Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE

Georgia Political Science Association

VOLUME XI 2024

Questions in Politics Editorial Team

About the Georgia Political Science Association

Georgia Political Science Association

Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

Questions in Politics is the official journal publication of the GPSA.

Visit the GPSA website for more information visit www.gpsa-online.org.

Articles are typeset using Overleaf's *Scientific Reports* template.

Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GEORGIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
VOL. XI

Contents

Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GEORGIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

VOL. XI

Preface

It is with great pride that we present Questions in Politics, Volume XI, as the official peer-reviewed publication of the Georgia Political Science Association. This year's collection of papers reflects the continuing tradition of diverse and rigorous scholarship that the GPSA fosters. The 2023 GPSA annual meeting in **St. Simmons Island** was a vibrant gathering, bringing together scholars who presented cutting-edge research across various fields of political science. The breadth and depth of the topics covered in this volume are a testament to the dynamic nature of political inquiry within our community.

About the Issue

Volume XI contains four peer-reviewed papers that highlight pressing and innovative discussions in contemporary political science. This year's selection, while smaller in number compared to previous years, is notable for the high quality of research and the timeliness of the topics addressed. The organization of the issue reflects both the thematic coherence of the selected papers and their individual contributions to the broader discourse in political science.

The first article, "Strength in Numbers? Political Disadvantage and Coalition Formation in Public Law Cases," by Ted D. Rossier, examines how politically disadvantaged groups leverage coalition-building to succeed in public law litigation. The study explores the theory of political disadvantage, which posits that groups representing marginalized constituencies—such as racial minorities, women, and the poor—often turn to the courts as a primary venue for policy change due to their lack of influence in traditional political arenas. Rossier uses qualitative and quantitative methods, including case studies of organizations like the National Center for Law and Economic Justice (NCLEJ) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), to demonstrate how these groups form coalitions to pool resources and enhance their litigation strength. The findings suggest that coalition formation is a critical strategy for disadvantaged groups, allowing them to overcome resource limitations and increase their chances of success in the courts. This article won the McBrayer Award for the best paper presented at the 2023 GPSA Annual Meeting.

Following this, the article "Fear and Loathing in American Politics: The Trump Candidacies and Affective Polarization" by Joseph Gershtenson explores the rise of affective polarization in American politics, particularly during Donald Trump's presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. The study uses data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) to trace the increasing divergence in sentiments toward presidential candidates and political parties from 1968 to 2020. Gershtenson finds that polarization has become more intense, with negative feelings toward the opposing party growing faster than positive feelings toward one's own party. The research highlights that while polarization was already on the rise, Trump's divisive rhetoric and presidency have significantly exacerbated it, leading to the highest levels of affective polarization in recent history. The study emphasizes the importance of understanding these dynamics, as continued polarization poses significant challenges to political discourse and governance in the United States.

The third article, "Black Market Politics: The Importance of Parallel Governance" by Jerry Mark Silverman explores the concept of parallel governance, where non-state actors assume governance functions typically expected from formal governments, especially in contexts where official governments are ineffective. Silverman argues that in many low- and middle-income countries, informal organizations often provide essential services and governance, especially among impoverished communities. These parallel systems arise when formal governance is either absent or insufficient, and they play a crucial role in poverty alleviation by being more accountable and attuned to local needs than formal government bodies. The article emphasizes the need for formal governments to recognize and collaborate with these parallel governance structures to create

effective poverty reduction strategies. By leveraging the strengths of both formal and informal sectors, Silverman suggests that more sustainable and inclusive governance can be achieved, particularly in regions where traditional state governance fails to meet the needs of the population.

The article "Gender Gap in Social Welfare Policy Attitudes" by Vivian Cassaniti examines gender differences in public opinion on social welfare and related policies in the United States. Using data from the 2021 General Social Survey, Cassaniti explores how men and women diverge in support for national spending on welfare, childcare, defense, and crime reduction. The study confirms that women generally support social welfare spending, aligning with the "compassion issues" theory, while men favor increased spending on defense and crime policies. However, the findings also reveal unexpected patterns, such as men's higher support for childcare spending, challenging traditional gender role assumptions. The study highlights the complexity of gendered political attitudes, influenced not only by gender but also by political ideology, race, class, and other demographic factors, offering a nuanced understanding of the gender gap in American politics. This article won the 2023 GPSA Pajari Award for best undergraduate paper.

Each paper advances scholarly understanding in its respective field and offers practical implications for addressing some of society's most critical issues. We are confident that readers will find the discussions within this volume enlightening and thought-provoking, and we look forward to the continued dialogue these papers will inspire in the academic community and beyond.

Thanks to the Reviewers

As always, we are deeply indebted to the reviewers for Volume XI. We received an excellent slate of papers for this volume, which required us to find an outstanding slate of reviewers. In addition to the editors, each article received peer reviews from scholars whose expertise could speak to the quality and significance of the submitted manuscript. Our reviewers' expertise and suggested edits and revisions increased the quality of the work you see in this journal. Being a journal reviewer is often a thankless task, and—while it may not be much—we want to extend our heartiest "thank you" to our reviewers.

The reviewers and their affiliation for Volume XI of *Questions in Politics* are as follows:

Toby Bolsen
Georgia State University

Jeff DeWitt
Kennesaw State University

Judd Thornton
Georgia State University

Jeffrey M. Glas
University of Georgia

Mike Evans
Georgia State University

Brian Webb
Averett University

Brian Smith
Georgia Southwestern State University

For those who present at the 2024 GPSA meeting, please consider submitting your work to *QiP.* To find more information about submitting to *QiP*, please consult the GPSA website. The deadline for submissions for Volume XI is December 31, 2023.

Sean Richey & Ben Taylor

Questions in Politics
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GEORGIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
VOL. XI

Strength in Numbers? Political Disadvantage and Coalition Formation in Public Law Cases

Ted D. Rossier[1]

[1]University of North Georgia
[*]ted.rossier@ung.edu ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1433-6862
[*]McBrayer Award for the best paper presented at the 2023 GPSA Annual Meeting.

ABSTRACT

Political Disadvantage has long been one of the traditional theoretical foundations for studying interest group success in public law cases. It proposes that interest groups use the courts more often to advance their agenda if they primarily represent certain underserved constituencies. These may include racial and religious minorities, women, the poor, and other similarly situated groups. The theory holds that because lobbying and campaign contributions are less effective for these constituencies, they tend to turn toward the courts, and in so doing, are better able to obtain their preferred policy outcomes.
It is therefore incumbent upon researchers to identify the probable mechanism for such success. In this paper I suggest one possibility: that if politically disadvantaged interest groups enjoy greater success in court, it is because of the coalitions they form which act as a signaling device to the justice system in their favor. I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods to explore this question, and conclude that coalitions indeed play a critical role.

Many of our most important landmark court decisions have resulted from interest group litigation, and sometimes resorting to the legal system is the only avenue of redress in the face of a recalcitrant legislature and a disinterested public. These "public interest lawsuits" rarely occur in a political vacuum. History shows that they are invariably part of a larger public and elite awareness campaign waged as much through personal relationships as through the media. Yet, the mechanisms of interest group activism in the courts receive relatively little attention from scholars. The theoretical foundations remain somewhat underdeveloped, though one, in particular, gained traction in the 1960s: the theory of political disadvantage, which stands for the proposition that interest groups use the courts more often to advance their agendas if they primarily represent certain constituencies. These normally include racial and religious minorities, women, the poor, and other similarly situated groups (Epstein 1993; Olson 1990). The theory holds that because lobbying and campaign contributions are less effective for these constituencies, they tend to turn toward the courts. This is because they see the courts as more receptive to furthering their policy objectives (Caldeira and Wright 1990; Galanter 1974). A more extreme version of this theory argues that the courts are the only forum where disadvantaged groups may achieve their goals, and that the courts exist primarily to "level the playing field" in relation to the political branches of government (Cortner 1968).

However, this political disadvantage is not necessarily limited to strategic decisions related to the form or forum of advocacy. The limitations that disadvantaged groups face may arise at any stage of the group's existence–from formation to resource gathering to the initial struggle to achieve that first policy success to finally gaining widespread recognition and "a seat at the table." A notable alternative to the "disadvantage-as-constituency" concept was argued by Galanter (1974), whose taxonomy of "one-shotters" and "repeat players" provided an interesting twist on the usual classification of litigants as either rights-conscious or gain-conscious (the former said to be more likely to favor public law litigation). Galanter defines an "advantaged" group as a repeat player with significant resources to play the long game and incrementally seek to change the legal rules of decision. This definition stands in contrast to the traditional political disadvantage perspective of "haves" as those parties opposed to distributive justice or rights-oriented change.

There are many paths on the road to recognition as a political force for advocacy, yet it remains the case that success often comes first through a landmark court case. The history of public interest law is strewn with the detritus of businesses and governments who were bested in court by "the little guy." But as romantic as Man Against Giant Corporation stories sometimes seem, it is rare that an individual goes it alone and ultimately prevails. Much more often, the winner is a group of "little guys," a citizens or community group formed around a common concern or a localized organization sponsored by a national network and able to tap into specialized legal expertise and media relations. For every Erin Brockovich or Robert Bilott, there are dozens of Parents Involved in Community Schools and Citizens Climate Lobbies, and it is the latter that are often able to attract the necessary attention to accomplish their goals. Coalition formation has been a major vehicle that has allowed small businesses, citizens groups, and "discrete and insular minorities" to have some hope of overcoming the presumption of validity that state laws and local ordinances have enjoyed in the courts (Ackerman 1984; Gilman 2004; Hessick 2009). In point of fact, Cortner

(1968) suggested the importance of coalitions in his seminal article on political disadvantage theory. It is, therefore, incumbent upon interest group scholars to study when and how groups go about the business of forming combinations, either for the purpose of litigating specific policy issues or to set up a united front to put pressure on lawmakers.

To demonstrate this phenomenon, I provide brief histories of two interest groups nationally recognized in their fields of endeavor that exhibit strikingly similar historical trajectories. The National Center for Law and Economic Justice (NCLEJ) was founded in 1965 to "advance the cause of economic justice for low-income families, individuals, and communities across the country."[1] Five years later, the Natural Resources Defense Council(NRDC) was founded with the stated mission to "safeguard the earth—its people, its plants and animals, and the natural systems on which all life depends."[2]

The development of both groups is very well documented from both primary and secondary sources, and there is a wealth of information upon which to draw for our purposes here. Both groups emerged from movement-oriented teams of lawyers who desired to put their litigation skills to good use for the betterment of society and the improvement of public policy, without much consideration for their own personal remuneration. Even though they engage with different policy areas, and one represents "people" and the other "the environ- ment," their respective paths to policy success followed a similar track. Each began with the desire of a few individuals to create public awareness of a previously ignored or unpopular policy issue. In essence, each faced its own particular political disadvantage. Moreover, at key points in the development and expansion of the group's influence, coalition formation provided the necessary resources and momentum to move the group forward to greater heights.

Case Study: NCLEJ

The NCLEJ has been at the forefront of poverty law in the United States since the 1960s. What began as a small law office in New York City representing the poor in welfare rights cases soon expanded to a nationwide network of legal aid societies. At the same time, the group began to add other related policy areas to its portfolio, such as safe and fair housing, Medicaid and social security benefits, and the like. At its heart, the NCLEJ remained a public interest law firm, but the vicissitudes of time and political fortune required the staff to take a broader view of their organization's ability to influence welfare reform. The increase in political power that they sought was eventually achieved through combinations with other poverty-related interest groups, and by way of direct action to affect legislative outcomes.

Founding and purpose of the organization, initial court cases

The organization began operations in 1965 when Edward V. Sparer, a young New York lawyer, became interested in representing low-income and indigent clients. He founded the Center on Social Welfare Policy at Columbia University as one of the first "legal aid societies" and began to develop a network of community law offices that provided legal services to the poor. Inspired by the way in which groups such as the NAACP and ACLU had become successful in promoting civil rights through litigation, Sparer became convinced that high-profile "welfare rights" cases could change the legal landscape and give the poor a political and Constitutional voice (Diller and Davis 1995). In a very real sense, the organization originated from the ideas that underlie political disadvantage theory.

The initial goal of the Center's test case litigation was to secure a Constitutional "right to live." In other words, the organization had high hopes that the Supreme Court would recognize that the Constitution required the federal and state governments to ensure that all citizens had access to the essential necessities of life (Diller and Davis 1995). Such a ruling would have the effect of elevating the alleviation of poverty to the level of other positive rights, such as the right to vote. The Center's first major success of this nature was King v. Smith.[3]

The King case involved a challenge to Alabama's rules for the distribution of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Under its "substitute father" provision, the state's regulations declared that single mothers who cohabitated with able-bodied men thereby forfeited their children's eligibility for benefits. The Court determined that the Alabama rule conflicted with federal regulations that defined who a father was and that the state's rule was, therefore, void. In deciding the case on federalism grounds, the Court did not reach the issue of equal protection under the 14th Amendment. Nevertheless, this was a victory for the Center and acted as the foundational case upon which it began to build its national policy efforts (Denvir 1976).[4]

Coalition building quickly emerged as the primary strategy during this early period. The Center partnered with the now-defunct National Welfare Rights Organization, a group whose members were primarily welfare recipients and their advocates. The NWRO was not a litigation outfit, however. Instead, it achieved its goals mainly through lobbying, fostering relationships with the executive branch, and protests and demonstrations. The Center's role was to act as the legal arm of the NWRO and it filed a number of lawsuits on behalf of the organization's members. The Center also joined the Organization of Legal

[1] https://nclej.org/our-mission-and-values; last accessed 7/27/2020.
[2] https://www.nrdc.org/about; last accessed 7/27/2020.
[3] 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
[4] https://nclej.org/history; last accessed 6/19/2021.

Services Back-Up Centers, an umbrella group comprised of legal aid and poverty lawyers that received federal funding for their operations.[5]

Recognition and National Advocacy

During the early 1970s, the Center continued its national welfare activism training efforts, including publishing a number of legal manuals. It also continued the test case strategy under new leadership after Sparer moved on to an academic career, collecting a number of favorable rulings related to Medicaid and food stamp benefits.[6] The nobility of the Center's cause was evident, but the movement was not without its detractors, particularly when it came to securing federal support. From its inception, the Center and its progeny had relied heavily upon funds made available through various Great Society and War on Poverty programs begun during the Johnson administration (Phinney 2017). President Nixon and Governor (later President) Ronald Reagan of California were two of the most vocal opponents of such funding and actively worked to reduce or eliminate it.

In the 1980s, the Center began to expand its advocacy and outreach operations beyond the traditional arenas of Congress and the courts. It published a number of books and other documents about welfare benefits and recipients in general, and began to engage in policy research on a national level. Many of their papers and studies were presented to the National Academy of Sciences, and they began to hold meetings and conferences with not only attorneys, but also recipient communities and other advocacy organizations. This shift reflected the emerging social movement "think tank" model where activism partnerships are formed between a wide array of different types of groups. Coalition-based successes in court also continued to occur; one of the most prominent was National Senior Citizens Law Center et al. v. Legal Services Corporation,[7] in which the plaintiffs were able to secure an injunction that prevented the LSC from greatly restricting the use of their federal funds for certain types of activities.

A broader focus and expanded influence

The precarious nature of funding for social welfare initiatives finally reached a tipping point in 1995 when, following the Republican revolution, Congress severely limited appropriations for the LSC and enacted new provisions of the law that prevented LSC-funded lawyers from acting as class action counsel in welfare benefits cases. Of course, this dealt a severe blow to the Center's operations. Their response to this development was to shift to exclusively private funding in 1995. In so doing, the Center was able to double its budget and expand many of its programs.[8]

The Center continued its mix of state and federal lobbying and litigation into the 21st Century, with major successes counted both in court and particularly with state and local governmental benefits agencies. In 2006, the organization changed its name to the National Center for Law and Economic Justice to reflect its continued evolution into new areas of law and activism. Today, the group is at the forefront of policy change in such diverse areas as disability law, immigration, and workers' rights, and it continues to support and partner with grassroots community organizations. The tale of the Center is one of increasing variety with regard to its approaches to activism, with coalition formation seen as a continuing necessity.

Case Study: NRDC

As with the NCLEJ, the NRDC first emerged as a public interest law firm with very few resources and limited staff but with a high concept. A small group of young attorneys, guided by a common goal of clean air and water, sought to use their legal training to forge new paths through the courts that they hoped would complement the work of the newly- formed federal Environmental Protection Agency. But, as is often the case, the political reality was more complicated than the vision. The story is one of ups and downs, of progress and setbacks, and what ultimately emerged turned out to be a larger and more comprehensive organization that only sometimes followed one single model of activism.

Origin of the organization and success in court

Like the NCLEJ, the NRDC began as a member of the nascent community of public interest law firms that were forming in the late 1960s. Founded by a group of like-minded lawyers with similar backgrounds and mentored by an established firm that performed pro bono work on pollution torts, the fledgling organization amounted to little more than a collection of individuals with an idea: that environmental litigation could drive policy change. The young staff felt that they could (also like the NCLEJ) emulate the success of civil rights groups and their use of the court system to further their agenda (Adams et al. 2010, 18). The impending enactment of legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970 provided the means: citizen lawsuits.

[5] Interview with Henry Freedman, transcribed at the National Equal Justice Library, Georgetown Uni- versity, NEJL-009 (2013).
[6] See *USDA v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 523 (1973) and *USDA v. Murry*, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
[7] 7751 F.2d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
[8] Interview with Henry Freedman, transcribed at the National Equal Justice Library, Georgetown Uni- versity, NEJL-009 (2013).

These bills, and others that followed in the same vein, were some of the first that contained a method of enforcement known as the "private attorney general." That is, the law either explicitly or implicitly (as recognized by judicial ruling) authorized ordinary citizens, or groups of them, to sue to enforce provisions of an act against another private party or against the agency responsible for implementing it in the case of malfeasance (Timbers and Wirth 1984). Combined with direct judicial review of agency actions as provided by the federal Administrative Procedures Act,[9] public interest lawyers have increasingly been given access to an arsenal of powerful weapons to affect and shape policy to their preferred ends.

No sooner had they embarked upon their crusade against power companies, pollution, and toxic waste than the staff of the NRDC quickly realized one particular salient fact: litigation, especially of the environmental type, is expensive (Adams et al. 2010, 18). Cases in this arena often take years to resolve through trial and various appeals, and the opposing parties are generally unwilling to compromise or settle because of the nature of the case and the costs associated with an adverse outcome. Settlements of environmental cases, even if they allow the project to go forward, rarely result in decreased expenditures for the defendant. And, while a public entity might be able to absorb such a loss through increased taxation (or deficit spending where authorized), the long time horizon associated with energy-related public works or infrastructure projects means that any stoppage or delay could render construction or operation impractical. Therefore, it is often more beneficial and less expensive for environmental defendants to continue to fight in court to wrestle some advantage out of the eventual outcome, whatever that may ultimately be.

The focus on group resources thus entered the conversation early on at the NRDC. It became a central factor in formulating activism plans, and in terms of the decision-making process for litigation strategy, it became an essential consideration. A cadre of wealthy donors and growing membership (which provided both funding and visibility) led to the organization's first series of lawsuits related to the Clean Air Act, against the Tennessee Valley Authority (Adams et al. 2010, 47). The effort to force the TVA to clean up sulfur dioxide emissions from its power plants in the South had the dual effect of showcasing the power of private attorneys general and giving the relatively young Environmental Protection Agency some ammunition to bolster its separate enforcement actions.

Changing focus

While the decade of the 1970s produced numerous court victories for the NRDC, the staff realized that with the beginning of the Reagan administration, they would soon be entering a new era where lawsuits might not be the most effective tool to further their efforts. Until this point, the group had been operating alongside a (usually) friendly federal agency. The organization even characterized itself as a shadow EPA (Adams et al. 2010, 129), both assisting the agency when it had need and keeping it in line when enforcement seemed to lag. But, in the 1980s, all of that changed and the NRDC was forced to consider other alternatives. Landmark cases that could shape national environmental policy were becoming more difficult to find. It was this turn of events that began to shape the organization into a full-fledged interest group, with litigation as but one of many avenues of redress, along with lobbying and grassroots mobilization. The NRDC became a pioneer in negotiated rulemaking and as it began to lobby the executive branch and Congress, it often partnered with the very oil producers and energy companies that it fought as an adversary in court.[10] There also existed in the minds of the NRDC leadership a distinct sense that, to achieve their long-term goals, they needed to move beyond the public interest law firm model and begin to focus more on Congress itself. The effectiveness of bureaucratic lobbying had begun to wane, so they determined that the next best step was to descend upon the halls of the Capitol. The organization began a concerted effort to take its case for Congressional oversight directly to the committees responsible. At about the same time, financial resource problems led the NRDC to the realization that it could no longer act alone. Even though the group had occasionally operated through coalitions in the past (Adams et al. 2010, 135), the time had come to formalize such relationships to create a unified front in the fight for environmental justice before Congress. The result was the Group of Ten, a combination including the NRDC along with the Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, and the National Audubon Society among others. Coordination between these groups allowed them to share resources at at time when a number of them were in danger of failing financially because of protracted litigation against a recalcitrant federal government.

Recent scholarship suggests that interest groups, particularly those that are part of the environmental justice movement, tend to form coalitions that play to the strengths of and make up for the weaknesses of the other members. There is strong evidence that the division of labor and assignment of roles is important to the coalition dynamic, and the activities of the Group of Ten reflect this reasoning (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2018). In the litigation context, this phenomenon may manifest itself in, for example, assigning one or more groups as primary parties of interest, where the remainder contribute to supporting roles such as amicus curiae. The Group of Ten has also historically engaged in this type of multi-party litigation (Whitford 2003).

[9] 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1946)

[10] This pattern of behavior comports with the theory of Phinney (2017).

Expansion of advocacy: the 1990s and beyond

The next major change in the operation of the NRDC came shortly after the Republican Revolution of 1994. The initial joy of the election of Bill Clinton and his staunch environmentalist vice president, Al Gore, quickly gave way to consternation as it became evident that there was little political will to carry through with the new administration's sustainability initiative. Environmental groups, in general, were concerned about the lack of concrete policy achievements as well as the ramifications of the so-called "Contract with America." The Republican majority led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich promised to roll back taxes and regulations across the board, and the EPA was one of its prime targets.[11]

The NRDC leadership soon realized that a united front was the only way forward. During the years leading up to the 1994 election, a significant amount of resource competition existed among individual environmental groups. A certain amount of poaching of donors and supporters was occurring between entities, both small and large, and even the loose voluntary coalitions that had formed were too disorganized to send strong enough messages to government officials (Adams et al. 2010, 208). The Group of Ten had grown to a membership of 27 disparate environmental advocacy organizations, had been renamed the Green Group, and its constituent entities were often at odds with one another. For its part, the NRDC understood the need for formalized coordination of the coalition's efforts. They opened a joint office in Washington and hired staff specifically to communicate with the Clinton administration with one voice. The NRDC thus followed a path very similar to the NCLEJ.

Discussion

The foregoing histories are instructive on a number of levels. Both groups began their work with a similar objective: using the courts as the primary vehicle for a societal movement. Both believed that the "civil rights model" could be adapted to other policy imperatives and that, in so doing, they could force governmental institutions to address their preferred issues while at the same time raising public consciousness. And, more importantly, both groups realized that funding would be a major point in their decision-making process, sometimes being the determining factor as to what could be done, and when. Of particular interest to the topic at hand, both groups also discovered early on that coalition building would hold the key to influential growth. In fact, the two groups forged a coalition together in 2013 to commence the case of Baez v. NYC Housing Authority. [12] This was a lawsuit brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, to force the Authority to abate mold and other moisture problems in New York City's public housing projects. The partnership between the two groups, along with several others, was instrumental in achieving an initial victory as well as subsequent remedies that became necessary when the Authority reneged on its compliance with the court's orders. At every stage, the coalition appeared in the aggregate with a singular motivation to remind the court of the City's obligation to its more vulnerable residents.

These case studies are illustrative of the methods that many politically disadvantaged groups use to build political power. As noted, each experienced a similar path of activism. As they grew in influence, the two groups acted strategically in comparable ways. As it turns out, their choices were as much a result of the vicissitudes of limited financial and human resources, as they were of a lack of political power. It is abundantly clear that disadvantaged groups need coalitions, at least in the majority of cases. But are they always able to obtain them when desired? The answer to this question demands a focus on the available data that can be derived from court cases. The foregoing examples provide assistance in identifying and reinforcing the variables of interest needed for quantitative analysis. Having set the table, so to speak, we now proceed in that direction.

Explaining coalition formation in public litigation

Some scholars have found that judges may take into account the number of individuals or groups associated with one side or the other of a case. This is particularly true of plaintiffs, especially in product liability or environmental cases (Hassler and O'Connor 1986). Class actions are an extension of this concept. The old adage "where there's smoke, there's fire" is certainly true in personal injury litigation, and a plethora of plaintiffs is usually a signal to the court that it needs to look very closely at the details of the claims and defenses. Oneperson may file a frivolous case, but rarely will a group of individuals subject themselves to possible prosecution for perjury or abuse of process by filing baseless claims together.

Public law cases are no exception to this general rule, and courts researchers have in fact discovered particularized effects of this nature with regard to litigation coalitions in certain circumstances. For example, Goelzhauser and Vouvalis (2015) argue that large coalitions made up of diverse interests present a more credible front when they take similar positions before the court. If that is the case, then politically disadvantaged interest groups should desire to benefit from these arrangements as well. By theoretically possessing less litigation power, they would be in greater need of credibility. Indeed, history provides a number of famous or landmark examples where disadvantaged parties sought out larger, more diverse coalitions and were successful in doing so (see above and Cortner [1968]). When pooling resources through coalition formation, the main advantage to be gained is litigation strength. Litigation strength as wielded by the parties on either side of a public law case is a function of

[11] Bernard, M. and NRDC. 1995. Breach of faith: how the Contract's fine print undermines America's environmental success. NRDC published white paper.
[12] Class action settlement available at 13 Civ. 8916 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.).

two main factors: first, the resources supplied either by one organization or a coalition; and second, the repeat-player status of one or more of the parties. For example, Collins (2004, 2007) studied the effects of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court and discovered that not only do they provide information to the Court, but they also influence the Court's ideological decision-making. The effects tend to increase for either the appellant or respondent as the number of amicus briefs on that side increases. Stated differently, the larger the amicus coalition, the more litigation strength that side possesses.

With specific regard to the federal Courts of Appeals, Songer and Sheehan (1992) found a small but noticeable success advantage for "upperdogs" vs "underdogs," their terms for high and low-resource litigants respectively. A later study by Songer et al. (1999) confirmed that litigation resources (measured by party type) and repeat-player status were important predictors of successful outcomes. However, the authors' classification of parties to a case was limited to individuals, businesses, or government entities. They did not study interest groups as litigants, and in fact, their statistical analysis did not contain a category for them.

Two questions arise: Do these results translate to interest group litigation, particularly in the Courts of Appeals? If so, do groups with lower resources seek out coalitions to boost their litigation strength?

Hypotheses

It is possible for both the constituency type and resource level aspects of each group to affect the size of a coalition formed for the purposes of influencing the court. I therefore test two hypotheses here; the first is related to political disadvantage theory, and the second specifically addresses resource allocation. The availability and size of a coalition may or may not manifest before the initiation of a lawsuit. Below, I describe the variable specifications and expected outcomes for each hypothesis.

- H1: The size of a litigation coalition is larger for groups that represent disadvantaged constituencies than for those that do not.

This first hypothesis tests PDT as it relates to coalition size. According to the theory, groups that represent disadvantaged constituencies choose the courts as their preferred route of policy change because they obtain better outcomes and greater victories. If larger coalitions lead to greater litigation strength, then it stands to reason that disadvantaged groups should form larger coalitions more often, if only out of necessity. Likewise, disadvantaged groups should seek coalitions where possible in order to express to the court the breadth of the problem their lawsuit is designed to address. If coalition formation is based upon constituency, then the resulting litigation strength is either influential before the court or communicative to the court. Stated differently, it either impresses the court with the amount of public support for the coalition or with the salience of the coalition's case, or it provides information to the court regarding the effect of any ruling on the coalition's combined constituency.

If the indicator variable for constituency type shows a positive relationship, this result would support the hypothesis. On the other hand, if there is no significant difference between coalition size for disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged groups, then this hypothesis is not supported.

- H2: Litigation coalition size increases as litigation resources per coalition member decreases.

I anticipate an inverse relationship between coalition size and resource level. If the purpose of a coalition is to pool resources to gain litigation strength, then groups with lower levels of their own should desire to act in concert with larger combinations more often than more prominent organizations.

It should be noted that the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Both hypotheses can be supported or confirmed. If (as is commonly assumed) disadvantaged groups generally have access to fewer resources, then we might observe significance in both indicator variables.

Data and methods

I use two primary data sources to test the above hypotheses. The first is the Court of Appeals database for the years 1997-2002, hosted at the University of South Carolina (and maintained by Susan Haire of the University of Georgia). The second is the dataset created by Schlozman et al. (2013). It contains data for approximately 40,000 interest groups with variables related to lobbying expenditures, hiring internal and external lobbyists, testimony before Congress, and other related items. To complete the dataset, I used Westlaw to search the records of the Court of Appeals cases to determine which interest groups acted as parties or amicus, whether the outcome was favorable to those groups, and the size of any coalitions. I then merged the two datasets to arrive at a composite that can be used for analysis. The total sample or N size is 323.

For all models, the unit of analysis is the "organization/case." Each observation in the final combined dataset represents a single interest group party to a single case. If the case involved a sponsored plaintiff, where the organization's primary role was legal counsel, the observation contains information on the organization(s) only. For cases with coalitions, there is one

observation for each party. In these instances, the case information is the same for each, but the interest group information is specific to that group. All of the independent and control variables in each of the models represent group characteristics and are not influenced in any way by the case parameters.

The dataset exhibits a type of long format panel structure in that it associates individual interest groups with cases by year. Because of the clustering of observations within cases, the case information is repeated a number of times whenever there is a coalition. Estimates of some basic models may therefore be biased and unreliable. To account for this possibility, I employ mixed effects models. The group-level variables of interest are treated as fixed effects, while the case-level effects are allowed to vary randomly. This type of multilevel approach both fits the data structure and minimizes error.

I made certain modifications to the combined dataset because of the types of variables used in the models. Specifically, I excluded certain classes of cases for which the underlying analysis might be less meaningful at best or, at worst, misleading. I removed all labor cases from the data because specific federal law often dictates the parties and timing of litigation in such matters, as well as the available remedies. Labor-management disputes generally must be decided first by an administrative or arbitration proceeding, and only then may the parties proceed to federal court. Unions themselves are of a different character than other kinds of organizational parties. They are at once both a trade association and a common interest group, and they are limited in their ability to litigate by several factors outside of their control. As a result, several confounding variables render labor cases ill-suited to the study I am engaged in. [13]

For similar reasons, I chose to leave out criminal cases. The parties to a criminal case are always the government (sometimes characterized as "the people") and an individual. When interest groups become involved in criminal proceedings, it is almost always as an amicus curiae. The group may provide counsel for one or more defendants and financial and political support, but they are prohibited from becoming a party in interest. For this reason, including criminal cases would create an unwanted disparity in the data, overbalancing it toward amicus participants and potentially affecting the results.

Conducting a statistical analysis using the Court of Appeals database entails a few considerations and caveats. Perhaps most importantly, the dataset itself does not contain every case filed in the intermediate federal courts during the stated time period. Nor does it even contain every published decision. The dataset includes a sample of the decisions by "circuit-year"; that is, the collectors of the data randomly selected 30 cases per year from each appellate circuit. Each year in the dataset thus contains 360 cases. Because of this sampling method, and because the number and type of cases heard each year varies by circuit, it is possible that the data may produce biased results if the individual cases are not weighted based upon the court from which they originated. This assumes that one desires a truly random sample.

However, this issue is of minimal relevance to the analysis contained herein. The nature and structure of the variables I use require the selection of a subset of cases from the larger dataset that meet certain criteria, namely, that an interest group must either be a party or amicus participant and that cases involving certain legal matters (for instance, criminal cases) are excluded. For this reason, I do not (and, in fact, cannot) use a random sample. The dataset used for analysis can best be described as a convenience sample where true randomization is neither necessary nor desirable. That said, I did not select the cases for inclusion based on any other set of criteria that might bias the results of this study. Every case in the Court of Appeals database from 1997-2002 that meets the variable requirements is included in the dataset for this project.

Some discussion of the time differences of the two datasets is appropriate here. The Schlozman-Verba-Brady set contains data from a number of single "snapshot" years: 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, and 2011. I use the data for the year 2001 for two reasons. First, because it is contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals data. Second, because it contains the most complete information on group resources of any of the years included in the dataset. The Court of Appeals data cover a larger time frame than the S-V-B set. However, it is highly unlikely that any given interest group would so drastically change its advocacy strategy during a 5-year period that the reliability and validity of the data would be negatively affected. In fact, the difference in the Court of Appeals data is an advantage. Federal court cases regularly take a number of years to reach the appellate stage, therefore a single year "snapshot" would be very likely to leave out much of the ongoing litigation taking place during the relevant time period.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables. Where the coding rules reference the court opinion, the information was derived from Westlaw searches I conducted. I reviewed the published opinion for each case and coded each observation accordingly. Where the reference is to group-reported or publicly available information, I coded these based on internet searches and each group's official website, if they had one.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable for both hypotheses is coalition size, measured by the number of associated interest group parties aligned with one side of the litigation or with each side if there are interest groups on both sides of the case. Because this dependent variable represents a count, it is necessary to choose an appropriate generalized linear model that accounts for the

[13] This is, however, a good subject for a future project.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Type	Mean	S.D.	Data Source
Coalition size	Count	5.71	5.96	Num. IG parties
Resources	Ordinal	1.10	1.07	Group reported
Scope	Ordinal	1.50	0.70	Group reported
Disadvantaged	Binary	0.30	0.46	Group reported
Amicus	Binary	0.68	0.47	Court opinion
Group type	Categorical	1.34	0.70	Public info

a - see text for measurement details

distribution. An initial statistical test indicated overdispersion, which means that a standard Poisson regression is inadvisable. Therefore, I instead employ a negative binomial model.[14]

The frequency distribution of the dependent variable is shown in Figure 1. The data represented in the graph are the combined organization/cases for the years 1997-2002.



Figure 1: Distribution of dependent variable

Each case-level coalition is represented by each interest group that made up the coalition. Because each observation in the dataset represents an individual interest group within an individual case, unusually large coalitions may create artifacts in the graph, such as the single case with a 24-party coalition on the right-hand side. I performed influential data diagnostics to ensure that the model results were not biased and did not observe anything of concern.

Independent variables

The primary explanatory variable for H1 is disadvantaged constituency, which is a binary variable coded '1' if the interest group's membership or policy preferences are directed toward politically disadvantaged or historically marginalized persons, '0' otherwise. Disadvantaged is defined as any group that represents any of the following, based upon self-identification: the

[14]Even though it is impossible for coalition size to be zero, the standard negative binomial should be sufficient. While technically in this case it may be more appropriate to use the zero-truncated variety, because the mean of the count is not at or near 1, the two models should produce the same results.

poor or persons of low socioeconomic status; racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities; the mentally or physically disabled; children; victims of violent crime; and currently or formerly incarcerated or institutionalized persons. If significant in a positive direction, this would indicate that disadvantaged groups tend to form larger litigation coalitions.

For H2, the main variable of interest is resources. This is an ordinal measure of the overall amount of money available to each group, as reflected by reported annual revenue. This information is derived from tax filings or IRS documentation for the most recent year available, which were retrieved through Pro Publica, Cause IQ, Guidestar, or Open990. Because not all interest groups file the same tax forms or report revenue in the same way, I chose to employ a relative as opposed to an absolute resource scale. The categories are coded by dollar amount as 0 = under $1 million or not available, 1 = 1 - 9.9 million, 2 = 10 **50 million, and 3 = over 50 million. These categories and cut points were chosen because they represented natural breaks in the data, where the cell counts for each category were reasonably close to each other.**

Control variables

I include three control variables related to the nature of each group. Group type is an unordered categorical indicator based upon the typology proffered by Salisbury (1984), who argued that "institutional" interest groups should be treated differently from those that relied on membership dues and the provision of benefits, and whose membership is open to the general public. Salisbury defined institutional groups as those whose membership is restricted in some way to a certain trade or profession (trade associations), or those that lack any club-style membership and operate only as charitable, political, or educational organizations. Public interest law firms would also fall into this latter category. I therefore coded each observation according to the type of group involved in the litigation, as follows:

- Common or traditional membership is open to the public (it can be geared toward a specific constituency), and membership includes more than simply donating and basic information; there must be some tangible benefit attached. Governance participation (voting rights, etc.) is counted as tangible benefits.
- Institutional but not a trade, professional, industry, or local government association, engages in policy activism as a charitable or educational organization, membership is not open to the public (i.e., membership must be vetted or is limited to "insiders", such as an "exclusive club"), or "membership" means regular donations only with no additional benefits; includes public interest law firms.
- Trade association; membership only open to businesses or to individuals in a certain profession, trade, or sector of the economy or local government (county, school board, etc.)

Scope is an ordinal measure of the breadth of the group's influence: local or unknown, state/regional, or national. These categories are based either on the geographic location of the organization's membership, or (for groups without a defined membership) the general extent of the organization's primary activism. To qualify as a national organization, a group must either have membership, chapters, or locations in multiple states across the country and must be involved in activism to change federal policy. A state or regional group confines itself to one or more connected states and does not generally engage in lobbying the national Congress. Local groups are those that exist in relation to a municipality or defined area within a state. A significant relationship for any of these categories would not necessarily constitute cause to discard one or more hypotheses. However, it may mean that other factors may need to be investigated to obtain a more complete picture.

Finally, amicus is a binary variable coded '1' if the interest group(s) involved in the case filed an amicus curiae brief, '0' if the group was a real party in interest. Because group decision-making and coalition dynamics may be (and usually are) markedly different when an organization is a party to the case as opposed to a friend of the court (Caldeira and Wright 1990), I considered subsetting out the amicus parties from the real parties in interest and treating the two subsets with separate models. As it turned out, doing so reduced some of the cell counts beyond acceptability limits, which might have impaired the reliability of the results. However, I analyzed the data both ways and the model results did not appreciably change between the two methods. I chose to retain the larger combined dataset and use the amicus binary variable to account for differences in group behavior.

Model Specification

The probability distribution for a negative binomial model can be expressed as:

$$p(Y = y_i|x_i) = \frac{\Gamma(\theta + y_i)r_i(1 - r_i)^{y_i}}{\Gamma(1 + y_i)\Gamma(\theta)} \tag{1}$$

where θ is the parameter to be estimated, and $r = \frac{\theta}{\theta+\lambda_i}$ is a measure of dispersion.

Using μ for the mean or expected value of Y, and λ as the log-linear mean, for H_1, I employ a mixed effects model of the form:

$$\lambda = \log(\mu) = \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta_1 \text{disad}_{ij} + X_{ij}B_2 + Z_{ij}B_3 + \beta_4 \text{amicus}_{ij} + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

The resulting model expresses the log mean of the dependent variable count as a function of the linear predictors. The within-case effects are fixed, and the case-level intercepts are allowed to vary randomly. The independent variable of interest is the disadvantaged constituency indicator. The coefficient β_1 reflects the change in the expected size of the coalition of which the observed interest group is a member if the observed interest group is disadvantaged. If it is not, i.e., where $x = 0$, then the β_1 term drops out, and only the controls are used. Each of the controls is included as well, with additional separate β parameters for each, and ϵ is a stochastic error term.

For H_2, the independent variable of interest is resources. In equation (3), for each resource category, the β_1 coefficient represents the change in the expected size of the coalition of which the observed interest group is a member. I chose "high" (or level 3) as the reference category for ease of interpretation. If the resources variable behaves as the hypothesis predicts, then for each successively lower category, the coefficient should exhibit a positive sign indicative of larger coalition size. In all of the above equations, the terms $X_{ij}B_2$ and $Z_{ij}B_3$ represent sets of binary variables, type and scope, respectively.

$$\lambda = \log(\mu) = \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta_1 \text{resources}_{ij} + X_{ij}B_2 + Z_{ij}B_3 + \beta_4 \text{amicus}_{ij} + \epsilon_i \tag{3}$$

Model results for both hypotheses are in Table 2. I would expect that the disadvantaged constituency variable would be significant with a positive sign, indicating that disadvantaged groups generally form larger coalitions to increase their litigation strength. However, not only does the outcome of the analysis not support H1, the variable of interest shows some unexpected behavior; that being, significance in the opposite direction. It therefore appears that the effect of disadvantaged constituency operates to reduce coalition size.

H2 is also unsupported by the results, though in this case the resources variable does not display any discernible effect. Additionally, none of the controls exhibit any significance, with the exception of the amicus binary. Models 2 and 3 are included as checks for robustness and to account for any collinearity between the predictors. The amicus binary exhibits a positive effect, indicating that coalition size is generally larger among amicus participants than real parties in interest.[15]

Figure 2 is a plot of the coefficients from models 1 and 2. The disadvantaged variable exhibits a definite negative effect, and amicus a positive. For both models the effects are almost identical. The resource measures and controls do not show any appreciable effects as their confidence intervals cross the zero line. Their inclusion did not change the results or the visible effects of the two significant variables.

[15] I also estimated Model 1 with an interaction between the disadvantage and resource variables, however it did not produce any significant results. It is not included here.

Table 2. Results of Mixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression

Dependent variable:	Coalition Size		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Disadvantaged	−0.196**	−0.205**	
	(0.090)	(0.090)	
Very low resources	0.001	0.010	
	(0.098)	(0.098)	
Low resources	0.020	0.034	
	(0.092)	(0.092)	
Medium resources	0.069	0.092	
	(0.097)	(0.096)	
Common membership	0.117	0.118	0.114
	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.103)
Trade association	0.003	0.004	0.047
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Regional scope	0.007	0.006	−0.014
	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.098)
National scope	−0.068	−0.056	−0.079
	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.096)
Amicus curiae	0.435***	0.436***	0.422***
	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Observations	323	323	323
Log Likelihood	−667.260	−667.716	−669.610
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,356.520	1,351.433	1,359.220
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,398.075	1,381.654	1,396.996
Num. groups: casino	98	98	98
Var: casenum (Intercept)	0.40	0.40	0.40
SD: casenum (Intercept)	0.63	0.63	0.63

Note: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$



Figure 2: Coefficient plot

The effect of disadvantaged can be observed in Figure 3. There is a discernible reduction in the average coalition size associated with disadvantaged groups. Though the difference is small, this is still an unexpected finding.



Figure 3: Mean predicted counts for constituency types

Conclusion

The most obviously striking outcome is that not only do politically *disadvantaged* groups not necessarily form or join larger coalitions, they seem to favor smaller ones. This is true even with the amicus control included, so we can draw the additional conclusion that the effect of political disadvantage is independent of party status. That said, amicus curiae participants seem to join larger coalitions in general, and this is not unexpected; in any given public law case, there are often more amicus participants than there are parties. In addition, as noted above, interest groups are known to form larger and more diverse amicus coalitions before the Supreme Court, in order to maximize their credibility and present a united front with regard to policy preferences (Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson 2014; Goelzhauser and Vouvalis 2015). It seems logical that this same behavior would be exhibited at the appellate court level.

Two possible explanations for the unusual results related to political disadvantage present themselves; one is a matter of practicality, the other of strategy. In the first instance, it may be that the same disadvantages that limit such groups' ability to lobby effectively also operate to reduce their chances of forming coalitions in the litigation context. Stated differently, it could be the case that resource or political power limitations, represented as lower litigation strength, may limit the ability of disadvantaged groups to command the attention of like minded organizations. Referring back to the case studies in the first part of this article, the trajectory of each group does indicate one or more early victories before serious coalition building took place. Perhaps disadvantaged groups need to "prove themselves" before larger- scale support becomes available.

The second potential explanation is that, for some reason, larger coalitions may be less desirable. There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. Coalitions require coordination, and it stands to reason that the larger the beast, the more effort it takes to control it. Smaller coalitions may be more nimble and able to respond and react more quickly and effectively to changes in the case or the political environment. Smaller coalitions may present less risk of conflict over strategic preferences or preferred results (as would be the case if some of the groups in the coalition wish to settle a case and others do not). Space is insufficient to completely list all of the possibilities here. It will suffice for now to conclude that more research is needed to address the implications of these findings.

References

Ackerman, Bruce A. 1984. "Beyond Carolene Products." *Harvard Law Review* 98(4): 713–746.

Adams, John H., Patricia Adams, and George Black. 2010. *A Force for Nature: The Story of NRDC and the Fight to Save Our Planet*. San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Bethany A. Campbell, Dino P. Christenson, and Zoltan Navabi. 2018. "Role Analysis Using the Ego-ERGM: A Look at Environmental Interest Group Coalitions." *Social Networks* 52: 213–227.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Dino P. Christenson. 2014. "The Evolution and Formation of Amicus Curiae Networks." *Social Networks* 36: 82–96.

Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. 1990. "Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?" *The Journal of Politics* 52(3): 782–806.

Collins, Paul. 2007. "Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court." *Political Research Quarterly* 60(1): 55–70.

Collins, Paul M. 2004. "Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation." *Law & Society Review* 38(4): 807.

Cortner, Richard C. 1968. "Strategies and Tactics of Litigants in Constitutional Cases." *Journal of Public Law* 17(2): 287–307.

Denvir, John. 1976. "Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest Litigation." *North Carolina Law Review* 54(6): 1133–1160.

Diller, Matthew, and Mary Frances Davis. 1995. "Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age." *Michigan Law Review* 93(6): 1401.

Epstein, Lee. 1993. "Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era." *Journal of Law and Politics* 9(1): 639–717.

Galanter, Marc. 1974. "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change." *Law & Society Review* 9(1): 95–160.

Gilman, Frank. 2004. "The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote Fiftieth Anniversary Issue 1954-2004." *South Texas Law Review* 46(1): 163–244.

Goelzhauser, Greg, and Nicole Vouvalis. 2015. "Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling Credibility in Supreme Court Agenda Setting." *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 45(1): 99–116.

Hassler, Gregory L., and Karen O'Connor. 1986. "Woodsy Witchdoctors versus Judicial Guerrillas: The Role and Impact of Competing Interest Groups in Environmental Litigation." *Environmental Affairs* 13(4): 487–520.

Hessick, F. Andrew. 2009. "Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality." *Notre Dame Law Review* 85(4): 1447–1504.

Olson, Susan M. 1990. "Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory." *The Journal of Politics* 52(3): 854–882.

Phinney, Robin. 2017. *Strange Bedfellows: Interest Group Coalitions, Diverse Partners, and Influence in American Social Policy*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Salisbury, Robert H. 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions." *The American Political Science Review* 78(1): 64–76.

Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2013. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Songer, Donald R., and Reginald S. Sheehan. 1992. "Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(1): 235–258.

Songer, Donald R., Reginald S. Sheehan, and Susan B. Haire. 1999. "Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead Over Time? Applying Galanter's Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988." *Law & Society Review* 33(4): 811.

Timbers, William H., and David A. Wirth. 1984. "Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Cases." *Cornell Law Review* 70(3): 403.

Whitford, Andrew B. 2003. "Evidence from Environmental Litigation." *Business & Politics* 5(1): 45–64.

Fear and Loathing in American Politics: The Trump Candidacies and Affective Polarization

Joseph Gershtenson[1]

[1]University of North Georgia
*joseph.gershtenson@ung.edu

ABSTRACT

Much evidence suggests increased partisan polarization in American politics in recent decades. Partisanship appears to have become a stronger and more salient social identity and this has been associated with copartisan favoritism and hostility toward political figures and citizens associated with the opposing party. It is against this backdrop that Donald Trump, who many observers regard as a divisive figure engendering strong positive and negative feelings, came to the fore. I use a variety of indicators from the ANES cumulative file to trace polarization from 1968 to 2020 in terms of sentiments toward presidential candidates and toward the major political parties. The findings point to increased polarization with identifiers of both parties exhibiting growing divergence in their sentiments toward their own party and its candidates and the opposition, with polarization generally reaching its apex in 2020. Increased polarization has been asymmetric, with negative attitudes toward the out-party increasing more quickly than positive attitudes toward the in-party. Underlying general patterns, however, are variations that indicate the relevance of individual candidates, even in the context of enhanced importance of party affiliation.

It is far from a secret that contemporary American politics are combative and divisive. While there are many fault lines along which struggles occur, the most obvious is political party. Democrats and Republicans have become more distinctive from one another in recent decades while simultaneously becoming more unified within their own ranks. Party votes in Congress have become more common, party unity for both Democrats and Republicans has increased, and the ideological gap between party delegations has widened. Many media outlets have pronounced biases toward one or the other major political parties. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the electorate reflects these other developments. Partisan sorting has meant fewer liberal Republicans and fewer conservative Democrats can be found. In addition, identifiers of both parties have become at least somewhat more consistent and extreme in their views on political issues. Perhaps even more notable than ideological and issue polarization is greater affective polarization. Partisanship appears to have become a stronger and more salient social identity and this has been associated with copartisan favoritism, and even more notably, hostility toward political figures and citizens associated with the opposing party. Not only do many party identifiers dislike members of the other party, they are willing to discriminate against them in non-political settings, they do not wish to see their children marrying across party lines, and they are more prone to attribute negative stereotypes to opponents.

Scholars of American politics have documented many of these developments and explored both their causes and consequences. However, because polarization is a concept that necessarily involves a time dimension, polarization is a process while polarized is a condition at a given point in time, it is important to continually evaluate and reevaluate developments and trends. That is what I do in this study. Specifically, I focus on recent patterns in affective polarization.

This is particularly critical in the context of Donald Trump, arguably one of the most divisive figures in American politics, having burst onto the political scene when he announced his candidacy for president in New York's Trump Tower in June 2015.

Using data from the American National Election Studies cumulative file from 1968 to 2020, I find that identifiers of both major political parties have generally become more polarized in their sentiments toward presidential candidates, and that this polarization is greatest by most measures in the most recent election. This polarization has been uneven, however, as increased warmth toward the in-party has been significantly outpaced by greater negativity toward the out-party. In addition, within the broad trend of growing polarization, there are variations in affect that underscore the continued relevance of individual candidates, even in the context of enhanced importance of party affiliation.

Polarization in American Politics

By most accounts, the polarization of American politics first appeared among the ranks of the elite. Numerous scholars have specifically traced increasing divergence in the voting patterns of members of the two parties in Congress dating to the late 1960s and early 1970s (Coleman, 1997; Fleisher and Bond, 2000; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Rohde, 1991; Stonecash et al., 2003; Theriault, 2006). In addition to each of the two parties becoming more ideologically cohesive internally while becoming

more distinctive from one another, politics in the capital appears to have become more nasty and personal. For example, former member of Congress and Republican National Committee chair William Brock (2004: B7) wrote that "the evidence is compelling that we are today seeing a serious deterioration in political civility" exhibited by increasingly polarized members of Congress. One of the lows point for civility among elected officials was the 2009 outburst by Representative Joe Wilson (R-SC) who interrupted President Obama's address to a joint session of Congress by yelling "You lie!" as Obama defended his proposed healthcare legislation.

The public has noted this growth of elite-level incivility. In 2016 (KRC Research, 2016) about three-fourths of respondents reported a decline in civility, a marked increase from just a few years earlier (Page, 2010). In a related vein, more than 90% of U.S. respondents indicated that political discussions are angry and bad tempered (Harris Poll, 2016). It is also the case that a sizeable portion of the public view polarization as undesirable. In a 2022 survey by FiveThirtyEight, 28% of respondents indicated political extremism was among the most important issues facing the country, a percentage only exceeded by inflation and crime or gun violence (Skelly and Fuong, 2022).

At the same time that many Americans appear to bemoan the polarization of politics, there is evidence that the electorate has itself become more polarized. Earlier work on polarization generally conceptualized it as being associated with ideological and/or policy differences between the parties. To be certain, there are scholars who question the extent of polarization, arguing that it has been muted among the public (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2005, 2008). However, a larger camp suggests that Democrats and Republicans in the electorate have adopted increasingly divergent ideological and issue positions (Abramowitz, 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998, 2008; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Brewer, 2005; Hetherington 2001; Jacobson 2007; Layman and Carsey 2002; Levendusky 2009; Pew Research Center, 2014).

Affective Polarization

Polarized attitudes on political issues and in ideological orientations is important to recognize and can have significant implications for the nature of political debate, the functioning of government, citizen faith in government, and more. Nevertheless, issue-based polarization can still offer the opportunity for meaning dialogue and compromise. What makes this less likely is a corresponding rise in affective polarization.

As opposed to divergent positions on an ideological or issue scale, affective polarization is about sentiment and differential feelings toward one's own party and its leaders and the opposing party. Scholars have used various labels for this, including social polarization (Mason 2015), behavioral polarization (Mason 2013), and partisan prejudice (Lelkes and Westwood 2017). Regardless of the terminology, there is widespread agreement that affective polarization has been on the rise in recent decades (Haidt and Hetherington 2012; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2013). Heightened affective polarization can promote political involvement (Mason 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014). However, it can also lead individuals to be more dismissive of, or to avoid altogether, members of the opposing party, to extend preferential treatment to members of their own party, and to employ confrontational rhetoric (Lelkes and Westwood 2017; Mason 2015). It is these tendencies that can be troubling as indicated by Senator John McCain's widow, Cindy McCain (2019), in noting that "the anger some Americans feel for people with opposing views seems to have become more vitriolic and intense" and encouraging the U.S. public to "take a pledge of civility by committing to causes larger than ourselves and joining together across the aisle or whatever divides us to make the world a better place."

The hostility toward individuals on the other side of the aisle goes beyond political rhetoric to the very identity of many Americans and their societal interactions. So, partisans seem increasingly willing to assign negative personality attributes to those of the other party and to illustrate support for discriminating against them (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012; Miller and Conover 2015; Pew Research Center 2014, 2022). It even extends to attitudes about marrying across party lines, where opposition now exceeds that to racial intermarriage (Vavrek, 2017).

Scholars point to various causes for increased affective polarization. Partisan sorting, the process of conservatives finding their "natural" home in the Republican Party while liberals do likewise with the Democratic Party, and more generally, greater ideological and partisan consistency and stronger party ties, appear associated with polarization (Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016). Others indicate that polarization can be self-reinforcing as individuals receive negative information about the opposing party through campaigns and media coverage (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar 2017; Levendusky 2013; Miller and Conover 2015).

In a related vein, scholars have also devoted some attention to which individuals are likely to exhibit greater polarization. For example, Garrett and Bankert (2020) noted the role that moralized attitudes can have in contributing to affective polarization. Drawing from moral psychology, they suggest that propensity to moralize exacerbates affective polarization, having an effect beyond that of partisan strength. In particular, they find that individuals who are more likely to think about political issues in moral terms, based in fundamental beliefs about right and wrong, display more polarized attitudes toward presidential candidates and greater hostility toward opposing partisans (as assessed by measures of anger, incivility, and antagonism toward the out-party). Bolsen and Thornton (2021) emphasize the significance of political sophistication. They argue that individuals

who have greater interest in, involvement in, and information about politics should display greater biases toward presidential candidates of both political parties, largely because these individuals are the most likely to engage in partisan motivated reasoning. They find that more sophisticated individuals display a more pronounced person-positivity bias toward candidates of their own party and person-negativity bias toward candidates of the opposing party (rating the candidates more warmly/cooly using feeling thermometers respectively than do their less sophisticated counterparts).

The Trump Phenomenon

Literature pointing to elite polarization and elite behavior, and the nature of media coverage and exposure as factors promoting affective polarization in the electorate underscore the importance of considering specific political personalities and political context. Even prior to becoming the Republican presidential nominee in 2016, Donald Trump was quick to attack others, often in an uncivil manner. For example, referring to Carly Fiorina, Trump said, "Look at that face! Would anyone vote for that?" The general election campaign offered more examples of incivility, personal attacks, and questioning various characteristics of the candidates and their supporters. Fox News anchor Megyn Kelly reminded potential voters that Trump had a history of making sexist remarks, referring to women he disliked as "fat pigs, dogs, slobs, and disgusting animals." Trump's response suggested that Kelly must have been menstruating to ask such a "ridiculous" question. In the general election, Trump stayed true to form, calling Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton a "nasty woman" during the third presidential debate. Clinton returned fire on the campaign trail saying of Trump supporters, "They're racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic," and referring to half of them as a "basket of deplorables" (Reilly, 2016).

Following his election, Trump continued to used pointed language and personal attacks. He called MSNBC's Joe Scarborough "Psycho Joe" and said that Congresswoman Maxine Waters "an extraordinarily low IQ person." Trump's behavior and his personality led to counterattacks as well. After Trump indicated Democratic Florida congresswoman Frederica Wilson was "wacky" for criticizing his phone call to the family of a fallen U.S. soldier, she called him a "jerk" and a "liar." Waters urged her supporters to harass members of the Trump administration when they see them around town. And Democratic Virginia Lieutenant Governor Ralph Northam said that Trump was a "narcissistic maniac."

Given this, it is unsurprising that a 2018 poll revealed that 74% of respondents viewed the overall tone and civility in Washington, D.C. to have deteriorated since Trump's elections (Santhanam 2018). It is with general patterns in polarization combined the nature of the 2016 campaign (and subsequently the 2020 campaign) and what is widely perceived to be Trump's divisive presidency and personality, his willingness to denigrate political opponents and describe unfavorable media outlets as the enemy, and the reactions of Democratic officials and Democratic-leaning media to push back, that I derive empirical expectations about polarization.

- Hypothesis 1a: Affective polarization toward presidential candidates will be greater in 2016 and 2020 than in previous election cycles.
- Hypothesis 1b: Affective polarization toward political parties will be greater in 2016 and 2020 than in previous election cycles.
- Hypothesis 2a: Positive attitudes toward in-party presidential candidates will be greater in 2016 and 2020 than in previous election cycles.
- Hypothesis 2b: Negative attitudes toward out-party presidential candidates will be greater in 2016 and 2020 than in previous election cycles.
- Hypothesis 3: The increase in negative attitudes toward out-party presidential candidates will be greater than the increase in positive attitudes toward in-party presidential candidates.
- Hypothesis 4: The correlation between affective assessments of presidential candidates' and political parties' will be greater for both in-party and out-party in 2016 and 2020 than in previous election cycles.

  While Donald Trump was obviously the Republicans' standard bearer in 2016, he had not necessarily captured the party to the extent that he would by 2020. In the 2020 election, the Republican National Committee did not even adopt a new platform and its resolution asserted continued support for the America First agenda espoused by Trump. Similarly, several states canceled their Republican primaries and caucuses in 2020, eschewing any possibility of challenges to the incumbent president. This leads to one additional expectation.
- Hypothesis 5: The correlation between affective assessments of Donald Trump and the Republican Party will be greater in 2020 than in 2016.

Data and Measures

Examining developments in polarization requires time series data. The American National Election Studies (ANES) is one of the few sources meeting this need. Consequently, I use the ANES) Time Series Cumulative Data File (1948-2020). The ANES has its roots in the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan, which conducted the first survey in the series in 1948 using a national probability sample. The University of Michigan continued to conduct national surveys every two years, primarily with new cross-sectional samples, through 1976. In 1977, the National Science Foundation provided support to create the American National Election Studies, and the ANES has since continued to conduct politically-related surveys with national probability samples during presidential election years.[1]

As the name implies, ANES surveys focus on politics, particularly electoral politics, including things such as individuals' views on specific policy issues (e.g., government spending on national defense), individuals' general political orientations (e.g., party identification and ideology), and individuals' political behavior (e.g., contribute to political campaigns, vote in elections). In addition, the ANES regularly collects data for a number of sociodemographic variables such as education, income, and age. Not all survey administrations have included exactly the same battery of questions. However, there are a number of items that have appeared in many years, including some of those central to tracking affective polarization.

Measures of Polarization

I employ several measures of affect toward both presidential candidates and toward political parties, most of which have been used previously by other scholars. Beginning with candidates, the first measure of affect relies on thermometer ratings. These items ask respondents to rate various political figures and groups on a scale from 0 to 100. The survey instructs respondents that ratings from 50 degrees to 100 degrees mean that they "feel favorably and warm toward the group," while ratings from 0 degrees to 50 degrees mean that they "don't feel favorably towards the group." The thermometer ratings for candidates have been included in the 14 presidential election year ANES surveys from 1968 to 2020. The second indicator of affect toward candidates asks respondents to indicate if candidates have ever engendered certain emotions. For 2016 and 2020, the questions followed this lead: "Now we would like to know something about the feelings you have toward the candidates for President. I am going to name a candidate, and I want you to tell me whether something about that person or something he or she has done has made you have certain feelings like anger or pride. Think about [PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE]. How often would you say you've felt [AFFECT] because of the kind of person [PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE] is or because of something HE/SHE has done?" The specific sentiments (affect) I examine are "angry," "afraid," "hopeful," and "proud." I also note that prior to 2016, the question only allowed respondents to indicate whether or not they had each of the affective reactions, not how much/how often they felt a certain way. Consequently, I use a dichotomous variable for all four sentiments with data available to construct the measures for 1980-2016, where 1 indicates feeling the relevant emotion and 0 not feeling it.

I also have two measures of affect toward political parties. The first is thermometer ratings for each of the parties that mirror those described above for presidential candidates. The second similarly asks respondents their feelings toward political parties. In this case, the question reads as follows: "I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party." Respondents were provided with the names of parties and placements, which resulted in an 11-point scale for each.

My final analysis in this study seeks to provide some understanding of determinants of affective polarization using ordinary least squares regression for the years 1972 to 2020. The dependent variable measures affect toward presidential candidates from thermometer ratings, and is constructed by subtracting the rating of the out-party candidate from the in-party candidate. My main independent variables of interest in this analysis are the strength of partisanship and ideological strength. To measure partisanship, I begin with a 7-point party identification variable in the data set that is constructed by asking respondents, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" Follow-up questions ask Democrats and Republicans, "Would you call yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican) or a not very strong (Democrat/Republican)?" Respondents originally identifying as Independents were probed by asking, "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" The strength of partisanship is on a 4-point scale from "pure independent" (0) to strong Democrat/Republican (3). I also note that in tracing affective polarization over time, I show patterns separately for Democrats and Republicans. In those analyses, I define partisans to include strong, weak, and "leaning" individuals. The ideological strength measure parallels that of partisanship strength, ranging from moderate (0) to extremely liberal/conservative (3) based on responses to the following item: "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?"

[1] Neither the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan nor the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research bears any responsibility for the analysis and conclusions present here.

In addition to the partisanship and ideology variables, the regression analyses include a host of political and sociodemographic control variables. Specifically, I measure the following:

1. Political interest: "Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been/were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the political campaigns (so far) this year?" Variable ranges from 1 to 3, with 3 indicating greater interest.
2. Political participation, vote: "In talking to people about the election, we often find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote in the elections this November?" Variable coded as 1 for voted, 0 otherwise.
3. Age: Variable uses 7 age categories, coded 1 to 7 in ascending order of age category where categories are 17-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75 and older.
4. Gender: Coded as 1 for male, 2 for female
5. Race: Coded as 1 for white, non-Hispanic, 0 otherwise.
6. Region, south: Coded as 1 for 13 states of the Confederacy, 0 otherwise
7. Education: Variable uses 4 categories, coded 1 to 4, grade school or less (1), high school (2), some college (3), college or advanced degree (4).
8. Income: Respondents were asked to indicate their household family income from all sources (with question-wording varying by year). Respondents were then placed into the following five categories in the cumulative data file: 0 to 16 percentile (1), 17 to 33 percentile (2), 34 to 67 percentile (3), 68 to 95 percentile (4), and 96 to 100 percentile (5).

Results

The initial examinations of affective polarization use feelings toward the presidential candidates of the two major political parties from thermometer ratings. I begin with extreme ratings of the candidates, namely the percentages of Democrats and Republicans rating the in-party candidate at the maximum and the out-party candidate at the minimum. Figure 1 displays the results. In the figure, the solid lines show the percentages of partisans with maximum ratings of their own candidates. Variability for both Democrats and Republicans here speak to the importance of individual candidates. For example, the relative weakness of both George McGovern in 1972 and Jimmy Carter in 1976 among Democrats is apparent while Republicans were seemingly less thrilled with their nominees of Bob Dole and John McCain in 1996 and 2008 respectively. In contrast, and consistent with expectations (Hypothesis 2a), more Republicans (34.2%) gave Donald Trump in 2020 the highest thermometer rating possible than they had any candidate prior to that point. Trump's effect is also evident when considering Democrats' ratings of him. Democrats went from 28.2% minimum ratings (0) of Mitt Romney in 2012 to 53.4% providing this rating of Trump in 2016 and a whopping 73.5% in 2020, a pattern consistent with Hypothesis 2b. While not as pronounced for Republicans, they also saw higher percentages of their identifiers rating the Democratic candidates (Clinton and Biden) at zero in 2016 and 2020 than at any point prior to that, a finding again consistent with Hypothesis 2b. Given these sentiments toward each of the candidates, it is also the case that the proportions of Democratic and Republican identifiers having the maximum possible difference in ratings of candidates (maximum value for their own candidate combined with minimum value for the opponent) was greater in 2016 and 2020 than in preceding elections. In other words, there is evidence of greater polarization in 2016 and 2020 consistent with Hypothesis 1a.[2]

Figure 2 continues the story by displaying mean thermometer ratings of presidential candidates. The patterns here offer further evidence of increasing polarization, consistent with Hypothesis 1a. For Democrats, the mean difference in feeling thermometer scores between their party's candidate and the opposition candidate increased from 31.37 in the 1968-2012 elections to 61.68 for the 2016 and 2020 elections. This difference is statistically significant (t-test for difference in independent samples) at the .001 level as is the difference in the means of Republicans from 37.00 in the 1968-2012 elections to 52.28 in the two most recent elections.[3] Figure 2 also illustrates the nature of polarization in terms of warmth toward each of the candidates. Specifically, mean ratings of in-party candidates do not follow a monotonic trend for identifiers of either party.

[2]Z tests for equal proportions of independent samples, the samples being 2016/2020 and 1968-2012, are significant at the .001 level for all proportions except the proportions of Democrats rating in-party candidates at the minimum, 0. In that instance, the proportion of Democrats was not significantly lower in 2016/2020 than it was earlier. This appears to be a function of higher numbers of Democrats rating Hillary Clinton at 0.

[3]While the hypotheses in this study are about changes in polarization over time, it is worth noting that for both Democratic and Republican identifiers, the differences between their feeling thermometer ratings of in-party and out-party candidates are statistically significant (paired samples t-tests) at the .001 level for every year in this series.

For Democrats, the difference in mean thermometer ratings of Democratic candidates is virtually identical for the two sets of elections (72.51 for 1968-2012 and 72.17 for 2016/2020) and is not statistically significant. Mean thermometer ratings of their own candidate (Trump) for Republicans were actually lower in 2019/2020, 71.45, than in the preceding elections, 74.04. These findings run counter to the expectation of increasingly positive attitudes toward in-party candidates from Hypothesis 2a. In contrast, the evidence fully supports increasingly negative attitudes toward out-party candidates from Hypothesis 2b. For both Democrats and Republicans, mean ratings of opposing candidates were significantly lower in 2016/2020 than in 1968-2012. These findings with regard to feelings toward in-party and out-party candidates also generally support Hypothesis 3 that points to greater changes in attitudes toward opposing candidates (i.e. that increasing polarization is driven more by hostility toward the out-party). Finally, it is important to note here that the effect of Trump's presence on the national political scene is less straightforward than might be expected. It appears that significant changes began following the 2008 elections and then continued with Trump's two campaigns.

Next, I turn to specific emotions that candidates engender in respondents. Specifically, I examine two "negative" emotions, anger and fear, and two "positive" emotions, hope and pride. To the extent that affective polarization has been on the rise, we should expect to see both negative reactions to the out-party candidate and positive reactions to the in-party candidate increasing over time. Figures 3 and 4 display results for Democratic and Republican identifiers respectively. Specifically, each figure shows the mean ratings of in-party and out-party candidates constructed so positive values indicate greater favorability toward in-party candidates. For example, for Democrats, for anger and fear, the measure subtracts their own candidate's response from the opposing party's (Republican) candidate. Thus, if a Democrat said that the Republican candidate made them angry while their own candidate did not, it would yield a score of 1 (it would be 0 if neither or both candidates produced anger, and -1 if just the Democratic candidate did). Figure 3 generally suggests increasing affective polarization from 1980 to 2016 (as mentioned earlier, the items did not appear on the 2020 survey). For each of the four emotions, positive sentiment toward the Democratic candidate relative to that toward the Republican candidate was higher (statistically significant at the .001 in independent samples t-tests) in 2016 than in the 1980-2012 period. As was the case with feeling thermometer ratings of candidates, emotional assessments also support greater polarization as forwarded by Hypothesis 1a. [4]

Figure 1. Thermometer Ratings of Democratic and Republican Candidates by Party Identification



Within the general trend of the measures moving in the expected, becoming greater, direction, there are some variations. For example, Democrats expressed low levels of relative pride in Bill Clinton compared to George H.W. Bush in 1992. Also, while 2016 showed an uptick in differential ratings of the two candidates, Clinton and Trump, on negative sentiments (anger and fear), it didn't on positive assessments (hopefulness and pride). Of course, these relative ratings can mask assessments of each candidate and do not directly address hypotheses about separate changes in sentiments toward in-party and out-party. Hypothesis 2a posits that positive attitudes toward in-party candidates will be highest in the most recent elections. This is supported for the Democrats. In 2016, 88.3% of Democrats indicated feeling proud of Clinton and 85.6% felt hopeful compared to significantly lower percentages of 78.1% and 63.3% in the elections from 1980 to 2012.[5] In a similar vein, Democrats'

[4] As with feeling thermometer ratings, paired samples t-tests show that relative emotions evoked by in-party and out-party candidates are consistently significant. Specifically, with the exceptions of relative anger among Democrats in 1980 and relative pride among Republicans in 1992, identifiers of both parties exhibited more positive relative emotions toward their own candidates than toward opposing candidates.

[5] The proportions of identifiers exhibiting each of the four sentiments is not shown in the figures, but these statistics are available on request.

negative sentiments toward Trump exceeded those toward preceding candidates, thus supporting Hypothesis 2b. While 43.4% of Democrats felt afraid of Republican candidates and 53.8% felt anger during the 1980-2012 elections, those numbers jumped significantly in 2016 to 90.0% and 93.1%. These patterns also support expectations regarding asymmetry in changing attitudes from Hypothesis 3. Namely, while positive assessments of in-party candidates increased by 10.2 percentage points for feeling proud and 22.3 percentage points for feeling hopeful, these were dwarfed by growth in negative feelings toward out-party candidates which were 46.6 points in fear and 39.3 points in anger.

Figure 4 displays relative sentiments toward the candidates for Republican identifiers. Unlike Democrats, Republicans do not exhibit uniformly greater relative in-party positivity in 2016 compared to the earlier elections. While relative hopefulness and pride were higher (significant at the .001 level) in 2016 as expected with Hypothesis 1a, relative fear was essentially the same in the two periods and relative anger was actually significantly lower in 2016 than in the preceding elections. As with Democrats, the figure reveals some real variations across elections rather than a simple monotonic trend. This again points to the importance of the specific candidates in a race. Republicans' difference in positive sentiments toward the candidates peaked in the two elections in which they had an incumbent candidate win reelection, Ronald Reagan in 1984 and George W. Bush in 2004. On the other hand, negative feelings were more distinctive in the elections featuring a Democratic incumbent being reelected, Bill Clinton in 1996 and Obama in 2012.

Also, as is the case with Democrats, comparative feelings toward the candidates can obscure patterns in separate feelings toward candidates. Here, like Democrats, Republicans feelings of anger and fear toward Democratic candidates has a more observable downward trend over the 36-year period and reach their highest levels in 2016. And, like Democrats and consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the proportions of Republicans with negative feelings toward the out-party candidate were higher in 2016 at 86.7% and 92.5% for fear and anger respectively than they were for 1980-2012 when they stood at 46.4% and 59.2%. Republicans also provide support for Hypothesis 2a, with positive feelings toward Trump in 2016 exceeding those toward candidates in the 1980-2012 period. The proportions of feeling hopeful and proud toward in-party candidates rose from 75.6% and 66.0%, respectively, in the earlier period to 85.2% and 78.3% in 2016. Finally, these patterns are again with Hypothesis 3. Changing attitudes toward in-party and out-party candidates are not symmetrical with the increases in negative attitudes toward out-party candidates greatly outstripping those of increases in positive attitudes toward in-party candidates.



Conceptually, affective partisanship should apply to political parties themselves, not just the parties' presidential candidates, though perhaps polarization toward parties may be less pronounced than toward candidates (see, e.g., Bolsen and Thornton, 2021). Figure 5 displays mean differences in ratings of in-party v. out-party thermometer ratings with the solid lines. The patterns here are similar to those for thermometer ratings of candidates. Namely, affective polarization has increased substantially, with the mean differences between parties more than doubling for both Democrats and Republicans from 1980 to 2020. Furthermore, most of the increase has occurred since 2004 with identifiers of both parties reaching their highest polarization levels in 2020. Statistical tests for differences of means between the 2016/2020 elections and the earlier elections

are significant at the .001 level for both Democrats and Republicans, providing support for Hypothesis 1b.

More difficult to see are patterns in polarization as measured by the mean difference in ratings of the two parties on the 11-point like/dislike scale. Here, the ANES item was asked in 1996 and then again from 2004 to 2020. For identifiers of both parties, polarization generally trended up over the observations, and, for both, they reached their highest levels in 2020. Among both Democrats and Republicans, mean differences were significantly higher (at the .001 level) in 2016/2020 than in earlier years, again consistent with Hypothesis 1b.



The final hypotheses (4 and 5) concern linkages between feelings toward political parties and their candidates. The primary examination of this uses correlations between party and candidate thermometer ratings with Figure 6 displaying the correlations for both in-party and out-party for identifiers of each party. For both Democrats and Republicans, correlations between parties and candidates end the time series higher than they began. However, none of the correlations move monotonically upward over the entire period. Furthermore, it is only for Republicans that 2020 represents the strongest correlations between feelings toward parties and candidates. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, statistical tests (z tests following Fisher's transformation of the correlation coefficients) provide mixed support for Hypothesis 4 that posited higher correlations in 2016 and 2020 than in the earlier elections. For both Democrats and Republicans, correlations between in-party candidates and the in party itself were higher in the most recent elections than in preceding contests (.604 v. .535 for Democrats and .613 v. .659 for Republicans). However, for Republicans, the correlations between Democratic candidates and the Democratic Party were virtually identical in the two periods (.641 and .638), and the correlations of the Republican Party and Donald Trump were actually weaker (.539) for Democrats than they were for candidates and the Party prior to 2016 (.656). The figure does offer an interesting story related to Trump. Moving from 2012 to 2016, the connection between party and candidate affect with regard to Republicans declined for identifiers of both parties. That is to say, feelings toward Trump and the Republican Party were more distinctive for both Democrats and Republicans than they had been prior to that time (reaching a low for the entire period for Democrats). This likely reflects Trump representing a departure, at least in part, from existing conceptions of Republicans. However, as president, with his hold over the Republican Party increasing, the link in feelings toward Trump and the Party rebounded considerably. For Democrats, the correlation between the Republican Party and its candidate rose from .48 in 2016 to .566 in 2020 while for Republicans the change was even more dramatitc, from .475 to .825. For identifiers of both parties, the differences in the correlations between the two years are statistically significant at the .001 level, thus providing support for Hypothesis 5. With an apparent rematch of the 2020 election in store for 2024, the link between assessments of political parties and their nominees in presidential elections is likely to tick upward, but that remains to be seen.



This likely reflects Trump's representing a departure, at least in part, from the existing conceptions of Republicans. However, as President, with his hold over the Republican Party increasing, the link in feelings toward Trump and the Party rebounded considerably. In fact, for Democrats, the correlation between the Republican Party and its candidate reached its highest point. In sum, the evidence for the strengthening of assessments of political parties and their nominees in presidential elections is only partially supported. With an apparent rematch of the 2020 election in store for 2024, the link is likely to tick upward, but that remains to be seen.



The other analysis designed to help illuminate connections between partisanship, ideology, and affect estimates regression models with the difference between thermometer ratings of in-party and out-party candidates as the dependent variable. The construction means that higher scores indicate greater relative warmth toward the in-party candidate, i.e., greater affective polarization. Table 1 presents the results for the years 1972-2020. As shown there, both the strength of party identification

and ideological extremity are consistently important (the most important in the model) predictors of polarization, with each being statistically significant at the .01 level every year. If party identification has become more directly connected to affective evaluations, we would expect the magnitude of the partisanship strength effect to increase over time. And, while it is generally higher in more recent elections than those earlier in the series, it does not increase monotonically. In a similar vein, estimates of ideological extremity's effects does not move consistently in one direction across elections. It is worth noting, though, that they were considerably higher in 2016 and 2020 than they had been since 1984. Of the remaining, control, variables, the only one that is also significant every year is interest in the election. Higher levels of interested are consistently associated with greater affective polarization, a finding consistent with Bolsen and Thornton (2021). In a related vein, in most years, individuals who report voting also exhibit higher polarization than their counterparts who abstain. None of the other variables emerge as reliable determinants of polarization, though it is interesting that race has been significant in the last three elections, with whites exhibiting less polarization than others, all else being equal.




Figure 6. Correlations of Party and Candidate Thermometer Ratings by Party Identification
Correlation Coefficient
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020
Year
Correlation Democratic Party and Democratic Candidate Thermometer Ratings, Democrats
Correlation Republican Party and Republican Candidate Thermometer Ratings, Democrats
Correlation Republican Party and Republican Candidate Thermometer Ratings, Republicans
Correlation Democratic Party and Democratic Candidate Thermometer Ratings, Republicans

Table 1. OLS Regression of Affective Polarization Toward Presidential Candidates

Year	Adj. R^2	Party	Ideology	Interest	Vote	Age	Gender	Race	South	Edu.	Inc.
1972	.118	7.332**	6.385**	8.422**	3.202	.591 (.771)	-.385	-14.269**	-23.779**	4.882**	-.912
1976	.071	7.459**	4.782**	4.572**	-3.800	.084 (.629)	1.433	-9.517**	-1.456	1.230	-.068
1980	.109	8.543**	7.464**	4.609*	9.113**	-1.754* (.765)	4.303	-.758	-4.620	-.526	-.509
1984	.138	6.273**	9.854**	7.302**	8.104**	.629 (.652)	1.867	-2.292	-3.378	.139	-.519
1988	.109	9.207**	4.254**	5.707**	6.061*	-.840 (.636)	-3.371	.371	.419	2.055	-2.109*
1992	.153	9.909**	5.534**	8.949**	5.042*	-.322 (.519)	1.497	2.825	-2.901	.758	-1.738*
1996	.148	9.947**	4.770**	7.748**	2.055	-.647 (.587)	5.903**	-.138	-2.952	-1.231	-.127
2000	.160	8.979**	6.061**	10.611**	-2.438	-.090 (.966)	-.643	1.579	6.749*	-2.892	2.792
2004	.254	11.669**	5.104**	13.789**	8.744*	.493 (.743)	4.377	-.167	4.081	.486	1.859
2008	.175	10.550**	4.889**	10.049**	6.378	-1.821* (.792)	.229	-.720	-3.196	2.506	.196
2012	.158	10.386**	5.048**	9.354**	7.326**	-.227 (.329)	.918	-2.762*	-.095	-.446	-.316
2016	.186	10.582**	9.802**	8.586**	7.940**	.965* (.436)	.961	-3.493*	-.478	-1.240	-.719
2020	.190	9.835**	8.211**	9.828**	10.118**	.815** (.301)	2.826**	-2.392*	.847	-1.217	-.449

Conclusion

The partisan polarization of American politics is widely recognized and discussed. Political pundits, media outlets, public officials, and citizens alike tend to understand that politics has become more divisive and contentious in recent decades. Political scientists also recognize this polarization and have devoted considerable scholarly attention to it. Patterns in the voting behavior and rhetoric of members of Congress, and diverging ideological and issue stances among the electorate, illustrate polarization. More recently, scholars have also examined affective assessments, noting that feelings toward the two major political parties and people associated with them have exhibited polarization as well. The current study continues this line of inquiry, tracing developments in citizens' feelings using several indicators from the 1970s through the 2020 presidential contest. The findings reinforce the general line of thinking that affective polarization has been on the rise, and that the polarization exhibits some asymmetry, with negative feelings toward the out-party increasing more than positive feelings toward the in-party. Importantly, by extending the examination to 2020, I reveal an apparent acceleration of polarization when Donald Trump entered the national political scene. By virtually all measures, polarization is higher now than at any time for which we have data to make comparisons. These findings underscore the continued relevance of partisanship as a linchpin of identity in American politics.

While party is clearly critical, variation in affect across the elections examined here support Bolsen and Thornton's (2021, p. 6) claim that "the individual candidate or political context matters." A number of scholars have explored determinants of polarized sentiment, but understanding how the relative importance of determinants ebb and flow as a function of context is an avenue for future research. In a similar vein, examinations of individual-level change are scarce. So, we know much more about aggregate patterns in polarization than we do about individuals' themselves experiencing increasingly divergent feelings toward the parties and those affiliated with them. Panel studies would allow for increased attention to such processes, but panel data are unfortunately not abundant. Understanding those processes would also potentially address some questions with the regression models I estimate. In the models here, I do not account for the possibility of reciprocal relationships between affective polarization and party identification and between feelings toward parties and candidates and political interest and turnout. Finally, at the individual level, future work could also more directly examine party identification as an element of identity. For example, in what ways is party identification similar to, and different from, more traditional characteristics of identity such as race, religion, or gender.

Continuing affective polarization may be a cause for concern. Disagreement on policy objectives and the means to achieve them is inevitable. However, when those whom disagree with you are portrayed as the enemy and regarded as somehow less human, there can be real danger of political differences escalating to political violence and other problematic behavior (see, for example, Kalmoe, 2014). Yet, the fact that many knowledgeable observers and many average Americans regard polarization as problematic offers hope for some efforts to combat the current situation and begin a process of de-escalation.

References

Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *Journal of Politics* 60: 634-652.

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. "Is Polarization a Myth?" *Journal of Politics* 70: 542-555.

Bafumi, Joseph and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2009. "A New Partisan Voter." *The Journal of Politics* 71: 1-24.

Brewer, Mark D. 2005. "The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict Within the American Electorate." *Political Research Quarterly* 58: 219-229.

Brock, William E. 2004. "A recipe for incivility." *Washington Post.* 27 July 2004, B7.

Coleman, John J. 1997. "The Decline and Resurgence of Congressional Party Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 59: 165-184.

Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. "Political Polarization in the American Public." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 563-588.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America.* Pearson Longman: New York.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2008. "Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings." *Journal of Politics* 70: 556-560.

Fleisher, Richard and Jon R. Bond. 2000. "Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress. In *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era.* Washington, DC: C.Q. Press.

Garrett, Kristin N. and Alexa Bankert. 2020. "The Moral Roots of Partisan Division: How Moral Conviction Heightens Affective Polarization." *British Journal of Political Science.* 50 (2): 621-40.

Haidt, Jonathan, and Marc J. Hetherington. 2012. "Look How Far We've Come Apart." http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/look-how-far-weve-comeapart/

Harris Poll. "Political climate: angry, and getting angrier." March 1, 2016. http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Political-Roundup.html.

Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *Journal of Politics* 95: 619-631.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76: 405-431.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2007. *A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People.* New York: Pearson Longman.

KRC Research. "Nearly all likely voters say candidates' civility will affect their vote; new poll finds 93% say behavior will matter." Jan. 28, 2016. http://www.webershandwick.com/news/article/nearly-all-likely-voters-say-candidates-civility-will-affect-their-vote

Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 786-802.

Lelkes, Yphtach, Gaurav Sood, and Shanto Iyengar. 2017. "The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect." *American Journal of Political Science* 71: 5-20.

Lelkes, Yphtach and Sean J. Westwood. 2017. "The Limits of Partisan Prejudice." *Journal of Politics* 79: 485–501.

Levendusky, Matthew S. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mason, Lilliana. 2013. "The Rise of Uncivil Agreement: Issue Versus Behavioral Polarization in the American Electorate." *American Behavioral Scientist* 57: 140-159.

Mason, Lilliana. 2015. "I Disrespectfully Agree": The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59: 128-145.

McCain, Cindy. 2019. "My husband was a man of civility. Americans can still learn from him." *Washington Post.* 20 Aug. 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/21/my-husband-john-mccain-was-man-civility-americans-can-still-learn-him/

Miller, Patrick R., and Pamela Johnston Conover. 2015. "Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan Hostility and Voting in the United States." *Political Research Quarterly* 68: 225-239.

Page, Susan. "Poll: USA fed up with political incivility." *USA Today,* 22 April, 2010.

Pew Research Center. 2014. "Political Polarization in the American Public." http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.

Pew Research Center. 2016. "Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016." http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/

Pew Research Center. 2022. "As Partisan Hostility Grows, Signs of Frustration With the Two-Party System." https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/08/09/as-partisan-hostility-grows-signs-of-frustration-with-the-two-party-system/.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Reilly, Katie. 2017. "Read Hillary Clinton's 'Basket of Deplorables' Remarks About Donald Trump Supporters." *Time*. https://time.com/4486502/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables-transcript/

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Rogowski, Jon C., and Joseph L. Sutherland. 2016. "How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization." *Political Behavior* 38: 485-508.

Santhanam, Laura. "Nearly 80 percent of Americans concerned lack of civility in politics will lead to violence, poll says." PBS NewsHour. 1 Nov. 2018. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/nearly-80-percent-of-americans-concerned-negative-tone-lack-of-civility-will-lead-to-violence-poll-says/

Skelley, Geoffrey, and Holly Fuong. 2022. "3 In 10 Americans Named Political Polarization As A Top Issue Facing the Country." *FiveThirtyEight*. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/3-in-10-americans-named-political-polarization-as-a-top-issue-facing-the-country/

Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mark D. Mariana. 2003. *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Theriault, Sean. 2006. "Party Polarization in the U.S. Congress: Member Replacement and Member Adaptation." *Party Politics* 12: 483-503.

Vavrek, Lynn. 2017. "A Measure of Identity: Are You Wedded to Your Party?" *New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/upshot/are-you-married-to-your-party.html.

Black Market Politics: The Importance of Parallel Governance

Jerry Mark Silverman[1]

[1]Independent Scholar
*jmsilverman5@comcast.net

ABSTRACT

This paper applies the concept of "parallel governance" to the reduction or mitigation of "poverty." Definitions of poverty vary between those that emphasize quantifiable, tangible poverty indicators and those that emphasize qualitative differences among the heterogeneous "poor." Parallel governance is analogous to parallel economies or black markets. It exists whenever legally recognized governments do not perform expected governance functions. Where and when they do not, other informal organizations will perform them. Top-down attempts by formal governments to reduce poverty must be compatible with existing local parallel governance systems that focus primarily on mitigation. Informal parallel governance systems can be a continuation of former regime remnants (including multiple, localized, and culturally diverse locations) when official governments fail to take root within newly established states. Alternatively, they can occur when at least one political group emerges to perform essential governance functions absent effective official Government performance or as informal competition to it.

I used to think I was poor. Then they told me I wasn't poor, I was needy. Then they told me it was self-defeating to think of myself as needy, I was deprived. Then they told me deprived was a bad image, I was underprivileged. Then they told me underprivileged was overused, I was disadvantaged. I still don't have a dime. But I sure have a great vocabulary.

(Jules Feifer 1965, 442)

This paper focuses primarily on governance issues affecting attempts to reduce or alleviate poverty, much of which occurs in the informal sector. But what exactly constitutes "poverty?" I have addressed that question in greater detail in a previous publication (Silverman 2005: 25-28). Suffice it to say here that the notion of "*Poverty*" has both tangible "*objective*" and intangible "*subjective*" dimensions. Tangible poverty indicators are observable and can be measured; therefore, they apply to all "poor" people worldwide. However, above that absolute threshold, subjective dimensions of poverty are rooted in shared norms and values and, therefore, are perceived differently by policymakers and those who do or do not consider themselves "poor" (Silverman 2004: 228, 231, 243, 245). Unfortunately, governments and international development agencies rely primarily on tangible, measurable indicators to identify their financial or technical poverty reduction or alleviation support programs, most often without substantive consultation with the targetted end-users (*personal experience*).[1]

According to a wide-ranging World Bank study, based on interviews of over 60,000 poor women and men from 60 countries worldwide, costing several million U.S. dollars, and published in three volumes between 2000 and 2002 (Narayan 2000, 2000, 2002), many people – especially people experiencing poverty – residing in "*low*" and "*lower middle income*" countries view "*community-based organizations*" (CBOs) created and managed by themselves as more accountable, trustworthy, and participatory than formal sector government institutions and, perhaps surprisingly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in several countries (Narayan, et al 2000b, 16; 2000c, 149, 203); although that varies substantially by location.

As might be expected, there is a general perception among the "poor" that the structure of authority disadvantages them in almost all formal and informal systems.

The logic of conflicts of interest among people experiencing poverty takes us beyond existing assumptions about the need for simply mediating conflicts between the poor and the "*non-poor*." Thus, to fashion effective anti-poverty programs, it will be necessary to 1 acknowledge the need for crafting poverty alleviation programs that differentiate among different types of

[1]I have actively engaged in poverty-alleviation programs and projects financed primarily by the official bi-lateral non-military "foreign-aid" entities of the United States (USAID) and the multi-lateral World Bank's original core "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development" (IBRD) and "International Development Association (IDA) between 1967-2000; in addition to lesser or sporadic involvements in similar programs of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 1982-1983); UK's Department for International Development (DfFID, 2003-2004); The German and Spanish Embassies in Honduras (2005); and the Asian Development Bank (2005-2006, 2007). Those engagements included ten long-term residential assignments in seven countries (i.e., Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Peru, Thailand, and Vietnam; multiple long-term programs or projects requiring intermittent visits in 27 countries distributed among four different regions (i.e., Sub-Sahara Africa (13), Asia (9), Latin America (3), and Middle East (2); and other professional engagements in twelve countries outside of the longer-term residential assignments or intermittent longer-term engagements across three continents (i.e., Sub-Sahara Africa (6), Asia (4), and Central America (2).

poor people, 2 adapt such programs to the subjective perceptions of the poor themselves, and 3 utilize pre-existing legitimate decision-making processes where they exist to mediate the resolution of conflicts among the poor themselves and between them and other segments of society (*i.e.*, utilize parallel governance arrangements when possible and appropriate).[2]

At least one of the keys to poverty reduction is the mutual leveraging of the limited but different resources available in the *formal* and *informal* sectors. Formal sovereign-state governments are necessary and important partners for reducing poverty within their countries' borders. However, the reality remains that a broader range of informal organizations perform governance functions than those within the formal public sector alone.

Parallel Governance

If we aren't organized and don't unite, we can't ask for anything" – an anonymous "poor man" from Argentina

(Narayan 2000a: 21)

For the purposes of this paper, "parallel governance" is defined as "*the effective performance of public sector governance functions by non-state actors within organized socio-political and economic groups*."[3] With that definition in mind, this paper also argues that there is *No Such Thing as an Ungoverned Populated Space*! If officially recognized governments do not perform essential governance functions or do so in substantially ineffective ways – despite retaining a legally sanctioned monopoly of force to coerce compliance – other non-official groups will do so in their stead. While officially recognized central governments are expected to perform governance functions within their own states, pockets of populated groups are governed entirely or partially outside the ambit of formal government in almost every country.

Non-state parallel governance systems can consist of remnants of former regimes (including multiple, localized, and culturally diverse locations) when official governments fail to take root within newly established states. Alternatively, they can occur when at least one political group emerges to perform essential governance functions absent effective official Government performance or as informal competition to it. When formal governments do not perform legitimate governance functions among a significant part of the informal sector population – and where informal governance systems exist – there is a fundamental disconnect between official governments and a critical mass of their country's total population.

Before the establishment of sovereign states, most people lived and worked in a legally unregulated fashion. That did not mean that states did not exist or were not governed, but rather that comprehensive, legally defined authority had not yet been introduced. As James Scott has argued, sovereign state governments are inherently driven to make societies "*legible*" because tax collection, military conscription, and prevention of rebellion require the ability to count its citizens (Scott 1999, 2), as does the more "modern" post-World War II expectation that official governments deliver some level and types of *public* goods.[4]

Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne point out that "*extensive empirical evidence* exists...*that the self-organizing capabilities of people can survive and occasionally even flourish under repressive regimes*" (Elinor Ostrom et al. 1993, 190). Thus, the assumption that formal governments are the exclusive instrument for the performance of the governance function has proven to be much too limiting; it contributes to the distorted lenses through which we too often look at political systems in studies of comparative and inter-state politics. That is the case because where governments do not perform some or most governance functions, other "informal sector" groups do address them.[5] Thus, parallel governance exists whenever all of

[2]It is essential that legitimate unofficial organizations serve as a channel – even if only one channel – for citizen participation. Where the structure of authority within pre-existing unpublished organizations inhibits equitable participation and access to benefits (e.g., where they discriminate against women or the poor), new alternative organizational channels should also be provided as an opportunity for disadvantaged persons to use. Such an approach is based on an expanded conception of who should be included as relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, totally ignoring established informal structures of authority is also perilous, as some have argued was the case with India's changes in the panchayat system of village government.

[3]This is my definition of the prime concept promoted in these pages. I originally referred to essentially the same phenomena as "parallel government" in a 1992 World Bank publication. However, I updated that label to "parallel governance" in 1997; see my Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992, p. 10-11, and Analyzing the Role of the Public Sector in Africa: Implications for Civil Service Reform Policies, in Derick Brinkerhoff (ed), Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc., 1997), 159-185; respectively.

[4]Neither the economics nor public finance literature are consistent in specifying the attributes that differentiate "public" and "private" services. Nevertheless, most academic or practicing economists also agree that where the following characteristics are present, the good or service is public: (1) goods or services characterized by inability to exclude large numbers of people from receiving the benefit, whether they pay for it or not, should be considered public goods because there is no incentive for the private sector to provide them; (2) where the goods or services are consumed jointly and simultaneously by many people and the quantity and quality of such goods are relatively difficult to measure, then such goods are appropriately considered public goods; (3) when people have no choice in the consumption of a good or service because exposure to it is the equivalent of consuming it, the good or service should be considered a public good; and (4) when, within the normal operation of market mechanisms, economies of scale in the production of goods or services can be expected to lead to "natural monopolies," the good or service is essentially a public good even if the other criteria do not apply; quoted directly from Jerry Silverman, Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), 8.

[5]Keith Hart, a British anthropologist, introduced the term "informal sector" in 1971 while conducting research on rural migrants to Accra, the Capital City of Ghana, see Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, The Journal of Modern African Studies, March 1973, 68-76. Since then, the study of informal sectors has increased substantially. Nonetheless, although Hart was an anthropologist, in this early article, his focus was limited

the following criteria are met when and where informal groups: 1 can mobilize resources to provide public goods and services, 2 are endowed by its members with the authority to apply sanctions to those who do not comply with their decisions, and 3 the members attach primary loyalty to those informal organizations (with, perhaps the exception of loyalty to their immediate family).

Why is this important? From an economic perspective, informal sector employment increased substantially during and after the global recession from December 2007 to June 2009 (Horn 2009, 2-3). According to the International Labour Office, the informal sector was estimated at 61.2 percent of total employment *worldwide* by 2018; such shares increased to ~67 percent in "middle-income" states and ~90 percent in "lower-income" countries (Bonnet, Leung, Chacaltana 2018, 24-25). Those economic considerations are important, but interest in the equally important study of how those people are *governed* within their communities, workplaces, and social environments has lagged much further behind.

Nonetheless, the behavior of people who work, try to improve their lives, and raise and educate their children within the informal sector, directly and indirectly, impacts those who pursue the same goals within the formal sector. That is as important as the more obvious positive or negative impact of the formal sector on the "marginalized" lives of those existing in the informal sector – e.g., persons whose survival depends on public health and medical care services, transportation to work, childcare, public security, and so forth. Nonetheless, the issues that trap many people in lower-income, illegal informal neighborhoods while providing domestic or other less attractive services are mainly invisible to "their" official governments and the international external support agencies (ESAs) that partially finance them (Ostrom et al. 1993, 185, 187).

However, providing services alone does not by itself constitute "*governance*." Instead, the legitimate levying of "taxes" – monetary, in-kind, user fees, or other forms of required participation – and the ability to legitimately apply sanctions to those who do not comply qualifies such informal arrangements as *parallel governance*. It is clear from simple observations that such mechanisms exist and are in play. To the degree that this is the case in a particular time and place, effective linkages between official and parallel governance systems are necessary for efficient, effective, and sustainable poverty reduction or alleviation programs. Top-down attempts by formal governments to reduce poverty must be compatible with existing local parallel governance systems that focus primarily on mitigation.

Although parallel governance is most visible when countries are engaged in, or just emerging from, external wars or domestic "insurgencies," its importance is not limited to such circumstances alone. Thus, there are other types of parallel governance systems, including "*primordial*," "*adaptive*," "*reactive*," and "*intermediative*." (Picard et al. 2006, 17)

Primordial. In many parts of the world, primary affiliations accrue to stable communities or groups: tribes, clans, religions, and so forth. Persistent systems have evolved naturally from governance patterns that have organically developed from fundamental socio-political behavioral patterns existing before the introduction of macro-sovereign state superstructures (Geertz 1973, 255-310; Shils 1957, *passim*). As with other social science concepts, *primordialism* is used in various and not always consistent ways. Nonetheless, many scholars favorably disposed toward consideration of such "*primary sentiments*" would agree with Harold F. Schiffman that without some combination of "*first-order*" cultural elements, a society "*could not imagine themselves to exist* (Schiffman 1999, 25)." For people who live according to the well-understood rules of their own communities, these systems are simply "*ordinary*." Within broad parameters, such systems transcend the life cycles of those who live, work, and die within them.

In some places, parallel governance systems pre-date the colonial era. That is a good rather than a bad thing. Without non-state actors in many parts of the world, there would be even more illness, premature death, and physical destruction than what exists today – which is bad enough as it is (*cf* Ostrom, Schroeder, Wynne 1993, 185-192). As only one example, people often pay "untrained" or officially unregistered traditional "medical" practitioners for diagnoses and prescriptions (Donkoh

primarily to the same list of concerns held by economists whose understanding of the informal sector (i.e., parallel economies) is most often limited to the size and composition of the parallel economy, what drives or causes it, the impact of an informal economy on "welfare or productivity," economic linkages between the informal and formal sectors, and problems of dramatic rural to urban migration, existing tensions between macro-economic growth (GDP) versus the tenacity of poverty within the informal sector at local levels, and inequality. However, a number of social scientists have increasingly become interested in related governmental aspects of those issues. Examples of such recent studies include the following. First, for a comparative overview, see Veronique Dupont, David Jordhus-Lier, Catherine Sutherland, and Einar Braathen (eds), The Politics of Slums in the Global South: Urban Informality in Brazil, India, South Africa and Peru (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 230 pages; a discussion of politics within poor settlements in the global "south" emphasizing, among several other characteristics, residents' coping strategies and collective action. Second, for Kenya, see Kenneth King, Jua Kali Kenya: Change and Development in an Informal Economy, 1970–1995 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996), 256 pages; and for an early study of the estimated 25,000 hawkers who were "always at war with the city authorities," see Winnie Mitullah, Hawking as a Survival Strategy For The Urban Poor in Nairobi: The Case of Women, Environment and Urbanization, 3 (1991), p. 16, cited in Richard Stren, African Urban Research Since The Late 1980s: Responses to Poverty and Urban Growth, Urban Studies Review (1992). Third, for illustrations of life within Brazil's urban favelas, the performance of governance performance by "narco-terrorist" and civilian "militias" embedded within them, how the complex web of violence impact residents' lives, and the importance of economic and socio-political interactions between the formal and informal sectors, see Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (eds), Competition in Order and Progress: Criminal Insurgencies and Governance in Brazil (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris for Small Wars Foundation/, 2022), 606 pages, especially p. 133-154, Misha Glenny, Nemesis: One Man and the Battle for Rio (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 320 pages (for a summary, see this author's book review, Nemesis: One Man and the Battle for Rio, in the New York Journal of Books [February 12, 2016]), Erika M. R. Larkins, The Spectacular Favela: Violence in Modern Brazil (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015), 256 pages; respectively.

2005, 7). They will use so-called "traditional medicine" rather than governments' health programs – even when those services are provided free of charge. In such cases, culturally accepted informal parallel governance systems might be in place that "certify" the qualifications of those traditional medical practitioners (Jeugmann 2006, 32).

From a state-centric perspective, parallel governance systems negatively impact the effectiveness of official government medical programs. However, from the perspective of those living and working within the informal sector, traditional approaches to prescribing and providing care are often more effective or, if not more, accessible and better than nothing. Alternatively, governments could respond to such traditional practitioners by offering opportunities to learn how to respond to dehydration, take blood pressure readings, administer vaccinations, and supply them with sufficient amounts of rehydration pills and other non-toxic medicines. Approaches that do not attempt to eliminate traditional practices can contribute to the relative effectiveness of both modern and traditional systems and do so in ways that are not threatening to either (Jeugmann 2006, 25, 32-34, 35).

Adaptive**.** Meeting the need for defensive security or organized self-help – especially among people in informal urban neighborhoods – is the essence of "adaptive" parallel governance. The informal settlements of Lima, Peru, described by Hernando de Soto, are well-known examples (de Soto 1989). However, another variant includes broader criminal syndicates that displace formal government entities by providing "security" and minimal social services in exchange for acquiescence among local residents. Whereas persistent systems survive largely separate from the state, adaptive systems involve symbiotic interactions between those within and outside the formal state system (Picard et al. 2006, 57), often in mutually beneficial corruption or occasionally engaging criminal groups in mutually acceptable development activities.

Reactive**.** Non-state actors also include those who do not want to achieve sovereign-state power but are reacting to the absence of official channels for political competition. At one extreme are active insurgencies or criminal networks that govern openly in some areas within a state. At the other extreme, sanctuary is sought within domestic havens beyond the effective political reach of formal governments. Examples of such protected arenas can include religious organizations within which people can operate politically – including criticizing the Government – without suffering unacceptable consequences. Examples include Iraq and the United States. However, that option is less available in theocratic states such as Iran or in which religious minorities are not protected by their central governments, as in Myanmar. Other examples include "no-go areas" dominated by drug cartels – e.g., Favelas in Rio de Janeiro and northern areas of Mexico, neighborhood youth gangs in many large urban cities worldwide at one extreme, and at the other, camps for cross-border "refugees" and internally "displaced persons" (UNHCR. 2024 Geneva, CH: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 15, 25).

Intermediative**.** Although many new sovereign states were established without reference to the distribution of "nations" within or between them, "modernizing" elites are often alienated from many of their fellow citizens. That is not necessarily because those elites are corrupt or are not committed to the best interests of their citizens as they understand them. Nonetheless, the formal sector puts substantially less emphasis on the specific priority interests of people experiencing poverty or others living and working in the informal sector.

Governments cannot control the process; they can only influence it (Silverman 1992b, 16-17). Where governments desire to legitimize entrenched informal governance systems, they must enable effective intermediation between themselves and those systems. Therefore, they should identify effective mechanisms to adapt to, rather than displace, existing informal safety nets. Finally, incentives that motivate government decision-making must be restructured to support supply-side responses rather than supply-driven decisions about policies and their implementation (Silverman 2004, 244).

An important premise underlying classical and neo-liberal macro-economic policy liberalization is that a relatively free market always exists to maintain optimally stable financial performance and economic stability, both domestically and internationally. When formal governments intervene in economic activities, "distortions" are created in the operation of the market. Those distortions are often dismissed as "externalities" – including "parallel economies."[6]

Or, in the general vernacular, "black markets."[7]

More than five decades ago, Albert Hirschman (1970) argued that people "*exit*" from participation in government programs if their "voice" is ignored. But "exit" to where? Sometimes, to other local government jurisdictions or into the informal sector and its systems of parallel governance (*cf* Pierre and Peters 2021, 29). Nonetheless, while it might be possible for people to

[6]As summarized in WIEGO, History, Debate Policies: Historical Perspectives; Recent History. Women in Informal Employment: Globalization and Organizing, the study of informal sectors has evolved into at least five dominant schools of thought: (1) the "Dualist School" describes informal economy activities as marginal to and independent of the formal sector economy; (2) the "Structuralist School" focuses on how informal economy activity is linked to and supportive of the formal economy, reducing costs for formal firms; (3) the "Legalist School" focuses on how the informal economy allows entrepreneurs to operate independent of the onerous legal registration requirements of the formal economy; (4) the "Voluntarist School" focuses on how the informal economy allows entrepreneurs to avoid not only legal registration requirements but also other fees, regulations, and taxes; and (5) the "Rule of Law School" focuses on the illegal nature of the activities of the informal economy. Notably missing, however, is consideration of socio-political parallel governance issues within the informal sector.

[7]The definition of "Black Markets" varies. For many economists, it's defined as "illicit trade in goods or services in violation of official regulations" (compare to Merriam-Webster, Black-Market). This paper expands the concern for illicit economic activity to focus on governance issues within the black market, especially regarding conflicts. See Owen Griffiths, "Need, Greed, and Protest in Japan's Black Market, 1938-1949," Journal of Social History, 35/4 (Summer, 2002), p. 825-858.

"*escape*" the reach of formal sovereign-state *Governments*, they cannot opt out of a society's system of *governance* (except by moving within the ambit of another society's system of *governance*).

When and where significant numbers of people or groups have never entered the formal governance system, or others "exit" from it to organized informal governance systems, the costs to official governments of enforcing their legal requirements are sometimes perceived as ultimately self-defeating. Indeed, the existence of non-state governance systems can also function as a "safety valve" for governments under more demand pressures than they can reduce on their own. With that reasoning in mind, there is a need to distinguish between "*government*" and "*governance*."

Distinguishing Government from Governance**.** Government is best understood here as a formal legal organization that embodies the legal authority of a sovereign state; *i.e.*, government denotes an organization. Any government's minimum responsibility is the provision of physical security to the population at large and the peaceful allocation of *public*" goods. It is also generally understood that it is for that purpose that governments are endowed with a monopoly of coercive force within society, *i.e*., the power to make laws and enforce those laws with guns (*cf* Almond and Powell 1996, p. 22).

On the other hand, governance is defined here as "*the processes by which authority, whether codified in law or simply recognized* de facto *in society is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources*" (*i.e.*, governance is a social function).[8] By these definitions, the performance of the governance function is necessary in any ordered society (*cf* Kaufmann and Kraay 2023; World Bank n.d.),[9] and as a social function, governance – whether legitimate or not – can be provided by both (or either) formal and non-state entities. Nevertheless, specific governments might or might not effectively perform the governance function in a particular place or time. Therefore, where governments do not effectively perform some or most governance functions for a critical mass of their population, other non-state groups will perform them.

That does not mean that one or another parallel governance system is necessarily "*legitimate*." The basis of support for parallel governance systems is not uniform. Like any political system, parallel governance reflects actual distributions of power. It can be exercised through coercion or voluntary compliance. Some non-state actors provide more scope for individual freedom and stability than the governments they displace; others are dogmatic and repressive (Picard et al. 2006, 56).

Legitimate Governance**.** Governance is "*legitimate*" if it conforms with shared social norms and values that define appropriate structures of authority, the behavior of those persons exercising such authority, and the appropriate outcome of intra-societal conflict. As such, some conception of legitimacy influences behavior within both governments and non-state governing entities, at whatever level. Such attitudes include notions of appropriate structures of authority and the conduct of public officials. Thus, support for investment decisions depends, to some extent, on 1 the degree of agreement about the legitimate structure of authority among the population of a country, 2 the extent to which political and procedural norms and values are shared among the general population and their purported political leaders, or 3 the degree of congruence between shared norms concerning the structure of authority and the actual structure of such authority.

Legitimate governance is critical for achieving poverty reduction or mitigation. The normative aspect of legitimacy requires accountability of decision-makers to those affected by their decisions. A wide variety of mechanisms can contribute to accountability. Such tools can be divided into two broad categories: 1 those which operate internally within the public sector itself (*e.g.*, managerial supervision and evaluation of individual staff and effective performance of accounting and auditing functions) and those which are a function of "*balances of power*" among public sector institutions on the one hand and stakeholders outside of government on the other hand. Transparency of decisions and how they are implemented facilitates accountability. Central Governments in many countries and ESAs have often relied primarily on internal bureaucratic mechanisms to ensure accountability. More recent approaches increasingly stress external accountability by establishing markets and representative institutions for decision-making.

Thus, any effective approach to poverty alleviation among the heterogeneous poor must move from an essentially uniform focus on *what* specific investments to finance on the one hand to an increasing emphasis on *how* such decisions are made on the other hand; in other words, to a focus on *legitimate governance* that resolves conflict and achieves voluntary compliance by most parties with the outcome. Because both poverty and legitimate governance are subjective, the relationship between them is location and time-specific.

Life at rural village and urban neighborhood levels is institutionally complex. People experiencing poverty understand that complexity and consciously employ tactics to achieve benefits from the institutional hand they have been dealt. People living or working in the informal sector are fully aware of the much broader range of institutions within which they live than the limited number of organizations within and between which formal sector governments and external support agencies (ESAs) interact.

[8]The definition of "governance" provided by Webster's Unabridged Dictionary–i.e., the "exercise of [the] authority, control, management, [and] power of government" – is rejected here because it limits the performance of the "governance" function to "governments." Compare with Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Advanced Introduction to Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021), p. 1-6 of 168 pages. Also see World Bank, Managing Development: The Governance Dimension (A Discussion Paper) (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, August 29, 1991), p. 1. For a criticism of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators, among others, see Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Advanced Introduction to Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021), p. 112-113, 123-133 of 168 pages.

[9]See Worldwide Governance Indicators: Interactive Data Access for the complete data set.

Data provided by the previously cited World Bank study is suggestive – although admittedly not definitive. That evidence includes, as examples, 1 informal institutional arrangements for the provision of credit (through, for example, rotating credit societies); 2 voluntary security teams in large housing areas (i.e., in effect, unofficial police); and 3 financing of flood relief, orphanages, medical services, schools, access to water, sanitation, and power, and so forth. First, we look at some generic disadvantages experienced by people experiencing poverty from that World Bank study.

Participation. People experiencing poverty emphasized that participation involves a direct role in actual decision-making or at least having some influence on decisions that affect them. The ability to express and seriously consider those opinions in meetings or less formal discussions was an indicator of participation. Holding institutions accountable for their actual behaviors was also identified as important. Overall, informal institutions created and managed by people with low incomes themselves "*scored high on participation*." while formal sector government institutions and, perhaps surprisingly, NGOs scored substantially lower – except for programs directed toward supporting women and "other excluded groups" (Narayan 2000b, 16; 2000c, 149, 203).

However, a positive desire to actively participate in community or neighborhood activities should not be assumed! Few persons place a high priority on participation for its own sake. For example, most people want water delivered to their homes without making any effort beyond turning the tap. Interest in participating in activities related to water service delivery develops only to the extent that people believe that becoming involved improves the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supply above the opportunity cost of that involvement.

Thus, in Kawangu, Indonesia, older women thought participation was "unimportant." Instead, "*they placed 'fairness/justice and equitability' at the top of their list*." In Baan Ta Pak Chee, Thailand, some of the *poor* thought that if a decision by others in authority had been based on "*thorough consideration*" of the assistance being provided to them, then the degree of their participation would not be considered necessary; while in Kaoseng, Thailand, the p*oor* characterized *participation* as "*discussion, meeting, and news announcements*." In Chau Than, Viet Nam, a villager said, "*They talk a lot, so I cannot remember what they said in the meeting*." (Narayan et al. 2000c, 184) The issue, however, is, in most cases, more complex than these examples suggest.

Incentives for citizens to participate are deeply rooted in the particular physical, economic, political, and cultural context within which they find themselves (Techiman North District Assembly 2017). Identifying the variety and distribution of such location-specific incentives is not possible within the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, at least two incentives, besides the net economic benefit derived from participation, are generic:1the outcome of previous experiences with participation in government-sponsored activities and 2 conformity of the institutions for channeling participation with legitimate community organizations already in place.

For many community groups and individuals, experience with government in general has been negative. For example, 1 views solicited but then ignored, 2 data collected locally but analysis not subsequently shared, or 3 promises made but not kept. That is particularly true when superficially participatory methods are employed by governments to mobilize grass-roots political support. The result of such manipulative practices is most often local cynicism concerning the motives and consequences of government-sponsored participatory efforts.

Intermediation

An essential institutional policy implication for poverty reduction is the need to link mutually supportive activities performed within the informal and formal sectors. That, in turn, will require intermediation between culturally rooted *governance* practices and the governments of the internationally sanctioned formal sector.

Intermediation does not mean the wholesale co-optation of informal governance systems into *formal* systems. That approach – which involves creating parallel formal government *structures* at local community levels – has already been tried in most countries. Rather, *intermediation* implies legitimating pre-existing parallel governance arrangements and focusing on processes that provide mutually supportive links between those unpublished and formal governance systems.

What does that mean in practice? There are two key elements to establishing effective intermediation between formal and unpublished governance systems: 1 focusing on effective interaction rather than uniform organizational arrangements (*i.e.*, focus on the intermediation *function* rather than organizational *structures*) and 2 identifying appropriate agents of effective *intermediation*.

Intermediation Function**.** Joseph Stiglitz's argument that the IMF and World Bank went wrong when they confused the *function* of the *market* with the *structural* prescription of *privatization* is a direct corollary of the argument presented here (Stiglitz 1999). Thus, the notion that "unorganized" civil society participation in development decisions and implementation would require some form of the intermediation *function* was almost immediately transformed into the *structural* prescription of relying on self-proclaimed NGOs.

The difference between a formal sector *co-optation* approach and the *intermediation* approach advocated here is illustrated by the conventionally widespread assumption that effective "*participation*" requires "*community development*." That approach

assumes that people at the community level – or consumers of specific services – do not have the "*capacity*" to manage their own involvement in development assistance projects. People with low incomes, in particular, are often viewed as "*unorganized*" and lacking the skills required to plan and manage effective project implementation. However, that often means that the ways poor people organize themselves are not "*legible*" to the formal sector (and to ESA staff in particular) and that the *poor*'s *governance* behaviors do not conform to formal sector practices.

Thus, in real terms, the problem most often arises from the fact that 1 by virtue of being informal, the organized poor do not have formal sector legal status and, thus, cannot enter into legal contracts with *formal* sector agencies or 2 they do not include persons who know how to conform to the specific administrative procedures required by the formal sector (*e.g.*, carry-out procurement according to formal government or ESA requirements). Thus, the normal response to those perceived deficiencies is two-fold: 1 "*community development*," which involves "*mobilizing*" and "*organizing*" people to enable them to participate effectively *as a group within* and in *conformity with* formal sector norms, values, organizational arrangements, and behaviors and 2 "*capacity-building*," which involves training local leadership and other individuals in those specific skills required to perform tasks according to the rules established by the formal sector.

Intermediation implies a substantially different approach than that required by the "*community-development*" and "*capacity-building*" approach. It begins from the assumption that the "*poor*" do, in fact, live within pre-existing organized societies within which some form of effective – if not always optimally efficient – "*governance*" is operative. The problem is, therefore, not a lack of organization and capacity but rather that the norms, values, organizational arrangements, and behaviors are different. Such differences make connections at the interface between the formal and informal systems difficult; ignoring the existence of parallel governance systems makes mutually supportive relationships impossible. Thus, *intermediation* does not require changes in the norms, values, organizational structures, or behaviors in either formal or informal governance. Instead, it focuses on how effective connections can be made between those distinct systems without any substantial changes in either of them.

Transactions between the *formal* and *informal* sectors can be *direct* or *indirect*, *sequential* or *concurrent*. The concern here is limited to direct, indirect, or concurrent transactions. Examples of *direct* transactions are the reliance of many formal sector enterprises on informal sector provision of raw materials and other products or services for their own production processes and *vice verse*. *Sequential* transactions are movements of individuals between *formal* and *informal* sector employment (*e.g.*, migrant workers).

Intermediation Agents**.** "*Middlemen"* are an example of *concurrent* transactions that enable exchanges of goods and services between *formal* and *informal* sectors by translating the "*contracting*" mechanisms in one sector into the "*contracting*" mechanisms of the other (it should also be noted that such "*middlemen*" are often individual formal sector civil servants who maintain close connections to their home communities and families) (Silverman 2004, 241).

Persons concurrently participating in *formal* and *informal* sector activities can be viewed as "*Commuters*." *Commuters* include those employed in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy simultaneously (King 1990, *passim*) or who facilitate transactions between them. Thus, "*although the financial markets in the two sectors are highly segmented, demand for credit in one sector is not entirely exclusive of the other sector*" (Silverman 1992a, 22-23). For example, money produced within the informal sector is often used to purchase goods – and to a more limited extent – services available in the formal sector.

Both formal and informal sector organizations have limited discretion over what they can and cannot do. As an example from the finance sector, central banks in most countries attempt to monitor – with more or less effect – commercial banks to ensure prudent lending practices. However, those regulations are not the only disincentive for formal-sector commercial banks' disinclination to provide small-volume non-collateralized loans to a myriad number of potential borrowers. Other factors include the need to 1 establish multiple branch offices, 2 conduct due diligence on potential small-scale borrowers lacking "real property" assets (Silverman 2005a, 33-34; de Soto 2000, *passim*), and 3 train both headquarters and branch employees to provide a welcoming environment for such borrowers (personal experience). That latter change is especially important to offset the intimidating effect of the often ostentatious physical structures favored by established commercial banks and resentments resulting from the dismissive or explicitly insulting treatment received from formal banking personnel.

Although sometimes subject to exploitation, the intermediation role is not inherently exploitive. Transaction costs incurred by non-state lenders often reflect the economic value of services provided (Silverman 1992a, 23). Nonetheless, *ad hoc* mechanisms currently employed for maintaining effective links between the *formal* and *informal* sectors minimize the potential positive contribution that activities within the latter could make to economic development and the improved efficiency derived from mutually supportive links between *informal* and *formal governance* arrangements. The fact that the "*community development*," "*capacity-building*," and "*intermediation*" approaches are different does not mean that they are necessarily mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, a primary emphasis on crafting effective means for efficient intermediation should receive increased attention.

Formalizing the Informal Sector?

Viewed from the conventional formal sector perspective on economic development, the informal sector, as an illegal and effectively unregulated segment of the economy, is a problem. But that problem is compounded substantially by the existence of parallel governance. The solution to the problem of parallel economies offered by many free-market economists is to recognize the reality of the market-oriented informal (*i.e.*, parallel) economy and integrate it into the formal and officially sanctioned economic system. By so doing, it is believed that mutually supportive relationships can be established between the interests of both the public and private sectors. As only one example of this reasoning, if a Government can legitimate and regularize economic activities currently undertaken in the informal sector, it should be able to increase its tax revenues while reducing the cost of operations for the private sector.

Unfortunately, any attempt to integrate formal and informal governance systems will likely be complicated (Ostrom et al. 1993, 183-184). Thus, many governments have relied on structural co-optation instead of attempting functional integration. For example, some observers have argued that the formal establishment of the *panchayat* system by the Indian Federal Government in the late 1950s was an attempt to transfer effective authority over "*common property resources*" (CPR) at the village level from traditional local leaders to more cooperative, supposedly development-oriented, persons (Chandaka 2021, 43-44). However, the *new panchayat* leadership lacked the ability to provide the positive incentives that had previously motivated the users of CPRs to contribute toward their upkeep. Thus, the new *panchayat* system established a substitute form of governance involving custodians and managers whose primary motivation was to exploit them to secure subsidies from the Federal and State governments (Datta and Sodhi 2021, 9-24).

Conclusion

This paper has outlined a path toward greater clarity in the study of "poverty" by emphasizing the utility of a multi-disciplinary approach, the core of which relies on the concept of parallel governance. It has argues that we should expand the parameters of our research, study, and teaching about poverty and domestic and external attempts to reduce it to include "*parallel governance.*"[10] Top-down attempts by formal governments to reduce poverty must be compatible with existing local parallel governance systems that focus primarily on mitigating different manifestations of poverty among the heterogeneous "poor." However, under conditions where *formal* and *informal* governance systems exist largely apart, the transaction costs for effective interactions between them are unnecessarily high.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the structures within which we currently organize ourselves to *do* poverty reduction are founded on a view of both domestic and external political systems that do not conform to current or likely future political realities. Any new paradigm will need to acknowledge the importance of crafting poverty alleviation programs that differentiate among different types of poor people, adapt poverty alleviation programs to their own subjective perceptions, and utilize *pre-existing legitimate* decision-making processes where they exist that mediate the resolution of conflicts among people living and working within the informal sectors themselves, and between them and those more visible segments of a society's social, economic, and political life.

References

Almond, Gabriel, and G. Bingham Powell. 2007. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 9th edition. London, UK: Pearson Longman: 800.

Bonnet, Florence, Vicky Leung, and Juan Chacaltana. 2018. Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture. 3rd edition. Geneva, CH: Document and Publications Production, Printing and Distribution Branch/ILO: 164.

Bunker, Robert J., and John P. Sullivan (eds). 2022. *Competition in Order and Progress: Criminal Insurgencies and Governance in Brazil.* Bloomington, IN: Xlibris for Small Wars Foundation.

Chandaka, Umamaheswararao. 2021. "Local Self-Government in India: An Historical Evolution." *International Journal of Academic Research*. 8/12 (December): 39-47.

Datta, Prabhat Kumar and Inderjeet Singh Sodhi. 2021. "The Rise of the Panchayati Raj Institutions as the Third Tier in Indian Federalism: Where the Shoe Pinches." *Indian Journal of Public Administration*. 67/1: 9-26.

[10] In my current book project, tentatively titled "Parallel Governance: Institutional Change in Vietnamese History," I argue that parallel governance is only one of several related concepts that, in combination, are key to a more inclusive understanding of political activities in countries worldwide. Nonetheless, addressing all three of those core concepts in this one paper would require more space than available here.

De Soto, Hernando. 1989. *The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution In The Third World*. New York, NY: Basic Books: 271.

_____. 2003. *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*. New York: Basic Books: 288.

Donkoh, Wilhelmina J. 2005. "Traditional Leadership, Human Rights and Development: The Asante Example." Paper presented at the The Second International Conference on Gross National Happiness, *Rethinking Development: Local Pathways to Global Wellbeing*. St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada. (June 20-24): 1-11.

Dupont, Veronique, et al (eds). 2015. *The Politics of Slums in the Global South: Urban Informality in Brazil, India, South Africa and Peru.* New York, NY: Routledge: 248.

Feifer, Jules. 1965. *Explainers: The Complete Village Voice Strips (1956-66)*. Seattle, WA: Fantagraphics Books: 568.

Geertz, Clifford J. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc.: 479.

Glenny, Misha. 2016. *Nemesis: One Man and the Battle for Rio*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf: 328.

Griffiths, Owen. 2002. "Need, Greed, and Protest in Japan's Black Market, 1938-1949." *Journal of Social History,* 35/4 (Summer): 825-58.

Hart, Keith. 1973. "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, (March): 68-76.

Hirschman, Albert. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 176.

Horn, Zoe E. 2009. "No Cushion to Fall Back On: The Global Economic Crisis and Informal Worker." Global Economic Crisis Study*, Synthesis Report*. Manchester, UK: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing Ltd. [WIEGO] (August): 36.

Jeugmann, Jacques, and Jerry Mark Silverman. 2006. "Cross-Sectoral Governance & Achievement of Health MDGs in Asia." Final draft. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank: 103.

Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. Worldwide Governance Indicators: What is Meant by Governance? A Database for the Period Between 1996-2023. Washington, DC: World Bank.

King, Kenneth. 1996. "*Jua Kali Kenya: Change and Development in an Informal Economy, 1970–1995*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press: 256.

_____. 1990. "Research, Policy and the Informal Sector: African Experience." In *The Informal Sector Revisited,* edited by David Turnham, Bernard Salome, and Antoine Schwarz. Paris: Development Centre of the OECD: 226.

Larkins, Erika M.R. 2015. *The Spectacular Favela: Violence in Modern Brazil*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press: 256.

Le, Christina. 2023. Land of the Big P.X.: A Social History of South Vietnam's Black Market Economy. Paper prepared for presentation at the 52nd Annual Southwest Conference on Asian Studies (SWCAS). Houston, TX (November 3-4, 2023): 26 pages.

Mitullah, Winnie. 1991. "Hawking as a Survival Strategy For The Urban Poor in Nairobi: The Case of Women." *Environment and Urbanization*, 3/2: 13-22. cited in Richard Stren, "African Urban Research Since The Late 1980s: Responses to Poverty and Urban Growth." *Urban Studies Review*. May 1992: 533-555.

Narayan, Deepa. 2000a. "Poverty is Powerlessness and Voicelessness," *Finance & Development: A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF,* 37/4 (December): 18-21.

_____. et al. 2000b. Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices From 47 Countries. Vol. 1 of 3. New York, NY: Oxford University Press for The World Bank: 348.

_____. et al. 2000c. Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change. Vol. 2 of 3. New York, NY: Oxford University Press for The World Bank: 336.

_____. and Patti Petesch, (eds). 2002. Voices of the Poor: From Many Lands. Vol. 3 of 3. New York, NY: Oxford University Press for The World Bank: 530.

Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne. 1993. *Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 288.

Picard, Louis A., et al. 2006. "Draft Final Report for USAID, Regional Variations in Local Governance" Washington, DC: PADCO. unpublished: 78.

Pierre, Jon, and B. Guy Peters. 2021. *Advanced Introduction to Governance*. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing: 176.

Samimian-Darash, and Paul Rabinow (eds). 2015. *Modes of Uncertainty: Anthropological Cases*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press: 256.

Schiffman, Harold F. 1999. "Linguistic Primordialism," in Gary B. Palmer and Debra J. Occhi (eds). *Languages of Sentiment: Cultural Constructions of Emotional Substrates*. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Co. (Dec. 15): 25-38.

Scott, James. 1999. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 464.

Shils, Edward A. 1957. "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory," *British Journal of Sociology*, 8/2 (June): 130-145.

Silverman, Jerry Mark, 2016. "Review of Nemesis: One Man and the Battle for Rio." Misha Glenny, *New York Journal of Books* (Feb. 12).

_____. 2005. " Economic Policies, Poverty & Political Accountability in Latin America & The Caribbean." Jose de Arimateia da Cruz and Eduardo R Gomez (eds). *Latin America in the New International System: Challenges and Opportunity*. Boston: Pearson Custom Publishers): p. 174-232.

_____. 2004. "The Missing Link: Creating Mutual Dependencies Between the Poor and the State." *International Public Management Journal*, 7/2: 227-247.

_____. 2000. "Governance and Poverty: An Alternative Paradigm." Paper presented at a workshop on *Asia's Persisting Social Challenge* at the Second Asia Development Forum: East Asia From Crisis to Opportunity, jointly organized in Singapore by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank (June 6-8, 2000): 40 pages.

_____. 1997. "Analyzing the Role of the Public Sector in Africa: Implications for Civil Service Reform Policies." *Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus*. Derick Brinkerhoff (ed). Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc: p 159-185.

_____. 1992a. "Dual Economy Theory Revisited: Governance and The Role of The Informal Sector." Paper presented at the Fourth Annual International Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (*SASE*), Irvine, California (March 27 - 29): 29 pages.

_____. 1992b. Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs. Washington, DC: World Bank (November): 126 pages.

Stiglitz, Joseph. 1999. "Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition," paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, DC: April 28–30.

Techiman North District Assembly (Ghana; ~80 miles north of Kumasi), "Governance: The Local Government System" (November 21, 2017).

UNHCR. 2024. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023. Geneva, CH: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 48.

Vietnam Law & Legal Forum. 2017. Current Local Administration System in Vietnam. Ha-Noi, VN: Viet-Nam News Agency (March 11).

WIEGOa. "History, Debate & Policies: Historical Perspectives; Recent History." Manchester, UK: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing Ltd.

WIEGOb. "Informal Workers In Focus: Domestic Workers." Manchester, UK: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing Ltd.

World Bank. 1991. Managing Development: The Governance Dimension, World Bank Discussion Paper. Washington, DC: The World Bank: 61.

World Bank. n.d. "Worldwide Governance Indicators: Interactive Data Access." Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Gender Gap in Social Welfare Policy Attitudes

Vivian Cassaniti[1]

[1]Undergraduate Student, Department of Government and Sociology, Georgia College & State University.
[*]2023 GPSA Pajari Award for best undergraduate paper.

ABSTRACT

Gender differences in public opinion and policy attitudes have been a hallmark of American politics for many years. Gender differences account for how women and men respond to contemporary issues. For example, women are more likely than men to support gun control measures, access to abortion, and increased spending on social welfare programs. Women are less likely than men to support the death penalty, the use of military force to settle international disputes, and stricter immigration policies. Furthermore, gender patterns in public opinion extend to several other public policy issues under the umbrella of social welfare. Political science studies show that women are more likely to identify as Democrats than men and are more likely to express opinions that are consistent with Democrats' policy positions. However, there are more important differences between women based on race, ethnicity, and other demographic factors. Why are there systematic gender differences in attitudes to public policy issues? What are the factors driving these differences? What role do other factors, such as partisanship and racial and ethnic identity, play? This study explores the dynamics of these gender differences and how they shape American politics. This study sheds light on what gendered patterns of public opinion look like in the United States, what underlying factors drive these patterns, and how gender interacts with other identities to influence political attitudes. To examine how partisanship and other identities influence gender disparities in social welfare policy attitudes, this study analyzes data from the 2021 General Social Survey.

The gender gap is usually interpreted as the distinct difference in earnings between men and women. The most common statistic cited when discussing the gender gap and its effects ("for every dollar earned by men, women earn between 80 – 83 cents") confines the gender gap into a discussion about wages. While this is one of the most harmful effects that has resulted from the perceived societal difference between men and women, the gender gap also exists in healthcare, education attainment, and economic and political participation. The gender gap is a polarizing issue and as such, there has been an inconsistent effort to address it in the form of legislation. The formally proposed Equality Act (2021) could have addressed gender inequality in a significant way by "prohibiting discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity in public facilities, education, federal funding, employment, housing, credit, and the jury system" (H.R. 5 2021). At a time with incredibly thin margins for both Democrats and Republicans, the Equality Act failed to achieve ratification. The difference in ideological beliefs and values between the two political parties is the strongest explanation for the failed legislative act but, considering that the objective was to address discrimination on the basis of sex, it must also be considered how the gender makeup of each party contributed to the outcome of this act and other legislation proposed to mitigate similar problems (Pearson 2010). The failed result is indicative of a partisan difference between gender issues and sex, but does that same difference exist among American citizens?

Despite targeted legislation proposed and, sometimes, enacted to mitigate the differences in treatment between men and women, the gender gap is deeply engrained in many facets of social and political environments. Men and women often hold different views on legislation and proposed policies, but do these differences align with the differences observed between party lines? This study will focus on national spending policies and the attitudes observed between men and women. It will seek to understand the difference between men and women in their attitudes towards specific national spending amounts and if those differences exist more between gender or between party affiliation. To test party affiliation on a more inclusive scale, this study will incorporate political ideology as an indicator for anticipated political behavior, using a scale from liberal to moderate to conservative. This study will also explore if other factors, such as race, age, class, and religion, have a substantial effect on the observed differences between men and women on policy attitudes.

Gender and Political Attitudes

Research done on gender in political science typically applies socially perceived phenomena as an explanation to political behavior, such as political participation, voting behavior, and other forms of civic engagement. Common stereotypes and observed personality traits associated with men and women strongly affect their political behavior (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kaufmann 2002). If we treat women as an isolated monolithic block, stereotypes naturally lead us to believe that women are

matronly, compassionate, gentle, and passive individuals. Contrastingly, stereotypes indicate that men are aggressive, dominant, and tough individuals. These stereotypes play into political behavior by suggesting that women will support policies that are compassionate and gentle and men will support policies that are tough and aggressive, especially policies that mediate threats to security (Huddy and Terkliden 1993; Kaufmann 2002). In the instance of foreign policy and foreign aid, specifically, women are conventionally seen as more "peace-loving and pacifistic" than men (Togeby 1994). Issues that women are more likely to support because of their compassionate and matronly qualities are regarded as "compassion issues"; compassion issues include policies that aid the disabled, impoverished, sick, and homeless, among others. Women are consistently more likely to support compassion issues than men (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

The above phenomenon developed after the 1980s. Prior to the 1980s, women were typically more politically conservative than their male counterparts. This introduces the effect that cultural issues have on perceived stereotypes and political attitudes. The political environment of the 1980s shifted women's behavior from conservative to liberal. Women, as a group, are more likely to be affected by current cultural issues and, as such, are more likely to support issues that mediate tension and support disadvantaged groups (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Welch 1977). Barring the obvious relationship between women and reproductive rights, this theory explains women's overwhelming support for reproductive rights, LGBTQ+ rights, police/prison reform, and immigration reform. This is more evidence in support of the "compassion issues" theory. Additionally, when analyzing attitudes towards national *spending*, it is imperative to include how the likelihood of economic stability/vulnerability may influence one's opinion. As women are more likely to experience economic vulnerability than their male counterparts, they are more likely to rely on government assistance, which helps to explain their support for such programs (Kaufman 2002).

Political Ideology and Political Attitudes

An individual's political ideology is one of the most influential factors in predicting and explaining political behavior. Challenging the notion that party identification determines attitudes on specific political issues, some scholars (Cann and Levendusky 2011; Carsey and Layman 2006) argue that charged political issues and polarization determine party identification and subsequently political ideology. Cann and Levendusky (2011) describe the phenomenon of "party sorting" as individuals adjusting their ideology and "sorting" themselves within the party to align more with their new ideology depending on the cultural issue. For example, a Republican voter who is against the use of the death penalty may "sort" themselves as a conservative democrat because of the severity of capital punishment in their personal view (Cann and Levendusky 2011). This is further evidence that political issues influence political ideology more than any existing loyalty to a specific party. Other scholars partially reject this phenomenon by suggesting that partisanship and political attitudes fluctuate and inform each other instead of causing each other. Carsey and Layman (2006) qualify this theory with the condition that individuals who make this shift in their political ideology must be aware of a distinct difference between the parties (and loosely the political ideologies) on the issue in question. Despite the research conducted on political issues informing party identification, there is substantial research indicating that political ideology is one of the most powerful predictors of political attitudes (Grossman and Hopkins 2015; Kaufmann 2002).

The Intersection of Gender and Political Ideology

There is overwhelming research that finds that Democrats are in support of "compassion issues." The liberal political ideology observed in the US is largely centered around the government being responsible for the safety and welfare of the public. Additionally, Grossmann and Hopkins (2015) consistently describe the Democratic Party as a coalition of different forces, usually social groups, united to achieve tangible government action "who are engaged in politics not merely to seek power for its own sake but also to advance particular government policies." In contrast, Grossmann and Hopkins (2015) describe the Republican party as "an agent of ideological movement" who value small government and individual responsibility. Thus, consistent with previous research, women are more likely to identify with liberal political ideologies and vote Democrat, while men are more likely to identify with conservative political ideologies and vote Republican (Barnes and Cassese 2017; Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, Koenig 2004; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). This is supported when applying the earlier theory of men and women voters and "compassion issues." The extent to which sex and political ideology affect political attitudes will be analyzed further in this study.

Critical Review

Research on gender and political behavior/expression often fails to consider the immense variability within large monoliths. While some scholars (Foster 2008) do analyze the combined effects that race and gender have on political attitudes and behavior, most treat women as a single functioning body. There is substantial evidence of women of different races and classes holding competing views based on certain issues. Cassese and Barnes (2018) determine a difference in support of childcare policies

based on the race of the mother and children who would receive the welfare. Notably, black mothers are particularly against childcare given to white mothers regardless of the class of the latter. This study alone challenges the notion that all women share the same political tendencies and attitudes. As race significantly contributes to an individual's personal experiences, it is an important factor to consider when analyzing the effects sex has on political attitudes. To correct for this, this study will add race as an independent variable when predicting attitudes toward national spending amounts.

Theory and Hypotheses

The following framework for understanding attitudes towards national spending amounts can be understood based on research surrounding this topic. First, based on gendered differences in political participation and social attitudes, women are more likely to support higher spending amounts on policies such as welfare, healthcare, education, childcare, poverty relief, foreign aid, etc. For a multitude of reasons, many lying within the stereotypes and perceived personality traits women are associated with (compassionate, gentle, community-oriented, passive), women are more likely to identify with liberal ideologies. Based on opposite stereotypes and perceived personality traits (individualistic, aggressive, assertive, dominant), men are more likely to support policies that enhance these traits on a larger scale. Examples include seeking individualist/protectionist policies in foreign affairs and supporting increased national security. As such, men are more likely to identify with conservative ideologies. This framework is largely based on supported sociopolitical phenomena that link these specific traits and behaviors to civically engaged men and women. From this theory, two hypotheses can be formed. Note the relationship between men who identify with liberal ideologies and women who identify with conservative ideologies will be explored more.

As mentioned earlier, the tendency for women to support increased spending on social welfare can be, in part, explained by the economic vulnerability of women. Women are more likely to experience lower income, poverty, and domestic and sexual abuse, leaving them more likely to rely on the government for jobs and assistance than their male counterparts (Kauffman 2002). In tandem with the increased susceptibility for harm, women are more likely to support "compassion issues" (Huddy and Terklidsen 1993). This theory yields the first hypothesis:

H1: Women will support higher national spending on childcare, welfare, and foreign aid than men.

Combining the effect that political ideology has on political attitudes with gender, there is the potential for a slight difference within one sex based on political ideology (Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, and Koenig 2004; Eichenberg and Stoll 2012). Along with the liberal tendency to support "compassion issues," focusing on men and the male tendency to support aggressive and assertive policies, the following hypothesis emerges:

H2: Men will support higher national spending on defense and crime reduction polices than woman.

Data and Variables

The General Social Survey, conducted every other year, tracks information on United States citizens' concerns, expressions, attitudes, and practices. For the purpose of this study, the results from the 2021 General Social Survey were used and analyzed. This study uses ten independent variables and five dependent variables measuring attitudes toward national spending. The main independent variables this study will focus on are sex and political ideology. The variable sex is measured as '1' for male and '2' for female. The variable measuring political ideology represents the respondent's self-placed political ideology measured on a seven-point scale with '1' being extremely liberal and '7' being extremely conservative. A higher score on *polsview* indicates that the respondent identifies their political beliefs as more conservative, while a lower score indicates that the respondent identifies their political beliefs as more liberal.

Five national spending variables were used to measure respondent's attitudes toward existing spending amounts. The national spending variables were measured on a three-point scale with '1' being "too little," '2' being "about right," and '3' being "too much." Lower scores on these national spending variables indicate that the respondent supports additional spending on the policies that fall under the spending category. Higher scores indicate that the respondent supports decreased spending on the policies in question. The following five national spending variables were used in this study: *nataid* (measuring attitudes towards national spending amount on foreign aid), *natarms* (military, armaments, and defense), *natchld* (assistance for childcare), *natcrime* (halting the rising crime rate), and *natfare* (welfare).

While sex and political ideology are important factors when determining the respondent's attitudes toward policy spending amounts (Barnes and Cassese 2017; Eagly Diekman, Johannsesen-Schmidt, and Koenig 2004; Grossman and Hopkins 2015), they are not the only factors that inform one's attitudes and as such, should not be strictly considered when predicting political attitudes. When conducting multiple logistic regression analyses for each spending variable, this study included the additional independent variables of race, religion, age, class, education, and confidence in military, Congress, and banks and financial institutions, as there is consistent research that proves that these factors influence respondents' political attitudes and behavior (Barnes and Cassese 2017; Foster 2008; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Togeby 1994; Watts 1999).

The confidence variables (*conarmy*, *conlegis*, *confinan*) were measured on a three-point scale with '1' being "a great deal," '2' being "only some," and '3' being "hardly any." The race variable (*race*) is measured as '1' being white, '2' being black, and 3 being other. The religion variable (*protestant*) is measured as 0 being "other religion" and '1' being Protestant religion. The education variable (*degree*) is measured on a five-point scale, with '0' being "less than high school" and '4' being a "graduate degree." The class variable (*class*) is measured on a five-point scale from "lower class" to "upper class," including a "no class" option. The score on the age variable (*age*) is directly correlated with the respondent's age (measuring 1 – 88) except for respondents who are 89 and older.

Measurement

The variables selected from this study all have categories that are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and relatively homogenous. The variables sex, race, and Protestant are all at the nominal level of measurement as these variables are non-numerical and cannot be ranked. The following variables are at the ordinal level of measurement as the categories that GSS2021 provides can be ranked from high to low or low to high, depending on the variable: national spending variables (*natarms*, *nataid*, *natchld*, *natcrime*, *natfare*), political ideology (*polsview*), class (*class*), education level (*degree*), confidence variables (*conarmy, confinan, conlegis*). Finally, age (*age*) is at the interval-ratio level of measurement.

Methods

To test these hypotheses, this study will first demonstrate a crosstabulation between sex and the national spending amount variables. This bivariate correlation will provide information on the existing relationship between sex and attitudes toward national spending amounts and if these relationships are statistically significant. Following this, this study will conduct multinomial logistic regression analyses that can be used to both predict attitudes towards national spending amounts and provide clarity as to what effect the independent variables have on national spending amount attitudes. As the dependent variables in this study are at the ordinal level of measurement, ordinal logistic regression is usually conducted to produce the results intended for this study. However, one of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the coefficients that describe the relationship between higher categories of the response variables are the same as those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories. In this study, this parallel regression assumption was violated, indicating that there is a difference in the coefficients between models. As such, this study will use multinomial logistic regression.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 is a frequency table for the variable *sex*. There is a slight majority of female respondents with 55.9% being women and 44.1% being men.

Table 1

	Frequency	*Percent*	*Valid Percent*	*Cumulative Percent*
male	1736	43.1	44.1	44.1
female	2204	54.7	55.9	100
Total	3940	97.7	100	

	Frequency	*Percent*	*Valid Percent*	*Cumulative Percent*
male	1736	43.1	44.1	44.1
female	2204	54.7	55.9	100
Total	3940	97.7	100	

Table 2 is a frequency table for the variable *polsview*. Based on this figure, the most represented political ideology among respondents is moderate (34.7%). There is a steady decline on each side of the spectrum in terms of representation with "liberal" (15.7%) as a slight plurality over "conservative" (15.6%). As anticipated, the two extremes, "extremely liberal" and "extremely conservative," are in the minority with 5.2% and 4.4%, respectively.

Table 2

	Frequency	*Percent*	*Valid Percent*	*Cumulative Percent*
extremely liberal	207	5.1	5.2	5.2
liberal	623	15.5	15.7	20.9
slightly liberal	490	12.2	12.4	33.3
moderate, middle of the road	1377	34.2	34.7	68
slightly conservative	476	11.8	12	80
conservative	617	15.3	15.6	95.6
extremely conservative	174	4.3	4.4	100
Total	3964	98.3	100	

Bivariate Comparison

Bivariate comparisons analyze and compare measures of associations between two variables. These crosstabulations also assess the strength and pattern of relationships between variables, which is helpful when determining how variables are related to each other and potentially inform each other.

Table 3 depicts information collected from running a crosstabulation between *sex* and all national spending variables, *nataid*, *natarms*, *natchld*, *natcrime*, *natfare*.

Table 3

	nataid	*natarms*	*natchld*	*natcrime*	*natfare*
Pearson Chi-Square	0.263	9.599	32.277	25.608	0.618
Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	0.877	0.008**	<.001**	<.001**	0.734
df	2	2	2	2	2
N of Valid Cases	1914	1919	3892	1915	1915
Phi	0.012	0.071	0.092	0.116	0.018
Cramer's V	0.012	0.071	0.092	0.116	0.018

Out of the five national spending variables selected for this study, three had a significant relationship with sex: national spending amount on defense, childcare, and crime reduction policies. National spending on foreign aid (Chi-Square = .0263, df = 2, Cramer's V = .012, p-value = .0877) and national spending on welfare (Chi-Square = .618, df = 2, Cramer's V = .018, p-value = .0734) had insignificant relationships with sex. Despite the relationships between sex and national spending on military, armaments, and defense (Chi-Square = 9.599, df = 2, Cramer's V = .071, p-value = .008), national spending on childcare (Chi-Square = 32.377, df = 2, Cramer's V = .092, p-value <.001), and national spending on crime reduction policies (Chi-Square = 25.608, df = 2, Cramer's V = .116, p-value <.001), being significant, all relationships where relatively weak. This is indicated by the low Cramer's V value of .071, .092, and .116, respectively. The relationships between all national spending variables and sex, as well as other demographic factors, will be explored further.

Multinomial Logistic Regression

By conducting a multinomial logistic regression analysis, the probability of the score on the dependent variable can be generated. Multinomial logistic regression also provides salient information on which variables have the strongest effect on the dependent variable and the total amount of variance in the dependent variables that the combined effects of all independent variables are responsible for. This information is crucial when revising and editing theories and hypotheses. Multinomial logistic regression is used for predicting scores on a categorical dependent variable, in this case, the national spending amount attitudes. For this study, the third category in the national spending variables ("too much") was treated as the reference category. To create a binary of support for either more or less national spending, results were
focused on analyzing the Beta coefficients from the "too little" category. **Table 4** displays the Pseudo R Square values, measured using Nagelkerke, for all independent variables.

Table 4

	Pseudo R Square value, Nagelkerke
Foreign aid (nataid)	0.247
Military, armaments, defense (natarms)	0.417
Childcare (natchld)	0.153
Crime reduction (natcrime)	0.121
Welfare (natfare)	0.296

Table 5 is the collected information from running multinomial logistic regression on the variable *nataid* (measuring attitudes on national spending on foreign aid), specifically displaying the factors and covariates that had a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The full table with all independent variables (sex, race, and religion as factors and age, class, education attainment, political ideology and confidence variables (*conarmy*, *confinan*, *conlegis*) as covariates) is available in the appendix in **Table 10**. The Pseudo R Square value of .247 indicates that 24.7% of the variance in attitudes toward national spending on foreign aid can be explained by the factors and covariates listed below (Nagelkerke = .247, **Table 4**). The intercept for "too little" was 1.301, with a standard error of .959 and a p-value of .175. The intercept for "about right" was 1.732 with a standard error of .597 and a p-value of .004. All of the Beta coefficients for variables with a significant relationship with *nataid* are negative, indicating that respondents with higher scores on those independent variables have a greater possibility of supporting less spending on foreign aid (*age*, B = -.021, p-value = .005; *polsview*, B = -.0451, p-value <.001; *confinan*, B= -0.161, p-value = .044; *conlegis*, B = -.74, p-value <.001). Except for individuals in a higher socioeconomic class (*class*, B = .372, p-value = .001) who are content with the current spending amount on foreign aid, no group of respondents indicate a desire for increased foreign aid spending. Of note, the main independent variable of concern for this study, sex, does not have a significant relationship with national spending on foreign aid. This indicates that a respondent's sex is not responsible for explaining one's attitude toward current national spending on foreign aid.

Table 5, nataid (significant values)

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	-0.021	0.007	0.005
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.451	0.092	<.001
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	0.161	0.209	0.44
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.74	0.203	<.001
"about right"	Subjective class identification (class)	0.372	0.113	0.001
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.48	0.054	<.001
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.734	0.127	<.001

Table 6 is the collected information from running multinomial logistic regression on the variable *natarms* (measuring attitudes on national spending on military, armaments, and defense), specifically displaying the factors and covariates that had a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The full table is available in the appendix in **Table 11**. The Pseudo R Square value of .417 indicates that 41.7% of the variance in attitudes toward national spending on defense can be explained by the factors and covariates listed below (Nagelkerke = .417, **Table 4**). Notably, this is the highest Pseudo R-Square value of the five dependent variables. The intercept for "too little" was -1.549 with a standard error of .813 and a p-value of .057. The intercept for "about right" was .374, with a standard error of .671 and a p-value of .577.

Overall, the results for national spending on military, armaments, and defense were mixed. The independent variables with a significant relationship with *natarms* and negative Beta coefficients signal that respondents are less likely to select "too little" to measure their opinion on current military spending; from here, we can purport that they would be in support of greater military spending. These variables are: class (*class*, B = -.533, p-value <.001), education level (*degree*, B = -.335, p-value <.001), confidence in the military (*conarmy*, B = -1.006, p-value <.001), sex (*sex*, B = -.0657, p-value = .002), and religion (*protestant*, B = -.67, p-value = .002). These results are consistent with previous research stating that men, conservative

respondents, wealthier individuals, and religious individuals are in support of higher national spending on defense (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Welch, 1977).

However, age (B = .03, p-value <.001), political ideology (B = .921, p-value <.001), and confidence in Congress (B = .357, p-value = .044) have positive Beta coefficients, indicating that higher scores on these variables have a lower probability of indicating "too little" or "about right" when assessing their attitude towards national spending amount on defense. These results indicate that older individuals, Conservative respondents, and those who are confident in Congress' abilities may disapprove of more spending on the military. This is supported when reviewing the "about right" reference category (*age*, B = .03, p-value = <.001; *polsview*, B = .584, p-value = <.001), though surprising when applying conventional knowledge and previous research conducted on conservative individuals and policies, which typically prioritize national defense.

The following variables shared a negative Beta coefficient with *natarms* in the "about right" reference category: education (*degree*, B = -.187, p-value = .009), confidence in the military (*conarmy*, B = -.747, p-value = <.001), confidence in financial institutions (*confinan*, B = -.351, p-value = .018) sex (*sex*, B = -.372, p-value = .026) and religion (*protestant*, B = -.564, p-value = .002). This signals that respondents here are less likely to indicate "about right," though the direction in which they might record their attitude is unclear. However, from the behavior of the sex variable in the "too little" category, the results show that men are more likely to support higher spending on national defense, as predicted.

Table 6, natarms (significant values)

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	0.03	0.006	<.001
	Subjective class identification (class)	-0.533	0.154	<.001
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.335	0.086	<.001
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.921	0.08	<.001
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-1.006	0.172	<.001
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	0.357	0.177	0.044
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.657	0.2	0.001
	Protestant = other religion	-0.67	0.213	0.002
"about right"	Age of respondent (age)	0.03	0.005	<.001
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.187	0.071	0.009
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.584	0.067	<.001
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.747	0.142	<.001
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.351	0.148	0.018
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.372	0.168	0.026
	Protestant = other religion	-0.564	0.185	0.002

Table 7 is the collected information from running multinomial logistic regression on the variable *natchld* (measuring attitudes on national spending on childcare), specifically displaying the factors and covariates that had a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The full table is available in the appendix in **Table 12.** The Pseudo R Square value of .153 indicates that 15.3% of variance in attitudes towards national spending on childcare can be explained by the factors and covariates listed below (Nagelkerke = .153, **Table 4**). The intercept for "too little" was 6.68 with a standard error of .787 and a p-value of <.001. The intercept for "about right" was 5.321 with a standard error of .788 and a p-value of <.001. Here, there are only three variables that have a significant relationship with *natchld* for the category "too little" and four variables under "about right." All of these variables have a negative Beta coefficient, signaling respondents with higher scores on these demographic factors are less likely to support more spending on childcare: political ideology (*polsview*, B = -.641, p-value <.001); confidence in Congress (*conlegis*, B = -.491, p-value = .006), and sex (*sex*, B = -.699, p-value <.001). For the "about right" categories, respondents that fall under these independent variables (high confidence in military and Congress and men) are less likely to be content with the current amount of spending on childcare (*polsview*, B = -.0336, p-value = <.001; *conarmy*, B = -.361, p-value = .015; *conlegis*, B = -.567, p-value = .002; *sex*, B = -.425, p-value = .014). Here, sex has a significant relationship with childcare. However, according to the results of running multinomial logistic regression, the negative Beta coefficient indicates that compared to their female counterparts, men are more likely to indicate higher national spending on childcare. This result is surprising and partially disproves hypothesis one. A possible explanation as to why this result came about, despite previous research suggesting

that women, on average, support more national spending on childcare than men, can be found in the summary of findings section.

Table 7, natchld (significant values)

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.641	0.067	<.001
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.491	0.178	0.006
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.699	0.173	<.001
"about right"	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.336	0.067	<.001
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.361	0.148	0.015
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.567	0.179	0.002
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.425	0.174	0.014

Table 8 is the collected information from running multinomial logistic regression on the variable *natcrime* (measuring attitudes on national spending on halting the rising crime rate), specifically displaying the factors and covariates that had a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The full table is available in the appendix in **Table 13**. The Pseudo R Square value of .121 indicates that 12.1% of the variance in attitudes toward national spending on crime reduction policies can be explained by the factors and covariates listed below (Nagelkerke = .121, **Table 4**). The intercept for "too little" was 2.967 with a standard error of 1.006 and a p-value of .003. The intercept for "about right" was 2.527 with a standard error of 1.055 and a p-value of .017. The results for *natcrime* functioned similarly to how the variables responded when analyzing *natarms*. This is expected as defense and crime reduction fall into the same category of policies aimed at enhancing security and mediating threats. The independent variables with significant relationships with *natcrime* for the "too little" category were age (*age*, B = .025, p-value <.001), political ideology (*polsview*, B = .254, p-value = .002), confidence in the military (*conarmy*, B = -.577, p-value = .002) and sex (*sex*, B = -.961, p-value <.001). The positive Beta coefficients for age and political ideology operated in a similar fashion when discussing military defense. Older and more conservative individuals here appear to not support higher spending on crime reduction policies. However, the Beta coefficient for the main independent variable of sex in both the "too little" (B = -.961) and "about right" (-.498) category indicate that men are in support of greater or consistent spending on halting the rising crime rate. This affirms hypothesis two.

Table 8, natcrime (significant values)

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	0.025	0.007	<.001
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.254	0.083	0.002
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.577	0.185	0.002
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.961	0.234	<.001
"about right"	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.517	0.195	0.008
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.498	0.227	0.028
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.693	0.245	0.005

Table 9 is the collected information from running multinomial logistic regression on the variable *natfare* (measuring attitudes on national spending on welfare), specifically displaying the factors and covariates that had a significant relationship with the dependent variable. The full table is available in the appendix in **Table 14.** The Pseudo R Square value of .296 indicates that 29.6% of variance in attitudes towards national spending on welfare can be explained by the factors and covariates listed below (Nagelkerke = .296, **Table 4**). The intercept for "too little" was 3.036 with a standard error of .756 and a p-value of <.001. The intercept for "about right" was 3.119 with a standard error of .656 and a p-value of <.001. Of the independent variables in the "too little" category with a significant relationship with *natfare*, political ideology (*polsview*, B = -.868, p-value <.001) and confidence in Congress (*conlegis*, B = -.4, p-value = .013) had negative Beta coefficients while confidence in military (*conarmy*, B = .443, p-value = .003), and race (*race*, B = 1.228, p-value = .004) had positive Beta coefficients. Sex here is insignificant. Of note, this is the only dependent variable in which race had a significant relationship.

Table 9, natfare (significant values)

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.868	0.073	<.001
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	0.443	0.151	0.003
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.4	0.16	0.013
	Race of respondent = black	1.228	0.422	0.004
"about right"	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.463	0.06	<.001
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.549	0.141	<.001

Conclusion

This study analyzed and explored the relationships between sex, political ideology, and attitudes towards specific national spending amounts with the objective of better understanding the gender gap in social welfare policy attitudes. Based on previous research, a theoretical framework connecting the sociopolitical behavior of men and women to their predicted attitudes toward national spending was developed and tested using a bivariate comparison. Finally, multinomial logistic regression analyses were used to explore the relationship between national spending amount attitudes and a range of important demographic factors typically taken into consideration when analyzing political attitudes and behaviors. These additional variables included race, age, class, education attainment, religion, political ideology, and confidence in the military, banks and financial institutions, and Congress.

The bivariate comparison between sex and each national spending amount revealed three significant relationships, those being between sex and military, armaments, and defense, childcare, and crime reduction policies. Although significant, the relationship was weak. Multinomial logistic regression was conducted for all five spending variables using race, sex, and religion as factors and age, class, education, political ideology, and confidence in the military, banks and financial institutions, and Congress as covariates.

Based on the bivariate comparison and multinomial logistic regression results, hypothesis one – w*omen will support higher national spending on childcare, welfare, and foreign aid than men* – was completely rejected. The bivariate comparison indicated a significant, though weak, relationship between *sex* and *natchld.* (Chi Square = 32.277, df = 2, Cramer's V = .092, p-value = <.001). Additionally, the results from the multinomial logistic regression analysis between sex and national spending on childcare indicated that male respondents are in higher support of more spending on childcare than their female counterparts (B = -.699, p-vale <.001), as male respondents are more likely to indicate "too little" when asked to evaluate the amount of national spending on childcare. The results from the bivariate comparison revealed an insignificant relationship between *sex* and both *nataid* (Chi Square = .263, df = 2, Cramer's V = .012, p-value = .877) and *natfare* (Chi Square = .618, df = 2, Cramer's V = .018, p-value = .734). This was consistent with an insignificant relationship between sex and both *nataid* and *natfare* during multinomial logistic regression.

A possible explanation for the insignificant relationships between *sex*, *nataid*, and *natfare*, lies in how the question is posed to respondents. Respondents are asked to evaluate their opinion on amounts spent on "foreign aid" and "welfare;" no further elaboration is provided to the terms. These terms are often used to describe an amalgamation of policies, resources, and strategies, and as such, it is difficult to evaluate one's opinion of the encompassing term. Additionally, previous research implies that foreign aid, welfare, and childcare policies are more complex than conventionally treated (Cassese and Barnes 2018).

Regarding the unanticipated regression results for sex and childcare, a theoretical explanation relying on gender essentialism-based pressures should be considered. Gender essentialism is the theory that innate qualities and abilities assigned to the two biological sexes inform, in totality, the roles and functions that men and women must play in society. This theory informs men and women in multifaceted ways – both in external expectations enforced by society and internal expectations perpetuated by the family unit. Scholars (Harris 2000; Nedelsky 2012) posit that gendered division observed in the traditional organization of household labor (laundry, cleaning, cooking, etc. as well as all aspects of childcare) may prevent women from claiming their rights in the political sphere and workforce. This is supported by the notion that women, as a group, face stronger barriers of entry to political and corporate fields than their male counterparts.

The resulting conflicting position that women may find themselves in is threefold: In essence, (i) the gender essentialist view that women are intrinsically better and more capable of providing and organizing childcare combined with (ii) insurmountable barriers of entry to political or corporate spaces and (iii) the immense pressure of assuming the expected, though antiquated, role of a women in society may result in an *internalized* belief that childcare is not a government expense but rather, a mandatory obligation to women in society. Further, gender essentialism indicates that men are better providers for and protectors of the family unit and that this should be their role in society. This is supported by previous research on gender stereotypes that tend to inform political behavior. The point of contention arrives when an individual departs from their expected role. Whereas a man who steps outside of his designated responsibilities to participate in childcare is often received positively, a woman who

steps outside of her designated responsibilities to participate in the workforce is almost always received negatively. This social phenomenon may explain why a man may regard childcare as an expense and service that must be provided by another entity *other* than himself, while a woman may regard childcare as an obligation of her personhood that should be provided by herself and herself alone. This proposed theory requires its own review and experimentation but, as an exercise, could provide one explanation for the regression result between sex and childcare.

Based on the results from the bivariate comparison and multinomial logistic regression, hypothesis two – *men will support higher national spending on defense and crime reduction polices than women* – is accepted. Both the bivariate comparison and multinomial logistic regression analyses completed between sex and attitudes towards national spending amounts on defense and crime reduction policies, indicated significant relationships. Of note, the Cramer's V value between *sex* and *natcrime* was the largest out of the five spending variables at .116 (*natarms*, Chi Square = 9.599, df = 2, Cramer's V = .071, p-value = .008; *natcrime*, Chi Square = 25.608, df = 2, Cramer's V = .116, p-value $<$.001). Additionally, the Nagelkerke value for *natarms* was the largest and most significant at .417. The results from completing multinomial logistic regression between sex and *natarms* and *natcrime* support the proposed hypothesis that men are more likely to support higher amounts of spending on defense and crime reduction policies (*natarms*, B = -.657, p-value = .001; *natcrime*, B = -.961, p-value $<$.001).

By analyzing respondents' attitudes towards national spending amounts, we can better understand the degree of responsibility and obligation individuals place on the national government. The proposed theory linked sociopolitical traits to men's and women's anticipated attitudes toward national spending. This connection theorized that men and women largely act within certain perceptions and conditions placed on them outside the political realm. Based on the results, it does appear that men and women follow these trends in their attitudes toward national spending. However, there is significant space for other factors to affect this. For example, with the exception of *sex* and *natarms (*Nagelkerke = .417, **Table 4**), the Nagelkerke values for the spending variables were low, ranging between .12 – .29. This is indicative of other demographic factors not being taken into consideration that may influence attitudes towards national spending more. Particularly for the relationships between sex, foreign aid (Nagelkerke = .247), and welfare (Nagelkerke = .296), which had low Pseudo R-Square values and lacked significance, this theory needs to be revised to give more space to include alternative factors.

There was only one dependent variable, national spending on welfare, in which race played a significant role when analyzing spending attitudes. This fact, combined with the research proving that race plays a pivotal role in attitudes toward childcare (Cassese and Barnes 2018) and political behavior in general (Foster 2008), signifies the importance of exploring the impact of race in future studies. Some scholars (Eichenberg and Stoll 2012; Foster 2008) identify class as an important factor to consider in predicting political attitudes. Based on the context being national *spending*, and deciding where government funds should be allocated, perhaps the class variable, which measures class on a four-point scale from lower class to upper class, is not enough to provide information on respondents' financial situations. Including one or more detailed variables, such as income or tax level, could also provide more clarity as to what drives political attitudes. Finally, the unpredictability of the independent variable measuring political ideology highlights an important issue to consider. Similar to problems with treating one gender as a monolithic block, it appears as if we cannot treat one point on the ideological scale as a uniform functioning body. Perhaps these results confirm Cann and Levendusky's theory of "party sorting," in which individuals sort themselves into an ideological grouping based on a specific issue. For future studies, including more independent variables that can describe one's ideological or political alignment may help determine where these groups lie on a specific issue. This could also include testing other commonly associated political questions to correct for respondents who may self-report based on a particular "passion" issue (e.g., gun control, reproductive rights, or immigration reform).

References

Barnes, Tiffany D., and Erin C. Cassese. 2017. "American Party Women: A Look at Gender Gap within Parties." *Political Research Quarterly* 70(1): 127–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916675738.

Cann, D. M., and M. Levendusky. 2011. "Review of the Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans." *The Journal of Politics* 73(1): 294–95. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610001118.

Carsey, Thomas M., and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 464–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00196.x.

Cassese, Erin C., and Tiffany D. Barnes. 2018. "Intersectional Motherhood: Investigating Public Support for Child Care Subsidies." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 7(4): 775–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1441035.

Eagly, Alice H., Amanda B. Diekman, Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, and Anne M. Koenig. 2004. "Gender Gaps in Sociopolitical Attitudes: A Social Psychological Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87(6): 796–816. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.796.

Eichenberg, Richard C., and Richard J. Stoll. 2011. "Gender Difference or Parallel Publics? The Dynamics of Defense Spending Opinions in the United States, 1965–2007." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(2): 331–48.

Equality Act, H.R. 5, 175th Cong. (March 2, 2021). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5/text.

Feldman, Stanley, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2001. "The Humanitarian Foundation of Public Support for Social Welfare." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 658. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669244.

Foster, C. H. 2008. "The Welfare Queen: Race, Gender, Class, and Public Opinion." *Gender & Class* 15(3/4): 162–79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41674659.

Grossmann, Matt, and David A. Hopkins. 2015. "Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 13(1): 119–39. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714003168.

Harris, Angela P. 2000. "Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice." *Stanford Law Review* 52(4): 777–807.

Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(1): 119. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111526.

Kaufmann, K. M. 2002. "Culture Wars, Secular Realignment, and the Gender Gap in Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 24(3): 283–307. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558398.

Pearson, Kathryn. 2010. "Demographic Change and the Future of Congress." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43(2): 235–38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40646719.

Nedelsky, J. 2012. "The Gendered Division of Household Labor: An Issue of Constitutional Rights." *Feminist Constitutionalism, Global Perspectives*: 15–47. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511980442.004.

Shapiro, Robert Y., and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50(1): 42. https://doi.org/10.1086/268958.

Togeby, Lise. 1994. "The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Journal of Peace Research* 31(4): 375–92. .

Watts, Meredith W. 1999. "Are There Typical Age Curves in Political Behavior? The 'Age Invariance' Hypothesis and Political Socialization." *Political Psychology* 20(3): 477–99. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895x.00153.

Welch, Susan. 1977. "Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences." *American Journal of Political Science* 21(4): 711. https://doi.org/10.2307/2110733.

Appendix

Table 10

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	-0.021	0.007	0.005**
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.312	0.18	0.084
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	0.167	0.101	0.099
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.451	0.092	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	0.088	0.199	0.659
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.161	0.209	0.44**
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.74	0.203	<.001**
	Race of respondent = white	-0.524	0.37	0.157
	Race of respondent = black	0.54	0.456	0.237
	Race of respondent = other	0^b		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.042	0.239	0.859
	Respondent's sex = female	0^b		
	Protestant = other religion	0.173	0.274	0.529
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0^b		
"about right"	Age of respondent (age)	0.005	0.004	0.271
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.372	0.113	0.001**
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	0.097	0.062	0.12
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.48	0.054	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	0.155	0.124	0.212
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.118	0.13	0.364
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.734	0.127	<.001**
	Race of respondent = white	-0.084	0.258	0.745
	Race of respondent = black	0.418	0.331	0.207
	Race of respondent = other	0^b		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.01	0.145	0.946
	Respondent's sex = female	0^b		
	Protestant = other religion	0.179	0.158	0.258
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0^b		

Table 11

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	0.03	0.006	<.001**
	Subjective class identification (class)	-0.533	0.154	<.001**
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.335	0.086	<.001**
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.921	0.08	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-1.006	0.172	<.001**
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.273	0.178	0.125
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	0.357	0.177	0.044**
	Race of respondent = white	0.179	0.372	0.63
	Race of respondent = black	0.003	0.471	0.994
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.657	0.2	0.001**
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	-0.67	0.213	0.002**
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		
"about right"	Age of respondent (age)	0.03	0.005	<.001**
	Subjective class identification (class)	-0.149	0.13	0.249
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.187	0.071	0.009**
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.584	0.067	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.747	0.142	<.001**
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.351	0.148	0.018**
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.131	0.144	0.364
	Race of respondent = white	-0.16	0.282	0.569
	Race of respondent = black	0.026	0.362	0.943
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.372	0.168	0.026**
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	-0.564	0.185	0.002**
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		

Table 12

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	-0.003	0.005	0.638
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.077	0.137	0.574
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.066	0.078	0.396
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.641	0.067	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.233	0.146	0.111
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	0.227	0.155	0.142
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.491	0.178	0.006**
	Race of respondent = white	-0.581	0.389	0.136
	Race of respondent = black	0.352	0.531	0.508
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.699	0.173	<.001**
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	0.287	0.178	0.107
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		
"about right"	Age of respondent (age)	0.004	0.005	0.421
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.067	0.137	0.624
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.048	0.078	0.541
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.336	0.067	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.361	0.148	0.015**
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	0.023	0.155	0.88
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.567	0.179	0.002**
	Race of respondent = white	-0.491	0.393	0.211
	Race of respondent = black	-0.004	0.54	0.994
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.425	0.174	0.014**
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	0.319	0.178	0.074
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		

Table 13

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	0.025	0.007	<.001**
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.049	0.175	0.782
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	-0.107	0.101	0.287
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.254	0.083	0.002**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.577	0.185	0.002**
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.022	0.206	0.916
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.43	0.219	0.05
	Race of respondent = white	-0.597	0.417	0.152
	Race of respondent = black	-0.066	0.552	0.905
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.961	0.234	<.001**
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	-0.05	0.266	0.852
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		
"about right"	Age of respondent (age)	0.013	0.007	0.085
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.038	0.184	0.834
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	0.055	0.105	0.602
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	0.136	0.087	0.119
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	-0.517	0.195	0.008**
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.126	0.215	0.559
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.498	0.227	0.028**
	Race of respondent = white	0.041	0.451	0.928
	Race of respondent = black	0.06	0.596	0.92
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.693	0.245	0.005**
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	0.149	0.28	0.595
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		

Table 14

		B	*Std. Error*	*Sig.*
"too little"	Age of respondent (age)	0.006	0.005	0.252
	Subjective class identification (class)	-0.177	0.137	0.197
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	0.17	0.078	0.029**
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.868	0.073	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	0.443	0.151	0.003**
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	0.064	0.161	0.691
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.4	0.16	0.013**
	Race of respondent = white	-0.022	0.319	0.945
	Race of respondent = black	1.228	0.422	0.004**
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	-0.031	0.179	0.861
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	0.14	0.195	0.475
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		
"about right"	Age of respondent (age)	0.008	0.005	0.103
	Subjective class identification (class)	0.047	0.121	0.696
	Respondent's highest degree (degree)	0.016	0.068	0.819
	Think of self as liberal or conservative (polsview)	-0.463	0.06	<.001**
	Confidence in military (conarmy)	0.209	0.136	0.125
	Confidence in banks & financial institutions (confinan)	-0.217	0.141	0.125
	Confidence in congress (conlegis)	-0.549	0.141	<.001**
	Race of respondent = white	-0.135	0.285	0.635
	Race of respondent = black	0.298	0.403	0.459
	Race of respondent = other	0[b]		
	Respondent's sex = male	0.025	0.155	0.871
	Respondent's sex = female	0[b]		
	Protestant = other religion	0.042	0.16	0.8
	Protestant = Protestant religion	0[b]		