

Race and Political Affiliation on Cultural Issues: How Have Different Races Within Political Parties Affected the Individual's Political Attitudes on Cultural Issues?

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*2022 GPSA Pajari Award for best undergraduate paper.

ABSTRACT

While questioning how the American people view the ongoing cultural issues that surround us today, considering how these political attitudes differ among the races within these parties, if any, is essential. As analyses have occurred on the history of cultural issues, the effects of race on political polarization, and how race impacts polarization, we must identify how different races within parties view these topics. This analysis can help scholars better understand if the views on cultural issues vary by the individual's race or, more so, their political ideologies would be identified through the individual's political affiliation. With liberals commonly specifying as Democrats and conservatives typically identifying themselves as Republicans, the races within these groups can be analyzed. The results utilizing data from the 2018 General Social Survey showed that, without a political party, whites were typically the minor progress toward the dependent variables representing potentially marginalized groups but would be the most progressive after they aligned themselves with the democratic party. This information excludes the data from how white respondents felt about homosexual relations. The results ultimately call to question the impact of ideology on white and non-white Americans and how this can completely change their views on race-related cultural issues.

Introduction

Following its creation, the United States political system has lied on the backs of the existing and forever-changing racial orders that have divided its people.¹ These orders have governed how political ideologies and parties have aligned, leaving a largely moderate United States population to align themselves with two major political parties as they exercised their right to vote. However, this right initially belonged to white men and later white women as we entered the 20th century. Despite the several decades that had passed after its ratification, the Constitutional right to vote was granted and protected for all in the mid-20th century through the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In an age where political polarization has divided the Democratic and Republican parties, millions of people have been left to form their own opinions on different cultural issues, ultimately creating more division. With these cultural issues heavily emphasizing race, many have considered how polarization has impacted ideologies on these topics.

While questioning how the American people view the ongoing cultural issues that surround us today, it is important to consider how these political attitudes differ among the races within these parties, if any. This leads to the question: How do different races within political parties affect the individual's attitudes on cultural issues? As analyses have occurred on the history of cultural issues, the effects of race on political polarization, and the extent to which race impacts polarization, we must identify how different races within parties view these topics. This can help scholars better understand if the views on cultural issues vary by the individual's race or if their political ideologies would be identified through their political affiliation. With liberals commonly identifying as Democrats and conservatives typically identifying themselves as Republicans, the races within these groups can be analyzed.

Previous Literature

Race and Politics

The increasing presence of political polarization has led many scholars and researchers to fail to find a consensus on the cause of these changing extensions of the opposition of ideas in politics. While many believe and theorize that economic or class differentiations have mostly been attributed to this, they fail to consider a major potential cause of modern political unrest. This potential cause is race and its relationship with the origins of the dominating political parties witnessed today within the United States. Throughout the early history of the United States, this country has been built upon racial orders that have ruled in favor

¹Appendix available from author.

of American whites over non-whites (Olson 2008; King and Smith 2008). Racial orders are defined as foundational structures of economic and political status for those designated as having political identities in each historical era (King and Smith 2008). Eras that begin with slavery, to the adoption of sharecropping, then the founding of Jim Crow laws, to desegregation, and to where we are today.

Some argue that these orders and the history of the United States, dating back to the 1850s, have created this culmination of political polarization (Davis 1999). Beginning during the times of slavery and segregation, the United States witnessed the beginning of orders that ruled in favor of white supremacy; this paved the way for a society that made those who were non-white, particularly blacks, inferior. Though triumphs were later made during the civil rights movements, obtaining rights for black people led to a newfound resentment within those favored by the racial orders. Resentment then fueled the divisions between the Republican and Democratic parties as the Democratic party can be deemed as more “race-conscious,” and the Republican party is deemed as the party that represented a “virtuous middle” that was ultimately less race-conscious (Olson 2008; King and Smith 2008). Cultural issues and policies began to be labeled as “liberal” or “conservative,” making the viewpoints on race be categorized into two parties during an era where the issues of race were highly contested and debated.

As voting rights were granted to all after adopting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano 2016), racial solidarity was documented as participation rates increased for about fifteen years. Black political participation increased immensely throughout this era as legislation mandated and incorporated blacks within political institutions (Pinderhughes 1988). However, since the 1980s, this participation has drastically declined for the once exceptionally politically active group. Since this discovery, scholars still need to provide a significant correlation between racial solidarity and political participation, which many have been startled by. Despite this, scholars note that solidarity towards social matters is often observed among the black community (Chong and Rogers 2005). As parties began to identify themselves with different cultural issues, as mentioned previously, black unity began to take form through both militant and nationalism. Members of civil rights activist groups such as the NAACP or student unions are referred to as “militants.” Black nationalists have been noted to be more engaged in encouraging political activity and awareness. With a modest impact on voting and a significant impact on participation in political activities (including boycotts, protests, etc.), solidarity is important to note when analyzing the behaviors within a race (Chong and Rogers, 2005). A more recent study has researched the aftermath of the Obama administration; scholars have been able to conclude that the impacts of these racial orders and their response to the United States’ first black President can be telling of the prevalence of the disputes between cultural and racial issues within the United States (McDermott and Belcher 2014).

Transforming Cultural Issues into “Culture Wars”

With the increased political polarization, scholars have noted a heavy presence of “culture wars”. This phenomenon is defined as sharp and increasing divisions within American polity, specifically divisions within stances on various cultural issues (Muste 2014). As cultural issues and perspectives on them align themselves with specific political parties, individuals align themselves with parties, and more division occurs. Despite this division, scholars have identified the extent to which there are patterns of different preferences within each of the political parties. Some conservatives, identifying as Republican, may uphold traditional values while others may uphold traditional values while following the more “liberal view” regarding social policy. As Americans identify themselves along a political spectrum, this identification only equates to an equal understanding of every policy presented to them (Feldman and Johnston 2014). This is seen specifically in how individuals approach economic versus social issues. This makes ideology “multidimensional” rather than heterogeneous. Political scientists and psychologists have also identified shared traits among those within the two major political parties. Considering these, this makes ideology complex and how it reacts to cultural issues.

While assessing this polarization, some scholars believe that the responses triggered by the changing opinions on cultural issues should be limited to one solution for this issue. This perspective believes that if political figures and elites limited themselves or their brand to one specific opinion or idea, voters would be more likely to follow the views and decisions of the politicians or influencers in power (Layman and Carsey 2002). This perspective also shares the idea that rather than race or social group being the deciding factor within the polarization on cultural issues being the cause, the real cause is politicians and their contributions towards divisive politics. Though more scholars consider race and social group characteristics than not, it is important to consider all proposed perspectives. These social group characteristics are age, race, class, and gender (Muste 2014; Shaw 1997). If individuals identify with a demographic characteristic, their status with that trait will ultimately lead them to their views on a specific cultural issue. By measuring the individual’s favorability of the different cultural issues, the researchers often used graphs to display the differences among the different social group characteristics. However, like the study that will be conducted, this study needs to focus on the exact differences between the social characteristics of political parties. Despite this, it provides a sound framework for the study conducted here, yet the social characteristics will be race and political affiliation.

Critical Review

Within the discussion of race and its impact on political polarization, an important critique is that as scholars propose race and its history as a catalyst for polarization, polarization itself has several causes; therefore, limiting it to one cause lacks merit. However, several scholars have called for recognizing race as one of many causes of our current polarization. It would be effective to see different studies identifying the extent to which race impacts the growing disparities within the political climate, as many today fail to see the existence of racial discrimination (Kim 2002). Many can identify an extent by acknowledging the racial order, its components, and its existence. Similarly, a critique only some of the sources discussed was that as the effects of the history of race impact the formation of political parties, it is important to note that while analyzing these origins, this does not limit every member who affiliates with those parties as being in favor or against the cultural issues that are much debated within the United States.

Scholars now acknowledge that polarization is a consequence of the history of race within America as it has developed into the nation we see today. When the absence of rights and the adoption of rights experienced by non-whites are considered, this has resulted in differences within the bipartisan system we rely on today within our elections. As these studies acknowledge the well-needed context to the issue of polarization, they do not consider the extent to which the polarization within their parties impacts specific races as this study will conduct.

Theory And Process

We all contain uncontrollable demographic characteristics that define us through age, gender, race, etc. As we study polarization between the major political parties within the United States, this study focuses on a main variable often not considered by researchers when addressing this topic: race. Studies have shown that race, while overlooked, greatly impacts the political systems we have today. This is due to this country's treatment of non-white people since its origins founded on a system of white supremacy. Trickle down to the mid-20th century, the divisions created by slavery, Jim Crow, segregation, and the opposition to integration caused the beliefs of the political parties to align and brand themselves as in favor of the newfound integration or opposed. Through the realignments, as one party became branded as in favor of "non-whites," this paved the way for the ideology's views on various cultural issues. The divisions between parties then led to the modern-day "culture wars" we see today as we assess people's attitudes toward various cultural issues. Through the noted existence of racial solidarity, we will analyze if races among different political parties have similar views on cultural issues despite their association with one of this country's two major political parties. If differences are noted, it is important to consider the effects of political parties and how the ideologies create more division and polarization.

Many studies have argued that polarization is far too complex for the cause to be narrowed down to one single variable. Many agree, but it is equally important to study and address causes that have yet to be as widely researched, discussed, or accepted. Though this study focuses on race as a cause for polarization, I accept the alternative theories that highly focus on social class differentiations with a focus on economics as the cause. All variables must be considered as we progress into a more divisive political atmosphere. Several studies have analyzed and specified the most prominent moments within the United States history that have created "racial orders" or a system that has favored whites over non-whites. Within this, the studies describe how this directly impacted major political parties and what it means to be "liberal" or "conservative" (Olson 2008; King and Smith 2008; Davis 1999). Studies like these are essential when analyzing how race plays a part in political polarization. Likewise, studies that analyze race theory and racial solidarity provide context to the behaviors of unity and nationalism among races. This translates into how races participate in politics (Chong and Rogers 2005). In this study, I will analyze how these major concepts tie together and create a catalyst for polarization.

Propositions

Cultural issues pertain to issues regarding the diversity and tolerance of issues pertaining to race, gender, sexuality, and more. Survey data allows for unbiased and reliable data with respondents randomly selected throughout the United States to test how races view these ideas. Any individual participating in the General Social Survey conducted in 2018 (GSS2018) was eligible to be documented in this study. This survey offers respondents questions that allow them to identify their race and the political party they most align with. These characteristics will be analyzed as we review their views on various cultural issues. In this study, the cultural issues will pertain to the tolerance of other religions, views on immigrants and immigration, aid to black Americans, and views on homosexuality and the LGBT+ community. This can help to identify the extent to which race impacts these decisions and how that relates to the political party the respondent most identifies with.

Data And Hypotheses

Data and Variables

As this study moves to analyze the differences between races' attitudes towards cultural issues within the two major political parties in the United States, the variable selection is important as I study the highly debated topic known as polarization. Using the General Social Survey conducted in 2018 (GSS2018), variables were collected to test the research question. This study requires two independent variables: race and party identification. Using the GSS2018 variables, "race" represents the race or ethnicity of the respondent, and "partyid" represents if the respondent thinks of themselves as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or whatever ranging from 0-6. With zero being "Strong Democrat" and 6 being "Strong Republican," the lower the score, the more Democrat the respondent identifies themselves with. Having race and party identification as our causes, tests will be conducted to identify the correlation between the two and their views on cultural issues.

Culture wars have often been used to describe the increasing divisions within American polity about the polarization of cultural issues. As this study identifies the attitudes on cultural issues, dependent variables were selected based on survey questions from the GSS2018 database that pertained to race, sexuality, and religion. The first dependent variable is "Muslims," representing the respondent's attitude towards Muslims. Ranking from 1-5, the lower the score, the more positive the attitude towards Muslims is, and the higher the score, the attitude is more negative towards Muslims. The next dependent variable is "letin1a," which represents whether the respondent believes the number of immigrants to America should increase or decrease. Ranking from 1-5, the lower the number, the respondent believes the number should increase, and the higher the number, the respondent believes the number should decrease. The next dependent variable within this study is "helpblk," representing if the respondent feels that the government has a special obligation to help improve the living standards of black people due to the history of discrimination towards this group. With these survey questions, respondents have the option of selecting "Should help," "Agree with both," and "No special treatment." The final dependent variable is "homosexual," which represents a respondent's views toward sexual relations between two adults of the same sex. On a scale from 1-4, respondents can choose "Always wrong" to "Not wrong at all."

The selection of these independent and dependent variables directly correlates to the research topic. By using the survey questions that identify the individual's race and political party identification, we can identify which races in which parties have certain views on various cultural issues. By selecting "Muslims," "letin1a," "help," and "homosexual" as the dependent variables, each question allows the respondent to give their opinion on a race, religion, or sexuality-based question. These questions all fall into the "cultural issues" category as they discuss topics that impact various minority groups within the United States. As the groups described in these questions have been disenfranchised by the racial orders created within the United States, they have become part of the phenomena known as culture wars. By identifying how races respond to these topics within their political parties, we can assess the correlation between race, political ideology, and attitudes toward cultural issues.

Measurement

All variables selected for this study have mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and relatively homogenous categories. The independent variables of the respondent's race (racecen1) and the respondent's party identification (partyid) are nominal as their measurement level. Race and political parties are non-numerical and cannot be ranked. This makes these variables the lowest level of measurement available as they consist of categories that can only be compared by considering how many cases fall under each one. The dependent variables "Muslims," "letin1a," "help," and "homosexual" are all ordinal variables. These variables have scores or categories assigned by the GSS2018 database, allowing them to be ranked from high to low. It is important to note that ordinal variables can be limited because the exact distance from one score or category to the next is unknown.

Hypotheses

The ideas have been applied to test the predicted outcome by analyzing and applying the theories within the previous studies conducted and discussed. We use the respondents' race and political ideology to assess their political attitudes towards various cultural issues. Each dependent variable that discusses attitudes towards Muslims, immigrants, and immigration, aiding black Americans and homosexuals pertains to a current marginalized and minority group within the United States. With racial orders being a prominent component of this research paper, it is important to analyze where these variables fall within that system. As the dependent variables are all a part of different marginalized and minority groups, each member within these communities falls into different parts of the racial order. Though it is a spectrum, these groups stray further from an order prioritizing white supremacy. Non-white voters may resonate with this due to the proven existence of racial solidarity, which often can lead to minorities supporting other minorities in their political activity. This leads us to the first hypothesis:

H1: Non-white voters within the Democratic and Republican parties have political values in favor of the presented cultural issues.

However, considering the effects and impacts of one’s political ideology and how that impacts decision-making regarding any policies, including cultural issues, is important. While assessing this, we must remember where the dominating political parties of Democrats and Republicans have fallen within the history of race orders, according to those theories presented. Along with this, and as previously mentioned, an individual’s set ideology is both complex and multidimensional (Feldman and Johnston 2014). It is impossible for all people who identify as "conservative" or Republican and people who identify as "liberal" or Democratic to believe the same things within their political parties. Knowing that there are differences, it is important to note the strength of an individual’s identification in the first place. Political scientists and psychologists have noted similar traits amongst those identifying with specific political ideologies. An example of a "robust" relationship is political conservatism, consciousness, and openness. Due to the potential of shared characteristics and theory presented regarding racial orders and where the parties have fallen on the spectrum regarding these orders, we believe that:

H2: Non-white voters within the Democratic party will rule more in favor of presented cultural issues than the non-white voters within the Republican party.

Through the existence of complex theories such as the United States’ racial orders, the existence of racial solidarity within political activity, and the complexity of political ideologies, these hypotheses hope to analyze the relationship between specifically race and cultural issues, and then race with the influence of political ideology and its impact on various cultural issues. With the selected independent and dependent variables, using the General Social Survey conducted in 2018 (GSS2018) will help identify these relationships.

Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

This study has an immense focus on race, specifically whites versus non-whites. Using the GSS2018 data, we can analyze the number of respondents who are white versus the respondents who are non-white. The use of a general frequency table can help to identify the demographic characteristics of the respondents. With 2348 respondents, 1693 were white, and 655 were non-white (with 385 respondents being black and 270 respondents being another race). The mean, median, and mode all fall within the respondent’s likelihood of being white. The frequency table displaying this data can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1. Respondent Race

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
WHITE	1693	72.1	72.1	72.1
BLACK	385	16.4	16.4	88.5
OTHER	270	11.5	11.5	100
Total	2348	100	100	

As previously stated, a major focus of this study is the political attitudes towards various cultural issues by race. The data can be visually displayed using bar graphs to assess the different races’ opinions towards the ordinal, dependent variables. The variables marked as “Muslims,” “letin1a,” “helpblk,” and “homosexual” are being used to measure the respondent’s political attitude towards that topic. In **Figure 1**, a bar graph depicts the relationship between race and the variable “Muslims.” **Figure 1** helps to depict the differences in racial support for the religious group of Muslims. This graph shows clear differences between the races who feel "very positive" towards this group and "very negative." The second bar graph depicted in **Figure 2** displays how the respondents feel about the number of immigrants within the United States. With most respondents feeling neither negative nor positive, there are clear differences between who feels more positive and who feels more negative. The third bar graph, **Figure 3**, depicts how the respondents feel about aid to black Americans by race. This scale ranges to whether the respondent feels there should be an aid, feels they should not get aid or feels towards both options on a scale. The fourth bar graph, **Figure 4**, depicts the respondents’ feelings towards homosexual sex relations. Once again, the respondents are separated by race, and their responses range on a scale. Finally, within **Figure 5**, the bar graph represents which races and where they identify themselves on a spectrum from Democrat to Republican. Here, we can see which races are Republican, Democrat, Independent, or between.

Bivariate Comparisons

An analysis of the measurements of associations between race and the various cultural issues can provide information on the strength of the relationship, the pattern and direction of the relationship, and a prediction of the value of the dependent variable.




Figure 1. Relationship between race and the variable “Muslims”




Figure 2. How the respondents feel about the number of immigrants within the United States




Figure 3. How the respondents feel about aid to black Americans, by race




Figure 4. Respondents' feelings towards homosexual sex relations




Figure 5. Party ID, by race

Namely, the variables being compared within the bivariate tables will be the independent variable of race and then “Muslims,” “letin1a,” “helpblk,” and “homosexual.” As race will be tested to cause the bivariate relationship and each dependent variable will be the believed outcomes of the bivariate relationship, we can begin a more thorough analysis of the relationship between the two ideas. By using bivariate tables to help better understand the relationship between the variables, the significance will tell us if the association exists, the strength will help to assess how strong the relationship is, and the pattern will tell the direction of the relationship. All these elements are crucial in conducting a thorough analysis of the variables. Within this study, the four bivariate tables and their Chi-Square tests will be labeled **Figures 7-14**, a table for each dependent variable.

The bivariate table in Figures 7-8 displays the relationship between "race" and the variable "Muslims." For a sample of 1124 respondents, there was a weak and significant relationship between race and the personal attitudes towards members of a religious group- Muslims (Chi-Square= 48.599, df= 8, Cramer’s V= .147, p < .05). Within the bivariate table, 9.3% of white respondents felt very positive towards the religious group of Muslims versus the 25.3% of black respondents and 17.8% of respondents with a different race (other). Likewise, the black respondents were more likely to feel somewhat positive (28.0%) than the white respondents (26.9%) and "other" respondents (23.3%). White respondents were more likely to feel somewhat negative towards the religion of Muslims (13.2%) versus black respondents (7.1%) and “other” respondents (10.9%). Non-white respondents, specifically black respondents, are more likely to feel positively towards Muslims in comparison to white respondents, with a significant relationship.

The bivariate table, labeled as **Figures 9-10**, depicts the relationship between "race" and the dependent variable "letin1a". This dependent variable measures how the respondent feels the number of immigrants should be today. For a sample of 1520 respondents, there was a significant and weak relationship between race and the attitudes toward the number of immigrants within the United States (Chi-Square= 52.432, df= 8, Cramer’s V= .131, p < .05). The bivariate table depicts that 5.7% of white respondents believe that the number of immigrants should be increased a lot versus 11.0% of black respondents and 13.5% of "other" respondents. Most respondents felt that the number of immigrants should remain the same. 18.0% of white respondents felt that the number of immigrants should be reduced, more than 12.2% of black respondents, and 5.1% of "other" respondents.

The bivariate table, labeled **Figures 11-12**, depicts the relationship between "race" and the dependent variable labeled "helpblk". This dependent variable measures the respondent’s feelings about government aid toward black Americans. For a sample of 1493 respondents, there was a weak and significant relationship between race and the political attitudes towards government aid for black Americans (Chi-Square= 172.356, df= 8, Cramer’s V= .240, p < .05). This table depicts that 10.0% of white respondents feel that the government should provide aid for black Americans versus 35.5% of black respondents and

23.8% of "other" respondents. This is compared to the 24.9% of white respondents who feel that black Americans should receive no special treatment versus 5.7% of black and 16.1% of "other" respondents. About 32.0% of white respondents, 37.1% of black respondents, and 41.7% of "other" respondents agree with both the aid and no special treatment towards black respondents. Though a weak relationship, the relationship between race and the "help" variable is the strongest of the 4 dependent variables being tested within this study.

The bivariate table labeled **Figures 13-14** depicts the relationship between "race" and the dependent variable "homosexual." This dependent variable measures the respondents' attitudes towards homosexual sex relations. For a sample of 1495 respondents, there was a significant and weak relationship between race and the attitudes towards homosexual sex relationships (Chi-Square= 47.622, df= 6, Cramer's V= .126, $p < .05$). The table shows that 51.3% of black respondents feel homosexual sex relations are always wrong versus 29.8% of white respondents and 31.5% of "other" respondents. 60.8% of white respondents feel that homosexual sex relations are not wrong, versus 38.2% of black respondents and 55.2% of "other" respondents. This suggests a stronger need within the black respondents to feel that homosexual sex relations are wrong compared to the attitudes of white and "other" respondents.

Controlled Comparisons

To further the analysis within this study, it is imperative to assess the partial correlation between one variable (X) and variable (Y) to see how the relationship holds across categories or levels of a third variable (Z). As we have emphasized the importance of political ideology and the polarization of ideology, here is where we incorporate that variable within our studies on race. Using our independent variable (race) and the dependent variables ("Muslim", "letin1a", "helpblk", and "homosexual"), we will see the effects of the control variable "party". This will help to conduct a more thorough analysis of the variables for this study. The results were found in tables labeled **Figures 15-26**, and differences between the direct and partial relationships were reported.

For a sample of 1106 respondents, there was a weak and significant relationship between race and personal attitudes towards a specific religious group- Muslims, with the control variable being "strong democrat" as the respondent's political party affiliation (Chi-Square= 19.429, df= 8, Cramer's V= .230, $p < .05$). 36.1% of voters who identified themselves as "strong Democrats" and were white felt "somewhat positive" about "Muslims" versus 25.7% of black respondents and 25% of "other" respondents. As the party identification variables were introduced, more white respondents favored this "Muslim" category than the direct relationship that did not include party identification. For respondents that identify themselves as "Not strong democrat," there was a weak and not significant relationship between race and views towards "Muslims" with the added control of party identification (Chi-Square= 12.721, df= 8, Cramer's V= .189, $p > .05$). About 29.2% of "other" respondents reported that they were very positive versus 18.6% of black respondents and 7.2% of white respondents. This contrasts the direct relationship as the direct relationship shows that black respondents felt the most positive, with "other" respondents being the second most "very positive" and white respondents being the least "very positive." Along with this, 34.2% of white respondents reported that they are "somewhat positive" towards "Muslims" versus 32.6% of black respondents and 20.8% of "other" respondents. Though the difference is subtle, the direct relationship displayed black respondents being the most "somewhat positive" compared to white respondents. For the option of "neither positive nor negative," the partial relationship displays 41.4% of white respondents in favor of this option, contrasting the direct relationship, which stated that "other" respondents were more likely to feel "neither positive nor negative." For voters identifying themselves as "independent near democrat," there was a weak and not significant relationship between race and attitudes towards "Muslims" with the added control of party identification (Chi-Square= 7.312, df= 8, Cramer's V= .162, $p > .05$). 32.3% of white respondents reported being somewhat positive towards "Muslims" versus 26.9% of black respondents and 15.0% of "other" respondents. This subtle difference makes white respondents more likely to be somewhat positive towards "Muslims" versus black respondents, who are the most likely to be "somewhat positive" within the direct relationship. Respondents who felt "somewhat negative" were 20.0% "other" versus 8.6% of white respondents and 7.7% of black respondents. White respondents were most likely to feel "somewhat negative" within the direct relationship. For independent voters, there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 7.033, df= 8, Cramer's V= .130, $p > .05$) as black respondents were most likely to feel "very positive" towards "Muslim" with 17.4%, like the direct relationship. However, white respondents were least likely to feel very positive within the direct relationship. In the partial relationship, the "other" respondents were the least likely to feel very positive towards "Muslims" with 2.5%. For "somewhat positive," 17.4% of the responses were white respondents versus 21.7% of the black respondents and 25.0% of "other" respondents. In the direct relationship, "other" respondents were the least likely to feel "somewhat positive," and in the partial relationship, white respondents were the least likely to feel "somewhat positive". 8.7% of black respondents reported that they feel "somewhat negative" about "Muslims" versus 7.5% of "other" respondents and 6.9% of white respondents. This contrasts the direct relationship as the direct relationship depicted white respondents as most likely to feel "somewhat negative". The partial relationship and direct relationship were identical for respondents who identified themselves as "independent near Republican" with a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 5.127, df= 8, Cramer's

$V = .146, p > .05$). For respondents who identified themselves as "not strong Republican," there was a weak and not significant relationship as 7.9% of white respondents felt "very positive" about "Muslims" versus 0.0% of black respondents and 16.7% of "other" respondents (Chi-Square= 5.465, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .143, p > .05$). This differs from the direct relationship as black respondents were most likely to feel "very positive". Within the partial relationship, "other" respondents were more likely to feel "somewhat positive" at 33.3% versus white respondents at 24.6%. For the partial relationships between the variable "race" and the variable "Muslims" with the control of "partyid", full results can be seen in **Figures 15-17**.

For a sample of 1498 respondents, there was a weak and significant relationship between race and personal attitudes towards the number of immigrants within the United States, with the control variable being "strong democrat" within party identification (Chi-Square= 24.751, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .226, p < .05$). About 15.3% of white respondents believed the number of immigrants should "increase a lot" versus 5.6% of "other" respondents. This slightly contrasts the direct relationship as the partial relationship now depicts white respondents as the second most likely to feel that the amount should "increase a lot," whereas "other" respondents were the second most likely within the direct relationship. 55.6% of "other" respondents believe the amount should "remain the same as it is" versus 47.3% of black and 36.6% of white respondents. The direct relationship displayed that black voters were most likely to believe the amount should "remain the same as it is." White respondents were least likely to believe the amount should be "reduced a little" in the partial relationship versus the direct relationship. 14.0% of black respondents reported that the number of immigrants should be "reduced a lot" versus 4.6% of white respondents and 0.0% of "other respondents." This is different from the direct relationship which stated that white respondents were most likely to believe that the number of immigrants should be "reduced a lot". For respondents who identify themselves as "not strong democrat," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 4.248, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .095, p > .05$). "Other" respondents were least likely to believe that the number of immigrants should be "increased a little" within the partial relationship versus the black respondents being least likely within the direct relationship. 48.3% of "other" respondents believe the number of immigrants should "remain the same as it is" versus 46.8% of black and 44.4% of white respondents. Within the direct relationship, black respondents were most likely to feel the amount should "remain the same as it is." The partial relationship depicts that "other" respondents were the least likely to feel that the amount should be "reduced a little." In contrast, the direct relationship depicts black respondents as being least likely. 11.3% of white and black respondents believed the number of immigrants should be "reduced a lot" versus 6.9% of "other" respondents. The direct relationship depicts that white respondents were most likely to feel that the number of immigrants should be greatly reduced. For respondents who identify themselves as "independent near democrat," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 7.064, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .137, p > .05$). Black respondents were the second most likely to be in favor of the number of immigrants being "increased a little." In contrast, the direct relationship displays them as being least in favor. "Other" respondents were the least likely to favor the number of immigrants being "remain the same as it is" in the partial relationship. However, they were the second likely to favor this within the direct relationship. The partial relationship shows that "other" respondents are most likely to be in favor of the number of immigrants being "reduced a little" and that black respondents are most likely to be in favor of "reduced a lot." In contrast, the direct relationship shows white respondents being most in favor. For respondents who identify themselves as independent, there was a weak and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 24.786, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .212, p < .05$). About 13.9% of black respondents believed that the number of immigrants should be "reduced a lot" versus 12.4% of white respondents and 1.9% of "other" respondents. The direct relationship contrasts this as white respondents were most in favor of "reduced a lot." For respondents who identify themselves as "independent, near Republican," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 9.517, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .168, p > .05$). White respondents were most in favor of the number of immigrants being "increased a lot" and "increased a little," contrasting the direct relationship. "Other" respondents were the least likely to believe that the number of immigrants should be "reduced a little" or "reduced a lot" in the partial relationship. In contrast, the direct relationship shows black respondents being least in favor of these. For respondents identifying themselves as "not strong Republican," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 4.405, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .110, p > .05$). White respondents were seen to be least in favor of "increased a lot" within the direct relationships but were most in favor of this within the partial relationship. Black respondents were least likely to favor "increased a little" within the direct relationship but most in favor of the partial relationship. The partial relationship depicts that "other" respondents were second most likely to favor "reducing" the number of immigrants. However, in the direct relationship, they were the least likely to favor this. **Figures 18-20** depict the full results for the partial relationship between the variable "race" and the variable "letin1a" with the added control variable of "partyid".

For a sample of 1479 respondents, there was a weak and significant relationship between race and personal attitudes towards government aids for black Americans with "strong democrat" as the control within the party identification variable (Chi-Square= 15.914, $df = 8$, Cramer's $V = .181, p < .05$). About 30.2% of black respondents "agree with both" versus 29.3% of white respondents and 27.8% of "other" respondents. This contrasts the direct relationship as it depicted the "other" respondents most in favor of this. In the partial relationship 11.1% of "other" respondents believe there should be "no special treatment" which differs from the direct relationship where "other" respondents were second most likely to feel this way, not the most

likely. For respondents who identify as "not strong democrat", there was a weak and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 31.142, df= 8, Cramer's V= .265, $p < .05$). About 31.5% of black respondents reported that they "agree with both", making them the least likely within the partial correlation, differing from the direct relationship where they were second most likely to feel this way. For respondents who identified themselves as "independent, near democrat," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 14.355, df= 8, Cramer's V= .188, $p > .05$). The partial relationship reports that black respondents were most likely to "agree with both," contrasting the direct relationship which stated that "other" respondents were most in favor of this. "Other" respondents were also most likely to believe that there should be "no special treatment," contrasting the direct relationship, which states that white respondents favor this most. For respondents identifying as "independent," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 12.828, df= 8, Cramer's V= .163, $p > .05$). Results did not contrast the direct relationship results. For respondents identifying themselves as "independent, near Republican," there was a weak and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 26.660, df= 8, Cramer's V= .281, $p < .05$). About 58.3% of black respondents "agree with both" versus 55.6% of "other" respondents and 28.8% of white respondents. This is different from the direct relationship as it stated that "other" respondents would favor this most. For respondents who identify themselves as "not strong Republican," there was a weak and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 19.005, df= 8, Cramer's V= .234, $p < .05$). About 42.9% of black respondents "agree with both" versus 35.7% of "other" respondents and 33.6% of white respondents. The direct relationship states that "other" respondents favor this most. For respondents who identify themselves as "strong Republican," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 13.935, df= 8, Cramer's V= .199, $p > .05$). About 40.0% of black respondents "agree with both" versus 20.0% of "other" respondents and 20.5% of white respondents. Once again, the direct relationship states that "other" respondents are most in favor of this. **Figures 21-23** display the full results for the partial relationship between the variable "race" and the variable "helpblk" with the added control of "partyid."

For a sample of 1477 respondents, there was a moderate and significant relationship between race and personal attitudes towards homosexual sex relations with strong democrat as the control within the party identification variable (Chi-Square= 62.878, df= 6, Cramer's V= .351, $p < .05$). About 4.6% of black respondents feel that homosexual sex relations are "sometimes wrong" versus 6.7% of white respondents and 11.1% of "other respondents." This contrasts the direct relationship as it stated that white respondents were least likely to believe this. For respondents identifying themselves as "not strong democrat," there was a weak and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 29.777, df= 6, Cramer's V= .257, $p < .05$). About 0.0% of "other" respondents believe that homosexual sex relations are "almost always wrong" versus 2.2% of white respondents and 3.8% of black respondents. This is different from the direct relationship as it stated that "other" respondents were most likely to favor this. 10.8% of white respondents believe homosexual sex relations are "sometimes wrong" versus 5.9% of "other" respondents and 3.8% of black respondents. The partial relationship states that white respondents are most likely to believe this, whereas the direct relationship states that white respondents are least likely to believe this. For respondents who identify themselves as "independent, near democrat," there was a moderate and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 36.514, df= 6, Cramer's V= .300, $p < .05$). About 5.9% of white respondents believe homosexual sex relations are "sometimes wrong" versus 5.4% of black respondents and 3.2% of "other" respondents. The direct relationship is different from this as it shows white respondents being least in favor of this. For respondents who identify themselves as "independent," there was a weak and significant relationship (Chi-Square= 14.151, df= 6, Cramer's V= .170, $p < .05$). About 0.0% of "other" respondents believe that homosexual sex relations are "almost always wrong" versus 2.7% of black respondents and 4.2% of respondents. The direct relationship contrasts this as "other" respondents were most in favor of this. For respondents who identify themselves as "independent, near Republican," there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 5.287, df= 6, Cramer's V= .126, $p > .05$). About 34.8% of white respondents believe that homosexual sex relations are "always wrong" versus 33.3% of "other" respondents and 20.0% of black respondents. While the partial relationship depicts the white respondents as most likely to believe this, the direct relationship depicts white respondents as least likely. The partial relationship displays that black respondents are least likely to believe homosexual sex relations are "almost always wrong." In contrast, the direct relationship displays black respondents as second most likely to believe this. While the partial relationship states that "other" respondents are least likely to believe "sometimes wrong," the direct relationship depicts them as most likely to believe this. As the partial relationship depicts black respondents to believe that homosexual sex relations are "not wrong at all," the direct relationship depicts them as least likely to believe this. For respondents who identify themselves as "not strong Republican", there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 3.406, df= 6, Cramer's V= .099, $p > .05$). About 16.7% of black respondents believe that homosexual sex relations are "almost always wrong" versus 5.0% of white respondents and 0.0% of "other" respondents. The direct relationship contradicts this as black respondents were the second most likely, not most likely. Next, black respondents were least likely to favor homosexual sex relations being "sometimes wrong," but in the direct relationship, they were second most in favor of this. For respondents who identify themselves as "strong Republican", there was a weak and not significant relationship (Chi-Square= 2.858, df= 6, Cramer's V= .095, $p > .05$). About 60.7% of white respondents believe homosexual sex relations are "always wrong" versus 50.0% of "other" respondents and 0.0% of black respondents. This differs immensely from the direct relationship, which states that white respondents are least in favor of this, and black respondents are most in

favor of this. Here, the partial relationship states that white respondents favor homosexual sex relations being "almost always wrong" and "sometimes wrong" when the direct relationship states that they are least likely to believe this. Finally, the partial relationship shows black respondents as most favoring homosexual sex relations being "not wrong at all." In contrast, the direct relationship depicts them as least likely to favor this. **Figures 24-26** depict the full results for the partial relationships between "race" and the variable "homosexual" with the added control variable of "partyid."

Conclusion

This study analyzed the relationships between race, political ideology, and various cultural issues to answer the question, "How have different races within political parties affected the individual's political attitudes on cultural issues?". With the help of previous studies that detailed the complexities of race within polarization and the impact of polarization on cultural issues, the ideas were combined through bivariate comparisons that analyzed the direct relationship between race and cultural issues and controlled comparisons that analyzed the partial relationship between race and cultural issues with party identification as the controlled variable. The findings are likewise complex as polarization is heavily debated due to its complexity.

For the direct relationships, there was a weak and significant relationship between race and each of the four dependent variables ("Muslims," "letin1a", "helpblk," and "homosexual"). The variable "Muslims" with trends that displayed black respondents as the "most positive" towards this group and white respondents being the most likely to feel negative towards this group and the least likely to feel positive towards this group. For the variable "letin1a", most respondents gravitated towards the "remain the same as is" option, regarding the number of immigrants within the United States. White respondents were the most likely to select "reduced a lot" and were the least likely to select "increased a lot." The non-white respondents were more in favor of increasing the number of immigrants within the United States. For the variable "helpblk", most respondents chose "agree with both" regarding black aid. Black respondents were the most likely to favor aid for black Americans, whereas white respondents were the most likely to select "no special treatment." For the variable "homosexual", white respondents were the most likely to support homosexual sex relations versus black respondents who were the least likely to be in favor of this variable.

For the partial relationships, adding the control variable "partyid" affected the relationship between race and the various dependent variables in several ways. As the differences were discussed previously, there are some similarities between the trends within the partial relationship and the direct relationship. For the variable "Muslims," only respondents who identified as "strong democrat" and "not strong democrat" showed a weak and significant relationship. For the variable "letin1a", there was a weak and significant relationship for the relationships for respondents who identified as "strong democrat." For the remaining variables, there were more similarities between the relationships for "helpblk" and "homosexual". For the variable "helpblk," the respondents who identified as "strong democrat," "not strong democrat," "independent, Republican," and "not strong democrat" all had weak and significant relationships, like the direct relationship between race and the "helpblk" variable. For the variable "homosexual," respondents who identified as "independent, democrat," and "strong democrat" all had moderate and significant relationships. Those identifying as "independent" and "not strong democrat" displayed a weak and significant variable for the "homosexual" variable. Once again, this was like a direct relationship.

Based on these findings, both hypotheses within this study were partially supported and partially denied. Since the hypotheses specifically referred to the behaviors of races that identify themselves as "Democrat" or "Republican," to see if these hypotheses were supported, I will be only referring to the partial relationship results for respondents identifying as "strong Democrat" "not strong democrat," "not strong Republican," and "strong Republican." This is because the respondents confidently identified and aligned themselves with one of the major two political parties within the United States, which this study focuses on. For hypothesis #1, the variable "Muslims" supported the hypothesis except for respondents within the "strong Republican" category. For the "letin1a" variable, the hypothesis was only halfway supported with "strong democrat" and "not strong Republican" categories contradicting the theory. The "help" variable completely supported the hypothesis, whereas the "homosexual" variable completely contradicted the theory. With hypothesis #2 also being partially supported and partially declined, this hypothesis was more supported than hypothesis #1. The variable "Muslims" and "helpblk" completely supported this hypothesis. For the "letin1a" variable, all categories supported this hypothesis except for the "strong Republican" category. Though the "homosexual" variable also supported this hypothesis, black respondents were more inclined to be against this variable.

Implications for Theory

After researching previous studies, implementing descriptive statistics, and analyzing the bivariate and controlled comparison results, the data allowed me to note the flaws within my theory and what I learned. When the control variable of party identification was added to the relationships, this severely impacted the data received from the white respondents. This led to the parts of the first hypothesis that were denied. Likewise, the addition of party identification seemed to have made white respondents feel more progressive towards the cultural issues than without the control variable and just compared race and

the respondents' views on the cultural issues. This is seen within the white respondents who identified themselves as "strong Democrats" and "not strong Democrats." Once the respondents could identify themselves as such, they were more inclined to feel more positively towards the "Muslim" variable and favor increasing the number of immigrants within the "letin1a" variable. Without party identification, white respondents were more inclined to feel negatively towards Muslims and feel that the number of immigrants should be decreased. For both hypotheses, it was interesting to note how black respondents were the least likely to support homosexual sex relations when I theorized that non-whites would be more in favor of the cultural issues regardless of whether the issue focused on race, religion, or sexuality.

News Issues or Questions

New questions raised following the completion of this study are noting the importance of the relationship between white Americans and ideology, specifically the democratic party. The results showed that white respondents were typically the least progressive towards the dependent variables representing potentially marginalized groups without a political party but would be the most progressive after they aligned themselves with the democratic party. This excludes the data from how white respondents felt about homosexual relations. The results ultimately call to question the impact of ideology on white Americans and how this can completely change their views on race-related cultural issues. It was also theorized that non-white respondents would favor the presented cultural issues due to the present racial orders and the theory's impact on our behaviors. However, the results showed that the black and often the "other" respondents would be the least likely to support this cultural issue. For future studies, it would be important to analyze how minorities respond to cultural issues, only leaning towards race-based issues rather than sexuality. Regarding racial solidarity, it would be imperative that studies study the extent to which races only display solidarity towards their race and how the history of race relations within the United States has impacted that.

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