauded this as precisely what the secret ballot is for, others voiced disgust that the ballot had freed voters to act "irresponsibly." The 2016 election thus raised an older normative problem regarding the role of the secret ballot in modern democracies. This article seeks to better understand normative arguments for and against the secret ballot by comparing the writings of D. W. Winnicott—one of its most thoughtful defenders—and J. S. Mill—one of its most provocative critics. Winnicott and Mill both support mass democracy but share an understanding of it as inherently pathological and, oftentimes, irrational. But where Winnicott embraces the secret ballot in representative democracy as a healthy and minimally destructive means of purging citizens' irrational drives, Mill argues that an open voting system more effectively persuades, if not compels, citizens to act reasonably and virtuously when making public decisions.

The election of November 8, 2016, had its fair share of winners and losers, and arguably, none outside the Clinton war room suffered more on election night than political pollsters. As the shock surrounding Donald Trump's presidential victory sank in during the morning hours of November 9, two related questions arose: First, how had Trump managed to win this election, particularly in rust

belt states such as Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—the pillars of Hillary Clinton's so-called "electoral firewall"? And second, how had preelection pollsters so grossly misjudged the outcome, especially in those hotly contested states? The New York Times called it "the biggest polling miss in a presidential election in decades" (Cohn et al. 2016), while an *Atlantic* writer asked: "How did we get this thing this wrong? From the myriad polls and poll aggregators, to the vaunted oracles at Nate Silver's FiveThirtyEight and the *New York Times*'s shiny forecasting interface, most serious predictors completely misjudged Trump's chances of victory" (Newkirk 2016).

Soon, experts at places such as Johns Hopkins and Stanford were discussing the limitations of big data and polling "blind spots" (Lyons 2016; Shashkevich 2016). Some attributed the error to "nonresponse bias" among likely Trump voters—less educated whites who "systematically do not respond to surveys" although they plan to vote (Mercer et al. 2016), particularly since "the more non-educated white people there are in a state, the higher the polling gap" (Kirk and Scott 2016; see also Cohn et al. 2016; Vogel and Isenstadt 2016). Still others cited as mitigating factors Clinton's sizable popular vote lead (nearly 3 million votes) and the distorting effects of the Electoral College (which Trump won by a margin of 306–232) on perceptions of electoral performance (Kurtzleben 2016).

But hovering over these explanations was a theory that struck a more sensitive political nerve, variously called the "stealth voter" or "shy voter" phenomenon, "social desirability bias," or, more symbolically, the "Reverse Bradley Effect." The Bradley Effect refers to the 1982 California gubernatorial election in which Tom Bradley, an African American candidate representing the Democratic Party, lost to Republican George Deukmejian despite having a considerable lead in many polls leading up to the election. The turn of events was explained by reluctance among white voters, perhaps fearing the appearance of racism, to reveal that they were not voting for a black candidate facing a white candidate, leading to a sizable discrepancy between polling predictions and election results. Discussion of the Bradley Effect intensified in the lead-up to the 2008 presidential election (Holmes 2008), but following Barack Obama's historic victory, scholars cited its absence as manifesting "an enormous transformation in racial attitudes and outlooks in the United States" (Bobo and Dawson 2009). Daniel Hopkins (2009) indicatively argued that while a meaningful Bradley (or "Wilder") effect existed in America up through the early 1990s, by Obama's 2008 election, the phenomenon had become highly context-dependent.

Whatever the scientific assessments, clarifying the theoretical issue is important: the Bradley Effect is *not* a purported explanation of voter behavior, nor is it purported to measure the effects of racism or racial bias on polling or voting. It is, rather, an attempt to explain a *discrepancy* between polling data and real preferences based on the systematic misrepresentation of those same

preferences to pollsters. In plain terms, the theory purports to explain a social phenomenon of mass fibbing, which may in turn reflect broader preference falsification among a significant portion of society based on factors ranging from an internalized sense of guilt or shame to the fear of external social sanctions like rejection, isolation, ostracism, and unemployment (Noelle-Neumann 1993).

From a democratic perspective, the Bradley Effect is problematic for two reasons. The first concerns the link between opinion polls and political responsiveness. As one Pew article put it on Election Night, "The role of polling in a democracy goes far beyond simply predicting the horse race. At its best, polling provides an equal voice to everyone and helps to give expression to the public's needs and wants in ways that elections may be too blunt to do. That is why restoring polling's credibility is so important" (Mercer et al. 2016). A second problem concerns the relation between the public sphere and political legitimacy. As Timur Kuran (1997) writes, "one socially significant consequence of preference falsification is … widespread public support for policies that would be rejected in a vote taken by the secret ballot … to the exclusion of alternative policies capable of commanding stable support" (18). This leads to a powerful argument for the ballot: "Because elections by secret ballot measure private opinion, polls undertaken to predict electoral outcomes will yield misleading forecasts unless respondents feel comfortable expressing themselves freely" (Kuran 1997, 341).

Indeed, systematic preference falsification and polling errors largely explained the shock surrounding Trump's presidential victory. Famously only two major polls—the USC-Dornsife-*Los Angeles Times* Daybreak and Trafalgar Group of Atlanta polls—consistently projected a Trump victory prior to Election Day, and their experts cited a so-called "Reverse Bradley Effect" as the likely source of a Trump upset. A glimpse at their methodology is revealing: The USC-*Los Angeles Times* poll differed from others in two major respects: first, by giving added weight to rural white voters who were underrepresented elsewhere; and second, by contacting respondents exclusively online rather than over the phone, which boosted Trump's numbers considerably. In the online polls, Trump voters "reported themselves as being slightly more comfortable than Clinton voters in talking to family members and acquaintances about their choice," and "were notably less comfortable about telling a telephone pollster about their vote." Moreover, "Women who said they backed Trump were particularly less likely to say they would be comfortable talking to a pollster about their vote" (Lauter 2016).

The Trafalgar Group tackled the problem of "comfort" in another way—by asking respondents, in addition to their own vote, who they thought their

neighbors were voting for. The neighbor question was crucial for estimating the so-called "hidden Trump voter." As one Trafalgar representative put it:

> [I]f you want to find out the truth on a hot topic, you can't just ask the question directly. So the neighbor is part of the mechanism to get the real answer. In the 11 battleground states, and 3 non-battleground, there was a significant drop-off between the ballot test question [which candidate you support] and the neighbors' question [which candidate you believe most of your neighbors support]. The neighbors question result showed a similar result in each state. Hillary dropped [relative to the ballot test question] and Trump comes up across every demographic, every geography. Hillary's drop was between 3 and 11 percent while Trump's increase was between 3 and 7 percent. This pattern existed everywhere from Pennsylvania to Nevada to Utah to Georgia, and it was a constant … And what we discovered is … a lot of minorities were shy voters and women were shy voters. (Fossett and Shepard 2016)

The Trafalgar Group discovered a similar mechanism in differences between live phone call and push-button (or robocall) poll results: "Every single time we polled the primary, the push-button said 4.5 points better for Trump. And obviously, we didn't know until the primary election that the push-button would always be right" (Fossett and Shepard 2016).

The Trump campaign generated a great deal of open enthusiasm, and indeed, Trump's crowds throughout the 2016 campaign were large and vocal. But after the election, the USC-*Los Angeles Times* and Trafalgar groups garnered praise for polling methods that revealed the significant number of Trump "hidden voters" in an electoral environment, which—given Trump's controversial remarks regarding a variety of groups from women and Muslims to Mexicans and immigrants, and election-level scrutiny of these remarks by media outlets and the Clinton campaign—may have harbored the impression (if not the reality) in some communities that isolation and ostracism would follow from revealing one's preference for Trump, not only among whites but also among women, minority, and educated voters—all of whom apparently voted for Trump in higher numbers than projected.

The Secret Ballot Crisis

The phenomenon of voter shyness in 2016 raised concerns about the health of American democracy. On Election Day, CNBC's Jake Novak, citing Trafalgar's prediction, paired an interesting question about America with a provocative suggestion about democracy: "What will it say about America if

Trump wins and the polls were all wrong because millions of us were literally too scared to tell pollsters, neighbors, and even family members about our voting choice? … [W]hatever we do, it's important to note that no democracy can really be healthy when too many people are afraid to even say for whom they're voting" (Novak 2016a). Novak's postelection remarks were even stronger:

> The problem was that too many people felt afraid to answer [the preelection polls] honestly. For all the focus on how nasty and offensive Trump was, there was a stronger and steadier stream of nastiness from editorials in major papers, posts on social media, and conversations in office break rooms and classrooms that bashed Trump, sometimes even equating him to Hitler. That took its toll on a lot of Trump supporters … [I]t's clear millions of Americans have been living for months in fear of saying they intended to vote for him … The 'stealth Trump vote' … was born out of a callousness and dismissive nature that's becoming more and more common in American society. (Novak 2016b)

On the other hand, Election Night coverage showed serious concern from another angle: In one memorable segment, CNN's Van Jones called Trump's victory a "whitelash against a changing country … [and] against a black president in part. And that's the part where the pain comes" (Ryan 2016). Around the same time, MSNBC's Rachel Maddow and Chris Matthews entered a heated exchange on the reasons Trump was winning:

> [Maddow:] What we've got though, the biggest number and the biggest thing that explains how Trump could maybe win the Presidency with only 29% of the Latino vote, is that he's spiked white vote. He has figured out a way to do that, and that has always been the far right's dream, that you could figure out a way to do it without minorities, in fact you could figure out a way to do it on the backs of minorities by threatening minorities in a way that make a lot of people uncomfortable but that does awaken something … basically … that's racial anxiety among whites, and that's how you win. That's been a dream on the far right. It's the Ann Coulter dream of white turnout.
>
> [Matthews:] Well let me give the other version of that notion and it is that, the three issues that he tapped into—trade, immigration, and wars—I think he was on the popular side of.

A heated debate ensued in which Matthews criticized Clinton for not coming out with "strong elements of a comprehensive immigration program" because "She thought she could get all the Hispanic vote without paying a price," with Maddow responding that Clinton did in fact offer a comprehensive and politically risky enforcement plan, but "What she didn't do was say 'Build a wall,' and 'Mexicans are rapists.'" Matthews concluded by emphasizing the legitimacy of Trump's issue campaign, though not his rhetoric: "I don't think it was racism," said Matthews. "The way he did it was, but I don't think the issue was," to which Maddow responded, "The way he did it … is an important part of how he did it."

Jones's and Maddow's remarks displayed more than a little disgust not just at the Trump campaign, but particularly with Trump voters, of whom a meaningful portion were reprimanded for voting, at worst, in a way that is bigoted and ethnically tribal, or at best, based on noxious anxieties provoked by racist, sexist, and demagogic rhetoric. Their votes, it was suggested, reflect the most dangerous elements of populist democracy; and their vulgar, even irrational motives lack the critical elements of enlightened reason and public-orientation that are a thriving democracy's bedrock. This gives relief to Matthews's response to Maddow—not to defend Trump voters per se, but to suggest that among many (if not most), there *was* a potentially reasonable and public-spirited motive to vote, attached to a national concern with jobs, immigration reform, and trade policy.

The hidden linchpin of this tension, I would suggest, was the effect of the secret ballot. For better or worse, the anonymity of the secret ballot made Trump's pivotal "stealth voters" comfortable with voting as they did. And in a year that saw the rise not only of the stealth Trump vote but also the stealth "Brexit" vote, in a bitter and rancorous electoral atmosphere eerily similar to that of the United States, it was relatively easy to juxtapose the liberty of the secret ballot (which typically benefitted the right) with the coercive (or corrective) power of political correctness (typically attached to the left), and to place them on opposite sides of a populist–liberal divide.

As early as July 2016, for example, in the wake of Britain's stunning and poll-busting vote to leave the European Union, conservative columnist Stella Morabito offered a historical connection between "mobster-style" control of public opinion (a proxy for "political correctness") and corresponding historical anxieties among elites that the secret ballot would undermine their control over political discourse and outcomes: "Political correctness," wrote Morabito, "always suppresses certain 'incorrect' opinions in public. We feel it constantly in the media, on college campuses, and throughout popular culture. But what about in private? … The idea that ordinary citizens can decide big questions in the privacy of a voting booth shielded from fear of retribution has always been

anathema to power-mongering elites" (Morabito 2016). Thus, in Britain, while "Intimidation was the hallmark of the Remain camp's propaganda that equated Brexit voters with ignorance and bigotry" (Morabito 2016), in June 2016 the secret ballot allowed the hidden majority to overcome these pressures. Morabito then cites examples ranging from "optional" secret ballots in Fairfax, Virginia, to the online publication of petition signatures on both sides of same-sex marriage initiatives, to a 2012 article called "Abolish the Secret Ballot" in *The Atlantic* (Issenberg 2012)—as evidence of an insidious tendency toward undermining the secret ballot to support a liberal agenda.

Conversely, others linked recent electoral results via the secret ballot to the broader legitimization of political bigotry, irrationality, and irresponsibility in what Pankal Mishra called a new "age of anger" (Mishra 2016, 2017). As early as November 25, 2016, *Politico*'s Charles Sykes wrote that "Trump's victory means that the most extreme and irresponsible voices on the right now feel emboldened and empowered. And more worrisome than that, they have an ally in the White House" (Sykes 2016). And David Niewert charged Trump's campaign with "mainstreaming of alt-right ideology … [and having] an invigorating effect on an older generation of white nationalists" (Neiwert 2017). From this perspective, the secret ballot had proved a catalyst for gathering noxious political forces, hitherto isolated and enervated by shame and public opinion, into a critical mass.

In sum, the range of emotional reactions to the 2016 election raised old but oft-forgotten questions: *What potentially harmful—rather than healthful—forces might the secret ballot release? Is the secret ballot necessarily best for democracy? What are the tensions between healthy democracy and the secret ballot, and how are these resolved?* For generations such questions had laid dormant in popular discourse and only occasionally tackled by social scientists. "The secret vote, many believe, is the jewel in the democratic crown," wrote Brennan and Pettit (1990, 311), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948, Art. 21, sec. 3) indicatively places "secret vote" alongside "universal and equal suffrage" as a basic human right (Crook and Crook 2007, 449–50). Robert Dahl, an authority on the topic, writes that "Although open voting still has a few defenders, secrecy has become the general standard; a country in which it is widely violated would be judged as lacking free and fair elections" (Dahl 2000, 96).

But this normative conclusion is hardly epistemological. Citing a recent surge in critical histories of the secret ballot, Crook and Crook (2011, 200) argue that "Rather than view it as the necessary product of political idealism and linear, global progress, we should instead regard the secret ballot as the contingent outcome of diverse struggles, specific to time and place." Today's natural presumptions about democracy were once debatable issues, and the

question of open or closed voting (among others) generated immense controversy in places such as England, France, and the United States throughout the nineteenth century during modern democracy's "first wave" of expansion (Buchstein 2015; Crook and Crook 2007, 2011; Huntington 1991, 16–17; Kinzer 1978b; Park 1931; Theuns 2017). These were formative years in national and transnational understandings of representative democracy, and a variety of contingent factors—"sectional party interests, logistical considerations, contested political ideals, and technological innovations," to say nothing of foreign example (Crook and Crook 2011, 200)—steered and shaped the physiognomy of these debates.

These same social, ideological, logistical, and technological factors, and the democratic tensions they negotiate, remain as variable and important today as during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even if many of the underlying *questions* they implicate (including the secret ballot) remain latent at a time of apparent consensus. But if ours is indeed a moment of democratic crisis, then it is during such times that important questions are recovered; and there is, as Hannah Arendt (1993) wrote, the "opportunity, provided by the very fact of crisis—which tears away facades and obliterates prejudices—to explore and inquire into whatever has been laid bare of the essence of the matter" (174).

Debating the Ballot: Liberal, Republican, and Pathological Voices

In recent years a select number of political scientists have reopened discussion on the merits of open and closed voting systems (Barbalet 2002; Brennan and Pettit 1990; Elster 2015; Engelen and Nys 2013; Theuns 2017). In a useful summary, for example, Theuns distinguishes three nineteenth-century arguments for and against the secret ballot. The former arguments are well known: the secret ballot protects voters from outside intimidation, offers an accurate aggregation of free voter preferences, and protects a voter's privacy. On the other hand, open voting has been favored on republican moral grounds: it would compel citizens to vote in "communally and socially acceptable" ways (Theuns 2017, 503), and it would encourage greater social responsibility. Open voting also facilitates effective political mobilization by revealing genuine allies and antagonists. Thus, for a time, open voting, traditionally understood to favor entrenched upper-class influences, was preferred even by British Chartists representing the working class (Barbalet 2002, 131; Theuns 2017, 497).

Novel arguments have also appeared. In a trailblazing piece, Brennan and Pettit (1990) argued that a modified open voting system—which "unveiled the vote" without actually recording it—is today preferable to closed voting for two reasons. First, if the ballot's traditional advantage has centered on eliminating corruption, intimidation, and bribery—thus ensuring an accurate tally of voter

preferences—then, in practice, the slim chance of casting a pivotal vote actually induces capricious voting behavior: "Although he prefers *A* to *B*, this fact provides [the voter] with negligible reason to *vote* for *A*, and there may well be more weighty reasons for him to vote otherwise" (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 322). Subsequently, because concrete preferences over electoral outcomes are ineffectual, they are crowded out by more arbitrary "posture preferences": "a preference for seeing himself as a *B*-voter rather than an *A*-voter perhaps; or a preference for being on the side that is probably going to win; or a preference for being able candidly to report that he voted *B*" (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 321).

On the other hand, an open voting scheme exacerbates this problem of "posture preferences," but with the transfigurative advantage of elevating a "judgment ideal" of voting whereby voters prioritize the public good over private interests. "[P]eople are more likely to vote according to their judgment if a preference for voting in a discursively defensible manner dominates their decision-making," Brennan and Pettit argue. "[A] way to ensure the dominance of such a discursive preference is by unveiling the vote: by relaxing in some measure the existing rule of secret voting" (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 323–24). The causal mechanism is simple: "if the vote is unveiled the desire for social acceptance will play a larger role in your decision as to how to vote; and in a pluralistic society the surest way of winning acceptance will be to vote in a way you can discursively support" (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 326).

Bernard Manin and John Ferejohn respond with traditional defenses of the secret ballot and fresh nuances. Manin (2015) points out, for example, that the most likely audience of open voting is not the "broad public," but rather a small, self-selecting, and especially influential (if not outright coercive) group of close associates including friends, family, professional relations, and neighbors (211). Meanwhile, Ferejohn (2015) argues that combining closed voting in elections with private deliberations in Congress protects citizen privacy while also enabling Congress to discuss seriously (i.e., without constituent pressure) issues concerning the general public good.

Still others have proposed inventive combinations. To maximize voter "responsibility" and "autonomy," Vermeule (2015) proffers a two-step "open-secret" or "second opinion" concept: "The hope is that the open vote will represent an aggregation of maximally responsible judgments, the secret vote an aggregation of maximally autonomous ones, and that both will be informative, both for voters and other actors" (227). In a much different attempt to enhance the salience of deliberative democracy, Engelen and Nys (2013) seek to combine closed-ballot voting with a small but real prospect of deliberative accountability to one's citizen peers—a so-called "Justification Day."

Whatever the approach, a consistent theme runs through these articles—a tension between what Ferejohn calls the "liberal aspects" and "republican

aspects" of modern democracy. The former prioritizes individual freedom, privacy, and personal preferences, while the latter is willing to compromise these things (at least somewhat) on behalf of the broader public good. For Brennan and Pettit, for example, this tension exists in theory between the liberal "preference ideal" and republican "judgment ideal" of voting, which they resolve quaintly by declaring one impossible and the other not. Vermeule frames the issue as a tension between liberal "autonomy" in private and republican "responsibility" when observed, and he resolves the tension by having separate "liberal" and "republican" votes and comparing the results. Ferejohn, as we have seen, explicitly adopts the language of liberalism and republicanism to steer his project. And Engelen and Nys tacitly distinguish liberal and republican viewpoints based on attitudes toward shame: If liberals "value the right of privacy because it gives us some control over the disclosure of [shameful] things," then the republican approach recognizes and embraces that "Shame, in short, can be a strong incentive for helping people to improve their moral character and behavior" (Engelen and Nys 2013, 499–500).

This turn to shame as a theoretical linchpin is timely. In 2016 shame was salient in both the reluctance of some voters to reveal their preferences (or judgments) to others, and in the emotional response of opponents to their votes. While some were disgusted by what they saw as shameful political rhetoric, on Election Day others felt uniquely protected from public shaming. So, in the presence of hidden voters, the hidden question was this: Should democratic citizens be *shamed* into behaving in socially acceptable or "politically correct" ways? Where should the line of public pressure begin and end? Should greater protections of free expression exist in the public sphere? And, should the shielding necessarily extend to the voting booth, where private acts have public consequences?

As we have seen, to date discussions of the secret ballot have reflected a clear divide between liberal and republican perspectives on this question. But a third approach—which I call the *pathological* approach, is also possible and useful. This framework is grounded on three basic premises: First, the fortress principle of modern representative democracy is universal adult suffrage. Second, universal suffrage (i.e., the emancipation of the masses) brings with it certain risks and pathologies. And third, the quality of representative democracy—in terms of stability, public policy, and overall representativeness—requires mitigating these risks while minimizing the damage done to democratic institutions.

The remainder of this article demonstrates this approach from two distinct angles via the writing of two very different English theorists—political philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and Freudian psychologist Donald W. Winnicott (1896–1971). Mill and Winnicott both embraced universal

suffrage while acknowledging its certain pathologies, and they subsequently pursued creative ways to embrace the democratic masses while hedging against their stereotypical vices. As we will see, contemporary concerns with democratic populism are hardly novel, and indeed, they share much in common with mid-nineteenth-century republican concerns about vulgarizing or corrupting the vote, and late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century fears of irrational "mob democracy" (Buchstein 2015; Zaretsky 2016). These were precisely the contexts in which Mill and Winnicott wrote.

For reasons that are interesting today, they also land on opposite sides of the secret ballot debate. To anticipate, Mill argued that the open ballot is not just a viable antidote to the pathologies of universal suffrage, but the most effective means of embracing the emancipated working class. Meanwhile, much of Winnicott's political writing occurred in the aftermath of World War II and the rise of populist European fascism. With appreciation for the enduring British democracy, Winnicott rejected open voting as a source of mass repression that might easily elevate demagogues to satisfy citizens' emotional needs. Instead, he argued that the secret ballot safely purges citizens of precisely those political emotions that, even if shameful, must ultimately find expression. Repression via public pressure does not insulate democracy from the irrational or mean passions of the masses—it only diverts those passions to more dangerous and undemocratic channels.

John Stuart Mill on Universal Suffrage and Open Voting

John Stuart Mill's stature among the canonical theorists of representative democracy is well established. Mill was the nineteenth century's most powerful advocate of libertarian freedom and basic human equality, and his popular standing among democratic theorists derives largely from his utilitarian defense of liberty and legal rights (*On Liberty*, 1859; *Utilitarianism*, 1861) and his radical call for women's equality in the mid-to-late nineteenth century (*The Subjection of Women*, 1869). Mill's most sustained examination of modern democratic institutions is his 1861 *Considerations on Representative Government*. But for several reasons, among them Mill's unabashed intellectual elitism and highly unfashionable justification of nineteenth-century British imperialism and paternalistic despotism (Jahn 2005; Sullivan 1983; Tunick 2006), it is arguably his most underappreciated democratic work.

Mill's life spanned a dynamic period in the expansion of British democracy. As a young Philosophical Radical, Mill saw passage of the British Great Reform Act of 1832, which extended the vote to small property holders (though not the working class, or even a large percentage of the middle class) and established a system of representation more closely linked to actual population distribution—

to wit, the act eliminated entirely the representation of fifty-six "rotten boroughs" and transferred a large number of seats from less densely populated to more densely populated urban areas. In this context of primitive suffrage expansion, Mill adamantly supported the secret ballot, writing several articles on its behalf throughout the 1830s (see Kinzer 1978a). By the late 1850s, however, Mill would change his stance on the secret ballot, a fact that scholars have long sought to explain.

Bruce Kinzer (1978a), for example, argues that "Mill's commitment to secret voting in the thirties was not of an abstract character. Its value was understood strictly within the context of the struggle to establish a viable radical party and to undermine aristocratic political influence" (22). The 1832 Reform Act had failed to solidify the Whig majority in the House of Commons—indeed, the liberal Whigs were actually *losing* ground—and these losses in turn were blamed internally on "the concessions already made to the radicals" (ibid, 24). Mill thus hoped the issue of the ballot (if not also its passing) would not only cement the Whig majority but reenergize and elevate the more radical wing within the party. But when these goals proved elusive, he abandoned the cause.

Buchstein (2015) explains Mill's transformation differently as a function of changing class relations in England. Mill favored the secret ballot in the 1830s in the context of entrenched aristocratic privilege and influence over middle-class voters. But by the late 1850s, conditions had changed, and most voters were free and independent:

> According to Mill, direct personal dependencies have disappeared in the course of England's newer societal development. The social upheavals of the past and the current social changes are doing away with the main reasons that could have been put forward in favor of secret balloting. For example, direct external influence on voters via servitude, leasehold, and rent has been declining steadily for several decades in England, which leads him to a general sociological conclusion: "[I]n the more advanced states of modern Europe, and especially in this country, the power of coercing voters has declined and is declining." … According to Mill, England's social structure had become so mobile and flexible that electoral policy could and should focus wholly on the positive effects of public voting. (Buchstein 2015, 32–33)

In this context, it is significant that *Considerations on Representative Government* was published amid heated debates in England over further expansion of the vote to the English working class, for a tension surrounding the working-class vote pervades the treatise, and Mill's arguments anticipated what would soon become the Reform Act of 1867, which "extended the vote to

most male householders and nearly doubled the electorate from roughly one to two million out of nearly seven million adult males in England and Wales" (Butler 2017, 58). Throughout *Considerations*, Mill thus attempted a delicate balancing act—between his radical and hardly universal enthusiasm for the democratic idea of universal suffrage on one hand, and his concern over how such a reform would affect the quality of democratic institutions on the other. Mill lauded political equality and celebrated the tapering of aristocratic privilege. But he prioritized the public good, and for this reason, he abandoned the secret ballot in favor of both open and plural voting.

One can better appreciate Mill's support of open and plural voting—institutions that today seem antithetical to democracy—by first considering why he supported representative democracy at all. In *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill argued that the best political system, all else being equal, should be judged based on two interacting criteria—a "twofold division of the merit which any set of political institutions can possess"—which "consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs" (Mill 1998, 229).

In brief, governments exist (a) to make citizens morally and intellectually better, and (b) to maximize the use of this moral and intellectual talent for the public good. But the quality of citizens stands central: "If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government in all its senses, from the humblest to the most exalted, depends," wrote Mill, "we find that the principal of them, the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the government is exercised" (Mill 1998, 225). Mill subsequently argues that of all known political systems, representative democracy is most conducive to these ends. It is effective at producing virtuous and educated citizens, because responsible political participation in an open society naturally cultivates citizens' moral and intellectual development; subsequently, it is effective at utilizing these talents for the public precisely because political participation is open to all.

To highlight the representative system's advantage in this regard, Mill discounts the benevolent rule even of eminently wise despots. Even assuming that Platonic philosopher kings existed, for example, Mill argues that under their rule, "Endeavor is even more effectually restrained by the certainty of its impotence, than by any positive discouragement." A philosopher king's rule, even if benevolent, would stunt citizens' moral and intellectual growth by shielding them from public responsibility and reducing their incentive to

cultivate an understanding of public affairs. But "Very different," said Mill, "is the state of the human faculties where a human being feels himself under no other external constraint than the necessities of nature, or mandates of society which he has his share in imposing, and which it is open to him, if he thinks them wrong, publicly to dissent from, and exert himself actively to get altered" (1998, 253). Moreover, wrote Mill:

> The maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom upon the character is only attained, when the person acted on either is, or is looking forward to becoming, a citizen as fully privileged as any other. What is still more important than even this matter of feeling, is the practical discipline which the character obtains, from the occasional demand made upon the citizens to exercise, for a time and in their turn, some social function. It is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is routine … Giving him something to do for the public, supplies, in a measure, all these deficiencies. (Mill 1998, 254)

But this raises a practical problem. For if maximizing citizen participation is key to representative democracy's success, and yet a significant proportion of the citizen body (even a majority of it) enters the forum deficient in one essential manner or another—perhaps they are uninformed or uneducated, inexperienced or narrow-minded, limited in perspective to one's own class or region—then how, despite this, can one ensure that public policy will veer toward the impartial public interest? How can one maximize citizen participation while also maximizing democratic performance and the greater public good?

To address this problem, Mill offered four different proposals, at least three of which compromise his enthusiastic embrace of universal adult suffrage (including women). The first, ironically, is to restrict that suffrage, presumably to a very limited extent, based on particular criteria including basic math and literacy tests and minimal property requirements. There ought, said Mill, to be "no persons disqualified, except through their own default," but "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage, without being able to read, write, and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic," even when "society has not performed its duty, by rendering this amount of instruction accessible to all," because "universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement" (Mill 1998, 329–30). One also cannot vote while receiving "parish relief," because "He who cannot by his labour suffice for his own support, has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others" (332).

Here, we see the tension of Mill's thought fully, for while denying the vote to the poor and illiterate on prudential grounds, he also acknowledged a significant public loss, for:

> It is by political discussion that the manual laborer, whose employment is routine, and whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect on his personal interests; and it is from political discussion, and collective political action, that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle around himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community (Mill 1998, 328).

Political participation is critical not only to the freedom and liberty of democratic citizens, but to the very self-cultivation that makes their participation effective. Thus, for the vast majority of cases above poverty and illiteracy, and where education or experience may vary significantly, Mill offers a different solution—the "plural vote"—which extends the suffrage broadly (thus enabling most citizens to participate) while giving added influence (i.e., a "plural vote") to more qualified voters. The right to a plural vote would be merit-based, either on public examination or on other proxies of education such as university degrees or years of experience in certain liberal professions. Notably, Mill was unmoved by criticism that this system is undemocratic: "I do not look upon equal voting as among the things which are good in themselves," he wrote (1998, 340), because voting systems are a means to an end. Rather than undermine the radical call for universal adult suffrage, plural voting supports it: "Entire exclusion from a voice in the common concerns, is one thing: the concession to others of a more potential voice, on the grounds of greater capacity for the management of the joint interests, is another" (Mill 1998, 335).

Similar reasoning grounds Mill's proposal for filling a Second Chamber of parliament. Though Mill "set little value on any check which a Second Chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise unchecked" (1998, 384), he suggested that an ideal Second Chamber would model the Roman Senate:

> If one House represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and fortified by practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber, the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen; a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important political offices or employments. Such a chamber would be fitted for much more than

> to be a merely moderating body. It would not be exclusively a check, but an impelling force. (Mill 1998, 388)

As a third prudential measure, finally, Mill rejected the secret ballot categorically and argued for an open ballot process which would subject individual voters to public scrutiny. Here, Mill strayed especially far from contemporary democratic sensibilities, for the vote, he argued, is not a private "right" to exercise but a public "trust" to treat others fairly. As Nadia Urbinati (2002, 111) writes, for Mill, "Insofar as voting was not simply a self-regarding action, it had to be judged according to the harm principle," and thus "when he focused on consequences of voting, and emphasized its power to influence the lives of others *directly*, Mill concluded that the vote should not be treated simply as a self-regarding action." Voting exists not for citizens to privately or irresponsibly *choose* what they *want*, but rather to enable citizens to publicly and effectually *judge* what is *best*:

> In any election, even by universal suffrage (and still more obviously in the case of a restricted suffrage), the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his private advantage, and give his vote to the best of his judgment, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election depended upon him alone. This being admitted, it is at least a prima facie consequence, that the duty of voting, like any other public duty, should be performed under the eye and criticism of the public; every one of whom has not only an interest in its performance, but a good title to consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than honestly and carefully. (Mill 1998, 355)

This helps explain why Mill rejected the secret ballot and embraced open voting. Subjecting voters to the scrutiny of public opinion will have one, if not two major positive effects. First, the knowledge that votes *will* be public will compel voters to consider what kind of decision would look reasonable or defensible to their citizen peers. At minimum, the threat of social sanctions will deter actions that one senses will be publicly indefensible: "Even the bare fact of having to give an account of their conduct, is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of which at least some decent account can be given" (Mill 1998, 360). Second, and more auspiciously, the open vote will encourage all, but particularly those who anticipate public criticism, to defend their votes with arguments and counterarguments that then enter and enrich the public sphere. This not only improves the depth and quality of public discourse; it also enlightens public opinion through richer debate and compels citizens to cultivate

their own political understanding, if only in self-defense. "To be under the eyes of others," wrote Mill, "to have to defend oneself to others—is never more important than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have sure ground for their working against pressure" (1998, 360).

In the process, open voting expands on the project already begun with plural voting—to embrace a program of near universal suffrage, while mitigating its potentially deleterious effects on the overall quality of democratic participation. Where fears reasonably remain that certain lower- or middle-class perspectives will be underrepresented by this scheme, Mill suggests a fourth measure to ensure a diversity of class-based and regional representation—namely, proportional representation. As Urbinati (2002, 79–80) argues, for Mill, "where universal suffrage guaranteed that all citizens are treated equally, proportional representation tried to ensure that all views are respected":

> In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy … the majority of people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? … In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. (Mill 1998, 303)

Mill's concern here is not just with the dominance of the old aristocracy today, but looking forward to the inevitable numerical majority of the working and lower-middle classes with accompanying fears of "working-class intolerance" and the dominant ascent of narrowly class-based and pro-labor parliamentary agendas (Baccarini and Ivanković 2015, 141). If protection of the working-class minority is necessary today, protection of property will be necessary tomorrow, and proportional representation happily institutionalizes the representation and deliberative competition of all views within Parliament.

In sum, Mill's democratic theory jettisons much that is taken for granted in contemporary democratic theory, inviting serious criticism from contemporary democratic theorists (See e.g. Baccarini and Ivanković 2015; Cerovac 2016; Latimer 2018; Lever 2007). But these compromises are designed to embrace an even more fundamental principle of modern representative democracy—universal adult suffrage—at a time when the latter was more controversial

than the former. Mill believed that plural voting, open voting, and proportional representation maximize what is best about representative democracy—universal participation—while minimizing its potential harm to the public. They allow virtually all citizens to participate, while giving more weight to more informed judgments. They give all citizens a vessel to participate, and a responsibility in doing so. With rare exception, every citizen's vote matters, and all are free to vote how they wish. But each is also accountable for their public actions, and the glare of public opinion not only compels citizens to vote responsibly, but encourages them to sharpen their own understanding of what they support and why. This enriches public discourse and makes democracy better.

D. W. Winnicott's Healthy Democracy and the Secret Ballot

A sharp criticism of Mill's open voting scheme centers on the problem of *shame*. As Annabelle Lever (2007, 376) has argued, in a democratic society, "the presumption should be that voters are entitled to keep their votes to themselves. They are entitled to do so … because protection for the privacy of individuals reflects various democratic ideas about the nature and duty of citizens." Moreover, "democracies are concerned not only with the freedom of citizens, but with their social standing, and ability to see and treat each other as equal and responsible adults." Mandatory public voting undercuts these concerns because it "necessarily exposes people to the risk of public humiliation and shame, whether for misinterpreting their own interests, misidentifying their duties, or for weakness of will in voting as they ought" (Lever 2007, 376). At times Mill himself appears to agree, as when he wrote famously in *On Liberty* that while "the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities," in fact "when society itself is the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it … it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself." Therefore, argued Mill, "Protection … against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them" (Mill 1998, 8–9).

Mill thus separated the problem of *social* and *political* tyranny in a way that liberal critics like Laver adamantly reject. Laver (2007, 377) calls Mill "wrong to believe that we can neatly separate the personal and political in a democracy

and, with it, the private and the public." But sensible as such criticism is, it is important to note that this *philosophical* critique of the public vote fails to meet Mill on his own *pathological* terms—in other words, if the vote should be kept secret, then how does doing so address the kinds of pathologies of mass democracy that concerned Mill? One way to defeat this question is to deny the premise that mass democracy is pathological at all. Another is to demonstrate why the secret ballot more effectively addresses these pathologies. The latter approach is adopted by twentieth-century British psychologist D. W. Winnicott.

Donald Winnicott was a Freudian psychologist specializing in child psychology, and in recent years his reputation among political theorists has grown considerably in research tackling topics ranging from neoliberalism and democratic culture to public education and the welfare state (Bowker and Buzby 2017; Honig 2013; Lamothe 2014; Rosenthal 2016). For our purposes, Winnicott is interesting for two reasons: First, given the emotional tenor of our current politics—the so-called the "age of anger" with elections of stealth and shame—a psychologist's perspective may offer unique insight into the crises of our times. This has already been suggested (Coleman 2016). Second, Winnicott's understanding of democracy, like Mill's, combined an appreciation of modern democratic institutions with an acknowledgement of democracy's pathological tendencies. So why does Winnicott, contra Mill, adamantly reject open voting in favor of the secret ballot?

Winnicott's starting point is to reject the assumed premise that citizens express concrete preferences or reasoning when they vote. To further interests or exercise judgment is not *why* people enthusiastically vote. Instead, a growing body of research in political science (see especially Elster 1998a, 1998b) and psychology have highlighted the central role of emotions in political actions. Indicatively, psychologist Drew Westen has highlighted the extent to which citizens with strong ideological predispositions use "motivated reasoning" to absorb, frame, and/or ignore new information based on whether it supports their existing beliefs (Westen et al. 2006), suggesting that "the notion of 'partisan reasoning' is an oxymoron, and most of the time, partisans feel their way to beliefs rather than use their thinking caps" (Packard 2008). In forming political judgments, says Westen, "We ultimately found that reason and knowledge contribute very little … Even when we gave [test subjects] empirical data that pushed them one way or the other, that had no impact, or it only hardened their emotionally biased views" (Packard 2008). In practical terms, "It means recognizing that elections are won or lost in the marketplace of emotions, and that political persuasion is about managing emotions by activating the right networks [of emotions]" (Westen 2008, 420). A similar point was made by *New York Times* writer David Brooks two days before President Obama's 2008 inauguration: "In reality, we voters—all of us—make emotional, intuitive

decisions about who we prefer, and then come up with post-hoc rationalizations to explain the choices that were already made beneath conscious awareness" (Brooks 2008). Let us call this the "intuitive voter."

This "intuitive voter" model sheds light on the meaning of voting for many (if not most) democratic voters, particularly when we acknowledge how unlikely it is that one's vote will determine the outcome (cf. Riker and Ordeshook 1968). In fact, argued Winnicott, the real function of voting is *therapeutic*, an act that both liberates and purges the voting citizen of otherwise suppressed emotions—of fear and hope, love and anger, desire and resentment—and this is for the best. With all this in mind, Winnicott's thesis is twofold. First, he argued that cultivating psychologically healthy citizens—citizens who are happy, socially well-adjusted, and able to contribute meaningfully to democratic processes—requires a social and political environment that encourages citizens to be spontaneous, transparent, and honest without fear of persecution. In other words, it requires the opposite of Mill's public opinion policing. Second, and within this framework, a well-functioning democracy will utilize certain participatory institutions, like the secret ballot, to enable citizens to be their *True Self* in politics, without allowing their most selfish and irrational passions to undermine the public good or the basic foundations of democracy (see LeJeune 2017, pages 250–57 of which the remainder of this article draws significantly).

Winnicott's theory of healthy democracy begins with the humanistic concept of True Self, defined as "the theoretical position from which come the spontaneous gesture and the personal idea. The spontaneous gesture is the True Self in action. Only the True Self can be creative and only the True Self can feel real. Whereas a True Self feels real, the existence of a False Self results in a feeling unreal or a sense of futility" (Winnicott 1960, 148). Conversely, an unhappy sense of False Self emerges when a perceived need for compliance compels one to offer an artificial presentation of oneself. When False Self becomes the dominant form of self-presentation, life becomes unsatisfying and empty.

The True Self experience cannot thrive in an environment of fear and insecurity—indeed, it is precisely the fear that one's genuine personality or opinions will be persecuted that steers one toward a False Self existence. True Self instead requires constant protection and a safe space in which to act—what Winnicott calls a secure *potential space*. The development of *potential space*, argued Winnicott, first happens in the interaction between mother and child, where at birth a mother begins by adapting fully to a baby's needs and wants. Then over time, the psychologically (and socially) healthiest path of development involves a gradual movement from the parent's total adaptation to the infant's needs to "a series of failures of adaptation," which "are again a kind of adaptation

because they are related to the growing need of the child for meeting reality" (Winnicott 1963, 96). The mother's *graduated* failures to adapt do not destroy the *potential space* in which a child feels safe being herself, because they are calibrated to the child's ability to absorb them without trauma, fear, or disillusion. As such, they teach the child to adapt flexibly to the world and prepare the child to join an occasionally uncooperative society.

The "good enough" environment that a mother provides, which accustoms the young person to explore his personality freely, becomes the basis for his healthy social integration in adolescence and adulthood. Subsequently, one can think of psychological health in terms not only of "the absence of psychoneurotic disorder," but also of "freedom within the personality, of capacity for trust and faith … [and] freedom from self-deception," all of which the mother's early adaptive care have facilitated (Winnicott 1967, 26). "The main thing," said Winnicott, "is that the man or woman feels he or she *is living his or her own life*, taking responsibility for action and inaction, and able to take credit for success and blame for failure" (Winnicott 1967, 27; emphasis in original). A person who develops confidently in a reliable *potential space* at home is primed to trust in others and enter society in a healthy way. As Winnicott wrote:

> [T]he parents' attempt to provide a home for their children, in which the children can grow as individuals, and each *gradually add* a capacity to identify with the parents and then wider groupings, starts at the beginning … and in recent years a great deal has been found out by psychologists as to the ways in which a stable home not only enables children to find themselves and to find each other, but also makes them begin to qualify for membership in society in a wider sense. (Winnicott 1950, 248; italics in original)

Elsewhere, Winnicott continued:

> If we assume reasonable achievement in terms of instinct capacity, then we see new tasks for the relatively healthy person. There is, for instance, his or her relationship to society—an extension of the family. Let us say that in health a man or woman is able *to reach towards an identification with society without too great a loss of individual or personal impulse.* There must, of course, be loss in the sense of control of personal impulse, but the extreme of identification with society with total loss of sense of self and self-importance is not normal at all. (Winnicott 1967, 27; italics in original)

There is much to unpack here regarding the healthy individual and a healthy democratic society, and it is useful to consider the opposite of health here, too. On one hand, when a person feels himself acting in a constant state of compliance—when, for reasons internal or external, he finds it easier to adopt a feigned of false persona in front of others—that person falls into the trap of unhappy False Self, whose clinical degrees range considerably. The most neurotic stage, for example, involves total absorption in False Self and total loss of True Self. Here, one effectively lives like an actor who never removes the mask; life is empty and unhappy because of this, but the root problem is not identified. The person may actually confuse their complaint False Self as simple reality. Less neurotic is a False Self which recognizes itself as such and either allows the True Self a "secret life" or "[searches] for conditions which will make it possible for the True Self to come into its own." Finally, a False Self actually exists "In health" when it works alongside the True Self and is "represented by the whole organization of the polite and mannered social attitude." The small degree of False Self in this case represents a healthy compromise, whereby polite social manners that allow one to get along in the social world (integration) combine with an autonomous sense of True Self in limiting cases when compromise "ceases to become allowable when the issues become crucial" (Winnicott 1960, 143, 150; see also LeJeune 2017, 251).

The political arena subsequently marks one of the most important and dangerous areas in which the problem of True/False Self manifests. As one leaves the potential space of the "good enough" home and enters a more judgmental social arena, protecting the integrity of True Self requires that the inclination to trust others with one's genuine personality be transferred to the new 'holding' space of the social, cultural, and political arenas. If one does not feel comfortable in society, for example—if a person does not find that the socio-cultural-political space offers a reliable feeling of security or 'holding' of their genuine personality—the result may be an unhappy and neurotic embrace of a compliant False Self in public. Where this feeling is widespread, the unhappy result is a mass phenomenon of anxiety, unhappiness, and repression hidden beneath False Self personas. The dangers to democracy under these circumstances are myriad, particularly when exogenous shocks explode citizens' genuine feelings into reality. Thus, if in some contexts a relatively benign surprise election is provoked, in others where repression is especially intense and widespread, the explosion of repressed emotions into reality may even be revolutionary, unleashing a cascade of social upheaval and antigovernment protest (Kuran 1989, 1991), or a broad-based scourge of terror, violence, and brutality (see Fanon 2004).

Anxieties surrounding the suppression of True Self in society involve more than just a conflict with society or government—they also involve a moral

tension within one's self, a suppression of the antisocial tendencies that are *always* present at the level of "unconscious fantasy" (Winnicott 1968, 166), what Winnicott elsewhere calls "the fact of conflict in the personal inner psychic reality" (Winnicott 1969, 227). Not only do social pressures repress the individual, but also personal feelings of shame or guilt. The irony is that those who do presumably recognize the worst in themselves—their unhappy and ignoble resentments, for example—can never be happy with themselves, for to act on these impulses evokes personal shame and guilt, but to deny them is to lose one's True Self.

Winnicott, however, believed it absolutely necessary to account for these darker and irrational emotions when considering politics and political institutions, for two reasons. On one hand, doing so helps us understand what people actually do, because:

> In human affairs … [logical or scientific] thinking is but a snare and a delusion unless the unconscious is taken into account. I refer to both meanings of the word, "unconscious" meaning deep and not readily available, and also meaning repressed, or actively kept from availability because of the pain that belongs to its acceptance as part of the self. Unconscious feelings sway bodies of people at critical moments, and who is to say that this is bad or good? It is just a fact, and one that has to be taken into account all the time by rational politicians if nasty shocks are to be avoided. In fact, thinking men and women can only be safely turned loose in the field of planning if they have qualified in this matter of the true understanding of unconscious feelings. (Winnicott 1945, 169)

On the other hand, this clarifies a practical problem for democracy: If one agrees that psychological health involves recognizing and even liberating the spontaneous action of True Self—which includes recognizing and even liberating the kinds of irrational and antisocial elements of True Self that society rejects—then how is democracy to accommodate? To completely dismiss the antisocial urges would encourage a mass phenomenon of unhappy False Selves; but to liberate them risks also liberating all kinds of warlike, aggressive, and antisocial passions that would be the destruction of democracy. But the latter, argued Winnicott, is the challenge modern democracy must honestly address if political participation is to be embraced—the inherent pathologies of mass democracy. Indeed, liberating the antisocial elements of anger and resentment through democratic processes—more specifically, through the secret ballot—is precisely what he encouraged.

"Freedom puts a strain on the individual's whole personality," wrote Winnicott in 1940 at a time of fascist momentum in Europe, for in freedom, one "is left with no logical excuse for the angry or aggressive feelings except the insatiability of his own greed. And he has no one to give or withhold permission to do what he wants to do—in other words, to save him from the tyranny of a strict conscience. No wonder people fear not only freedom, but also the idea of freedom and the giving of freedom" (Winnicott 1940, 215). The assumption of genuine political responsibility is painful to the psyche, particularly when one's True Self motivations are steeped in anger, resentment, or other antisocial tendencies and one must actually bear their moral burden. This burden weighs doubly when our ugly True Selves are exposed to the public, as they might be by an open voting system. But critically, Winnicott argues, we must recognize that antisocial emotions are a mass phenomenon—they are natural—and will always seek an outlet that both satisfies the emotional need of True Self release and minimizes the moral burden of responsibility.

At one extreme there is hero-worship and stubborn attachment to principle. Either of these mechanisms effectively liberates the antisocial emotions of the darker True Self but transfers psychic responsibility for them to another person (the hero) or a preestablished notion of truth (ideology). In either form, responsibility for decisions is evaded by a kind of unthinking commitment or dogmatism. Such programs are tempting—they were the source of twentieth-century European fascism—but the outcome is not satisfying. In the long run, for example, offering mindless allegiance to a demagogic leader or ideology ends up rendering an impoverished sense of True Self, a "poverty of personality" (Winnicott 1940, 216) stemming from a lack of autonomy, and what Winnicott calls an "antisocial tendency" that "is not an identification with authority that arises out of self-discovery," but rather "a sense of frame without sense of picture, a sense of form without retention of spontaneity. This is a prosociety tendency that is anti-individual" (Winnicott 1950, 244; see also LeJeune 2017, 255).

At the other extreme, to avoid political responsibility, one may simply abandon the democratic space altogether. This possibility—nonparticipation to avoid the trauma of shame or guilt for one's political actions—threatens to undermine democracy itself, because effective democracy depends on citizen participation, which in turn requires that citizens take responsibility for their political affairs. Meanwhile citizen nonparticipants over the long run will suffer from a kind of neurotic repression of their natural desire to speak or influence political affairs, particularly given the stakes of modern politics and the multitude of psychic emotions—anger and resentment, hope and greed, love and hate—that political issues rub. So what is to be done? How can responsible political activity be undertaken without threatening man's healthy conscience or destroying democracy itself?

Winnicott's solution is the "secret ballot." In an important description of British parliamentary democracy, he wrote:

> It is obvious that the working of the democratic parliamentary system … depends on the survival of the monarchy, and *pari passu* the survival of the monarchy depends on the people's feeling that they really can, by voting, turn a government out in a parliamentary election or get rid of a prime minister. It is assumed here that the turning out of a government or a prime minister must be on the basis of feeling, as expressed in the secret ballot, and not on the basis of the poll (Gallup or other) that fails to give expression to deep feeling or to unconscious motivation or to trends that seem illogical. (Winnicott 1970, 264)

The secret ballot selection of representatives squares the circle of integrating a healthy release of conscious and subconscious antisocial drives into a stable democratic polity. First, it allows the average citizen to participate in politics in a closed booth that isolates them from public pressure. Thus, there is no danger that social pressures or the tyranny of public opinion will coerce individuals into acting in a manner inconsistent with their True Self. In Winnicott's terms, the voting booth—as opposed to the arena of public opinion—offers a reliable *potential space* within which the individual feels free to act safely, securely, and entirely in accordance with True Self.

Second, when one votes for a person (thus transferring effective responsibility for policymaking to the elected representative), the secret ballot allows the antisocial True Self to act free not only from public shame, but also from a personal sense of guilt. Citizen responsibility for public policy is real, but indirect. Instead, the real burden of guilt is transferred to the *elected officials* themselves who actually determine public policy. Thus, wrote Winnicott, while "The election of a person implies that the electors believe in themselves as persons, and therefore believe in the person they vote for," only "The person elected has the opportunity to act as a person" (Winnicott 1950, 249). The secret ballot has thus empowered the average citizen's True Self (including the antisocial True Self) not only to act unashamedly and without guilt, but to make someone else responsible for it!

This seems quite scary, precisely the stuff of demagogues. But in the long run, this works for democracy for a third crucial reason—because the political candidate who wins the election does *not* himself have the luxury of acting in secret. The representative who crafts public policy must act in full public view, and this renders him accountable to the public not only in terms of representing constituent interests and judgments, but also in the broader realm of public opinion where citizens in public suppress their antisocial tendencies, adopt a

public face of innocence, goodness, and well-being—what we might call "political correctness"—and punish those who do not adhere.

This could mean that elected officials will themselves experience unhappy False Self while on the job and assuming their public persona. It could also mean that, unlike voters, their ability to satisfy their antisocial tendencies is stifled by the real sense of guilt attached to genuine policymaking responsibility. But these are the burdens of office, which one is free to leave at any time; and the transfer of responsibility, guilt, and shame to elected representatives not only preserves the psychological health of democratic citizens, but constrains the antisocial tendencies of the tiny minority who *are* in positions of power.

Conclusion

Whether one approached 2016 from the political left, right, or center, the events of that year—from Brexit, to the US presidential election, to wider concerns about populist national movements throughout Europe—placed modern democracy at a moment of crisis. If recent events revealed anything about modern representative democracy, it is the buried question of the ballot's role in democracy's healthy functioning and the tensions that once inspired a fruitful debate on the ballot's merits. Modern democracy is and has always been a work in progress, and the ballot is no exception.

The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as already noted, were a green era for modern democracy, and the candid nature in which even basic questions about democracy were broached as real questions led to a flourishing of experimentation, learning, and emulation. The tenor of these debates was not only practical, but even nationalistic and ideological *within* the framework of democracy. By the 1870s, for example, many English, including English liberals, considered open voting a special sign of British character, even a symbol of anti-Catholicism in contrast to the "hypocritical, cunning, furtive, and deceitful" French who first experimented with secret voting in the 1790s (Kinzer 1978b, 243; see also Park 1931). Meanwhile the French, ever perplexed with how to square the circle of both stifling the corruption and intimidation associated with open voting, while also avoiding the secret ballot's impetus to selfishness and a decline in public virtue, for much of the century adopted a novel "secret vote cast in public" scheme, which in early form involved writing one's vote in secret on a table and then personally dropping it in the ballot box, all in full view of the public (Crook and Crook 2007, 453). Only after decades of experimentation did the French finally settle on the "Australian" secret ballot in 1913, with serious discussions beginning several decades earlier to "civilize elections" after a wave of electoral rioting, drinking, and kidnapping, even if more than one commentator at Select Committee hearings called it a "necessary

evil" (Crook and Crook 2007, 463–64). Similar experiments with voting procedures and ballot forms, inspired by diverse institutions throughout Europe and the British colonies, happened throughout the American colonies and the United States during the colonial era and well into the twentieth century (Crook and Crook 2011).

Today, however, democracy faces a unique crisis defined by two intertwined structural conditions. On one hand, modern democracy confronts a world in which society's reach into the private lives of individuals via technology, social media, or otherwise has dramatically expanded, and the penalties for violating society's norms, though always threatening, have become more immediate, unpredictable, and diffuse. On the other hand, democracy as a viable institution now faces an increasingly volatile world of extraordinarily rapid change and global interconnectedness, and this in turn has exacerbated the kinds of anxieties, fears, and resentments—be they racial, tribal, national, or class-based—which democratic publics generally profess to reject. Mill and Winnicott tell us that modern democracy has tools to handle these problems: To wit, where Winnicott would counter the threat of the public gaze with the protection of the secret ballot, Mill would counter voter irrationality and irresponsibility with the sanction of public opinion.

But we cannot readily have both, and the comparison of Mill and Winnicott is most instructive in revealing that our unhappiness with modern democracy, so far as it exists, is not simply the fault of voters or the voting process. It is, rather, a reflection of the inherent pathologies of the mass democracy we embrace, and the product of our collective decision—nay, our apparent consensus—about which alternative we can happily live with.

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Pollinator Politics and Policymaking: The Evolution of an Advocacy Coalition Framework of Representation[1]

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Given recent initiatives to make the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) more inclusive and diverse, thus upholding the title of "The People's Department," this study explores the evolving development of actor coalitions and policymaking brokers that impact a common public issue considered by many as a potentially harmful threat affecting our food supply. Politically and publicly acknowledged because the issues involve an impending crisis in the production of food crops resulting from pollinator collapse, the context of this crisis relates to the reported population decline of pollinators as reflected in honeybee winter hive loss of 30 percent per year since 2006 to Colony Collapse Disease (CCD). Without pollinators, one-third of the overall US total food supply is at risk of being lost. Using the analytical tool advocacy coalition framework (ACF), the results of this study present the representative diversity of policymakers and the subsequent coalition formation that influences and directs policy development, implementation, regulation, and oversight of this multidisciplinary policy domain. Also, primary actor relationships are identified and evaluated using network analysis. The study finds evolving and conflicting policy positions of the USDA, the 2015–16 Obama Administration/EPA, and congressional action articulated in the Agricultural Act of 2014. The policy directions from the policy actors/brokers are found to have been more politically motivated than directed by CCD scientific research.

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A critical food sustainability issue for the United States, as well as the world, is the potential crisis in agriculture crop production as the population of pollinators decline. Without pollinators, close to one-third of the overall US food supply would be at risk of being lost. A foundational assumption of this analysis is that the American food supply is a common pool resource requiring common resource management methods and techniques. These common pool resource methods and techniques are also used by those who are engaged in the protection and output of the pollinator population resource. However, those who need to manage the pollinator common pool must navigate through a highly contentious and politically challenging policy decision-making process. It is common knowledge that when Congress and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) deal with legislation or regulations that affect agricultural policy, they face pressure from an array of interest groups and coalitions. For example, within this policy domain, biotechnology firms lobby Congress heavily, as does a growing organic food industry that often disparages the safety of foods genetically modified to resist pests. Adding to these efforts, pollinator protection nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), research centers, and traditional pollinator communities all vie for a representative seat at this small table.

For several years, both the USDA and the Department of Interior (DOI) have acknowledged the need for healthy pollinators to support the country's agriculture needs. They have worked closely with states in conservation/ education programs for both the agriculture sector and the public. Given this awareness, through diversity initiatives, the USDA has attempted to gain a better representation of the many faces of American agriculture by adding "seats to the table" (USDA 2016). Given the broad scope of the USDA and the public administrators leading these agencies, the USDA is often cited as the model that other groups or sectors should follow. The USDA's diversity initiatives promoted a way to produce an environment that fosters representative policymaking and policy change. It is within this more positive agency environment that pollinator policy had a chance to incubate and evolve. This study assesses the behavioral dynamics associated with the making of pollinator policy. What follows is a narrative that identifies various actors, actions, and results within the theoretical and analytical structure of an advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Adam and Kriesi 2007).

The research narrative will first describe the pollinator policy domain, including a brief discussion of actor representation and the political nature of the domain. Second, there will be an analysis of actor coalition formation and behaviors using ACF theory and unique characteristics of the pollinator policy domain. Third, a macro network analysis of coalition relationships will be presented. Last will be a discussion of ACF theoretical attributes used in this

study as well as a more detailed finding addressing actor representation and diversification levels. The method used in this study to identify the pollinator policy in the ACF model involves qualitative textual reviews and analysis of House and Senate testimonies from the Library of Congress, USDA listening sessions transcripts, white paper publications from the White House Briefing Room, and NGO websites.

Nature of the Pollinator Policy Domain—Parameter and Attributes

The first step in understanding the pollinator policy domain is to define what constitutes the pollinator population as well as the actors who are advocating for the pollinators' protection. Per the USDA's definition, pollinators can include bees, butterflies, moths, bats, and various birds, e.g., hummingbirds (USDA 2018). Both the US and world food supply are dependent on pollinator health and well-being. In the United States, about 23 percent of agricultural production comes from pollinator-dependent crops (Johnson 2010). Bond, Hunt, and Plattner (2014) also point out that "Through the provision of pollination services, honey bees support the cultivation of an estimated 90–130 crops, the harvest of which, directly and indirectly, accounts for up to a third of the U.S. diet" (4). Outside the United States, Gallai et al. (2009) estimate that the 2005 world agricultural economic production and consumption level dependence on these pollinators was in the range of 9.5 percent. However, this highly valued agriculture necessity is in jeopardy. Since 2006, commercial beekeepers in the United States have reported honeybee colony loss rates increasing to an average of 30 percent each winter, compared to historical loss rates of 10 to 15 percent. In 2013–14, the overwintering loss rate was 23.2 percent, down from 30.5 percent the previous year but still higher than historical averages. Since 2006, this loss has been attributed to an ill-defined disease, colony collapse disease (CCD) (Briefing Room 2014). In summary, the impact of pollinator loss on US food sustainability can be encapsulated in the statement from the Pollinator Health Task Force:

> Pollinators are critical to our Nation's economy, food security, and environmental health. Honey bee pollination alone adds more than $15 billion in value to agricultural crops each year and provides the backbone to ensuring our diets are plentiful with fruits, nuts, and vegetables. Through the actions discussed in this strategy, and by working with partners across our country, we can and will help restore and sustain pollinator health nationwide. (Pollinator Health Task Force 2015, ii)

The policymakers, who are the actors/brokers, have taken action to address this critical food sustainability issue in both the 2014 Farm Bill and the Obama White House's efforts to create a Pollinator Health Task Force in 2015. The latter was an attempt to set strategic policy objectives and actions to reverse the decline of the pollinator population. Also, approximately two to three years before this attempt, the traditional pollinator communities (small beekeeping operations and large pollinator/honey producers) and large pollinator NGOs (Xerces Society for Invertebrate Conservation, Pollinator Partnership, Honey Bee Health Coalition, and North American Pollinator Protection Campaign) formed an informal group to advocate for a national pollinator policy. This informal group, working with the administration (USDA/ EPA/DOI), congressional leaders, and the White House formed a disjointed but concerted effort to construct a pollinator policy. This effort to develop and create policy has been and continues to be done in an evolving diverse and dynamic political environment.

ACF and the Pollinator Policy Domain

Using ACF's theoretical lens, the study's research questions can be narrowed to the following specific areas of analysis. These micro research questions will also be used to guide the application of ACF in this policy domain and, by doing so, contribute to expanding ACF theory.

- How funding levels and research resources are external and internal constraints that influence the formation of coalitions by policy subsystem actors/organizations.

- How belief systems founded on one of the CCD causal stress factors are used as a catalyst for specific organizational actors to create "change" policy coalitions.

- Given actors in this policy area are organizational units, whether social psychology theories can explain coalition relationships between organizational actors' behaviors.

- Whether ACF can be used to analyze and evaluate coalition actors in a political dynamic and evolving policy domain given changing policy parameters and direction.

- Whether the level of representativeness of certain organizational actors in the system is constrained, which can impact their ability to be legitimate, influential decision-makers in the policymaking process.

- Whether the degree of consensus on the scientific findings of CCD has led to the need to create new pollinator policies.

As a preface to the application of ACF, it should be noted that scant research has been conducted on the representativeness of coalitions within the pollinator policy domain or on the diversity of actor representativeness in the federal and state bureaucracies that may form pollinator policy. Most of the literature addressing the issue of bureaucratic diversity in this policy domain can be found on USDA, EPA, and DOI websites as well as the websites of various pollinator NGOs. Therefore, this study is presented as new research on the representative politics of the pollinator policymaking process. The following will address each ACF attribute in Figure 1 as it applies to the pollinator policy evolution.

Figure 1: ACF Structure



Source: Sabatier and Weible (2007, 202).

Figure 1 illustrates the analytical structure of ACF that Sabatier and Weible (2007) proposed. Each ACF analytical attribute (boxes) will be applied to the pollinator policy domain; however, we will focus on the Policy Subsystem attribute as described in Figure 1. The Policy Subsystem identifies actions that coalitions take to begin formulating a policy that ends in governmental action. While the Policy Subsystem may seem the most politically dynamic attribute, it also defines the value norming process within the coalition actors. This norming creation, per ACF theory, is the active driver of policy development.

Moving back from the governmental policy development of the Policy Subsystem, the center two attributes, Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structures and Short-Term Constraints/Resources of Subsystem Actors, are the coalition building activities. As the title indicates, the level and number of opportunities internal to the subsystem itself constrain the building of coalitions within the subsystem. Moreover, numerous factors, including actors' resources as well as external influences, limit the building process. These activities are the most dynamic regarding consensus-value building behaviors and political relationships. Indeed, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, 131–33) identified the significance of coalition-value building by categorizing the coalition belief structure as:

- Deep core beliefs—fundamental personal philosophical beliefs that are very difficult to change.

- Policy core beliefs—fundamental policy positions concerning the strategies for achieving core beliefs.

- Secondary beliefs—specific to the topic and may be changed by interactions and learning within the policy sub-system and across coalitions.

The two attributes on the left, Relatively Stable Parameters and External (System) Events, define the domain's limits of action and identify significant external influences that will impact coalition consensus-building and creation within the policy domain. The arrows in the diagram indicate the defining influences and creative processes. These influences and processes guide coalition building activities and, ultimately, policy creation. However, it is also important to understand that ACF is a closed-loop system where new policy may impact both the original policy parameters and create different external influences, thus making the system very dynamic and unstable. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) pointed out that ACF is, indeed, a policy-oriented learning

system. As Figure 1 indicates, in the Policy Subsystem attribute, the internal arrow indicates the presence of dynamic learning feedback taking place within the coalition as policy formulation is occurring.

Applying ACF Attributes to the Pollinator Policy Domain

Relatively Stable Parameters and External (System) Events

Per the ACF structure, the analysis begins with identification and evaluation of the parameters' stability that define the policy domain, as well as any external factors or events that may influence actors' behaviors within the policy domain. An identified structural parameter of the study is the USDA and the Obama administration's policy positions authored in 2012–14 and 2015, respectively. These policy positions were framed in the Agricultural Act of 2012–14 Farm Bills and the 2014–16 White House Pollinator Health Task Force.

As previously outlined, pollinator policy is broad and encompasses many pollinator species. However, most biological research of CCD has gone into the study of honeybees, as opposed to the native "unmanaged" species. Therefore, the present study uses the formulation of a honeybee policy as a parameter that defines coalition actors. Given this parameter, it is important to understand further the composition of the "honeybee community," other participants in honeybee management, associated advocates, and others. Per the US Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages Report 2012, 2,552 individuals comprise the honeybee management community. This number reflects those who were employed full time in the US apiculture or beekeeping sector (Bond, Hunt, and Plattner 2014, 1).

The beekeeping sector includes three groups. The first is small traditional beekeeping operations, where the primary focus is on small honey production units for personal honey consumption. The second is very similar to the traditional groups; however, honey sales are considered a side occupation of the beekeeper. The act of pollinating food crops is a secondary objective to these traditional bee managers. The last group consists of large honeybee commercial management community members who provide pollination services to the fruit-and-nuts agribusiness food production sector. These large economic concerns are also able to sell commercial honey to large food distribution entities. The BLS number is more reflective of the latter participant (Bond, Hunt, and Plattner 2014).

Besides these policy actors, other tangential actors exist that influence the pollinator Policy Subsystem, creating a "fuzzy" parameter. These actors may include conservationists and organic farmers as well as university/corporate researchers who are advocates of native pollinators; these pollinators may include wild honeybees, bumblebees, various wasps, and the Monarch butterfly. While these species of pollinators contribute to the overall success of crop

pollination, the policy objective of these native pollinator actors is different from the honeybee production coalition actors (Katz 2011). This difference in policy objective has recently become a counter-policy effort (USDA 2017).

Additionally, the ACF structure provides context to an increasingly prominent external event. From 2006 to the creation of the 2014 Farm Bill and the 2015 White House Task Force, a new socioeconomic external influence was making value inroads with crucial pollinator coalition actors. Specifically, the US population was beginning to demand healthier food product choices, such as organic products. This demand, as we shall see, plays a significant role in defining values and beliefs for pollinator policy actors.

Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structure and Short-Term Constraints and Resources of Subsystem Actors

Widespread discussion of the decline of pollinator populations, a decline that was observed in all pollinators but was particularly severe in the honeybee population, began in 2006. However, it was not until the 2012 Farm Bill that a pollinator policy, the first long-term coalition opportunity, began to crystallize by acknowledging the decline's potentially sizable adverse effects. In recognition of the significance of CCD, the 2012 bill created a conservation policy to be directed by both the USDA and DOI. The intent was twofold: first, conservation education in conjunction with states; and second, research funding to better understand the causal factors of CCD. Two years later, Congress passed a new 2014 Farm Bill with a small section addressing CCD that again only supported a conservation approach to the problem. With the bill's passage, the first pollinator policy/political triad coalition was forming between traditional beekeeping actors, the bee management community, and NGOs. This relationship was to continue to expand with new organizational actors until 2014 (House Agriculture Committee, Subcommittee on Horticulture, Research, Biotechnology and Foreign Agriculture 2014).

Policy Subsystem—Evolving Representation of Pollinator Management in Federal Policy Decision-Making

Through applying the Policy Subsystem section of the ACF, the pollinator policy domain begins to emerge with identifiable organizational actors. The first step is the value norming of the organizational actors that define their respective relationships. As the process pertains to CCD, Holy (2008) explains that actor norming began in the early 1990s, when beekeepers and pollinator service providers, both considered pollinator managers, first became aware of the pollinator population reduction. However, a public level acknowledgment of the problem did not occur until the second half of that decade. Further, the international bee community began discussing CCD before it was an issue in

the United States. Eventually, a combination of scientific researchers and NGO pollinator organizations began to explain the nature of the potential problem and make US policymakers more aware of the issues. While published research at the international level reported a similar rate of decline, the causes remained shrouded in mystery. Awareness of the decline became a foundational norm of all coalitions that had formed or that were in the process of forming. A second value proposition sprang from the early formation of the North American Pollinator Protection Campaign (NAPPC) from 2000 to 2003. The mission of this organization was to consider all pollinator populations, natural as well as managed. In their view the issue was the loss of natural habitat, noting that even managed pollinators are only partially managed (Katz 2011).

With prompting from these early forming set of collective actors, in 2004 the US Department of Agriculture and US Geological Survey provided funding to the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, "to examine data on pollinator status in North America" (Holy 2008, 5). This examination was an attempt to determine the rate of decline, potential causes, consequences on both agricultural and ecological systems, and what future research and monitoring are required. Furthermore, the examination was to provide suggested conservation and restoration steps to reduce or halt the population decline (Holy 2008). This research effort identified a fundamental value proposition in the norming formation of the subsequent organization coalitions.

As noted previously, while actor representation is not directly addressed in ACF theory, it is crucial to this study given the evolving nature of the pollinator policy domain. The dynamics of this environment make individual actors, as well as organization actors, important to fully understand the development of pollinator policy. An indicator of representation type and level can be found in the composition of the 2006 National Academy of Sciences Status of Pollinators in North America committee membership. The committee was an early attempt to understand the health of North American pollinators and to suggest policy direction. The critical point for this study was the membership representation, which consisted of three federal agencies, eight universities from the United States, and two Canadian universities (Holy 2008). What is interesting about this committee membership is the absence of any pollinator community managers or traditional beekeepers. While this can be understood given the investigative nature of the Academy of Science examination, it also means these actors were at best passive representatives in the findings of the committee. They contributed to the research but not to the committee's conclusions. However, it was this report that publicly identified a disease as the cause of pollinator colony collapse of honeybees, CCD (Holy 2008).

Given the recommendations of the Academy of Science/USDA committee's findings, as well as significant media coverage and lobbying efforts from

pollinator NGOs, congressional leadership took notice. Compared to the Academy of Science 2006 pollinator report, a more representative group of participants from the pollinator community gave testimony to the 2008 House Agriculture Subcommittee. Of the ten witnesses, 20 percent were pollinator managers. If the pollinator NGO witnesses are counted, then half of the witnesses were active representatives of the actual pollinator community (House Agriculture Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture Hearing 2008). Including these community members indicates that primary pollinator management actors once again were directly influencing agriculture policy decision-makers.

Even with the greater representation by the pollinator community, the recommendation of the 2008 Farm Bill followed objectives similar to those suggested in the Academy of Science report, including more funding for conservation initiatives. In summary, under the Conservation Title within the 2008 bill, the subcommittee recommended: "(1) the development of habitat for native and managed pollinators; and (2) the use of conservation practices that benefit native and managed pollinators" (Holy 2008, 17). A separate section of the Farm Bill contained provisions for opening National Forest System lands by:

> (A) allowing for managed honey bees to forage on National Forest System lands where compatible with other natural resource management priorities; and (B) planting and maintaining managed honey bee and native pollinator foraging on National Forest System lands where compatible with other natural resource management priorities. (House of Representatives 2014, sec. 7209, 241)

Lastly, the Farm Bill acknowledged the status of all pollinators (House Agriculture Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture Hearing 2008).

Policy Subsystem—Use of CCD Causal Factors as Coalition Values Formation

The acknowledgment by Congress was welcome, but little had been done to address the issue of CCD or to hear testimony concerning this plight. It was clear that thematically, any congressional action from the 2006 committee report through the 2014 Farm Bill CCD was to be considered a problem of land conservation (House Agriculture Subcommittee on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture Hearing 2008).

The pollinator CCD issue was then to be examined as a conservation issue and resolvable as such. Given this approach, actor coalition formation used

conservation as a critical value proposition from 2008 until the 2014 Farm Bill. The Natural Resources Conservation Services (NRCS) was the lead agency that managed the 2008 Farm Bill directives through the passage of the 2014 Farm Bill. The only deviation to this approach was an addition to the conservation effort through an EPA funding channel. This additional funding provided resources to various research centers that were attempting to determine CCD causal factors. However, even with this extra research funding, by 2017 there was still no consensus as to what CCD was or how to correct it (Environmental Protection Agency 2017; Suryanarayanan 2015).

Commencing in 2014 and continuing through 2016, the Obama White House created a Pollinator Health Task Force whose objectives paralleled the pollinator policy objectives found in the 2014 Farm Bill. The White House Pollinator Health Task Force membership was comprised of agencies from both USDA and DOI and would eventually include the EPA. The result of this parallel pollinator policy effort was the creation of a duality in the federal political policy-brokering sources, i.e., Congress and the White House Task Force. However, the political environment between the Democratic Obama administration and Republican congressional leadership was very dynamic and unstable. This unstable relationship became a new external force to the existing pollinator Policy Subsystem. Given that the Policy Subsystem, per ACF theory, is a closed system with feedback loops, a change in the belief structure and norming values were created by this new political brokerage duality. Existing coalitions' belief structures change to match the respective brokers' differing policy approaches. This change in coalition behavior became especially true as the White House Pollinator Health Task Force began to focus specifically on the use of pesticides as a CCD causal factor. The result of the value re-norming within the Policy Subsystem spawned new coalitions (Pollinator Health Task Force 2015).

The White House Pollinator Health Task Force was influenced by the growing public attention to the use of pesticides as a health hazard as well as a potential CCD causal factor. However, the Republican-controlled Agriculture Subcommittee was not (Foran 2014). Given this enhanced publicity and pressure from environmental groups outside of the pollinator community, an effort was made during the 2013 congressional hearings to approve and pass a companion bill, H.R. 2692 (113th): Saving America's Pollinators Act of 2013. Democratic minority members of the subcommittee, as well as other cosponsors, introduced the bill. In all, 78 members of Congress, all Democrats, cosponsored this bill. The purpose of the bill was to take the lead from European counterparts and restrict the usage of neonicotinyl (or neonic) insecticides (neonicotinoids), "the world's most widely used insecticides, whose usage in the US has risen dramatically since 2003" (Suryanarayanan 2015, 149). The

introduction of this pesticide in 2003 also correlates with the increased decline in the pollinator population (Holy 2008). However, efforts to pass H.R. 2692 out of the committee were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, this shift in perceptions of CCD's causal factors now created new values and belief structures, both "for and against" pesticides, in the Policy Subsystem. Again, as changing belief and norming values increased, coalition organizational actors began to shift.

Soon after the passage of the 2014 Farm Bill, a second hearing of the House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Horticulture, Research, Biotechnology, and Foreign Agriculture took place to review progress in pollinator health and review CCD findings. It is important to note that participants in the hearing consisted of only four witnesses: two from the pollinator management community, one from the USDA, and the other a new coalition actor from Bayer North American Bee Care Center. The reason for including the new witness was pending research findings stating that a leading cause of CCD was the systemic use of the neonic pesticide, of which Bayer is one of several worldwide producers. Any change in the use of this pesticide would have two significant economic impacts. First, in revenue alone, neonic pesticide sales were valued as a multibillion-dollar worldwide market. Second, neonic pesticides were estimated to have increased the overall gross value of the crop agriculture sector by five times (Foran 2014). The new coalition actors, pesticide manufacturers and agribusinesses, had an immediate influence on the Policy Subsystem structure. The result was the "birthing" of new or energizing of existing coalitions that would oppose new influences on the policy brokers.

The growing policy problem was becoming apparent. As noted before, research findings of the root cause of CCD were still very unclear, yet actor coalition value structures were solidifying and forming new relationships around suspect CCD factors. Even before the 2012 Farm Bill's passage, public and private research facilities had been attempting to identify and address the causal factors of CCD, yet by 2015 nothing was certain (Suryanarayanan 2015). What made the root causal factor research so tricky was the very nature of CCD. Pathologically, it is not a single disease strain but in fact a mix of environmental factors, parasitic infestations, pesticides, and domestication. While suspected in 2015, as of 2017 the following five factors were thought to be the leading causes of CCD; however, collective research findings would not declare these factors as the definitive list:

1. Pests (e.g., varroa mite), pathogens (e.g., the bacterial disease American foulbrood), and viruses.
2. Poor nutrition (e.g., due to loss of foraging habitat and increased reliance on supplemental diets).
3. Pesticide exposure.

4. Bee management practices (e.g., long migratory routes to support pollination services).
5. Lack of genetic diversity.

(Environmental Protection Agency 2017; Suryanarayanan 2015)

Given this lack of clarity in the pathology of CCD, this study did find that the use of pesticides still had created a highly dynamic political environment causing instability in pollinator policy decision-making.

Regardless of the lack of any definitive CCD findings by 2014, adoption and adherence to specific causal factor(s) began to create coalition value/belief structures that defined relationships and led to politically driven pollinator policy efforts. In addition to the introduction of these new organizational coalition actors, existing organizational actors also begin to embrace these perceived but unproven CCD causal factors to redefine existing coalition beliefs and values. As noted above, by 2015 CCD factors began to include nonenvironmental and biological causes. For example, one leading pollinator NGO, Xerces Society for Invertebrate Conservation, found that honey production management practices by both beekeepers and pollinator service providers were potentially causing malnutrition and hive stress (Keim 2012).

Again, as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) point out, in the ACF model a motivation driver in coalition formation is the cohesion of actor policy values and the creation of like belief structure. Figure 2 attempts to explain how the use of CCD causal factors came to articulate the coalition value propositions as well as direct the formation of like belief structure. Using Figure 2, this study has identified at least four organizational actor coalitions formed around the CCD causal factors as value statement: parasitic infestation, nutrition/genetic diversity, pesticide usage, and bee management practices.

Figure 2 outlines the membership in each coalition; for example, the parasitic infestation coalition is comprised primarily of the following organizational actors: traditional beekeepers, research labs, and organic farming NGOs with assistance from the EPA and USDA. However, these same organizational actors, per their belief in another CCD causal factor, have created an additional coalition founded on nutrition/genetic diversity concerns. Further, as Figure 2 indicates, newer coalitions have formed around the use or nonuse of pesticides. Each side creates counter-coalitions to provide different pro and con value structures. By analyzing the subsystem configuration in Figure 2, an interesting ACF structural framework configuration was discovered. It appears that coalition formation around these causal factors has created a new policy subsystem secondary layer made up of coalitions existing only in opposition to contrary value positions. It could be argued that this new structure is a micro-policy subsystem. In this analysis, a similar coalition structure, one addressing bee management practices, is also formed.

Figure 2: CCD Driven Coalitions



What also makes this ACF analysis both interesting and difficult is the emergence of a new and unanticipated overlapping pollinator policy subsystem, native pollinators. The focus of this analysis has been the honey bee pollinator; however, the native pollinator brings to the discussion different policy issues and concerns. This new native pollinator coalition, formally recognized by the USDA in 2017, is made up of new NGO organizations and academic interests around the native pollinators, especially native bee populations (USDA 2017). These native bee pollinators fall outside of the more domesticated managed honeybee population and include such species as bumblebees, European honeybees, alfalfa leafcutter bees, and unmanaged bee populations. Moreover, the value proposition of the native pollinator coalition is very different. First, this native pollinator coalition sees CCD as a domesticated managed honeybee problem because colony collapse has not occurred significantly in the native bee pollinator population. The conclusion is that solutions for a domestic managed bee population are not needed for native pollinators and, in fact, the honeybee CCD solutions may be harmful to native pollinator populations. Second, the native pollinator coalition wants to push toward some form of separability between the two bee pollinator populations, which is a counter policy to the conservation guidelines of both the 2012 and 2014 Farm Bills. While small, this coalition has now created a presence within the pollinator policymaking domain (USDA 2017).

Figure 3: Pollinator Coalition Network



Macro Network Analysis of Actor-Broker Relationships in the Pollinator Policy Domain

As an extension of the ACF model, a macro network analysis is applied to define specific coalition paths and dependencies. The previously identified coalitions are viewed as forming an internal policy value/belief cohesion structure (Figure 2). The network diagram (Figure 3) illustrates the relationships between cooperating and competing coalitions, including the policy brokers, USDA/EPA (White House Task Force) and Congress, based on similar interests and policy positions in contrast to the previously identified policy value and belief structures.

The dynamics of this network is caused by the changing representative membership and political conflict between brokers and was demonstrated in the development of the Obama White House Pollinator Health Task Force June 2014 Presidential Memorandum, "Creating a Federal Strategy to Promote the Health of Honey Bees and Other Pollinators," and by congressional intent in the 2014 Farm Bill. As discussed before, the Task Force's initial stated purpose was to support the 2014 Farm Bill by developing within a year a supporting strategic action plan. The USDA was to direct the task force; active membership primarily consisted of other agencies throughout the executive branch. The resultant action plan addressed the strategic objectives with one major addition. The Task Force objectives and strategic plan changed when the Obama administration specifically

chartered the EPA to assess the effect of pesticides, including neonicotinoid insecticides, on the health of bees and other pollinators and to take appropriate actions to protect pollinators (Pollinator Health Task Force, 2016). This action by the Administration was counter to congressional intent, since the 2014 Farm Bill did not specifically address any CCD causal factors, including the use of pesticides or that of commercial bee management practices. Again, as presented before, Congress not only took a passive approach to these topics but developed a conservation plan supporting state education programs and forest land use.

The passivity of Congress as a policy broker, as opposed to the more aggressive White House Task Force position, elevated the dialogue and eventually changed the coalition representation in policy decision-making. This changing condition is seen in the representation of the traditional beekeeping/ small commercial bee management actors, who ultimately were given a weak representative role, partially because of their limited lobbying resources (Foran 2014). The NGO actors, however, played a very active role in this network, while the pesticide producers and agribusinesses developed the most substantial network relationship with the congressional policy brokers. As one indicator of the organizational actors' political strength in the pollinator network, in 2014 the pesticide producers' lobby investment reached $2.4 million, while the total lobby investment by the NGOs and pollinator management community was approximately $23,000 (Foran 2014).

What is not found on the network diagram is the changing political relationship between the policymaking brokers: A Democratically controlled White House administration and a Republican-controlled congressional agricultural committee and subcommittees. As indicated in the above narrative, prior to the 2016 presidential election, it was reasonably apparent the CCD issue had been politicized by the introduction of the pesticide issue without confirmed research findings. The Republican 2014 Farm Bill did not address pesticides as a causal factor in CCD, while the Obama Presidential Task Force action plan devoted an entire section to the continued study and regulation of the neonic pesticides (Pollinator Health Task Force 2016). The finding from this study is that the apparent political tension in the pollinator policy domain appears contrived given the state of current CCD research. The major conflict focuses on the use of pesticides as a CCD causal factor. However, the study research finds that pesticides are identified only as a potential contributor and does not single them out as the root causal factor of CCD. This ancillary issue has diverted attention from the pivotal point of creating a pollinator policy around restoring colony health with the participation from the traditional honeybee management community. Policymakers seem to have lost sight of the original issue and objectives.

However, a recent evaluation of the 2018 political environment on pollinator policy finds that the Trump administration has moved away from the Pollinator Health Task Force direction and has adopted actions supporting a continuation of the 2014 Farm Bill policies. This would include more state involvement and ownership in managing a CCD solution. At the same time, the administration has been mute on pesticide control; also, it is not clear whether the Pollinator Health Task Force is still operative. These points maybe significant given that the 2018 congressional legislative plan is to pass a farm bill; it is not clear how the bill will address the issue of pollinator health. Indeed, pollinator policy is still in limbo (USDA 2018).

Summary Remarks and Findings: ACF Theoretical Behavioral and Environmental Attribute Extensions

This study stretched the ACF tool's normal application in two areas: applying it to an evolving political environment rather than a historical static state, and defining the term actors as organizations rather than individuals. These two theoretical anomalies, while missing in any extended ACF literature discussion, were not felt to limit the use of ACF model in the determination of representative diversity of the stakeholders or actors in a complex, evolving, and politically dynamic pollinator policy domain. Past agriculture policy researchers had used similar modeling to explain politically complex stakeholder-actor relationships in this policy domain (Bernstein 1955; Fristschler 1989). Likewise, any concern in changing the meaning of "actor" from individual to organization was not considered as a limitation but, to the contrary, an extension of the ACF theoretical framework. Both ACF changes resulted in an increased understanding of the multi-faceted agricultural policy domain in general and the pollinator policy domain specifically. Actors involved in agricultural policies may span a variety of disciplines, including agribusiness, health, government, science, and environmental interests. The content and level of organizational actor representation within the pollinator policy domain is but a microcosm of this larger agriculture policy area (Bernstein 1955; Fristschler 1989).

As a further clarification of ACF's nonstandard use in this study, it is important to consider two positions that were embraced. In ACF theory, individuals with shared beliefs or advocacy of an issue form coalitions but display Simon's definition of bounded rationality with constraints such as political feasibility and access to decision-making processes (Simon 1985). In this case, while it stretches this notion of bounded rationality from individual to organizational actors, Simon's constraints to organizations as policymaking actors still apply. Displaying individual bounded rationality behavioral attributes, organizations were the key political actors driving the creation of this new policy domain decision-making process. The second position was the application of

individual attribution theory to describe organizational behavior. Organization coalition formation is the ability for organizations to recognize like beliefs, values, and intentions. It is the ability to recognize or attribute to other like organizations that become the impetus to create coalitions with common objectives and goals (Fiske 2014). While this is presented as new to ACF theory, it is also an example of ACF theoretical strength and adaptability. Weible (2007) demonstrates this strength and adaptability of ACF in a study that explores how stakeholders, such as state and federal government officials as well as nongovernmental officials, including scientists, environmental groups, and industry representatives, collaborate and disagree on certain components of marine protected areas within California. As with this study, Weible uses ACF to understand how agreements are reached, how allies are made, and how the behavior of influential actors in the policymaking process impacts others. This study demonstrates the use of ACF in a highly contested political environment to address a multidisciplinary coalition membership in a specific policy area.

Lastly, to ensure compatibility of this approach in the current study requires reconciling and acknowledging the significant premises of ACF that Sabatier and Weible (2007) outlined in some of their original work. This reconciliation is especially true of both the ACF macro-level assumption "that policymaking occurs among specialists within a policy subsystem but that their behavior is affected by factors in the broader political and socioeconomic system" (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 191), and the micro-level view that individual behavior is drawn from social psychology theory. As they pertain to this study, these theories can apply as well to organizational "specialist" behaviors prompted by political and public concerns. As a last reconciliation point, Sabatier and Weible (2007) also identify a meso-level premise that the "best way to deal with the multiplicity of actors in a subsystem is to aggregate them into 'advocacy coalitions'" (191–92), but in this case, the aggregate will be comprised of various organizational participants. Indeed, pollinator policy originated from the concerns of various actor specialists, including research entomologists and traditional beekeepers. However, collective organizational voices (commercial bee management businesses, biotech firms, agribusinesses, NGOs, and organic farmers' associations) have emerged as the "new" specialists as the scope, economic impact, and concern over the variability in CCD research increased. Further, these new organizational actors have developed collective-value propositions around the suspected CCD causal factors, shifting the policy decision-making focal point.

Actor Diversification and Representation in Pollinator Policy Domain Findings

This study was also an attempt to apply Lasswell's representation definition of a democratically driven policy science. The last point in his definition directs

that the creation of a policy science, as well as a policy, needs to be done for a democracy (Lasswell 1951). It is hoped that this research sheds light on whether achieving this definitional objective was met within the context of a new evolving pollinator policy domain. Indeed, the analytical strength of ACF made it possible to identify diverse actor coalition representation as well as their positional relationships in the development of the Agricultural Act of 2014 as well as their positioning within the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill.

As previously addressed, pollinator policymaking actors have evolved since the 2006 public acknowledgment of a pending food crisis because of CCD. Initially, the pollinator management communities, both traditional and commercial beekeeping, were the primary representatives and contributors to pollinator health decision-making. They were the active voice at the "street level" as long as the formal government policy solution was considered a conservation management issue. Indeed, the pollinator management community had a more significant role in policy formation since the policy would address only conservation, pollinator education, and USDA/DOI communication. However, the policy decision-making focal point shifted as the CCD problem became more complicated and as stakeholders better understood the severity of its potential agricultural and economic consequences. Government policymaking brokers replaced local voices with bureaucratic actors in the pollinator decision-making process. This shift in representation was a move away from a more diverse democratic process to a centralized power brokerage policymaking process, contrary to Lasswell's (1951) admonition. For example, the actions of the Obama White House's Pollinator Health Task Force action to control pesticide use moved the policy decision focal point by creating an action plan to counter the biotech and agribusiness influence in this policy domain. However, at the same time, this action excluded the participation of the pollinator community. The action also prompted the rapid formation of pollinator coalitions by these new influential organizational actors. The biotech-pesticide producers, already significant actors in the agribusiness sector, now began robust lobbying campaigns in the pollinator policy domain. This change in the dominant decision-making coalition of actors was the second negative factor impacting the level of diverse representation. Indeed, this shift hastened the move in pollinator policy decision-making away from a more democratic approach to a less democratic, centralized brokerage approach (Foran 2014; Pollinator Health Task Force 2015).

In addition, by applying the modified version of ACF analysis to the evolving representation of organizational actors, this study has found that policy advocates and coalitions are very diverse and internally competitive over the policy subsystem's secondary layer belief structures. As noted before, it was discovered that competition within the subsystem secondary layer (Figure 2)

was a very politically dynamic environment allowing belief structures to be built on weak or nonexistent value criteria. The root cause of this behavior again was the lack of definitive findings regarding CCD's causal factors. Given the variability of CCD interpretation, the question of representation within the pollinator policy domain has shifted over the value norming period (Suryanarayanan 2015).

Additionally, as this study progressed, the introduction of a new overlapping organizational actor coalition, the native pollinator population, has also shifted relationships and broker attention, changing the question of policymaking representation again. Indeed, the native pollinator policy coalition has different objectives from those of the original members of the pollinator domain. Both have raised the pollinator health issue separately in pollinator policy. While the primary pollinator policy objective is the same—the health of pollinators—their approach is radically different and therefore requires a new "face at the table" in determining an overall pollinator policy direction. It is not clear whether those coalitions supporting continued CCD research and the native bee pollinator coalition can agree on a joint private and/or public research-funding policy. It can be further concluded, using the ACF theoretical hypothesis, that organizational coalition actors' internal norm building is in a state of flux, with little to no conforming influences coming from any external forces. As of 2018, each coalition's group norms still are internally formed around commonly shared beliefs of CCD causal factors. However, within the policy domain itself, there appears to be no single common norm to direct action. Therefore, as a study conclusion, for pollinator policy to successfully go forward, there is a demonstrated need to use a single CCD causal pathology only as a common policy value proposition. In addition, a second finding was that the use of CCD causal pathologies created strong coalition cohesion as well as conflictual relationships. This is true when strong opposing views exist on the validity of the CCD causal factor. Third, both academic and government research centers still do not agree nor advocate for any specific CCD research direction, including the newly proposed native bee pollinator policy direction (USDA 2017).

Conclusion and Future Research Directions

ACF has provided a robust analytical framework to describe and identify coalition actors and their representation in pollinator policymaking. The analytical strength of the expanded ACF model was adequate for evaluating organizations as actors as opposed to individuals. However, the need to analyze the value and norming creation of actors was more difficult because of the use of organization actors. In future research, two other analytical frameworks

might be a better fit for attempting to understand this policy domain: Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), which pertains to textual analysis of policy dialogue and influence (Shanahan 2011); or Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD), which pertains to situational action analysis (Ostrom, 2011). In line with this recommendation, Weible (2007) also suggests a stakeholder analysis:

> The most likely recipients of an ACF stakeholder analysis are interest group leaders, government sovereigns, agency managers and directors, and other individuals who develop broad, long-term strategies for a policy or program. Regardless of the goals and recipients, additional research is needed to understand how stakeholder analysis (or other political feasibility studies) are conducted and used among stakeholders in policy debates (113).

As a response to this call for further research, it would be necessary to conduct an in-depth investigation of individual leaders who are influential in the pollination community. The purpose is to discover commonalities and areas of disagreement within the community, to recognize perceptions of power and influence, and to gain an understanding of the degree to which policies represent those who are most impacted by any policy implementation. Lastly, the addition of a network analysis was helpful in this study but was based only on qualitative textual reference data. In future research, this network analysis could be more quantified by measuring the strength of the belief structure within and between both collaborative as well as competing organizational coalitions.

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Coming to America for Higher Education: An Analysis of the Predictors of International Student Enrollment at Colleges and Universities in the Southeast

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International students enrich the educational and cultural environment on college campuses as well as contribute to the economic health of institutions of higher education and their surrounding communities. International student recruitment has never been easy at non-doctoral institutions, but it has become even more challenging in the age of Trump. Our study begins with a description of the enrollment trends of international students at US colleges and universities, with special attention given to the impact of President Trump. We explore the factors that influence the decision of an international student to study in the United States, focusing particularly on the role of cost (tuition and fees) for regional universities and baccalaureate institutions. The heart of our study examines the percentage of international students enrolled at almost 200 institutions of higher education in the Southeast. We investigate the impact of institutional diversity, academic classification, cost, and public vs. private status on the percentage of international students enrolled for 2015–16. We find significantly higher rates of enrollment at doctoral institutions when compared to those which offer only master's, bachelor's, and associate degrees. Significant differences also emerge by the type of research classification for doctoral institutions with those universities designated as highest research activity reporting an international

student enrollment more than three times greater than moderate research activity universities. Furthermore, the average percentage of international students enrolled in private institutions is more than double that of enrollees in public institutions. In a multivariate regression model, percentage white and percentage female are negative predictors of the percentage of international students, while the cost of tuition and fees is a positive predictor. In a truncated model of just public master's universities, the cost of out-of-state tuition is a negative predictor of the percentage of international students, but it does not attain statistical significance. We conclude with policy recommendations for college and university campuses as well as for policymakers at the state level.

International students contribute mightily to the intellectual climate of our classrooms and college campuses. For all of us who have taught Introduction to American Government, Introduction to Political Science, or Global Issues in the core curriculum, international students provide a comparative perspective that is enlightening for the rest of our students. In upper-division classes, the intellectual impact of international students can be particularly powerful, whether the courses are in international relations, comparative politics, public administration, or American politics. International students can also have a significant economic impact on our university budgets and local communities. Given our current political environment, the higher education community faces great challenges in terms of recruiting international students to the United States. While we are currently witnessing a decline in international students studying in the United States, international students still remain an important part of the student population. According to the Open Doors report (IIE 2016), international students make up a little more than 5 percent of students in higher education across the United States, although 22 percent of those students attend the top 25 hosting institutions.

Our study begins with an examination of international student enrollment trends, the impact of our immigration debates and the Trump presidency, and an exploration of the factors that influence why international students choose to study in the United States. The heart of our study examines the key predictors of international student enrollment across colleges and universities in the Southeast. The dependent variable is the percentage of international students at colleges and universities in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Key institutional characteristics (total student

enrollment, Carnegie classification, public vs. private, and institutional diversity) serve as the independent variables to predict the percentage of international students on a college campus. An independent variable of particular interest is the tuition rate for an institution. We expect the impact of out-of-state tuition to be negligible at research-intensive doctoral institutions, but it may well be a key detrimental factor in the ability to attract international students at regional comprehensive universities and smaller schools. We conclude with policy recommendations that can be employed at the campus level to improve and expand the recruitment of international students along with policy recommendations to be considered at the state level.

International Student Enrollment in the Age of Trump

The recruitment of international students is an important issue not only from a cultural perspective but also because of the contribution international students make to the US economy. The Office of Immigration Statistics gathers information on nonimmigrant foreign nationals and publishes a report annually. The last year for which statistics are available is 2015. The report shows that 1,886,948 students entered the country on an F-1 visa in 2015. Additionally, exchange visitors coming in on J-1 visas added another 502,372 foreign national entries associated with higher education (Teke and Navarro 2016, 4). These international students contributed over $3.8 billion to the US economy in 2015 (IIE 2016). Those dollars help keep our universities and university communities healthy and growing.

Key factors in the decline in overall international student numbers since the 2016 presidential election involve not only increased competition but also President Donald Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric and proposed travel ban. Telling is the drop in enrollments from China and Mexico, two countries Trump has openly criticized. Chinese student enrollment dropped by almost 2.2 percent, and enrollments from Mexico have declined by 11 percent (Trines 2017, 2). Enrollment across the board began to flatten in 2016 for a number of reasons. One reason is increased competition from Canada and Australia, but another reason college administrators cite is Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric and "restrictive views on immigration" (Saul 2017).

Trump's attempt at banning travel from some countries is another factor. *The Atlantic* reports that the largest decline in numbers of applications came from the Middle East. A recent survey of university applications and enrollments reveals that there was "a 39 percent decrease in Middle Eastern undergraduate applications and a 31 percent decrease in graduate applications from the region" (Bendix 2017). Additionally, the number of students in the United States from the revised list of banned countries was about 15,000 in 2016 (Bendix 2017). That is a significant number of students for institutions to lose. While it is argued

that the ban is justified for security reasons by the Trump administration, the news of such a policy is bound to affect students in more than just the countries targeted by the ban. When immigration policies are in flux, international student applications suffer because of the confusion and uncertainty over new policies (Saul 2017, 3). According to the survey, many potential students have expressed concern about the possibility of the list growing to include their countries, including potential students from China and India (Bendix 2017).

Why Students Choose to Study in the United States

In this section, we investigate the reasons students choose particular countries and educational institutions. As the United States is currently the most popular destination for international students worldwide, some of the reasons for selecting the United States as a destination are clear. First, the United States has the largest economy in the world, and an education in the United States gives students more possibilities for participating in the global economy. Second, the United States has a reputation for high-quality educational options. By looking at some data on how students evaluate and select universities, we hope to provide information on other attractive features of an education in the United States.

The following study by Elisa Park demonstrates the specific motivations for Korean students. However, similar studies would likely show different results based on the socioeconomic outlook of the *exporting* country and perhaps students' views of their own educational system, plus a myriad of other factors. Nevertheless, as South Korea sends a large number of students to the United States, lessons can be taken from this study.

The United States is a favorite destination for Korean students who want to study abroad. South Korea sent over 61,000 students to the United States in 2016 (IIE 2016). In her study of Korean student international-mobility motivations, Park (2009) polled Korean high school students regarding four popular destinations for those seeking an education abroad (see Figure 1). Students were given questionnaires regarding environment and academic expectations of an education in the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

"Students who selected the United States as an ideal destination had their high expectations of 'curriculum excellence,' 'high reputation of school,' and 'high job opportunity after graduation' for U.S. higher education" (Park 2009, 750). The United Kingdom was perceived similarly to the United States in terms of academic expectation but was deemed more traditional and conservative. Korean students who selected China as a study abroad destination did so due to monetary issues (Park 2009, 753), as summarized in Figure 2. Students who chose Australia had lower academic expectations and were looking for an exciting environment.

Figure 1: Comparison of Academic and Environmental Expectations in Four Countries



Source: Park (2009).

Figure 2: Academic and Environmental Expectations and Choice of Destination Countries



Source: Park (2009).

This study tells us that Korean students believe that an education in the United States represents the best option for future success. Similar results can be expected from Chinese students. An article on the BBC website reporting on Chinese students in the United States credits world-class universities as one reason, and the Chinese system failures as another. It posits that Chinese

students are eager to leave the Chinese system because test scores determine which subjects students will take (Svoboda 2015). Because of the quality and the prestige of an education in the United States, it is still the number-one choice for students considering study abroad in nearly every country (Gold 2016).

Coming to America

In order to understand the international student market, the first issue that needs to be addressed is how students evaluate and select a university abroad. The information we are most interested in is how students evaluate a university. These factors include national rankings, scholarships, research opportunities, and location. Understanding these factors is the key to the development of a recruitment strategy that targets your potential students.

From our experience recruiting abroad, for example, we have learned that most students we talked to in China asked about our national rankings. Our experience tells us that schools that can show high rankings in various programs have an advantage with Chinese students. The research from International Education Advantage (INTEAD), highlighted in Figure 3, confirms our sentiments regarding Chinese students' evaluation criteria. However, rankings are not a strong factor for all students according to a study done by INTEAD. In a survey sent to more than 807,000 students in 94 countries (not including China), INTEAD received more than 35,000 responses. The responses summarized in Figure 3 indicate that scholarships were clearly the top criteria students used when selecting a university abroad, followed by research opportunities, rankings, and then geography (INTEAD and FPP EDU Media 2016, 15).

Looking at the survey results and the countries surveyed, we see that promotion of scholarships and strong academic programs with research opportunities will interest students more than university rankings in many countries. We also see that geography plays a very small role for students from these same countries. The information we are most interested in is how students evaluate a university. For example, in the Middle East, an area with significant growth in study abroad numbers during the last decade, 56 percent of students surveyed said they looked at academic programs when deciding where to go, while 49 percent said scholarships were important, and 34 percent said rankings were important. However, in Vietnam, another country with strong growth in numbers of students going abroad to study, 68 percent said scholarships were an important factor in their choice. Academic programs were considered important by 59 percent of the respondents, and academic rankings as a consideration in choosing schools was so low, it did not merit mentioning (FPP EDU Media 2016). The data reveal that what attracts students in one country or region does not necessarily attract students in another country or region.

Figure 3: Decision-Making Criteria for Students from Select Countries When Selecting a University Abroad



Source: INTEAD and FPP EDU Media (2016).

On the Homefront

International students provided a significant boon to the economy in Georgia. There were 21,122 international students in Georgia last year, and it is estimated that they spent more than $683 million in the state (IIE 2016). However, enrollment declines have had a significant effect on revenues. Janel Davis (2015) of the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* reports that nearly every non-research-intensive university had significant declines in enrollment, ranging from 7.65 percent at Armstrong State University to 33.42 percent at Fort Valley State University. Valdosta State's enrollment declined by 11.7 percent during this period (Davis 2015). Figure 3 shows the serious enrollment decline at USG schools.

Regional comprehensive universities and smaller institutions have lost a significant number of students as well as funding provided by appropriations. Doctoral research-intensive universities have made up for lost funding through increases in out-of-state and international enrollments. In a recent journal article, Ashley Macrander (2017) posits that as state funding decreases, international student tuition dollars are seen as a replacement. Georgia Tech provides an example of this. In 2008, Georgia Tech enrolled 3,459 international students out of slightly fewer than 19,000 total students. In 2015, there were slightly more

Figure 4: Enrollment Declines at University System of Georgia Schools, Fall 2014



than 5,100 international students out of slightly over 19,000 students, a disproportionate increase (Georgia Tech Fact Book 2016).

International students are clearly attracted to doctoral research-intensive universities because of their academic programs and research. They are also enticed by their reputations as top-quality universities. However, not every international student qualifies for or can afford an education at a doctoral research-intensive institution. While the attraction of these top universities is understandable, what is less clear is how students select regional universities,

and how we can attract and enroll international students in quality programs at these universities. What are the key factors in terms of a regional university or four-year baccalaureate institution attracting international students? Is it academic rankings, program offerings, scholarships, geographical location, climate, or institutional characteristics?

The Open Doors report (IIE 2016) indicates that one out of three international students chooses to study in California, New York, or Texas. Where do the rest of them go? Georgia ranks 15th in states with the most international students, which sounds respectable; but of the more than 21,000 international students in Georgia, 15,870 went to University of Georgia, Georgia State, Georgia Tech, Emory, and Savannah College of Arts and Design (SCAD) (IIE 2016). That means that slightly over 5,000 students were spread out across all the other public and private institutions in Georgia. It is clear that the big draws for international students who come to Georgia are doctoral research-intensive universities or, in the case of SCAD, specialization of the programming; and the reason they selected these programs was because of their reputation for academic excellence. This is not just the case for Georgia, but a pattern across the United States. In the 2015–2016 academic year, eight US institutions had more than 10,000 international students enrolled: New York University led the way with 15,543 international students, the University of Southern California followed with 13,340, and Arizona State University and Columbia University enrolled more than 12,700 each. The University of Illinois and Northeastern University both enrolled more than 12,000, while the University of California, Los Angeles, had more than 11,000 international students. Purdue University rounds out the list with slightly more than 10,000 international students enrolled (Zong and Batalova 2017).

The Role of Out-of-State Tuition

We have established that the United States is a top destination for international students; however, money is still a very big impediment to an education in the United States. Those who are unable to gain admission to a top-ranked university, and more of those who cannot afford an education at a top-ranked school, would be well served by a good education at a regional comprehensive university or four-year baccalaureate institution. The problem for many of these students is that even at regional comprehensive universities, tuition charges are often so high as to make it too difficult for the majority of applicants to come. One reason is the additional tuition that international students pay.

Nearly every US state has a system whereby university tuition is charged according to whether you reside in the state. State residents receive a "discounted" rate because the students or their parents are presumed to have paid state taxes

to support that state's educational system. Students from out of state pay an "out-of-state tuition" rate, which is about three times higher than the in-state rate. In Georgia, this out-of-state rate is supposed to reflect the cost of education in the Georgia system. The policy governing out-of-state tuition rates is important for several reasons. First, most four-year baccalaureate universities and colleges in Georgia do not operate at full capacity and badly need students to fill empty seats. Enrollment in nearly all of these institutions has dropped drastically since its peak in 2010 (Davis 2015).

Enrollment management practices at all institutions in Georgia, including Valdosta State University, are made primarily at the state level. It can be argued that the policies set by the Board of Regents of the State of Georgia regarding out-of-state tuition rates help research institutions and flagship universities, but hurt regional comprehensive universities as well as baccalaureate colleges. Doctoral research-intensive universities are not impacted by high tuition rates for international or domestic students and enrollment rates remain strong, as discussed below. The unnecessarily high out-of-state tuition rates set by the Board of Regents, a key element of our data analysis in this study, can make it difficult for regional comprehensive universities and four-year baccalaureate colleges to recruit international students to fill vacant seats left open by declining enrollment numbers.

Prior research has shown that "public universities increase nonresident enrollment following declines in the state appropriations" (Jaquette et al. 2016). In Georgia, this is true for doctoral research-intensive universities, but not true for smaller institutions. Research-intensive universities across the country and in the state of Georgia (Georgia Tech and the University of Georgia) attract international students primarily through their reputations as high-quality institutions, and they are not noticeably affected by increases in tuition in terms of international student numbers. For example, in fall 2015 Georgia Tech had 5,193 international students out of a student body of 19,541 (Georgia Tech Fact Book 2016). International students made up over 25 percent of all students at Georgia Tech. Another 24 percent consisted of students from out of state (Georgia Tech Fact Book 2016). To further illustrate the point that research-intensive universities like Georgia Tech are immune from declines in enrollment, during the same period, Georgia Tech had approximately 27,000 freshman applications and 15,000 graduate school applications, the large majority of which were denied (Georgia Tech Fact Book 2016). In contrast to doctoral research-intensive universities, which can regulate out-of-state and international student admissions based on a desire for the extra revenue from out-of-state tuition, few regional comprehensive or four-year baccalaureate institutions are that lucky. Nevertheless, many regional universities are beginning to invest in strategies to attract out-of-state and international students to fill vacant seats.

Figure 5: Tuition Rates at Select University System of Georgia Institutions



Source: System University Fact sheets.

According to the Open Doors report (IIE 2016), international students make up 5.2 percent of students across the United States, and almost 20 percent of that number attended the top 20 hosting institutions. In contrast, international students in the United Kingdom make up approximately 20 percent of the student body at higher education institutions (HESA 2017), nearly 15 percent higher than in US institutions. In Australia, international students make up nearly 25 percent of the student body in higher education (Australian Education Network n.d.). Both the United Kingdom and Australia have focused on increasing numbers and revenue from the international student market, while the United States has been content to watch our market share slip away.

In-state and out-of-state tuition rates vary across the University System of Georgia institutions. Figure 5 shows the tuition rates of a selected number of institutions, showing doctoral research-intensive institutions such as Georgia Tech and the University of Georgia, regional comprehensive institutions such as Valdosta State and Kennesaw State, and four-year baccalaureate institutions such as Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College, Georgia College and State University, and Middle Georgia University. The columns in blue represent the cost of in-state tuition at each college, and the columns in red represent the cost of out-of-state tuition at each university or college for the fall semester of 2016. Data were taken directly from the college/university admissions websites. As

highlighted in Figure 5, the rates for out-of-state tuition are roughly three to three and a half times more than the rates for in-state tuition.

From Figure 5, one can clearly see the difference in the in-state and out-of-state tuition charges. The supposition is that the real cost for educating a student at each of these schools is the cost of the out-of-state tuition charge. One could then also deduce that the cost differential between in-state and out-of-state tuition is met through the state appropriations process (a reflection of what state taxpayers contribute that out-of-state students must compensate for by paying much higher tuition rates). This differential assumes that state appropriations constitute the vast majority of higher education funding, but this has not been true for many years. In Georgia, state appropriations constitute a quarter to one-third of the budget for most public institutions, with the majority of funding now coming from sources such as student-paid tuition and fees, grants and contracts, and auxiliary services.

The Board of Regents has already acted to address declining enrollments at regional comprehensive and four-year baccalaureate institutions. One step they have taken is the consolidation of many of the universities in the system. Another step afforded to several institutions has been the ability to offer in-state tuition rates to the border states of Florida, Alabama, and South Carolina (Davis 2015). While these are positive steps in addressing declining enrollments, they will not completely solve the problem. International student recruitment may be the best avenue for helping to boost Georgia's declining enrollment problems. There are millions of students from around the globe who want an education in the United States, and more and more who can now afford to come. Georgia would be wise to consider investing in international recruitment before too many other states are competing for those students.

Data and Methods

For our exploratory analysis of the key predictors of international student enrollment, this study analyzes colleges and universities in the Southeast. The Open Doors report (IIE 2016) provides data on colleges and universities with more than 10 international students. From the Open Doors report, almost 200 colleges and universities (n = 195) are in the six southeastern states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The enrollment data are for the 2015–2016 academic year. The dependent variable in our study is the total number of international students enrolled divided by the total enrollment (undergraduate + graduate students) at the institution. We analyzed the percentage of international students as a reflection of how successful small, medium, and large institutions are at recruiting international students.

Four hypotheses guide our analysis:

H1: Doctoral research-intensive universities will have the highest percentage of international students.

H2: Private colleges and universities will have a higher percentage of international students in their student body than public institutions.

H3: More diverse institutions will have a higher percentage of international students.

H4: Higher tuition rates, especially out-of-state tuition rates, will depress the percentage of international students at colleges and universities.

Initially, we expect that institutions with a large research and doctoral portfolio will be most successful in recruiting international students. These prestigious institutions are attractive for international students around the globe. We also hypothesize that private colleges and universities will be most successful in attracting international students through scholarships or waivers of tuition and fees. Furthermore, a diverse student body should help to attract international students to a college or university. As discussed previously, high rates of tuition should serve as a disincentive for international students to attend, especially at nondoctoral universities.

The diversity of a college campus is measured through four independent variables: percentage white, percentage African American, percentage Latino, and percentage female. Institutional cost is measured as the reported tuition and fees for private institutions and the out-of-state tuition rate and fees for public colleges and universities. The institutional academic classification is based upon five categories from the Open Doors report (specialty, associate's, bachelor's, master's, and doctoral) which is modeled from the Carnegie academic classifications. The final independent variable is a dummy variable for public or private institutions.

Table 1 summarizes all the variables in this study. For the 195 colleges and universities in this study, the total number of international students ranges from 10 to 6,751 (University of Florida) with a mean of 532 and a standard deviation of a little more than 1,000. Total enrollment ranges from 550 to 62,953 with an average institutional enrollment of approximately 10,000 for the institutions of higher education in this study. The percentage of international students, the dependent variable, ranges from a low of 0.14 percent (Greenville Technical College in South Carolina) to a high of 39 percent (Florida International University) with a mean percentage of international students of 4.65 and a standard deviation

Table 1: Variables, Characteristics, and Sources

Variables	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation	Source
Total Enrollment of International Students	10	6,751	532.47	1053.87	Open Doors 2015–2016
Total Enrollment (undergraduate + graduate)	550	62,953	10,380.06	11861.31	IPEDS
Percentage International Students	0.14	38.79	4.65	5.59	Open Doors Report/ IPEDS
Percentage White	0	85	53.81	22.97	IPEDS
Percentage African American	1	96	23.32	22.13	IPEDS
Percentage Latino	0	86	8.69	11.87	IPEDS
Percentage Female	20	100	58.56	9.72	IPEDS
Total Tuition and Fees	4,810	49,241	22,561.09	9,857.24	IPEDS
Institutional Academic Classification	1	5	3.56	1.14	IPEDS
Public/Private	0	1	.56	.50	IPEDS

of 5.59. The average of 4.65 percent for the institutions in this sample is very close to the national mean of 5 percent for international student enrollment.

Percentage white ranges from 0 to 85 percent with a mean of 54 percent across the colleges and universities of this study. Percentage African American ranges from 1 to 96 percent with a mean of 23 percent, and percentage Latino ranges from 0 to 86 percent with a mean of almost 9 percent. Percentage female ranges from 20 to 100 percent with an average female student body of 58 percent across the 195 colleges and universities in this study. There are 45 doctoral institutions (23 percent of the sample), 69 master's institutions (35 percent of the sample), 40 bachelor's institutions (21 percent of the sample), 34 associate's institutions (17 percent of the sample), and 7 specialty institutions (4 percent of the sample). For the final independent variable in Table 1, the dummy variable

for public/private is coded 0 for private colleges and universities (44 percent of the sample) and 1 for public institutions (56 percent of the sample). All of the independent variables are derived from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS n.d.) of the National Center for Education Statistics to match the academic year of data from the Open Doors report.

Findings

Our data analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage examines the percentage of international students by institutional type. The second stage utilizes an OLS (ordinary least squares) regression analysis to predict the percentage of international students across the 195 institutions of higher education in this study.

Table 2 highlights the percentage of international students by institutional academic classification as well as public compared to private colleges and universities. Interestingly, the highest percentage of international students in the overall student body (more than 10 percent) is evident at specialty institutions. Keep in mind that only 7 institutions fall in this category, with the majority being colleges of art and design, which are attractive to international students. As we hypothesized, the doctoral research-intensive universities have a larger percentage of international students (7.84 percent) than associate's (1.39 percent), bachelor's (4.9 percent), and master's (3.46 percent) institutions. The differences between doctoral-associate's and doctoral-master's institutions are highly significant at $p < .01$, with doctoral-bachelor's statistically significant at $p < .05$ based upon a *t*-test. The difference between doctoral (7.84 percent) and specialty (10.21 percent) institutions is not statistically significant ($t = -.735$, $p = .484$). The difference between master's-associate's is highly significant at $p < .01$, while the differences between master's-bachelor's and master's-specialty are not significant. Furthermore, the difference between bachelor's-associate's is highly significant at $p < .01$, while the difference between bachelor's-specialty is not significant. The last possible combination for the difference of means test of associate's-specialty is significant at $p < .05$.

We further disaggregated the doctoral institutions by the three Carnegie classifications of research activity: moderate, higher, and highest. As we expected, those institutions with the *highest* research activity have the highest international student enrollment (11.38 percent). Doctoral institutions that fall into the higher research activity category have a smaller percentage of international students (7.41 percent). It is noteworthy that doctoral institutions with the *highest* research activity have an international student enrollment more than three times greater than moderate research activity institutions (11.38 vs. 3.71 percent). Most regional comprehensive universities fall in the category of moderate research activity, and their level of international student enrollment is

Table 2: Percentage International Student Enrollment by Institutional Type

Institutional Academic Classification	Percentage International Students	Difference of Means Test: *t*-test
Doctoral	7.84	Doctoral-Master's: 3.61** Doctoral-Bachelor's: 2.18* Doctoral-Associate's: 5.63** Doctoral-Specialty: −.735
Master's	3.46	Master's-Bachelor's: −1.61 Master's-Associate's: 3.72** Master's-Specialty: −2.20
Bachelor's	4.90	Bachelor's-Associate's: 4.38** Bachelor's-Specialty: −1.69
Associate's	1.40	Associate's-Specialty: −2.89*
Specialty	10.21	
Doctoral Carnegie Classification		
Highest Research Activity	11.38	Highest-Higher: 1.37
Higher Research Activity	7.41	Higher-Moderate: 1.51
Moderate Research Activity	3.71	Moderate-Highest: −4.18**
Public or Private		
Public	3.05	Public-Private: −4.39**
Private	6.67	

*p < .05
**p < .01

roughly on par with master's institutions and even below bachelor's institutions. As reported in Table 2, the difference between moderate and highest research activity doctoral institutions is highly significant with a *t*-test of −4.18 with a probability below .01, while the differences between highest-higher and higher-moderate research activity are not significant.

Table 2 also highlights the significantly higher level of international student enrollment at private colleges and universities when compared to public institutions of higher education. The average percentage of international students at the 86 private colleges and universities in this study is 6.67 percent, which is more than double the average of 3.05 percent at the 109 public institutions in the sample. The difference is statistically significant with a *t*-test of −4.39 ($p < .01$), which provides support for the second hypothesis of this study.

Table 3: OLS Regression Analysis of International Student Enrollment across Colleges and Universities in the Southeast

Independent Variables	Model 1 All Colleges and Universities	Model 2 Public Masters
Diversity of Institution		
Percentage White	−.261**	.397
Percentage Latino	.098	−.368*
Percentage Female	−.327**	.122
Institutional Cost		
Total Cost of Tuition + Fees	.493**	−.173
Institutional Type		
Public or Private	−.050	
Institutional Size	.070	.051
Total Enrollment (undergraduate + graduate)		
F Score	22.609**	1.476
Adjusted r^2	.401	.064

Notes: Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients.
*p < .05
**p < .01

The second stage of our study employs a multiple regression analysis to predict the percentage of international students. The first model in Table 3 includes all the colleges and universities in our sample (n = 195). Three independent variables capture the diversity of the student body at an institution: percentage white, percentage Latino, and percentage female. Percentage African American and percentage white cannot be included together because of multicollinearity (each variable has a VIF score above 10 when included together in a multivariate model). We find mixed evidence for the third hypothesis of this study. As the percentage white increases at an institution, the percentage of international students declines, and the relationship is statistically significant at $p < .01$. Percentage Latino is positively associated with the percentage of international students, but the regression coefficient is not statistically significant. Intriguingly, the percentage of female students is negatively associated with the percentage of international students, and the relationship is statistically

significant at $p < .01$. The standardized regression coefficient for percentage female (−.327) is the second largest in the model.

When examining institutional cost, total tuition + fees is a positive predictor of the percentage of international students, and it is the strongest variable in the first model of Table 3 with a standardized regression coefficient of .493, which is statistically significant at $p < .01$. The positive and powerful relationship likely captures the prestigious doctoral institutions, which are particularly effective in recruiting international students although they have especially high out-of-state tuition rates. The same likely holds true at private colleges, where the sticker shock of sky-high tuition rates is mitigated by waivers or scholarships for international students. The dummy variable for public vs. private is not statistically significant in the first model in Table 3 with controls for the diversity of the institution, institutional cost, and total enrollment. Total enrollment is not significant in the first model of Table 3. While the largest state institutions are successful in recruiting international students, there are many large two-year institutions in this study with relatively small percentages of international students. Model 1 in Table 3 is fairly robust, with the independent variables accounting for slightly more than 40 percent of the variance in the percentage of international students enrolled at colleges and universities in the Southeast.

The second model in Table 3 truncates the regression analysis to just public master's institutions. Obviously, out-of-state vs. in-state tuition rates are applicable only to public institutions of higher education. As discussed previously in this study, we expect out-of-state tuition rates to have the most noticeable negative impact on international student enrollment at nondoctoral universities such as those in the master's category. While the out-of-state tuition variable has a negative coefficient in the second model of Table 3, it fails to reach statistical significance. The only variable that attains statistical significance in the second model is percentage Latino. As the percentage Latino rises at public master's institutions, the percentage of international students declines. With only 35 cases, Model 2 is rather weak with the independent variables explaining only 6 percent of the variance in the percentage of international students and the *F* score failing to achieve statistical significance. When baccalaureate institutions are included in Model 2, the findings are essentially unchanged with the same adjusted r^2.

Discussion of Findings

Our data analysis produced some findings that were very much expected as well as several interesting results for colleges and universities in the Southeast. Not surprisingly, in relation to our first hypothesis, we find higher percentages of international students at research-intensive doctoral institutions (7.84

percent) when compared to master's (3.46 percent), bachelor's (4.90 percent), and associate's (1.39 percent) colleges and universities. Specialty institutions have the highest percentage (just above 10 percent) which is accounted for by several colleges of art and design in the very small subsample (n = 7) for these institutions. When disaggregating doctoral institutions, it is remarkable that the percentage of international students is three times greater at the highest research activity institutions when contrasted to moderate research activity schools (11.38 to 3.71 percent), which clearly confirms the first hypothesis of this study. Furthermore, we find the average percentage of international students at private institutions (6.67 percent) is more than double the rate at public institutions (3.05 percent) in support of the second hypothesis. Private colleges and universities have been particularly active in the recruitment strategies that we outline below, and these institutions often have the capacity to waive tuition or substantially discount those rates for international students they wish to recruit.

For our third hypothesis, we have mixed evidence that the diversity of institutions of higher education in the Southeast helps to attract international students. In support of the hypothesis, we find that as the percentage white increases in the student body, there is an accompanying decline in the percentage of international students, and the results are statistically significant. In contrast to the hypothesis, we find that as the percentage female increases across the almost 200 institutions in this study, there is a decline in the percentage of international students, with the relationship statistically significant. This may well be explained by STEM colleges and universities, especially in relation to engineering, which still have a majority-male student population and are also successful in recruiting international students.

In contrast to our final hypothesis, we actually find that the price tag of tuition and fees is a positive predictor of the percentage of international student in the multivariate regression analysis of all the institutions in our sample. The relationship is the strongest in the model and statistically significant. This likely captures the large public state institutions as well as private institutions, which are particularly effective recruiting international students despite the eye-popping price tag of their tuition. Some of the lowest tuition rates in our sample are for the two-year colleges, which have very small international student populations. When we truncate our sample to public master's institutions, out-of-state tuition rates are a negative predictor of the percentage of international students, but the relationship is not statistically significant. Our sample includes fewer than 40 public master's institutions, so a much larger sample across the country would provide for a better test of the hypothesis.

It is also critical to keep in mind that we employ an aggregate unit of analysis, rather than individuals, with data clustered by college or university. Individual survey data reveal the critical role of cost and the availability of

scholarships for international students who are contemplating study in the United States. For the institutions analyzed in our study, useful independent variables for future research would involve the number of out-of-state tuition waivers, the availability of scholarships, and the scope and activities of Centers for International Programs across institutions.

Policy Recommendations at the Campus Level

Most regional comprehensive universities and smaller institutions in Georgia have not considered international student recruitment options. We have observed that few if any of these universities in Georgia have made serious attempts to recruit international students. They have neither developed nor invested in a recruitment strategy targeted at international student populations.

Recognizing the financial, cultural, and educational benefits of enrolling international students is an important first step for a university interested in bringing international students to campus. With a focus on internationalization on campuses over the last decade, most colleges see the benefits and would love to have more international students enrolled in their programs. Most regional comprehensive and four-year baccalaureate institutions in Georgia are unfamiliar with international recruitment and unprepared to compete for international students. For regional comprehensive and four-year universities to see real increases in international enrollment, they would have to plan and organize international recruitment efforts just like they do for domestic students or student athletes. They would have to develop recruitment strategies and build brand names just like they have done regionally. Developing a marketing strategy for international recruitment should be the top priority.

Another way that universities have seen significant success with increasing international student numbers is through the use of educational recruitment agencies. These agencies hold recruitment fairs, visit high schools in their home countries, and generally represent foreign universities to students. Many of these agencies either charge a consultation fee to the student or a commission to the university for each student they send. Many universities in the United States have been opposed to using paid educational agents, but a growing number are using this important recruitment tool. It was estimated "that in 2007, only 4 percent of international students in the United States identified agents as having played a major role in their choice of college" (Jaschik 2014). In 2013 that figure was estimated at 28 percent (Jaschik 2014). Additionally, a 2012 survey compares the use of agents from seven countries. As expected, the United States ranked lowest for the use of agents in Table 4 (Jaschik 2014).

By 2016, the number of universities directly working with agents in some manner had grown to about 50 percent, according to a study by Bridge Education Group (2016). Their studies claim that 37 percent of US universities

indicated that they work directly with agencies (Bridge Education Group 2016). Whether or not universities are comfortable with working with agents, it is a reality

Table 4: Proportion of International Students Recruited with Agents

Country	Percentage
Australia	53%
Canada	41%
Malaysia	56%
Netherlands	20%
New Zealand	47%
United Kingdom	38%
United States	11%

Source: Jaschik (2014).

that working with educational agencies is one of the most effective ways to bring international students to our college campuses.

Policy Recommendations at the State Level

The decline in enrollment numbers across the Georgia system has to be addressed: we have to either reduce the number of faculty and administrators, raise tuition costs for current students, or find a way to attract students from out of state to fill these seats.

One recommendation would be that the Georgia Board of Regents research how various states structure out-of-state-tuition charges for international students. According to an article by University Language Services (2013), some states like Minnesota and North Dakota allow certain schools to waive out-of-state tuition entirely in order to boost enrollments. As noted earlier, the Board of Regents has already created a policy to offer in-state tuition at a number of colleges and universities in Georgia to residents of the bordering states. It would be prudent for the Board of Regents to consider offering these seats to qualified international students as well. It may help us avoid the first two options and mitigate the impact of lower enrollment numbers.

A second recommendation is that the Georgia Board of Regents consider developing a policy that addresses recommended recruitment strategies for schools across the state. The recommendation is that clear policies and procedures for working with agents be articulated. Working with agents may prove to be the most effective and cheapest way for Georgia to increase its market share of international students.

A third recommendation is that if Georgia is to keep the out-of-state tuition policy in place, the Board of Regents should review the actual cost of tuition for

a university education. The difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition rates could be calculated based upon actual state appropriations for higher education. The difference could be in-state tuition plus 25 to 33 percent of that tuition rate, which more accurately reflects state appropriations. Currently, out-of-state tuition is three to almost four times the cost of in-state tuition. The Board of Regents should consider lowering out-of-state tuition at regional comprehensive and four-year baccalaureate as well as two-year institutions to a number closer to the actual cost to attract additional international students.

The findings of this study dovetail with our policy recommendations. Private institutions as well as doctoral research-intensive universities are doing well in terms of recruiting international students, but regional comprehensive universities lag well behind as do bachelor's and master's institutions. The contributions of international students to the intellectual climate of our classrooms and institutions should not be confined to our largest and most prestigious doctoral institutions. While greater diversity in the student body of an institution can contribute to the level of international student enrollment, the policy recommendations in this study are offered with the hopes of assisting campuses, state legislatures, and system offices spread the wealth of international student recruitment and enrollments across all types of institutions.

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