Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE

Georgia Political Science Association

Volume IX 2022

Questions in Politics Editorial Team

About the Georgia Political Science Association

Georgia Political Science Association

Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

Questions in Politics is the official journal publication of the GPSA.

Visit the GPSA website for more information visit www.gpsa-online.org.

Articles are typeset using Overleaf's *Scientific Reports* template.

Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GEORGIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Volume IX

Contents

Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GEORGIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Volume IX

Preface

Volume IX of *Questions in Politics* is created from manuscripts first presented at the 2021 Georgia Political Science Association annual meeting. However, unlike the GPSA meeting in 2020, the 2021 meeting was in person. Thanks to the incredible leadership who helped organize the return of our conference to an in-person meeting, it was an evident success. In a moment where there would have been every reason to call off the meeting entirely, GPSA persevered and had an excellent meeting with great political science being presented and discussed. This issue is a testament to all the fantastic research presented at the 2021 meeting.

About the Issue

The first paper, "Joining the Club? The Politics of Government Recognition" by M. Scott Meachum, is the McBrayer Award for the best paper presented at GPSA in 2021. Meachum uses an event history approach to test how and when countries strategically recognize new governments empirically. Our second article is "Perceptions of Attitudinal Change: The End of History Illusion and Polarization" by Russell Luke and Michael Westberg. This paper finds strong evidence for using the "end of history illusion" to understand political polarization. The third article is "The Popular Perception of China in Latin America and the Role of Confucian Institutes" by Thomas J. Nisley. Nisley observes that Confucius Institutes have not improved the perception of China in Latin American public opinion.

Valerie Cochran's "Sexual Assault Victims Have No Privacy: Updating Georgia's Victim Privacy Statute" is our fourth article. Cochran argues that states should enact laws to protect victims' privacy due to psychological risks imposed by social media. The fifth article is "Go West, Young Liberals! How The Critical Election Of 1992 Pioneered A Win Streak For The Democrats" by John Tures. Using critical election theory as a guidepost, he argues that the Democratic Party's recent success in Presidential elections in western American states is due to the Critical Election of 1992. John LeJeune's article "Chasing Secretariat: Plato, Socrates, and the Education of the Horseman" is the sixth article. He analyzes the use of horse analogies in ancient political theory. The final paper is "Cryptocurrency Regulation Around the World" by Daniel Weaver. This paper is the Pajari Award winner for the best undergraduate paper award at the 2021 annual meeting, as voted on by the Pajari committee.

Thanks to the Reviewers

As always, we are deeply indebted to the reviewers for Volume IX. We received an excellent slate of papers for this volume, which required us to find an outstanding slate of reviewers. In addition to ourselves, each article received peer reviews from scholars whose expertise could speak to the quality and significance of the submitted manuscript. Our reviewers' expertise and suggested edits and revisions increased the quality of the work you see in this journal. Being a journal reviewer is often a thankless task, and—while it may not be much—we want to extend our heartiest "thank you" to our reviewers.

The reviewers and their affiliation for Volume IX of *Questions in Politics* are as follows:

Rhys Jenkins
University of East Anglia

Logan Sommers
Georgia Southern University

Kimberly L. Owen
Columbus State University

John Tures
LaGrange College

Rick Crawford
Shorter University

Kristina LaPlant
University of Wisconsin - La Crosse

Dan Altman
Georgia State University

Robert Harding
Valdosta State University

Julia Partheymüller
Institut für Staatswissenschaft

Donggyu Sul
University of Texas at Dallas

April Johnson
Kennesaw State University

Brian M. Webb
Gordon State College

Aaron Houck
University of North Carolina, Charlotte

Michael Evans
Georgia State University

Shenita Brazelton
Morehouse College

Jeffrey M. Glas
University of Georgia

To close, we are thrilled that the 2022 GPSA conference will again be back in Savannah. For those who present, please consider submitting your work to *QiP.* To find more information about submitting to *QiP*, please consult the GPSA website. The deadline for submissions for Volume X is December 31, 2022.

Sean Richey & Ben Taylor

Questions in Politics

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE GEORGIA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Volume IX

Joining the Club? The Politics of Government Recognition

M. Scott Meachum[1]

[1]Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Georgia
[*]2022 McBrayer Award for best paper at 2021 GPSA Annual Meeting.

ABSTRACT

Under international law, when governments come to power through extra-legal means, the governments of other states must decide whether to recognize the new government as a legitimate agent of the state, and we observe considerable variation in who recognizes the new governments, the circumstances under which recognition occurs, and even how long it takes to recognize new governments. This project studies the processes that drive recognition decisions. Despite attempts, mainly by legal scholars, to limit the discretion that third-party governments have in this regard, the institution of recognition has persisted over time. I argue that states use recognition as a political tool to weaken hostile governments and support amicable ones. In addition to these direct self-interested motivations, I also posit that the nature of recognition itself shapes recognition decisions and encourages coordination among potential recognizers with regard to new governments. To support these suppositions, I develop a theory that uses both international legal (IL) arguments regarding recognition and international relations (IR) concepts and speaks to both literatures. IR scholars have developed a significant field of study regarding the recognition of states, particularly with respect to secessionist movements, but to date, there are no empirical studies of the recognition of governments, which are fundamentally distinct events. This project represents the first step in that regard, and I use an event history approach to empirically test how and when countries strategically recognize new governments. Consistent with my theoretical expectations, countries do appear to use recognition to weaken their enemies but do not seem to use recognition to bolster their friends. I also find support that countries coordinate their recognition decisions.

Introduction

On July 15, 2011, the United States, France, and nearly 30 other states recognized the National Transition Council (NTC) as the legitimate government in Libya (Black 2011). The Libya Contact Group, the international community's collective response to the Libyan civil war, issued a strongly worded statement that echoed the sentiments of its individual members (Libya Contact Group 2012). And yet, recognition of the new government was not universal. China and Russia waited nearly two full months before recognizing. The United Kingdom strongly objected to the language used by the Contact Group and refused to endorse it. These decisions to recognize or not a new government all occurred during the civil war that ultimately ended with the death of Muammar Gadaffi and the installation of the NTC as the governing authority in Libya, but many political scientists seemed not to take notice or question any of the recognition decisions.

Few government or leadership changes that take place are as eventful as the Libyan example. The vast majority of changes in the vast majority of governments have little bearing on the international system. Consider that in 2011, the same year Gadaffi was overthrown and killed, there were 32 other world leaders who left office. One retired due to health concerns, two died of natural causes, and 26 others left office in a normal fashion.[1] Two more, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, left office as a result of the Arab Spring in their countries, while Laurent Gbagbo was ousted in Cote d'Ivoire (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). The infrequency of these types of events is not noted to trivialize them but rather to highlight the fact that they are the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, it is in these exceptions—specifically in Libya—that we find opportunities for an important and nearly unstudied phenomenon in international politics.

Recognition is a topic that is familiar to many political scientists, especially as the subject relates to the sovereign entities that comprise the international system—states. In fact, the past decade has seen an increase in the number of studies examining recognition or not of secessionist movements around the world.[2] Yet, similar scholarly appreciation for the recognition of governments has not followed. International legal (IL) scholars have discussed and debated issues surrounding recognition of states and governments for years, but IR scholarship has yet to focus on the politics surrounding recognition of governments.

[1]The Archigos project codes the manner of entry and exit for every world leader and uses "regular" to describe leaving office "...according to the prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and norms of the country..." (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, 273).

[2]See, e.g., Coggins (2014); Griffiths (2016); Armakolas and Ker-Lindsay (2020); Siroky, Popovic, and Mirilovic (2021).

While states are the fundamental actors in the international system, their governments are the agents through which they interact. Recognition is the process by which those entities are legitimized in the international community, and that legitimacy comes from other states and other governments. This paper focuses on the recognition of governments and provides insight into why and when countries recognize new governments, which is virtually unstudied in IR. It also adds to the growing literature on recognition in general.

Recognition is a legal act with legal consequences, and it is also a political act with political consequences. The rich tradition of international legal analysis focuses on the development of the law surrounding recognition, its interpretation, correct use, and the legal consequences associated with it. That scholarship is discussed in the next section. Following that discussion, I provide an examination of recognition as a political tool and present a theory for how and when countries strategically use recognition to further their own political goals to help friendly governments and punish others. I also offer a system-level theory of a cascade effect of how recognition functions that are consistent with both IL and IR scholarship. Next, I describe the quantitative research design and analysis of recognition decisions from 1995 – 2010 and find support for my theoretical account. Finally, I provide concluding thoughts on where future studies of recognition should be directed.

A Legal Act with Legal Consequences

In very broad international legal terms, recognition refers to the "acknowledgment of the existence of an entity or situation indicating that full consequences of that existence will be respected" (Peterson 1997, 1). Both IL practice and scholarship recognition refers to many more situations and entities than just governments and states. For instance, at various times in history, states were empowered to recognize the status of particular belligerent and insurgent groups and formalize statuses such as war, foreign occupation, and neutrality. Each particular type of recognition comes with certain legal consequences, and those legal consequences can have very real effects.

An illustrative example from United States history is the status of the Confederacy during the Civil War. While the Confederate States never achieved international recognition in terms of statehood, both Britain and France recognized its belligerent status during the American Civil War (Halabi 2012). When President Lincoln blockaded Southern ports in 1861, Jefferson Davis authorized the issuance of letters of marque to southern privateers (2012, 344).[3] Britain, France, and other European powers then had to decide whether to recognize the privateers as legitimate—under the laws of war, only a lawful belligerent can issue letters of marque—or declare them to be pirates. Contrary to the wishes of President Lincoln and the Union, the British government officially declared its neutrality status in May of 1861, while France followed in June (2012, 344). The proclamation of neutrality was tacit acknowledgment of the belligerent status of the Confederacy, and along with issuing letters of marque, legitimized belligerents could also contract loans and purchase supplies in neutral nations.

Over the years, the emphasis on formally declaring war, proclaiming neutrality, and granting belligerent and insurgent status has waned, but the practice of recognizing states and governments has remained (Roth 1999; Peterson 1997; Brownlie 2008). This should be unsurprising when one considers the circumstances when each is required. In the case of states, the process is fairly straightforward. Following the dissolutions of the USSR and Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the international community was confronted with dozens of former republics, former sovereign states, newly formed nation-states, and other ethnic groups advocating for statehood. The question of whether to recognize those entities as new states is a politically complex one but identifying the circumstances as to when the opportunity for recognition exists is an easier process.

Identifying instances for the recognition of governments is fairly straightforward as well when one considers the legal definition. First, not all government change necessitates recognition.

Notions of sovereignty and equality among states that have developed over centuries afford states the right to be free from undue external influence (Kelsen 1966, 247-50). Part of that right is the inherent power to choose a method of governance and the manner in which government change takes place (Lauterpacht 1947; Peterson 1997; Brownlie 2008). In short, states establish domestic laws with respect to how they will govern and how power will be transferred from one regime to the next. So long as those particular laws are followed, there is no need for recognition when a new government takes power. When the change arises from a violation of national law, however, recognition becomes a concern.

> . . . as in the latter case [change in violation of domestic law] the replacement of one government by another is often accompanied by revolutionary upheavals in the form of civil wars of differing degrees of intensity and duration and by competing, assertions of power on the part of rival authorities, outside States are frequently called upon to take a decision on the question of which of the contesting parties must be regarded as being the government of the State in question. Or, after the hostilities have ceased, they may have to decide whether the authority which for the time being has triumphantly asserted itself over its opponents may properly be considered to be a government. To take a decision of this nature is to recognize—or refuse to recognize—the government in question (Lauterpacht 1947, 87).

[3] A letter of marque, also known as a letter of marque and reprisal, authorized individuals to attack and capture ships in the name of a state or government (Garner and Black 2004, 736).

Despite the best efforts of legal scholars and practitioners, there are no agreed-upon rules for the recognition of governments beyond those identifying when it is necessary. Objective criteria proposed in the past, including effective control, democratic rule, and popular support of citizens, have consistently been rejected by states in lieu of a system that prioritizes state discretion in recognition decisions. Put more bluntly, states have consistently worked to ensure that recognition remains a subjective choice. When it has suited their purposes, states have applied some of the above criteria along with others but never in a consistent fashion. Much to the frustration of those who study it, the only consensus among legal scholars is that the decision to recognize governments is a purely political one that nonetheless has legal consequences (Downer 2013; Roth 2010; Kelsen 1966). Those legal consequences include duties, rights, and obligations, and in the case of governments, those are not trivial matters. Once recognition occurs, a new government can fully enter diplomatic relations with countries, as well as negotiate treaties and other agreements. A newly recognized government acquires title to its predecessor's assets (bank deposits, investments, embassy buildings, etc.) in the territory of the recognizing state and is granted access to the domestic courts of the recognizing country (von Glahn and Taulbee 2013, 169).

Legal Principles of Recognition

There are a few key principles of international law that limit the circumstances for the recognition of new governments. First, there is an important distinction to make between a state and its government. The state is the basic unit of analysis in international law, but it must be represented by a concrete entity. That concrete entity is a government, which acts as the legal persona of the state (Roth 1999, 8). Thus, there is a sort of principal-agent relationship wherein the state (principal) and government (agent) are related but also distinct. The second principle is the doctrine of state continuity, which stresses the distinction between a state and its government and ensures that a change in government will not affect the legal status of the state (Peterson 1997, 12). This means that a state can change who or what it is represented by without losing its fundamental identity.

Both of these arguments stem from fundamental dual notions of sovereignty and equality, which treat all states as equal units and assures each will be free from undue external influence (Kelsen 1966, 247-50). Sovereignty thus maintains that each state may select its own method of governance and may change that government in accordance with its own law without any external interference. The important point as it relates to recognition is that the change occurs according to domestic law. If a new government comes to power or makes a claim to power in a manner that is not stipulated by domestic law, other states must choose whom they recognize as the legitimate government (Lauterpacht 1947; Peterson 1997; Brownlie 2008).[4] Thus there is necessarily a collective element to recognition. The following examples are useful to highlight situations in which recognition is required and in which it is not.

Every four years in the United States, a presidential election takes place. Based on the United States Constitution and other relevant domestic law, habits, and customs, there is an established procedure for the transition of power. As long as elections are valid and the transition is handled smoothly, there is no need for other states to recognize the new government as the legitimate government of the United States. At the other end of the spectrum are the removals of monarchies in Russia (1917), Greece (1973), Iran (1979), and other revolutions or coups d'état that replaced heads of state in an extra-legal manner. In each of these instances, states were able to decide whether to recognize the new government, and state practice varied widely. The United States withheld recognition from the Soviet Union until 1933, while Britain was much quicker; France, Britain, Canada, and the United States almost immediately recognized the new Greek regime; the Soviet Union quickly recognized the Iranian Islamic Republic, while other states did not.

Of course, not all governmental changes are as easily characterized as those indicated above. Consider Haiti in 2004 when, facing civil unrest and rebellion, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide resigned his presidency and left the country. As his successor was sworn in, the UNSC passed a resolution declaring that Aristide had resigned and the new president had been sworn in in accordance with the Haitian Constitution (UNSC Res 1529). For his part, Aristide claimed to have been the victim of a coup orchestrated by the US (CNN 2004). Per the Security Council resolution, recognition of a new government was not required. Similarly confusing is the case of the coup in Thailand in 1951 that replaced the prime minister, reinforced the military hold on the government, but left the king in place. In that case, some states saw the need to extend recognition while others did not (Peterson 1997, 16).

Two more fundamental aspects of recognition related to how state practice addresses ambiguous changes in government. While the manner of recognition and the type of recognition have no practical effect, legal scholars often distinguish between the two. In the first instance, grants of recognition may be expressed or implied. Express recognition usually comes from the executive branch of a recognizing state and is the clearest form of recognition. For example, regarding Libya in 2011, the United States issued a joint statement with the Libya Contact Group as well as issuing a statement from Secretary of State

[4] Many scholars focus on non-constitutional change, but in some instances, the change that triggers a recognition decision might be a violation of basic law or political practice and custom. That is, not every state has enshrined its transition procedures via constitutional law. In any of those situations, the change is extra-legal, which is the term I use from hereon to describe when recognition becomes an issue.

Hillary Clinton acknowledging that the United States officially recognized the NTC as ". . . the legitimate governing authority for Libya, and we will deal with it on that basis. In contrast, the United States views the Qadhafi regime as no longer having legitimate authority in Libya" (US Department of State 2011). Recognition can also be tacit or implied, as many states choose to convey their intention to recognize through some other means. Historically, tacit means have included the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, the establishment of formal consular relations, and/or the conclusion of a bilateral treaty (Peterson 1997, 87). In short, tacit recognition exists when a government performs a bilateral act that is inconsistent with nonrecognition. Whether express or implied, however, the manner in which recognition is given has no effect on its validity.

The second distinction that legal scholars focus on is whether recognition is *de facto* or *de jure*. British practice for some years was to distinguish between these types of recognition in an effort to more or less legitimacy on a regime. De facto recognition is considered by some to be a lesser form of recognition, perhaps an acknowledgment of a temporary situation on the ground that might change, while the de jure is a more permanent and fuller form of recognition. De facto recognition might be given to a group that is struggling for power and appears to have control, and de jure recognition is reserved for a later time (Roth 1999, 150). In practice, this often manifested itself in one government's acknowledgment that a new government was in power but that the recognizing government did not fully support the new regime (Peterson 1997, 98). In principle, the distinction is one of degrees but rarely has that distinction had any practical effect (Talmon 1998, 52).

It is abundantly clear that the possibility for recognition only exists when an extra-legal change in government takes place. It is also clear that states other than the one undergoing the change influence whether or not the change is deemed legal. This fact highlights the opportunity for states to use recognition as a political tool. States have attempted to adapt the tool to suit their purposes, but the institution has remained remarkably resilient. Yet how is it that states developed and maintained this power? Two fundamental legal perspectives—the declaratory view and the constitutive view—relate to recognition and the development of the international system as a whole. As I discuss in the next sections, the constitutive view maintains that states have broad discretion in recognizing those entities (states and governments) that will be able to participate in the system. Because state practice has consistently employed, and therefore reinforced, the fundamental precepts of the constitutive perspective, the political use of the institution of recognition continues to this day.

Theories of Recognition

While certain legal systems and principles of international law pre-date the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, most international legal scholars identify that event as the dawning of modern international law. More specifically for legal scholars, Westphalia marked the emergence of an international community of sovereign, equal, and independent states that recognized no superior authority (von Glaughn and Taulbee 2013, 33). This horizontally ordered system was a clear break from the previous feudal hierarchical structure that dominated Europe until that time. The new system would see its membership grow from 25 states in 1815 to just over 50 following World War I and to nearly 200 today (Coggins 2014). The manner in which states enter this system, however, has long been a point of contention between the declarative and constitutive theories of recognition, and this argument is mirrored by the contentions surrounding recognition of governments.

As is the case with many legal arguments, the debate between the declarative and constitutive views reduces to what should be a simple legal question of whether a duty to recognize exists. Proponents of the declarative theory maintain that an entity—a state or a government—exists in law as soon as it exists in fact (Lauterpacht 1947, 38). That is, there should be clear criteria that establish what a state or government is, and once an entity meets these requirements, it should be legally deemed a legitimate state or government. Moreover, there is no discretion with respect to whether recognition as a legal duty exists. The act of recognition is merely a formality—an acknowledgment of an already existing legal fact (Roth 1999, 124). One of the clear implications of such logic is that a new entity can come into existence and obtain legitimacy largely independent of other states in the sense that its identity is established whenever the relevant criteria are met. (Kelsen 1966, 390).

The constitutive theory, meanwhile, strongly opposes the idea that there is a legal duty to recognize new entities. Whereas proponents of the declarative school argue that the legal existence of states and governments begins when established criteria are met, constitutive thinkers argue that the legal existence of new entities derives solely from the will of those that are already established (Lauterpacht 1927, 38). In other words, the constitutive view holds that recognition is a precondition to the existence, legitimacy, and associated legal rights (Brownlie 2008, 87). In this conception, recognition is a matter of sovereign consent and is based on the mutuality of recognition (Menon 1994). Because there is no duty to recognize, states are free to recognize new entities entirely at their own discretion.

In many ways, the arguments for and against the declaratory and constitutive views mirror the larger philosophic debate of naturalism vs. positivism in international law (Roth 1999, 124). Natural law stresses that universal principles exist separate and apart from laws or rules that are created in a given system. Positive international law, meanwhile, asserts that the only law that matters is that which has been created and agreed to by states. The declaratory view of recognition is argued as a far more ethical basis of state emergence as it acknowledges the importance of political self-determination.[5] Under a declaratory system,

[5]The most notable example of such thinking is reflected in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, which established four criteria for statehood. The

any community that possesses those four criteria has a fundamental right to recognition. A constitutive system, on the other hand, that prizes state sovereignty is necessarily dependent on the decisions of states with respect to recognition. Recognition becomes a political decision and one that states can use to further their own interests.

A Political Act with Political Consequences

A common criticism of international law is that it often does not reflect the political realities of the day or that states simply ignore or enforce it when it is most convenient or expedient (Mearsheimer 1994/95). Much of the work done by IR scholars with respect to recognition involves the recognition of states and broadly falls into two distinct literatures. The first is largely theoretical and/or qualitative in nature, but recently there has been an increased emphasis on quantitative empirical work that has examined recognition, particularly in the case of secessionist movements. One of the first studies in this regard summed up prior work on state emergence and state recognition by stating, "Most theories take the fundamental units of political life to be exogenous. States either exist or do not, and how they come to be is presumed to be relatively unproblematic" (Coggins 2011, 434-35). While the focus of this article is on recognition of governments after an extra-legal change, it is useful to consider the work on recognition of states for the proper context.

Like international legal scholars, political scientists consider the Peace of Westphalia (Westphalia) a formational event in the history of the disciple. A classic retelling of IR history notes the date of Westphalia as the emergence of the modern international system. From that point on, like units struggled to survive in an anarchic system characterized by either conflict or the possibility for cooperation, depending on one's own paradigmatic predilections.[6] The "states" that make up the system are widely defined in the Weberian sense of the word wherein the "state" is the entity that monopolizes the legitimate use of force in an area. Even Spruyt (1994), who disputes the inevitability of the development of the modern state system, argues that this type emerged as the fittest of all competitors when the new international order was established. In this conception, new states emerge as a bottom-up process as groups develop the means to defend their territory and autonomy (Coggins 2014, 22). Westphalia was the joint acknowledgment of these like entities, and recognition was largely a formality and certainly secondary to the emergence of the system.

An alternative explanation for Westphalia stresses social determinants for the creation of states and the system. According to this view, the entities represented were not what we now think of as states, nor were they all sovereign (Osiander 2001). The relationships they enjoyed were not those of independent and equal units but instead reflected the political reality of the time. For instance, 212 representatives negotiated at Westphalia and were ostensibly treated with reciprocal external sovereignty (Coggins 2014, 23). And yet, some of those representatives were from territories that owed allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire; some were princes that did not have total authority over the citizens in their territory. In short, Westphalia did not represent the mutual acknowledgment of states. Instead, Westphalia created the idea of states while at the same time affirming states as the dominant governmental unit (Osiander 2011). Rather than representing a formality, recognition played a fundamental role in the creation of the actors and their system as it was both mutual and reciprocal among the newly created units.

This notion of socially created states and systems is not new. Bull (1977) specifically argues that the anarchic system that was created was not merely a system but a society of states. In his conception of the international community, a society exists:

When a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, for a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions. (Bull 1977, 13)

This idea of states as a socially constructed entity finds support in the work of many social constructivists, notably Wendt, who posits a constructivist view of systemic theory where state identities are learned and shaped through their interactions with other states (Wendt 1999). Viewed from this perspective, recognition at Westphalia did not represent a mere formality as a rubber stamp of the status quo, but the very nature of states and their system was constructed through mutual recognition. State creation was and is a top-down phenomenon, and existence and membership are only attainable through the acceptance of others.

The similarities between the legal theories of recognition and the IR conceptions of system emergence are quite evident. Declarative proponents see recognition as a bottom-up process whereby largely domestic factors eventually result in legitimation. Constitutive thinkers argue that legitimacy is dependent on the acceptance of other actors in the system. In other words, whether

Convention itself was a meeting of the International Conference of American States. Thus signatories of the Convention are limited to North and South American states. Nonetheless, the Convention is widely cited as evidence for the declaratory basis for statehood. For a more detailed account of the Convention and some criticisms, see, e.g., Grant (1999); Crawford (1979); Wilson (1937).

[6]Without subscribing to any particular "ism," this seems like a safe claim. Realists and neorealists would not dispute the fact. See e.g., Waltz (1979); Mearsheimer (2001). Likewise, liberals, institutionalists, and neo-liberal institutionalists shift the focus from the idea of the state as a black box, but they too acknowledge the import of states as actors and the lack of central authority. See e.g., Keohane and Nye (2012); Moravcsik (1997).

to recognize or legitimize a new entity is a subjective choice that states can make based on their own calculations. While IR scholars do not use the same language as IL scholars, the concepts are the same. The main difference is that while international law continues to debate which theory of recognition and statehood emergence is preferable, state practice over time has demonstrated a clear preference for the constitutive model.

It is well beyond the scope of this paper to summarize the entirety of the current state of that literature with regard to state recognition.[7] Nonetheless, a few studies in particular bear discussion with respect to the recognition of governments after extra-legal changes as they are system-wide studies whose underlying logic is applicable to both new states and new governments.

Coggins (2011; 2014) introduces and uses a social model to test the relationships between secessionist movements, recognition, and the role of external politics and external support. She explicitly tests the proposition that recognition is a political choice and that it is largely dependent on societal relationships between states. She likens the international community to an exclusive club to which new members must apply for membership and finds that external politics along with certain domestic factors in the new state are determinate of when states will recognize a new member. Moreover, Coggins uses a case study of international responses to the secession of Yugoslavia (1989-2011) to illustrate the social dynamics inherent in state emergence (Coggins 2014). Coggins's work reflects many previous descriptive accounts of recognition and state emergence and confirms that states seem to use the power related to recognition in a strategic manner.

Duque (2018) approaches the question of recognition from a slightly different perspective by conceptualizing recognition as status in international politics. Similar to Coggins's approach, Duque views recognition through a social lens by examining the relationships between established states and potential new members of the club. Eschewing arguments that statehood is determined by state attributes, Duque finds support for recognition emerging from social networks rather than an acknowledgment of a status quo.

What of recognition of governments? The foremost consequence of recognition, according to Coggins and Duque, is entery into the club. With respect to states, recognition is the acknowledgment of a legitimate peer able to participate fully in the political system. Recognition of governments is no different in this regard. States use the subjective decision of whether to recognize new states as a political tool and that use likewise extends to the decision to recognize governments that come to power through extra-legal change.

Peterson (1982; 1997) provides the only substantive treatments of government recognition in IR, but her work focuses mainly on the development of the institution over time. That is, she traces how the institution has changed based on various influences while making a compelling descriptive case that since at least 1815 states have consistently viewed and used recognition as a political device. In both her article and her book she argues that states strategically choose to grant/withhold recognition to further their foreign policy goals. While she does not use the language of strategic choice explicitly, her argument nonetheless fits within that construct.

As long as new regimes need recognition, and other governments' recognition decisions are not so predetermined by application of legal rules that they become matters of routine, governments can exploit a new regime's need of recognition for policy ends by withholding recognition unless or until the new regime does certain things. These policy ends might involve collective protection of particular shared values, but more frequently have involved the seeking of individual advantages (Peterson 1997, 3).

Peterson's account of recognition provides an even starker description of the political use of the institution with respect to governments as opposed to states. Consider that legal scholars and practitioners have had some success implementing the Montevideo criteria for statehood and moving the decision away from a purely political choice. Those criteria are: (1) a permanent population; (2) a clearly defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to enter relations with other states. (Organization of American States 1933, Art. 1). While they are certainly not always followed, questions about whether a particular entity is, in fact, a state tend to revolve around those four factors. Ryngaert and Sobrie (2011), for instance, argue that state decisions regarding the situations in Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia call into question whether the Montevideo criteria have any real power, as states seemingly ignored unequivocal facts related to those entities' claims of statehood.

Similar efforts have been made with respect to governments, but states have consistently refused to adopt objective criteria that would limit their discretion. Proposed criteria over the years for new governments have included: (1) the consent of the governed as evidenced through ratification of a constitution or subsequent elections (Latuerpacht 1947, 115-40); dynastic legitimism (Roth 1999, 142); a non-revolutionary ascent to power (1999, 144); and a democratic form of government (Downer 2013) to name a few. In reality these criteria largely reflect the preferences of the major powers at the time and how they viewed their own claim to legitimacy. For instance, that a legitimate government is one that rules by divine right clearly reflects the preference and practice of states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Likewise, in 1907 Guatemala, El Salvador,

[7] Without being an exhaustive list of relatively recent book-length treatments, see, e.g., Fabry (2010); Sterio (2012); Griffiths (2016); Visoka, Doyle, and Newman (2020); Ker-Lindsay and Fabry (Forthcoming). For more narrowly focused work, see, e.g., Caplan (2005); Mirilovic and Siroky (2015); Armakolas and Ker-Lindsay (2020); Siroky, Popovic, and Mirilovic (2021).

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica agreed to a treaty that would limit recognition of governments that were violently overthrown (Roth, 1999, 144). None of these politically expedient criteria have remained over time. History shows that the only criteria that seems to have had any sort of lasting effect is that before a new government can be recognized it must have effective control of the state, but even the importance of that criterion was ebbed and flowed over time (Peterson 1997, 36).

To summarize the discussion to this point, recognition is an institution that should be important to both international legal and international relations scholars. At its core, the question of recognition is fundamental to both because it relates directly to the units of interest of each discipline and how they interact. Legal scholars have long debated issues associated with recognition, and international relations scholars have largely focused on state recognition. It is hopefully clear by now that while we know much about the institution of recognition, we lack theoretical accounts and empirical testing regarding its use as applied specifically to recognition of governments after extra-legal change. In the next section, I outline the political effects of recognition as well as proposing my theory regarding the political use of recognition.

A Political Theory of Recognition

There are a few important points to note as they affect this theoretical account as to exactly what type of recognition is of most interest to the study. First, under international law recognition of a government is required whenever a new government comes to power via a means not contemplated by domestic law or custom. A government of a new state seeking international recognition might qualify under this definition. However, the process of recognizing new states—and by association their new governments—is fundamentally different than the situation where recognition is required due to a leader transition in an established state. Without question there are additional calculations that take place when recognizing a new state, and my theory of government recognition would not apply in those instances. Second, recognition here refers to a unilateral act as part of a bilateral relationship. That is, the recognition decision of interest in is when one country grants recognition to the new government in another country. This contrasts to other types of recognition that could be studied. For instance, the Credentials Committee is part of the United Nations General Assembly and is responsible for accrediting member-states delegations. While infrequent, the Committee has been called on to determine which delegation is the legitimate representative for a particular member-state (Ratliff 2009). Here, the analysis is limited to the international legal definition of recognition, which contemplates a unilateral decision on the part of a potential recognizer, though recognition as part of multi-lateral relations might be of interest in future work.

The bilateral nature of the relationship surrounding recognition questions suggests an important theoretic insight moving forward. In offering a critique of the early work on third-party interventions into civil conflict Findley and Teo (2006) provide a workable structure that focuses on the actors involved and not necessarily the phenomenon of interest. For instance, early intervention studies focused on attributes of the conflict that attracted intervention (Regan 1998; 2000) and whether interventions increased the severity (Balch-Lindsey, Enterline and Joyce 2008) or duration of conflicts (Regan 2002). While important, studies like these are what Findley and Teo call phenomenon-centric in that they explain less about the motivations of actors than they do about the conflicts themselves.

The authors go on to suggest an actor-centric framework that they ague is more applicable to the foreign policy decisions that are often at the heart of intervention questions. Findley and Teo then use the actor-centric focus to look at convergent and divergent interests between potential interveners, as well as potential interveners and conflict states. Such an approach is attractive given the nature of recognition described to this point. It is possible to identify convergent and divergent interests—or what potential recognizers perceive those interests to be—that should have an effect on the decision to recognize. Such an approach is also consistent with the international legal community's complaints that recognizers act politically (i.e. in their best interests), as well as with Coggins's formulation of state interests with regard to the recognition of states. All that remains is to identify the interests and particular relationships that drive the decision to recognize a new government.

One of the prime motivations identified throughout IR literature is the notion of security. It seems fair to assume that most states want to survive and that a major concern should therefore be their external security. Any decision about recognizing a new government should be made with an eye toward security, and this means that countries should use recognition to weaken their enemies and to strengthen their friends. Consider that in a recognition scenario there are three main actors: (1) the potential recognizing government; (2) the previous government in the country that experienced an extra-legal change; and (3) the new government in the country that experienced an extra-legal change. When a new government comes to power there is likely some uncertainty about what its policies will be and how any relationship with other governments will take shape. Based on its interactions with a previous regime, however, a potential recognizer knows whether the relationship was favorable, hostile, or something in between. That relationship will determine whether a potential recognizer will, in fact, recognize a new government.

This enmity-amity dynamic suggests two different mechanisms at work. In the case of enmity, recognition potentially serves a number of functions. First, if the previous regime was hostile, recognition represents a formal means of denouncing and replacing that regime with a new one. Helping to effectuate regime change could also build favor with a new regime. More

cynically, a potential recognizer may wish to add to the chaos and unstable political environment by granting legitimacy to a group that is challenging the hostile regime. Byman et al. (2001) and Saideman (2002) offer these and other motivations for why states support some insurgencies and not others, but the core argument is that that states seek to weaken their most threatening enemies. In terms of recognition, this means that an antagonistic relationship with a prior government should increase the likelihood that a potential recognizer grants legitimacy to a new regime. Consistent with that logic:

- *H1 (Enmity): A country is more likely to recognize a new government when a hostile relationship exists with the previous regime in a country that experiences an extra-legal change.*

While enmity suggests that potential recognizers are more likely to recognize new governments as a means to weaken their enemies, amity suggests that potential recognizers should use recognition to strategically bolster friends and allies. Ensuring that amicable governments maintain legitimacy directly increases external security by ensuring that hostile governments does not come to power, as an ally should be less likely to attack. It also has more indirect effects, though, as amicable and like-minded governments make cooperative tasks easier. Trade, for instance, is far more likely when a stable relationship exists between two countries. Potential recognizers should prefer a government that it has enjoyed an amicable relationship and should resist change by hesitating for refusing to acknowledge a new regime that comes to power extra-legally. In short, an amicable relationship with a prior government should decrease the likelihood that a potential recognizer grants legitimacy to a new regime. Thus:

- *H2 (Amity): A country is less likely to recognize a new government when an amicable relationship exists with the previous regime in a country that experiences an extra-legal change.*

In addition to the enmity-amity dynamics at work, the nature of recognition itself suggests another theoretic expectation. I have argued that countries have adopted and maintained the constitutive model of recognition with regard to both states and governments, and the primary mechanism that underlies the constitutive model is the notion that state and governments hold the power of legitimacy. That is, like a club good that individuals can be excluded from enjoying, recognition is an action that opens the doors of the club to new members. However, no one country holds the key. Much like the norm life cycle that requires a tipping point before norm adoption and internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), a similar critical mass of countries must recognize a new government before it is legitimized

Since membership is contingent on multiple countries recognizing a new government, this suggests the possibility of strategically coordinated action on the part of potential recognizers. It makes little sense for only one country to recognize a new government because no one country's decision constitutes recognition by the community. In fact, by acting alone a recognizer risks drawing the ire of other potential recognizers that could make acceptance of the new government more difficult on the whole. If potential recognizers actions are coordinated it should make recognition easier and quicker. Thus,

- *H3: As the number of recognizers increases, the likelihood of recognition should increase.*

Quantitative Research Design and Analysis

Irregular Leader Entries as Extra-Legal Changes and Opportunities for Recognition

Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) developed the Archigos project, which is a comprehensive dataset on political leaders from 1875-2004. Along with capturing leader attributes, the authors identify and code the manner in which every leader assumed and left office. That is, based on Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) identification of independent states, Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza identify the "effective primary ruler" in every state and record the manner in which they came to and left power. They code each entry and each exit as either regular or irregular depending on the manner in which it occurs. More specifically:

We identify whether leaders are selected into and leave political office in a manner prescribed by either explicit rules or established conventions. In a democracy, a leader may come to power through direct election or establishing a sufficient coalition of representatives in the legislature. Although leaders may not be elected or selected in particularly competitive processes, many autocracies have similar implicit or explicit rules for transfers of executive power. Leader changes that occur through designation by an outgoing leader, hereditary succession in a monarchy, and appointment by the central committee of a ruling party would all be considered regular transfers of power from one leader to another in a autocratic regime (Archigos v. 2.9 Codebook 2009).

Since the end of World War II there have been more than 2,000 leadership changes in countries around the world. More than 80% of those changes were normal: in democracies elections were held; in monarchies, the line of succession was followed; in Communist countries, the Party chose the next leader. A significant number of changes, however, were irregular—they did not conform to the laws, customs, or common practices of a country.

Recognition Events

The previous discussion of the legal aspects of recognition highlighted the manner in which it can be conferred by one country to another. Recall that legal scholarship and state practice differentiated recognition on the bases of de facto versus de jure and express versus implied. As Talmon (1998) notes, the distinctions were often attempts by states to confer more or less legitimacy on a new government or to avoid scrutiny of their express intention to do so, but the practical effect was that states recognized governments as legal and legitimate entities capable of carrying on bilateral relations. Moreover, the distinctions more often than not simply reflected the manner in which it was conveyed and not much else. Tracing the history and evolution of recognition with respect to governments, Peterson (1997, 111-18) highlights some of the historic debates among scholars and practitioners as to what type of actions constitute recognition. Some legal scholars asserted that nothing short of a formal grant of recognition will suffice, while others posit that actions such as the provision of aid (humanitarian, economic, or military) is sufficient. Contemporary practice, as Peterson indicates, is that recognition can be conveyed by any formal means—bi-lateral government to government action—that is inconsistent with nonrecognition (1997, 87). Put more simply, an act that treats a government as a legitimate and equal entity is sufficient for recognition.

The best means of identifying recognition events is an archival news search. The Integrated Early Warning System (ICEWS) project codes events from worldwide news sources dating to January 1, 1995 (Boschee, et al 2015). The dataset relies on automated event coding and follows the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) coding scheme, which codes events around the world according to approximately 300 event codes ranging from the detonation of a nuclear weapon to a public statement (Schrodt 2012). Crucially, ICEWS include the actors involved in an event as well as the date of an event, which allows identification of recognition events and the day on which they occurred.

Conceptually recognition is an act that confers legitimacy on another party. It indicates a willingness to treat another party as an equal. Operationally recognition events are defined here in a relatively narrow fashion. From the CAMEO coding scheme, I identify three events as recognition events: (1) a grant of diplomatic recognition, (2) an act of diplomatic cooperation, and (3) the signing of a formal agreement. While the first and third events are clear, an act of diplomatic cooperation refers to the initiation, resumption, or expansion of diplomatic efforts that do not include things like praise or endorsement of a policy or political actor, verbal defense or justification of a policy or actor, or a rally of support on behalf of a policy or actor (Schrodt 2012, 31-2). Crucially, each of these actions are visible events between governments. Focusing solely on formal grants of recognition ignores the reality that many countries prefer to confer recognition in a tacit manner. Limiting my operational definition to those formal grants plus diplomatic cooperation and the signing of formal agreements, meanwhile, coincides with the conceptual definition, accords with country practice, and prevents a dilution of the concept by conflating it with extraneous events.

Model Selection

As the theoretic hypotheses suggest, the focus of this study is not just if recognition occurs but instead when it occurs. Briefly, event history analysis is appropriate where the event of interest is tied to the history preceding the event. I argue that the decision to recognize a new government is not made based entirely on contemporaneous factors, but that it is also a result of previous events and interactions. In other words, event history analysis is useful when questions about *when* and event occurs, as well as *if* it happens at all (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 1).

Conducting event history analysis necessitates the use of a certain types of models that are alternately referred to as survival models, hazard models, failure-time models, duration models, and more. The various names come from the processes being studied, which typically include time-to-event or time within a particular state. I use a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972) to estimate the effect of my independent and control variables on the time it takes for recognition to occur. Unlike parametric models, the Cox model does not make any assumptions about the underlying functional form of the distribution of the residuals making it preferable over many models.

Variables

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is *Recognition* and is dichotomous taking the value of 1 in a year that a potential recognizer confers recognition on a government that has come to power via an extra-legal change and 0 otherwise.[8] Technically, when using a Cox model there is no dependent variable specified as the variable of interest serves as the censoring variable and the true dependent variable is a function of time and that variable. For these purposes, however, it is best to think of *Recognition* as the dependent variable. It is coded based on the ICEWS data, and it captures the first recognition event that occurs between a potential recognizer and a new government.

The ICEWS data is limited in that it only codes events dating back to 1995. In that timeframe there were 32 instances of an extra-legal changes providing the opportunity to record a recognition event. Rather than examining whether every country in

[8] In addition, I code a variable *Recognition_Type*, which is a variable that captures specifically what recognition event took place. It takes values of 1, 2, or 3 that correspond to the CAMEO event codes for a grant of diplomatic recognition, diplomatic cooperation, and signing a formal agreement, respectively.

the world recognized a new government, I limited the analysis to politically relevant dyads including local and regional powers. Therefore, each case had a minimum of five potential recognizers while most had more. Moreover, many cases span multiple years, which means there were often multiple dyad-years within each case. The 132 recognition events represent the fact that recognition took place in 13.6% of the dyad-years.[9] Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for time to recognition.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics – Summary of Survival Times

Data	Total Time at Risk (Days)	Mean Time at Risk (Days)	Survial Time		
			25%	*50%*	*75%*
1995-2010	247370	702.76	404	1378	3428

Explanatory Variables. The main theory being tested rests on the fundamental assumption that states are rational actors and will act in their best interests. One of the ways that states can act rationally is to act strategically to weaken their enemies and strengthen their friends or allies. When one considers the benefits of recognition—external legitimacy in the international community, internal legitimacy for a new government, access to state assets, legal authority to make and sign international agreements—it is clear that recognition can be leveraged as an important political tool.

The first two hypotheses reflect the relationship that a potential recognizer has with the government that is being replaced. That is, rather than look at the attributes of a new government, many of which may not be immediately clear in the aftermath of an extra-legal change, potential recognizers base their recognition decision on previous interactions. The first hypothesis is the *Enmity Hypothesis* and posits that countries will seek to weaken their enemies. If a hostile government is replaced, countries should act quickly to recognize the new government as this provides legitimacy and credibility to the new government at the expense of the prior regime. In other words, when a hostile government is replaced, the time to recognition should decrease.

To test the concept of hostility I use the variable *Hostility*, which is taken from the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data (Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Ghosen and Bennett 2003; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). In the MID dataset disputes are coded in years that they are initiated and/or ongoing. *Hostility* is coded in a similar fashion in my data and takes a value of 1 in every year that there is a MID ongoing or initiated between a potential recognizer and the state that experiences an extra-legal change of government and 0 otherwise. Because I focus on the interaction with the previous regime, I used a lagged version of the MID variable. For instance, in the case of Iran 1979, *Hostility* takes the value of 1 for any potential recognizer that either started or had a MID going with Iran in 1978.

The second hypothesis, the *Amity Hypothesis*, focuses on whether or not an amicable relationship exists with the government that has lost power. Just as a country should want to weaken its enemies it should want to bolster its friends. Thus, if a friendly government experiences an extra-legal change a potential recognizer should withhold recognition from the new government. Stated in terms of the model, when a friendly government is replaced the time to recognition should increase. It is important to note the operationalization of two separate concepts (enmity and amity) and therefore the need separate measures for each.

I test the *Amity Hypothesis* using three different variables that seek to capture two types of amicable relationships. The first relationship I test is whether or not the two countries share an ideological link. Like Coggins (2011) I use the Polity IV data's democracy and autocracy scores to create two dichotomous variables, *Mutual Democracy* and *Mutual Autocracy*, which indicate whether the potential recognizer and the previous government are mutually democratic or mutually autocratic (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). Consistent with the literature, countries with Polity scores of $+7$ or greater were coded as democracies and those with scores of -7 or less were coded as autocracies. Both democracies and autocracies should be slow to recognize any new government that replaces an ideological friend.

In addition to recognition decisions being made to help ideologically similar countries, I also expect countries to help their economic allies. To indicate a friendly economic relationship I use the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) Database to identify pairs of countries that have signed preferential trade agreements (Dur, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). DESTA covers nearly 800 trade agreements from 1947-2010. I focus on bilateral agreements (BTA) as opposed to multi-party agreements or membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) specifically due to the fact that recognition is a bilateral decision and bilateral trade agreements more closely mirror that relationship.[10] I use the variable *Bilateral Trade Agreement*, which is a

[9]The reference to dyad-years here is significant. After expanding the individual cases to account for all relevant potential recognizers, I then break each case-dyad into episodes by year. For instance, there was an extra-legal entry in Qatar on June 27, 1995. The United States conferred recognition on October 20, 1996. Thus, instead of having only one observation for the United States-Qatar dyad, I break it into two episodes one for 1995 and one for 1996. Had the United States never granted recognition, there would be an episode for each year until the Qatari regime left power. Breaking each dyad into such episodes allows me to include covariates that vary by year in my data analysis.

[10]I also tried to include various dyadic economic measures such as net trade flow, total trade flow, and trade flow as a percentage of joint GDP. The main problem involved missing data, specifically for many African countries and for Russia in many years. This forced the Cox model to omit a significant number

dichotomous variable and takes the value 1 in every year that an agreement is in force between a potential recognizer and a country experiencing an extra-legal entry. All other years are coded as 0. Like the ideological argument, the presence of a BTA should mean that a potential recognizer is less likely to recognize a new government.

The final hypothesis is the *Coordination Hypothesis*, and it eschews the enmity/amity paradigm and introduces another type of strategic thinking that countries might employ. Consistent with Coggins's and Duque's notion of international community with countries acting as the gatekeepers that wield the power to admit or deny new members, I also argue that countries have ardently defended the discretion that comes with that particular power in the face of suggestions about strict criteria that would make recognition a more objective process. In no small part this is because of the benefits that come with being "in the club." While recognition is a bilateral act, it is also true that recognition by one country alone does not equate to recognition by the community. That said, once one or more countries have recognized a new government it should be easier for others to do so as well. Employing the logic of a threshold or cascade model it should be true that as more countries recognize (i.e. legitimize) a new government that others should be more likely to recognize and to do so quickly. Moreover, it is possible for countries to coordinate their recognition decisions to help facilitate this process.

To test for this community behavior, I code the variable *Previous Recognition*, which is a count of the total number of recognizers in previous years. For instance, if there are five recognizers in a particular case and one country recognizes the new government in the first year, another recognizes the government in the second year, then *Previous Recognition* would be 0 in the first year, 1 in the second year, and 2 in the third year. The variable is obviously drawn from the data itself and ranges from 0-12 with an average number of previous recognitions just under 3. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all of my explanatory variables, as well as the control variables in each of the two datasets.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables, 1995-2010

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Hostile	0.03	0.18	0	1
Bilat. Trade Agree.	0.01	0.1	0	1
Mutual Democracy	0.08	0.27	0	1
Mutual Autocracy	0.03	0.18	0	1
Previous Recognition	1.91	2.82	0	12
Colonial History	0.06	0.24	0	1
Oil Production	0.39	0.39	0	1
Instability	0.07	0.25	0	1

Control Variables. Given that this is the first large-N empirical study of the recognition of governments there is no extant literature that identifies control variables that need to be included in a model of recognition. That said, two sources do offer insight and guidance into the problem. The first is Coggins's (2011; 2014) work on the recognition of states emerging from secessionist conflicts, which is largely responsible for the theoretic underpinnings of this entire project. Coggins offers both domestic and international explanations of the decision to recognize new states, and I have already included appropriate variables in my model. The second source of potential controls is the literature on intervention into civil conflicts.

To this point I have largely avoided a discussion comparing recognition to intervention, as I do not want readers to think of recognition simply as another type of intervention. This is to take nothing away from an area of study that is hugely important and is continually expanding explanations related to that phenomenon. The fundamental distinction to note, though, is related to that phenomenon as compared to the decision of whether or not to recognize a new government. The opportunity for recognition, as I have previously described, arises when there has been a violation of domestic law that has immediate repercussions in the international community as the legal identity and status of a state's representation in that community is in question. Other countries must decide what legitimate authority will take on the responsibilities and obligations associated with that representation.

In the case of intervention, however, the choice being made by a country is whether to insert itself into an ongoing civil conflict. Often those conflicts have already inflicted great costs on the combatants and others in the conflict area and the additional costs associated with intervention are not insignificant. Economic, military, and human capital will have to be spent in furtherance of an intervention. Those same calculations do not necessarily apply to the decision to recognize a new government. While there are similarities between the decision to recognize and the decision to intervene in terms of a third party involving itself in another country's domestic affairs, the calculus underlying the two decisions is simply not the same.

of observations. Additionally, when those particular measures were included in the models they either violated the proportional hazard assumption or otherwise led to more model fit.

With that in mind I do use three variables that frequently appear in models of civil war intervention. The first is *Oil Production* and is included because both the intervention literature and the broader civil conflict literature identify importance of that resource in a variety of ways. Some studies have shown that resource-rich countries are more likely to experience civil conflict (Collier and Hoffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003); other scholars make arguments regarding the possibility of extending conflicts or making an oil-rich state a likely target of intervention (Aydin 2010).[11] In truth, the mechanisms at play are still somewhat unsettled, but most scholars agree that it is important to control for the presence of oil.

As it relates to recognition, I think there are valid arguments that the presence of oil should make the time to recognition longer but that it could also make the time to recognition shorter. Potential recognizers reliant on oil might want to capitalize on a new government coming to power if the recognizer believes that the new government will be more amenable than the previous regime. Conversely, if a good relationship exists with the government that is being replaced, a potential recognizer may be hesitant to legitimize a new government. In short, I do not have any expectations as to the direction of the relationship that the presence of oil should have on the possibility of recognition. I code *Oil Production* as a dichotomous variable based on PETRODATA dataset (Lujala, Rod, and Theime 2007). That dataset provides information on oil production in particular countries and I code *Oil Production* 1 in the year that oil production begins and every year after and 0 if a country does not produce oil.[12]

I also control for colonial ties between the potential recognizer and the country that experienced an extra-legal change using the variable *Colonial History.* At the very least former colonial rulers should be more likely to take notice of an extra-legal change in a former colony, though it is not entirely clear how that status will affect their decision to recognize. Much like *Oil Production* arguments could be made that a shared colonial history should make recognition more likely or that it should make recognition less likely. Given that *Colonial History* is included as a control, that exact relationship is not the focus of the study. The variable is dichotomous, takes the value of 1 in every year in a dyad that has a colonial history, and is coded 0 otherwise.

Another factor that might influence a country's decision to recognize is domestic political instability. Kathman (2011) and others have written about the possibility of civil war contagion, and a similar logic should see countries with a tenuous grasp on power acting to quell unrest at home that might be fomented by an extra-legal change in another country. A country that is politically unstable should refuse, or at least delay, recognizing a new government for fear that it too might experience an extra-legal change. I include *Instability* as a dichotomous variable and code whether or not a country experienced a significant regime change in the year prior to an opportunity for recognition and 0 otherwise. I use Fearon and Laitin's (2003) operationalization of a three-or-greater change in Polity score to define a significant regime change.

Results and Analysis

Table 3 presents the regressions results of the Cox models on recognition decisions from 1995 – 2010. The signs to the right of the variable names indicate the expected direction of the relationship. To account for dependence within episodes I clustered the standard errors by dyad-id. Hazard ratios are presented, as their interpretation is more straightforward and more substantively meaningful that coefficients. A hazard ratio greater than one indicates an increased hazard—in this case the possibility of recognition. Meanwhile, a hazard ratio below one indicates a decreased possibility of recognition. Tests of the proportional hazard assumption indicate that the model does not violate the assumption and exhibits good fit on the whole.[13] All diagnostics along with coefficient estimates for the models and hazard ratios and coefficient estimates for models without clustering are available from the author.

In general, the results provide strong evidence for two of the three hypotheses. The *Enmity Hypothesis* has the most support with statistical significance at the $p<0.01$ level. Perhaps more important than the statistical interpretation, though, is the substantive interpretation. The presence of a hostile relationship with a prior regime increases the likelihood of recognition nearly three times. Put another way, the presence of a hostile relationship decreases the recognition time of a new government when it replaces a government that was unfriendly toward potential recognizers. Thus, the hypothesized mechanism of weakening one's enemies appears to be at work.

The *Coordination Hypothesis* also received strong support with statistical significance again at the $p<0.01$ level. A greater number of previous recognizers increases the likelihood of (decreases the time to) recognition of a new government. Remember that for coordination the posited effect was something akin to a cascade. Like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue with regard to the lifecycle of norms it could be that a tipping point exists for recognition—which is of course itself a social construct—and that the concerted efforts of other countries helps spur on the recognition process.

Interestingly there is virtually no support for the *Amity Hypothesis*. More troubling than simply the direction of the relationship is the significance of *Mutual Democracy* in both models, which indicates that when a potential recognizer and a

[11] Koubi et al. (2014) offers a nice overview of the studies that examine the role of natural resources in intrastate conflict.

[12] I chose this measure over others—such as a fuel exports as a percentage of GDP—due to missingness issues and model fit.

[13] I would note that for the model presented here *Previous Recognition* is very nearly approaches statistical significance at the 0.1 level but that a visual inspection of the Schoenfeld residuals allay any fears regarding the proportional hazards assumption (Cleves et al. 2010).

Table 3. Determinants of Recognition of New Governments after Extra-Legal Change

Independent Variables	*Hazard Ratio (1995-2010)*
Hostility (+)	2.849***
Bilateral Trade Agreement (-)	2.076
Mutual Democracy (-)	3.147***
Mutual Autocracy (-)	1.254
Previous Recognition (+)	1.272***
Colonial History (+/-)	1.771*
Oil Production (+/-)	1.495**
Instability (-)	1.157
Number of observations	964
Time at risk (days)	247,370
Number of failures	129
Number of subjects	352
Number of clusters	352

Notes: Hazard rations are presented. The hazard ratio is the exponentiated form of the coefficient. All tests are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered within each case by dyad-id and are presented with coefficient estimates in Appendix B. Significance at ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1.

previous regime are mutually democratic the likelihood of recognition of a new government—one that came to power in an extra-legal fashion—increases. This finding is particularly worrisome for proponents of the democratic legitimacy criteria as that theory holds that other countries, particularly democratic ones, should delay recognition or withhold it entirely from a government that came to power in a non-democratic fashion. This particular finding warrants further study in the future.

Consistent with the ideological findings it seems that the presence of a preferential trade agreement with a previous regime also has the effect of increasing the likelihood of recognizing a regime that comes to power in an extra-legal fashion, though not at a statistically significant level. Unlike the results for mutual ideology, there is perhaps a ready explanation for the trade finding. The assumption is that states act strategically to weaken their enemies and bolster their allies, which is another way of saying that countries act strategically to further their own self-interest. It is possible that in trade relations it is more important to maintain a stable relationship even if that means recognizing a government that replaced a friendly one. It undermines the notion of helping friends, but it is at least consistent with countries acting in their own best interests.

Finally, the control variables merit some discussion even though the expectations for them were less clear than the explanatory variables. Both *Colonial History* and *Oil Production* were statistically significant, and each increased the likelihood of recognition. Again, given the lack of agreement about the underlying mechanisms any justification of the findings would seem ad hoc at this point. Perhaps instead of fearing that recognition of other tenuous governments would make them appear domestically vulnerable countries believe that by recognizing new governments they themselves will become more legitimate in the international community. After all, recognition represents entry into the club and only those that are already members can provide access.

Conclusion

What determines why and when countries recognize governments that have come to power in an extra-legal fashion? Over the years, legal scholars and some policy makers have consistently bemoaned the lack of objective criteria to determine the legitimacy of such governments frustrated by the seeming political nature of recognition and its use by countries as a political tool. That frustration, however, offers an opportunity for political scientists to explain the behavior. The results presented here represent the first large-N empirical study that begins to untangle these particular questions and provide significant insight into what will hopefully become a more studied aspect of international relations.

It is hardly surprising that in general states act in a rational manner when it comes to recognition. That is, the complaint of legal scholars that recognition is too political should have indicated that countries used recognition to further their own interests. The novelty of this study, again aside from being the first empirical attempt to examine recognition of governments, is

that I attempt to explain the self-interested behavior of countries in terms of their relationships with the governments that lose power. It does appear that countries want to weaken opponents, as the presence of a hostile relationship between the potential recognizer and the previous government greatly increases the likelihood of recognition of a new government. This perhaps suggests that countries want to act quickly to ensure that a prior regime does not reclaim power.

On the other hand, amicable relations with a previous government stimulate rather than deter recognition when that government ousted extra-legally. The results surrounding mutual democracies are the most troubling and are most indicative of the need for future work. A beneficial economic relationship likewise did not have the expected effect on a recognition decision. Again, this perhaps suggest a more cynical approach to diplomacy that favors economic stability over helping a friend but that is conjecture at this point.

The social aspect of recognition is also an important consideration. Scholars have consistently advocated for an acknowledgment of the role that social constructs play in international relations, and some go so far as to argue that international society is itself a social construct. From this perspective recognition plays an important role as an institution that countries have worked over decades and centuries to develop and maintain and it serves as the fundamental mechanism for new actors to become members of that society. To that end, the role of coordination among potential recognizers cannot be ignored. Recognition can still be a strategic decision that countries make, but how the community views a new government matters as well.

As mentioned above, this study hopefully encourages other scholars to examine recognition. Questions about why mutual democracies act in the manner that they do abound and better data and different methods can always help answer new questions. Perhaps the most notable avenue for future research, though, is what happens after recognition. Whether or not newly recognized governments are more stable or survive longer than their counterparts are two immediate questions worthy of investigation. Likewise, the focus here has been on bilateral recognition, but the role of regional and international organizations warrant study. In short, this project should prove the starting point for many others going forward.

References

Armakolas, Ioannis and James Ker-Lindsey, Eds. 2020. *The Politics of Recognition and Engagement: EU Member State Relations with Kosovo*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aydin, Aysegul. 2010. "Where do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 27(1):47-66.

Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, Andrew. J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce. 2008. "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process." *Journal of Peace Research*. 45(3): 345-363.

Black, Ian. 2011. "Libyan Rebels win international recognition as country's leaders." *The Guardian*. July 15, 2011. Online

Boschee, Elizabeth, Jennifer Lautenschlager, Sean O'Brien, Steve Shellman, James Starz, Michael Ward. 2015. "ICEWS Coded Event Data." Online:
http:://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28075

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M and Bradford Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brownlie, Ian. 2008. *Principles of Public International Law*. 7th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 2001. *Trends in Oustide Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Caplan, Richard. 2005. *Europe and the Recognition of States in Yugoslavia*. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Cleves, Mario, Roberto G Gutierrez, William Gould, Yulia V. Marchenko. 2010. *An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata,* 3rd ed.College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Coggins, Bridget L. 2011. "Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of States from Secessionism." *International Organization*. 65(3): 433-67.

Coggins , Bridget L. 2014. *Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*. 61(1):563-95.

Correlates of War Project. 2011. "State Membership List, v2011." Online: http://correlatesofwar.org

Cox, D.R. 1972. "Regression Models and Life-Table." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B. (Methodological)*. (2): 187-220.

CNN. 2004. "Aristride says U.S. deposed him in 'coup d'état."'
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/03/01/aristide.claim/

Crawford, James. 1979. *The Creation of States in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downer, Joshua. 2013. "Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition." *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*. 46: 581-611.

Duque, Marina G. 2018. "Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach." International Studies Quarterly 62(3): 577–592.

Dur, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig. 2014. "The Design of International Trade Agreements." *Review of International Organizations*. 9(3): 333-52.

Fabry, Mikulas. 2010. *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *The American Political Science Review*. 97(1):75-90.

Findley, Michael G. and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach." *Journal of Politics*. 68(4): 828-837.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "Norms and International Relations Theory." *International Organization*. 52(4):887-917.

Garrner, Bryan A. and Henry Campbell Black. 2004. *Black's Law Dictionary*. 7th ed. St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters.

Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816." *International Interactions* 25(4): 393-413.

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 21(2):133-154.

Ghosn, Faten, and Scott Bennett. 2003. Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, Version 3.10. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org.

Goemans, Henk E. Kirstian Skrede Gledistch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research*. 46(2): 269-83.

Grant, Thomas D. 1999. *The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution*. London: Praeger

Griffiths, Ryan A. 2016. *Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halabi, Sam Foster. 2012. "Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: the Libyan Intervention in Historical and Theoretical Context." *American University International Law Review*. 27(2): 321-90.

Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer and J. David Singer. 1996. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2):163-213.

Kathman, Jacob D. 2011. "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 55(6): 847-76.

Kelsen, Hans. 1966. *Principles of International Law*. 2nd Ed. Edited and Revised by Robert W. Tucker. New York: Holt, Rinhart, and Winston.

Keohane, Robert O. and Jospeh S. Nye. 2012. *Power and Interdependence*. 4th Ed. Boston: Longman.

Ker-Lindsay, James and Mikulus Fabry. Forthcoming. *Secession and State Creation: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koubi, Vallu, Gabrielle Spilker, Tobias Bohmelt, Thomas Bernuaer. 2015. "Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research*. 51(2): 227-43.

Lauterpacht, Hersch. 1947. *Recognition in International Law*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Libya Contact Group. 2012. "Fourth Meeting of the Libya Contact Group, Chair's Statement," July 15, 2011. Retrieved from U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/168764.htm.

Lujala, Paivi, Jan Ketil Rod, Nadja Thieme. 2007. "Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 24(3):239-56.

Marshall, Monty and Keith Jaggers. 2010. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007*. Data online: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security*. 19(3): 5-49.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Menon, P.K. 1994. *The Law of Recognition in International Law: Basic Principles*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

Mirilovic, Nikola and David Siroky. 2015. "Two States in the Holy Land? The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international recognition." *Religion and Politics*. 8(2): 263-85.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International

Politics." *International Organization*. 51(4): 513-533.
Osiander, Anders. 2001. "International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth." *International Organization*. 55(2): 251-87.
Peterson, M.J. 1982. "Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System."
World Politics. 34(3): 324-52.
Peterson, M.J. 1997. *Recognition of Governments*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Ratliff, Suellen. 2009. "UN Representation Disputes: A Case Study of Cambodia and a New Accreditation Proposal for the Twenty-First Century." *University of California Law Review*. 87: 1207-64.
Regan, Patrick M. 1998. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts." *The Journal of Politics*. 60(3): 754-779.
Regan, Patrick M. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Regan, Patrick M. 2002. "Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 40(1): 336-359.
Roth, Brad R. 1999. *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Roth, Brad R. 2010. "Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine." *Melbourne Journal of International Law*. 11:393-440.
Ryngaert, Cedric and Sven Sobrie. 2011. "Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia." *Leiden Journal of International Law.* 24(2): 467-90.
Saideman. Steven M. 2002. "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups" *Journal of Peace Research* 39(1): 27–50.
Schrodt, Philip A. 2012 "CAMEO: Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event and Actor Codebook." Online:
http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/cameo.html
Siroky, David S., Milos Popovic, and Nikola Mirilovic. 2021. "Unilateral secession, international
recognition, and great power contestation." *Journal of Peace Research.* 58(5):1049 – 1067.
Sterio, Milena. 2012. *The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: 'Selfistans,'*
Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers. New York: Routledge.
Spruyt, Hendrick. 1994. *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Talmon, Stefean. 1998. *Recognition of Governments in International Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.
U.N. Security Council, 4919th Meeting. "Resolution 1529 (2004)". February 29, 2004.
http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/254/10/PDF/N0425410.pdf?OpenElement
United States Department of State. 2011. "Remarks on Libya and Syria." July 15, 2011.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168656.htm
Visoka, Gezim, John Doyle, and Edward Newman. 2020. *Routledge Handbook of State*
Recognition. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.
Von Glahn, Gerhard and Larry Taulbee. 2013. *Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law*. 10th Ed. New York: Pearson.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, PA: Addison Wesley.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, Robert R. "International Law in Treaties of the United States." *American Journal of International Law*. (31): 271-84.

Perceptions of Attitudinal Change: The End of History Illusion and Polarization

Russell Luke and Michael Westberg[1]

[1]Department of Political Science, Georgia State University

ABSTRACT

Does the perception that an individual's attitudes are temporally stable influence political polarization? The 'end of history illusion,' a theory not widely utilized in Political Science, posits that individuals will systematically overestimate the similarities between current and future attitudes (Quoidbach et al. 2013). We argue that this misperception of attitudinal stability is interrelated with political polarization through what we term 'attitudinal stasis.' If an individual believes their attitudes are unlikely to change due to the faulty perception that one's current attitudes are longitudinally static, then those who disagree are both factually incorrect and potentially morally deficient, issue and affective polarization, respectively. We attempt to reduce this source of polarization by highlighting the malleability of attitudes over time, thus indirectly introducing the notion that the respondent may not be entirely correct in their assumptions about attitudinal stasis. Using complementary survey experiments, we challenge our respondent's critical understanding of their political stances and how they view oppositional forces. We find strong suggestive evidence for the application of the "end of history illusion" in political domains. We also find limited evidence that priming respondents significantly increases their expectations for future change in specific domains. We do not find a meaningful reduction in affective polarization between those prompted to consider their previous attitudes and those who were not.

Introduction

The study of attitude formation and evolution has established general trends of longitudinal change in academic scholarship. Individuals' perception of their own attitudinal change is less understood. (Kent and Niemi 1968; Bartels and Jackman 2014; Lorenz et al. 2021). Psychological evidence from the preceding decades suggests that longitudinal stability in attitudes may be a false assumption of real-world behavior (Markus 1986; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Quoidbach et al. 2013; Ryzin 2016). We know that attitudes and preferences change over time, both among the general public and elected politicians. Take, for instance, Hillary Clinton's change in policy preference towards gay marriage. While in 2013, she announced her support for legalized same-sex marriages, just thirteen years earlier, when she was running for Senator of New York, she commented that "...I think a marriage is as a marriage has always been, between a man and a woman" (Sherman 2015). This change mirrors national trends that estimate that over 60% of Americans favored same-sex marriage in 2015, as compared to 60% opposing marriage equality in 1999 (McCarthy 2015).

Internal changes in attitudes and preferences are almost imperceptible to individuals. In a multi-wave, high N survey program, Jordi Quoidbach, Daniel Gilbert, and Timothy Wilson (2013) found that respondents systematically overestimated the longitudinal stability of their current attitudes and preferences when compared to reported changes to their previous views. Quoidbach and his coauthors describe this phenomenon as "the end of history illusion." The phrase conjures up comparisons to the famous Francis Fukuyama article and allusions to Hegelian philosophy. This theory contends that people systematically underestimate how their attitudes, personalities, and values can and will change in the future. The systematic misinterpretation of individuals' attitudinal rigidity highlights the question this paper seeks to address regarding the longitudinal stability of attitudes. Do individuals systematically underestimate future changes to their political attitudes? We theorize that the greater social meaning and material significance of political attitudes and preferences will inhibit the ability of individuals to predict future change in line with the end of history illusion.

The first section of this research extends Quoidbach and his team's experiment to political objects using a similar method of experimental survey design. In doing so, we illustrate the applicability of this psychological effect on political objects and how it short-circuits the individual's ability to process informational unknowns. The second half of this research applies a more recent survey experiment that explores how the effects of the end of history illusion may be countered and the relationship between this illusion and (affective) political polarization. Our expectations here are twofold. First, by prompting respondents to recognize that their attitudes have previously changed, they may be more inclined to predict future attitudinal change. Second, the end of history illusion interacts with affective polarization to obscure the information needed to recognize how attitudes may change over time.

We argue that the end of history illusion interacts with, and potentially contributes to, polarized attitudes to form what we term 'attitudinal stasis.' Affective polarization and partisan social identity imbue political beliefs and preferences with moral weight (Tajfel et al. 1971; Greene 1999, Iyengar et al. 2019). An admission that the in-group's current beliefs will change in the future suggests that either a) the in-group currently holds the incorrect view, or b) the in-group will hold the incorrect view in the future. Those that hold differing or opposing views are perceived as factually incorrect and potentially morally deficient. This political condition further reinforces the overestimation of attitudinal stability. In effect, the lack of future information creates a zero-sum game in which ideological sides are unable to perceive the other as worthwhile to negotiate with because attitudes are perceived as entrenched. Furthermore, any movement toward the outgroup's position could create cognitive dissonance. While this could be the result of outgroup animosity, the psychological effects of the end of history illusion may inhibit people from seeing how their own preferences have evolved over time. To this end, we additionally ask, does the misperception that individual attitudes are static affect politically polarized attitudes?

The importance of determining the effect of this psychological illusion on polarization is multifaceted. It adds another layer to the polarization literature that too often treats political attitudes as wholly contingent on social and environmental factors. While there are a variety of theorized forms of polarization, we examine affective polarization or "dislike or distrust" of those from opposing political factions as well as general "animosity between... parties" (Iyengar et al. 2019, 130). This conceptualization of polarization is a heavily discussed phenomenon in political and behavioral sciences and has gained increased traction over the years (Olson and Zanna 1993; Oskamp and Schultz 2005). Our addition to the literature details a new process that adds more precision about individual preferences and attitude self-conceptualization (Tesser 1978; Priester et al. 2004). It also provides a new theoretical outlet for which to study how individuals perceive themselves and their attitudinal preferences. We theorize that the effects associated with political polarization, such as decreased partisan cooperation, may interact with one's understanding of how their own attitudes have changed in the past and may change in the future. To do so, we utilize a similar experimental methodology as Quoidbach et al. (2013) to answer these questions.

The End of History

Quoidbach et al. (2013) and, more recently, Ryzin (2016) have emphasized a new dimension of how individuals observe attitudinal change. Limited cognitive resources restrict how one may perceive that they will change in the future while emphasizing how past experiences have already taken shape. This effect has been shown with supportive data using surveys on personality tests, values, and even preferences. While it is expected that individual tastes formalize and harden with time (Sears and Funk 1999; Stoker and Jennings 2008), the aforementioned authors show that attitudinal shifts still exist through time. The authors conclude that fixed preferences are the result of misestimations due to the imperceptible ways in which an individual measures those changes.

The effects of this misperception are clear and lead to false inferences when applied to behavioral cognition. Take, for instance, an article by Reihan Salam (2016), who makes an ecological fallacy by associating fixed preferences with the Republican Party and its voters. In the article, the author claims that the Republican party is rapidly aging and concludes that the conservative party will ultimately "die out." While this finding would be reasonable within the context of fixed political or affective attitudes in regard to the positions of ideological partisan sentiment, the evidence shows otherwise. Instead, according to a Science Direct study, aging produces an increase in conservative votes by 0.32% a year with an increase of nearly 20 percentage points from ages 20 to 80 (Tilly 2015). In other words, Salam's assumption that conservative Republicans will eventually age out does not account for the portions of younger generations, as they get older, who will replace them.

From the perspective of the end of history illusion, it is evident that individuals' partisanship and policy preferences shift over time. Political preferences are likely an ongoing process of socialization and life events that act to displace an individual and compel them to realign their preferences to match their onset interests (Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017). Continuous life-changing events (college graduation, employment, starting a family, buying a house, etc.) will erode present attitudes, which must change to meet the demands of experience and a shifting environment. Attitudes may also change as a response to shifts in the perceived legitimacy of reference groups (Hall, Varca, and Fisher 1986). A reference group, in Herbert Hyman's (1942, 309) terminology, indicates a set of standards an individual will calibrate their own attitudes against. However, future unknowns obscure how these opportunities for change can occur in response to unpredictable stimuli.

There is a conflicting strand of literature that emphasizes the stability of meaningful attitudes and strongly held beliefs that are essential to self-identity (Kaplan, Gimbel, and Harris 2016). Such arguments emphasize how political preferences are tied into larger personality traits that are theorized to remain fixed and predictable over time as a result of preferences hardwired into us through biology and socialization (Johnston, Levine, and Federico 2017; Boston et al. 2018). Arguments regarding large personality inventories, such as the Big Five, emphasize a high amount of stability into adulthood (Rantanen et al. 2007). Other research indicates variation in Big Five results as responses to socio-environmental stimuli (Caspi, Roberts, and Shiner 2005). Then there is another stream of literature that targets physiological traits and responses to stimuli as the main indicators of political preferences and attitudes (Rice University 2008). Take, for example, a recent study about the relationship between

fear and COVID-19 being predicted by personality traits, primarily neuroticism (Lippold et al. 2020). Comparatively, that same article discovered that policy stances were more likely to be divided along political lines, indicating that preexisting attitudes may shape one's experience rather than the inverse (Lippold et al. 2020, 3).

The longitudinal rigidity of perceived attitudes may be an outcome of one's own preferences, limiting the possibilities of experiences that could challenge their 'meaning systems' (Reiss et al. 2019, 1). The psychology literature emphasizes the directionality of values and preferences as stemming from one's core self and emanating outwards onto experiences and thus influencing them (Oskamp and Schultz 2005, 15). In this case, it is argued that core identities have an effect on one's experiences rather than solely the inverse. Certainly, there is a logical assertion that individuals are prone to prefer their own psychological and attitudinal orientations that bias experiences towards their own values (Taber et al. 2009; Heiss et al. 2019). This concept is known as 'attitude congruency bias' and indicates how people will "spend cognitive resources bolstering pro-attitudinal messages and denigrating counter-attitudinal ones" (Peralta et al. 2020, 50). Individuals may act to protect themselves from novel experiences when their attitudes are particularly strong in order to avoid contact with counterfactual stimuli (Kaplan, Gimbel, and Harris 2016; Reiss et al. 2019).

Thinking About the Past and Future

Quoidbach et al.'s (2013, 96) survey experiments demonstrated that individuals both underestimate that they will change and are unable to predict how change will occur. The effect of counterbalancing knowns and unknowns is summed up well by Kahneman et al. (1991, 194), who described the phenomenon as endowment effects in relation to status quo biases, as termed by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). This manifests as a preference for present circumstances over future uncertainty. The experiments of Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Kahneman et al. (1991) illuminated this immediacy bias of respondents. These results are consistent even when experimental subjects are presented with a future outcome that may provide a higher payout compared to the risks of breaking with the status quo. Kahneman and Tversky (1992) famously described this phenomenon as prospect theory, or the aversion to future unknowns when gains or losses are considered.

The behavioral economics literature explicitly argues that framing effects determine behavioral outcomes. The relationships between heuristic biases, given how humans receive and process information and our cognitive sensitivity to loss aversion, provide a blueprint for what may be occurring. Decision-making is often muddled by adherence to intuition or analytical thinking and switching between the two (Kahneman 2011). This relationship carries over into time discounting experiments which explain why individuals lean towards present payoffs rather than future rewards (Frederick et al. 2002). Importantly this cognitive bias can be altered by presenting experimental participants with future information, which helps to alleviate payoff deficits associated with the future (Herschfield et al. 2011). However, psychological effects and patterns in thinking have been shown to mitigate this connection as well. Bialek and Sawicki (2018) produced experimental evidence using cognitive reflection scores that assess patterns of fast and slow thinking in individuals to show that some are less susceptible to this manipulation. Furthermore, while collective attitudes may shift on issues, individual attitudes formalize and become less prone to manipulation over time (Ekstam 2022).

The rich literature demonstrates that behavior between knowns and unknowns creates biases, but there is room for our knowledge to be expanded. Previous experiments have examined how bias for the present becomes entrenched but lacks a critical assessment of what one's future self may be. In other words, how individuals 'frame' themselves in the future matters, but a disconnect exists regarding the validity of that perception. Furthermore, the reflection of past change produces systematically higher rates of change relative to preferences and attitudes. Nevertheless, the inverse holds true for future predictions and assessments of those same values. Human beings understand that they change but are systematically unlikely to apply that same conclusion to their future selves.

To demonstrate how this phenomenon affects decision-making, Quoidbach and his colleagues employed a simple series of experiments. In one of these iterations, the authors gave respondents a Ten Item Personality Inventory (Big Five battery) and then randomly assigned respondents to reporter or predictor groups. The reporter group was tasked to fill in the personality battery again but to fill it out as they would have done so ten years ago. The predictor group was asked to do the inverse and respond as they would have as if it was ten years from now. After comparing the results, the researchers found that the predictor group's expectations for change were biased towards their present-day answers. This result was severely limited when compared to the respondents in the reporter group who reported on their historical changes over the past ten years. This group of respondents was much more confident about more changes occurring in their own lives. The predictor group, however, was much less certain that change was likely to occur in the future. This effect was found across personality, attitudes, and preferences. Within political attitudes and preferences, we should expect to see a similar effect. This informs our first hypothesis:

- $\mathbf{H_1}$: Respondents will report a higher magnitude of change in attitudes and preferences from five years prior, as compared to predictive change for five years in the future.

Surveys as Methodology

Our methodological approach to this paper uses a series of electronically administered survey experiments. Survey approaches present several advantages and hazards. Foremost among the advantages, electronically administered surveys provide a greater reach for a larger pool of survey participants and increased flexibility for a wider pool to participate (Evans and Mathur 2005, 198). Such surveys excel at collecting behavioral responses that are less likely to be observed or documented by other approaches without dramatically increasing the cost of research – both time and financial (Phillips 2016, 8). Our reliance on a survey experiment, in this case, is supported by the lack of survey instruments that study the end of history phenomenon or research that is applicable to historical and future changes in attitude. Our surveys utilize previously developed instruments and inventories designed to assess attitudes, policy preferences, and polarization.

Our process is not without survey-specific difficulties. For one, there are problems with the stability of self-reported change. Often, survey participants will overestimate the stasis of their own values and work to cognitively disabuse themselves of counterfactuals and cognitive dissonance. Markus (1986) presented a longitudinal study of participants over 9 years which showed that participants self-reported very little change in policy preferences and often would rely on heuristics to fill in missing information when asked to conduct retrospective reflection. Lowenthal and Loewenstein (2001) found similar results in an experiment where they asked their participants to recall how they have changed over time regarding political preferences on policy. Converse (1964) famously observed that responses to survey questions seemed to vary over time randomly. However, because our project does not involve a longitudinal investigation, we rely solely on the efficacy and limitations of autobiographical reporting.

This highlights another issue that may present some fallibility to our study, which is the limits of autobiographical memory (Poulsen 2013). Individual respondent errors will decrease our data's validity without comparative markers. Despite these issues, there is still much to be gained from our approach. The end of history illusion effectively contends with the overconfidence one assesses of their own inability to perceive future change. This highlights the functionality of the argument in terms of individual behavior. An almost hubristic confidence in one's own viewpoints as simultaneously contemplated through lived experience but also designated without room for error or growth. From this perspective, it becomes apparent how the inability to discern attitudinal change may influence affective polarization. Theoretically, the end of history illusion accounts for politically affective behavior by emphasizing why such irrational and uncooperative feelings make sense to voters when they are unable to perceive how new information may shape their own ideational preferences in the future. Future iterations of this research may rely on in-person interviews or other interpersonal modes of data collection.

The End of History Political Survey

To test our first hypothesis, we use the results of a survey experiment conducted in Fall 2018. The motivation of the experiment was to provide a 'proof of concept' for the end of history illusion's applicability to political topics. This survey was fielded electronically for approximately three months on a convenience sample of undergraduate students in introductory Political Science courses[1]. Following collection of basic political and demographic information, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups: control, predictor, or reporter.

All respondents were then asked to indicate their current feelings and attitudes on a series of political topics. These topics included partisanship, feeling thermometers, and attitudes on several political issues.[2] Respondents in the predictor group were then asked to estimate where they would place themselves on the same series of political topics in five years' time. Respondents in the reporter group were asked to estimate their positions on the same political topics five years prior. The control group received neither the future nor past prompts. Issue-based attitudes were captured via five-point Likert Scales where 1 denoted "Strongly Disagree," and 5 denoted "Strongly Agree" with the political topic. The feeling thermometers range from 0 to 100, where 100 correlated with the highest possible affinity and 0 with the highest possible dislike. Partisanship was measured on a similar five-point scale, and ideology was captured using a seven-point scale with the highest values corresponding to 'Republican' and 'Extremely Conservative,' respectively.

Where Quoidbach's time treatments measured attitudinal changes ten years into the past and future, we edited the treatments to five years to better leverage responses since our sample of undergraduate students skewed relatively young. The average participant age was 20 years old. Research has demonstrated that by this age, the forces of political socialization are quite strong due to the effects of parentage, teachers, and peers (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). The so-called "impressional years" hypothesis implies that change in attitudes will be greater during an individual's formative years due to these environmental and socializing forces (Sears 1983). At the opposite end of the age spectrum, evidence for theories on attitude persistence

[1] N=468; Control Group N=158; Predictor Group N=145; Reporter Group N=165. The full survey questionnaire is presented in online appendix B, with descriptive statistics for all measures of interest presented in online appendix A tables A-1 to A-3. The online appendices may be accessed at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CYT2Z3.

[2] "Abortion," "gay marriage," "immigration control," "affirmative action," and "universal healthcare."

and old age have produced mixed results (Tyler and Schuller 1991; Sears and Funk 1999). Change seems to be a consistent factor in one's life, with complex causative factors that influence how change occurs. We expect, therefore, that an 18-year-old respondent should be able to reflect on their affective and political stances when prompted and allow us to ascertain the reported magnitude of change between retrospective and prospective groups compared to their present responses.

We test our first hypothesis by analyzing the group differences between future and present and past and present evaluations. The differences compared are constructed by taking the absolute difference between their current estimated position and either reporter or predictor estimate. We accomplish this through two sample t-tests comparing the group means of the predictor and reporter groups and present those results in Figure 1. The solid line indicates mean values for reporter groups; the dashed line indicates mean values for predictor groups. The results of two-sample t-tests are presented in online appendix D, Table D-1.



Figure 1. Mean Comparisons of Attitude, Thermometer, and Opinion by Reporter and Predictor Groups: 2018 Sample.

We find strong suggestive evidence that the end of history illusion applies to political objects in a consistent manner to Quoidbach and colleagues (2013) theory. Across positional, feeling, and issue evaluations, respondents systematically underestimate the likelihood of future change as compared to previous change. All of the examined relationships on political objects are statistically significant except for universal healthcare. Moreover, the magnitudes of these observed effects are substantively meaningful. The most consequential of these mean differences is that of political ideology, with a mean difference of 0.850. This coefficient indicates that respondents in the predictor group will estimate their future change to be almost a full point less different, on a seven-point scale, than the reporter group. It is important to note that we do not examine the direction of change throughout. Instead, we are solely concerned with the magnitude of change and respondents' propensity to underestimate future change.

The End of History Illusion and Polarization

The results of our 2018 survey provide strong, suggestive evidence that the end of history illusion applies to political objects. Individuals in the predictor group were less likely to estimate the change in the next five years compared to those in the reporter group recalling change over the previous five years. These results also suggest the influence of complementary psychological and political mechanisms. Respondents who were less likely to report change may be cognitively motivated to maintain ideological consistency over time. Additionally, the act of priming the reporter group with retrospective contemplation of change may have provided them with enough cognitive resources to break this pattern of historical consistency. In estimating future change, the lack of a historical precedent may limit the requisite cognitive resources to predict a future that breaks with present identities. This leads to an assumption that viewpoints will not change significantly in the future. Polarization may exacerbate this effect by motivating a respondent to remain ideologically 'pure.' In such instances, attitudinal stasis may act to obscure change, both past, and future, and allow polarized beliefs to be thought of as temporally consistent. Put differently, people who are more polarized may be more likely to invest in the illusion of their end of history as a matter of maintaining their attitude congruency bias. We explore how introducing reported past change may help to overcome this obstacle.

In applying these concepts to the end of history illusion thesis, we seek to take the experiment a step further. In a complementary survey experiment, we attempt to reshape present knowns and future unknowns by priming respondents with the reporter treatment. This treatment may prompt respondents to consider previous change as a tool for assessing potential future change. We do so with the knowledge gained from the previously discussed research and the 2018 survey that shows respondents can more accurately account for change from the past to the present. Retrospective thinking has the potential to activate recognition of attitudinal malleability and predict future changes. The behavioral economics literature has shown some success in getting individuals to more seriously consider their future selves (Herschfield et al. 2011). However, this used a prospective prompt with a visual aid to demonstrate change. We estimate that individuals who are prompted to reflect on past change can activate a similar response and yield better insight into how attitudes comparatively shift between past, present, and an unknown future. This yields the following hypothesis:

- $\mathbf{H_2}$: Respondents exposed to the reporter treatment will be more likely to predict future change compared to the control group.

High levels of attitudinal complacency and heightened polarized feelings present an obstacle to predictions of the future self. Extreme bias towards a particular viewpoint may correlate with failing to perceive and report changes in attitudes accurately. Additionally, experiences that have the potential to produce changes in effect and preferences may be limited by ideologically motivated individuals. Such individuals may avoid cognitive conflict by a process known as population sorting. This occurs when an individual restricts their interactions with other groups by making decisions that control their physical spaces and social environment (Martin and Webster 2018). This can be done via actions such as career choices, the neighborhood where an individual lives, and events individuals attend that limit the types of ideological interactions one may experience. The result is a level of homogeneity within one's own environment that allows one to endure very little counter-ideological pushback.

Bias also occurs in the self-selection of media and information an individual may consume by avoiding sources thought of as disreputable, incorrect, or oppositional. These limitations provide an additional layer of defense against incoming information that may challenge or alter an individual's attitudes or preferences (Wilson et al. 2020). Cognitive rigidity is also associated with polarized behavior, especially with more conservative individuals who are theorized to be more active and dogmatic in this adherence (Zmigrod 2020). Environmental limitations due to polarized attitudes allow groups to create a more negative image of their opponents and provide room for problematic techniques such as otherization and dehumanization to proliferate (Cassese 2020).

We expect the recollection of attitudinal change to temper polarized attitudes. Openness to experience and change demonstrates some compelling evidence as to how individuals perceive outgroups and tempers the effects of affective and polarized attitudes (Talisse 2019; Strandberg et al. 2020). This may be the result of voters who are less ideologically anchored being motivated by ends rather than the means of politics and policy and, therefore, more likely to accept that shifts occur (Hetherington 2006, 3). In addition, people who have shifted their viewpoints are more likely to have been exposed to varying and opposing viewpoints which may act as a moderating force (Stroud 2010; Iyengar et al. 2019; Steppat et al. 2021). However, recent studies suggest that partisan exposure to oppositional rhetoric in media can elicit a polarized response (Levendusky 2013; Bail et al. 2018).

Polarization may interact with the end of history illusion in several key ways. It may induce respondents to underestimate past change to a higher degree. When recalling past changes, ideologically possessed individuals may be more apt to rely on heuristics to recall past information. In such instances, they may overestimate how consistent their views have been over time (Reiss et al. 2019). As such, they are more likely to be invested in their attitudes remaining static into the future. However, it may be that individuals are failing to understand how they have changed due to the cognitive shortcuts individuals make when

considering past and future stability. As such, we estimate the following when a reporter treatment is introduced to our survey participants:

- **H_3**: Respondents exposed to treatment will be lower in polarized attitudes compared to the control group.

Uncertainty remains when interpreting the causality of this treatment as polarized individuals should, likewise, predict less change than their counterparts. More polarized individuals may also underreport change that has previously occurred in their lives. This may be either factual, due to limited experiences, or imagined as a means of maintaining attitude congruence bias in themselves. The end of history illusion may, therefore, affect individuals in ways that allow them to interpret consistency in their ideology and in-group mentality across time. As such, an individual who is prompted to report on the amount of change they have experienced in the past may be conditioned by higher levels of polarization. We present this argument formally as:

- **H_4**: Respondents higher in polarization will report and predict lower expected levels of attitudinal change.

Manipulating Polarization Using the End of Political History

To examine these three hypotheses, we fielded a second survey experiment in the Fall of 2021. The new set of participants was also a convenience sample of undergraduate students in introductory Political Science courses. This survey experiment had three intentions: first, to test if prompting respondents to consider past attitudinal change would stimulate a comparable increase in prospective evaluations. Second, to test if prompting respondents to consider past attitudinal change would decrease their levels of political polarization. Third, to test if polarized respondents were less likely to predict future attitudinal change. The treatment consisted of three sets of two retrospective prompts, in addition to a control condition where the respondents were shown no retrospective prompts.

The treatments varied in their content, with the first treatment asking respondents to consider their attitudinal change in the previous five years on non-political, non-policy objects ("music" and "movies"), and the second asked respondents to consider their attitudinal change in the previous five years on political, non-policy objects ("social issues" and "economic issues"), while the third asked respondents to consider their attitudinal change in the previous five years on political, policy objects ("racial equality laws" and "drug legalization laws.") The intent behind this content difference was to create low, medium, and high-intensity interventions with intensity defined as the degree of political content. These measures were repeated for the outcome variables of interest with the time scale altered from five years retrospective to five years prospective. All respondents were asked to estimate the attitudinal change over the next five years on the six previously stated evaluative objects.

Affective polarization was measured, following the American National Election Study example, with the absolute difference in feeling thermometers between “Democrat voters” and “Republican voters.” We are unconcerned about the direction of polarization. Rather we focus on the magnitude of polarization in either direction. We also included a dyad of polarization questions, following the example of Pew Research, wherein respondents were asked how they would feel if a “close friend or family member married” a member of either a Democrat or Republican. This measure proved inconclusive, and thus we use the feeling thermometer results when discussing polarization. The failure of this measure is likely due to the age of respondents in this survey – the age group of 18 to 29 showed the lowest degree of difference when asked by Pew.[3] Finally, the survey asked a series of demographic, personality, and political questions.

Respondents were randomly assigned to treatment or control groups through Qualtrics, and the respondents participated in the survey via electronic means.[4] Respondents were excluded from analysis if they completed the survey in a non-credible amount of time to increase the validity of the results. The full survey questionnaire is presented in online appendix C with descriptive statistics of all key variables presented in online appendix A, tables A-4 to A-8. To ensure the validity of results from both surveys, respondents who did not participate in the survey for a credible amount of time (1 minute for each) were removed from the analysis. Respondents indicating an age below 18 years were also removed to conform with Georgia State University’s IRB requirements for human subject research. We analyze our second hypothesis through the use of both two-sample t-tests and one-way ANOVA (analysis of variance). We first compare the mean values of the control group’s prospective responses to the prospective responses of the three treatment groups collectively. This is done to simply compare if any retrospective prompt will induce a greater amount of predicted prospective change. We then use the ANOVA procedure to examine the effect of treatment on prospective evaluations across treatment groups. This allows for a more detailed examination of any potential effects, specifically if the higher intensity treatment displays a great impact or if the retrospective treatment topic corresponds with a greater degree of predicted change on that topic. We illustrate these effects through the pairwise comparison of group means compared across groups and treatment topics.

We test hypothesis three through two-sample t-tests, ANOVA, and pairwise comparison of means. Again, the t-test compares responses of the control group, who received no retrospective prompt, with the combined treatment group responses. The

[3] https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/family-member-marrying-republican-democrat/

[4] N=282; Control group=69; Group 1=71; Group 2=71; Group 3=71.

outcome of interest in these analyses is affective polarization, measured as the absolute distance between feeling thermometer responses for Democrats and Republicans. This is a more theoretically appropriate approach than using the raw polarization values, given our primary focus on the degree of polarization rather than the direction or any partisan asymmetry thereof. We then perform ANOVA to compare control group polarization to each treatment group's reported degree of polarization and then examine this relationship through a pairwise comparison of means.

Finally, we explore hypothesis four through a series of linear regression models by regressing the absolute level of polarization on both the retrospective and prospective responses. This is done at both the aggregate level and separately for the control and treatment groups. The relatively low number of responses – approximately 70 per treatment group – result in estimates less robust than ideal. Nonetheless, the results suggest no evidence of heteroscedastic residuals within groups nor unreasonably influential outliers. One may suggest that an ordered logit model may be a more statistically appropriate approach, given the potentially ordinal nature of our outcome variable (a five-category Likert scale). This is possible, and future iterations will explore this possibility, but is not tenable given the current number of respondents.

Results of the End of History Illusion and Polarization

We find no evidence to support our second hypothesis generally but do find suggestive evidence to warrant further examination. The results of the two-sample t-tests comparing group means between the control and treatment groups for predicted change are presented in online appendix D, Table D-2, with the ANOVA results presented in online appendix D, Table D-3, and the pairwise comparison of means presented below in Table 1.[5] The results of the t-tests are not statistically significant. However, the pairwise comparison of means indicates exposure to the high-intensity retrospective prompt results in a statistically significant effect on predicted attitude change on economic issues over the medium intensity group, significant at the 0.05 α level. The substantive interpretation suggests that those respondents who received the medium intensity prompt reported a 0.5 unit greater expectation of future attitudinal change as compared to respondents who received the high-intensity treatment. This finding is discussed in greater detail in the discussion section.

Table 1. Pairwise Comparisons of Means: Effect of Treatment on Prospective Evaluations of Change: 2021

	Music	*Movies*	*Social Issues*	*Economic Issues*	*Racial Equality*	*Drug Legalization*
Control &	-0.040	0.107	0.118	0.155	0.202	0.106
Low Intensity	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.168)
Control &	0.030	0.304	0.175	0.429	0.343	0.026
Medium Intensity	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.167)
Control &	-0.106	-0.003	-0.192	-0.071	-0.010	0.012
High Intensity	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.167)
Low Intensity &	0.070	0.197	0.056	0.274	0.140	-0.080
Medium Intensity	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.175)	(0.167)
Low Intensity &	-0.066	-0.110	-0.310	-0.226	-0.212	-0.094
High Intensity	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.162)	(0.167)	(0.175)	(0.167)
Medium Intensity &	-0.136	-0.307	-0.366	-0.500*	-0.352	-0.014
High Intensity	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.162)	(0.168)	(0.174)	(0.166)

Note. Contrasts made via Tukey's differences: using Student's t-distribution. Control group received no retrospective prompt, low intensity group received music and movies retrospective prompts, medium intensity received social and economic issue retrospective prompts, and high intensity received racial equality legislation and drug legalization retrospective prompts. Standard errors in parentheses. N=282. * p<0.05

We find no evidence to support our third hypothesis that exposure to treatment reduces polarization. This is consistent across the t-test, ANOVA, and pairwise comparison of means. This may be due to the low number of observations, but there is no evidence that expanding the sample would result in any meaningful results. Thus, we conclude that exposure to treatment has no effect on polarization. The t-test and ANOVA results are presented in online Appendix D, Table D-4, with the pairwise comparison of means presented in online appendix D, Table D-5.

Finally, we find strong, suggestive evidence that polarization decreases the likelihood of predicted future change – our fourth hypothesis. These results are presented in Tables D-6 to D-9 in online appendix D. Prospective evaluations of change on social issues is the strongest finding, with positive (defined as predicted similarity of opinions in future), statistically significant

[5]Several tables are placed in online appendix D for aesthetic and presentation purposes.



Figure 2. Effect of Polarization on Predicted Stability of Views on Social Issues, by Treatment Group: 2021 Sample.

effects both in aggregate and across all intensity groups – illustrated in Figure 2. On average, shifting from the minimum to maximum value of polarization results in a 20% increase in predicted similarity of opinion. Predicted attitudinal similarities for racial equality legislation and drug legalization are positive and statistically significant for the high-intensity treatment group but neither the low nor medium-intensity groups. This suggests the treatment was effective in prompting respondents to consider their previous changes on these topics when estimating future change. Conversely, the low-intensity topics of music and movies were not significant in all cases. This suggests that the political content of the medium and high-intensity group may have triggered a deeper degree of retrospection than the relatively trivial topics in the low-intensity group. We cannot ascertain causation at this time, but these results suggest that the end of history illusion operates differently for different categories of evaluative objects.

Conclusion

Our 2018 survey provides strong, suggestive evidence that the end of history illusion encompasses political attitudes. Individuals systematically underestimate the future malleability of their attitudes as compared to retrospective consideration of attitudinal change. We were unable to consistently use this disparity as a priming effect in our 2021 survey to induce a respondent to contemplate and better predict future change. We were only successful in eliciting a significant effect for one treatment topic, economic issues. We theorize that the topic of economic issues was efficacious due to the generality of the prompt under consideration. Abstract topics may allow the respondent to consider change across several policy items rather than the specific prompts of the low and high treatments. The low and high-intensity treatments allowed respondents to isolate a specific evaluative object upon which to focus. Contrary to our expectations, this may reduce subsequent predictions of change on said object as the general concept of longitudinal change may be isolated within that article. Therefore, the respondent is understandably convinced that their current attitude is correct and, therefore, less likely to predict future change. The use of a less focused treatment, such as the medium intensity prompts, may allow respondents to generalize the concept of change, overcoming some of the motivated reasoning underlying the end of history illusion.

Regarding the efficacy of economic issues over social issues, it is plausible that undergraduate students have yet to develop solidified attitudes on economic issues as they are yet to enter the labor market in earnest. Conversely, social issues are likely of higher salience to this cohort, reducing the likelihood that students will predict future change – LGBTQ+ equality, reproductive choice, and similar issues tend to exist at the fore of campus politics. The relative importance of social over

economic issues among our sample likely reduces estimations of future change as respondents are more emotionally invested in their current social views. While this provides some motivation to continue to explore this phenomenon, our findings highlight the importance of experimental design evolution to best influence respondents and capture the nuances of change while accounting for highly polarized and biased participants.

The 2021 survey provided strong, suggestive evidence that affective polarization increases predicted rigidity in future attitudes, underscoring the multifaceted psychological contributors to this phenomenon. Efforts to depolarize individuals on a political level – exposure to contrasting information or highlighting the deleterious effect of polarization – may be insufficient. Future research should further explore the apolitical psychological contributors to polarization with the aim of developing effective depolarization strategies. It also appears that partisanship does not contribute to variability in prospective evaluations, as Kruskal Wallis tests do not indicate significant differences in responses based on partisanship once group assignment is considered - Tables E-1 to E-5 in online appendix E. These findings suggest the end of history illusion operates independently than a conservative proclivity towards attitudinal rigidity.

The end of history provides a theoretical framework for understanding the limitations of respondent self-assessment. Individuals appear hardwired towards current preferences and unreliable when moving beyond known information. Additionally, preferential bias towards attitudinal stasis and congruence biases is a difficult cognitive framework to overcome. The end of history illusion provides a useful framework with which to examine this phenomenon. Individuals place a large number of cognitive resources on reassuring themselves of their static quo alignments, and our argument provides several possible explanations. First, as the future is obfuscated, predicted change is likely to match current preferences as a means of positive self-assessment and reassurance of current behavior and attitudes. Second, past change may have little effect on informing one's future expectations for how they may change. In other words, while the past remains the past, individuals rely on the present to provide informational guidance for future experience. Individuals are prone to be naive to potential factors driving attitudinal evolution.

There are several key issues that need to be addressed moving forward. Foremost amongst these is to modify the experimental design toward a more efficacious treatment. It is likely that the verbiage, procedure, or strength of our intervention was insufficient to overcome the cognitive biases and psychological forces under study. Future iterations may provide respondents with vignettes or survey data highlighting the malleability of attitudes over time. Interventions may also be more potent with audio or video stimuli. A robust manipulation check will also be included in future iterations. The omission of such a check potentially limits the validity of our conclusions, though we found no evidence of insincere responses and excluded respondents who did not participate in the survey for a credible amount of time. We remain convinced that inducing malleability in an individual's predicted future through retrospection will stimulate respondents to reduce their reliance on the current political heuristics, the result of heightened affective polarization.

The average age of our sample limits generalizability and reduces our confidence in the conclusions drawn therefrom. The effects observed amongst undergraduate students may not be applicable to the general public. It is possible that individuals in this age cohort are more likely to predict future change as their attitudes and preferences have not yet solidified. Conversely, undergraduate students may underestimate future change as compared to the general public as they do not have the requisite experience to recognize that their attitudes have changed previously. We cannot speculate as to the causal effect of age on the propensity towards the end of history illusion, nor if other covariates are more influential. Future iterations of this research will address this uncertainty.

The end of history illusion may merely be an effect of human cognitive behavior rather than its cause. Therefore, isolating the phenomenon may only be useful as a limited treatment or heuristic cognition investigation to induce experiment participants to predict better how they may change. Reporting on change showed no impact as a motivation to move individuals away from their polarized stances. We expect this to be for several reasons, each consistent with the end of history hypothesis. Past change does not require participants to change in the future, and shifting one's past alignment on a particular stance does not provide enough information for the respondent to then estimate how they may shift again. Put differently, retrospection has not been shown to provide the requisite cognitive resources to estimate or predict future change beyond one's current assumptions. Attitudinal stasis provides an effective anchor that may make individuals more certain of the rightness of their current preferences.

References

Armakolas, Ioannis and James Ker-Lindsey, Eds. 2020. *The Politics of Recognition and Engagement: EU Member State Relations with Kosovo*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aydin, Aysegul. 2010. "Where do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 27(1):47-66.

Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, Andrew. J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce. 2008. "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process." *Journal of Peace Research*. 45(3): 345-363.

Black, Ian. 2011. “Libyan Rebels win international recognition as country’s leaders.” *The Guardian*. July 15, 2011. Online

Boschee, Elizabeth, Jennifer Lautenschlager, Sean O’Brien, Steve Shellman, James Starz, Michael Ward. 2015. “ICEWS Coded Event Data.” Online:
http:://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28075

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M and Bradford Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brownlie, Ian. 2008. *Principles of Public International Law*. 7th Ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 2001. *Trends in Oustide Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Caplan, Richard. 2005. *Europe and the Recognition of States in Yugoslavia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cleves, Mario, Roberto G Gutierrez, William Gould, Yulia V. Marchenko. 2010. *An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata,* 3rd ed.College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Coggins, Bridget L. 2011. “Friends in High Places: International Politics and the Emergence of States from Secessionism.” *International Organization*. 65(3): 433-67.

Coggins , Bridget L. 2014. *Power Politics and State Formation in the Twentieth Century: The Dynamics of Recognition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” *Oxford Economic Papers*. 61(1):563-95.

Correlates of War Project. 2011. “State Membership List, v2011.” Online: http://correlatesofwar.org

Cox, D.R. 1972. “Regression Models and Life-Table.” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B. (Methodological)*. (2): 187-220.

CNN. 2004. “Aristride says U.S. deposed him in ‘coup d’état.”’
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/03/01/aristide.claim/

Crawford, James. 1979. *The Creation of States in International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downer, Joshua. 2013. “Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition.” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*. 46: 581-611.

Duque, Marina G. 2018. “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach.” International Studies Quarterly 62(3): 577–592.

Dur, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig. 2014. “The Design of International Trade Agreements.” *Review of International Organizations*. 9(3): 333-52.

Fabry, Mikulas. 2010. *Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *The American Political Science Review*. 97(1):75-90.

Findley, Michael G. and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. “Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach.” *Journal of Politics*. 68(4): 828-837.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “Norms and International Relations Theory.” *International Organization*. 52(4):887-917.

Garrner, Bryan A. and Henry Campbell Black. 2004. *Black’s Law Dictionary*. 7th ed. St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters.

Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816." *International Interactions* 25(4): 393-413.

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 21(2):133-154.

Ghosn, Faten, and Scott Bennett. 2003. Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, Version 3.10. Online:
http://correlatesofwar.org.

Goemans, Henk E. Kirstian Skrede Gledistch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders.” *Journal of Peace Research*. 46(2): 269-83.

Grant, Thomas D. 1999. *The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution*. London: Praeger

Griffiths, Ryan A. 2016. *Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halabi, Sam Foster. 2012. “Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: the Libyan Intervention in Historical and Theoretical Context.” *American University International Law Review*. 27(2): 321-90.

Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer and J. David Singer. 1996. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2):163-213.

Kathman, Jacob D. 2011. "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 55(6): 847-76.

Kelsen, Hans. 1966. *Principles of International Law*. 2nd Ed. Edited and Revised by Robert W. Tucker. New York: Holt, Rinhart, and Winston.

Keohane, Robert O. and Jospeh S. Nye. 2012. *Power and Interdependence*. 4th Ed. Boston: Longman.

Ker-Lindsay, James and Mikulus Fabry. Forthcoming. *Secession and State Creation: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koubi, Vallu, Gabrielle Spilker, Tobias Bohmelt, Thomas Bernuaer. 2015. "Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research*. 51(2): 227-43.

Lauterpacht, Hersch. 1947. *Recognition in International Law*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Libya Contact Group. 2012. "Fourth Meeting of the Libya Contact Group, Chair's Statement," July 15, 2011. Retrieved from U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/168764.htm.

Lujala, Paivi, Jan Ketil Rod, Nadja Thieme. 2007. "Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 24(3):239-56.

Marshall, Monty and Keith Jaggers. 2010. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007*. Data online:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html

Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security*. 19(3): 5-49.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Menon, P.K. 1994. *The Law of Recognition in International Law: Basic Principles*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

Mirilovic, Nikola and David Siroky. 2015. "Two States in the Holy Land? The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international recognition." *Religion and Politics*. 8(2): 263-85.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*. 51(4): 513-533.

Osiander, Anders. 2001. "International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth." *International Organization*. 55(2): 251-87.

Peterson, M.J. 1982. "Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System." *World Politics*. 34(3): 324-52.

Peterson, M.J. 1997. *Recognition of Governments*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Ratliff, Suellen. 2009. "UN Representation Disputes: A Case Study of Cambodia and a New Accreditation Proposal for the Twenty-First Century." *University of California Law Review*. 87: 1207-64.

Regan, Patrick M. 1998. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts." *The Journal of Politics*. 60(3): 754-779.

Regan, Patrick M. 2000. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Regan, Patrick M. 2002. "Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 40(1): 336-359.

Roth, Brad R. 1999. *Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Roth, Brad R. 2010. "Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Effective Control Doctrine." *Melbourne Journal of International Law*. 11:393-440.

Ryngaert, Cedric and Sven Sobrie. 2011. "Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia." *Leiden Journal of International Law.* 24(2): 467-90.

Saideman. Steven M. 2002. "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups" *Journal of Peace Research* 39(1): 27–50.

Schrodt, Philip A. 2012 "CAMEO: Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event and Actor Codebook." Online:
http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/cameo.html

Siroky, David S., Milos Popovic, and Nikola Mirilovic. 2021. "Unilateral secession, international recognition, and great power contestation." *Journal of Peace Research.* 58(5):1049 – 1067.

Sterio, Milena. 2012. *The Right to Self-Determination under International Law: 'Selfistans,' Secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers*. New York: Routledge.

Spruyt, Hendrick. 1994. *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Talmon, Stefean. 1998. *Recognition of Governments in International Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.

U.N. Security Council, 4919th Meeting. "Resolution 1529 (2004)". February 29, 2004.
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/254/10/PDF/N0425410.pdf?OpenElement

United States Department of State. 2011. "Remarks on Libya and Syria." July 15, 2011.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168656.htm

Visoka, Gezim, John Doyle, and Edward Newman. 2020. *Routledge Handbook of State Recognition.* New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Von Glahn, Gerhard and Larry Taulbee. 2013. *Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law*. 10^{th} Ed. New York: Pearson.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, PA: Addison Wesley.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, Robert R. "International Law in Treaties of the United States." *American Journal of International Law*. (31): 271-84.

The Popular Perception of China in Latin America and the Role of Confucian Institutes

Thomas J. Nisley[1]

[1]Professor of Government and International Affairs, Kennesaw State University

ABSTRACT

As a rising great power, China is expanding its activities and interests globally, including in the region of Latin America. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese trade and investments have grown precipitously throughout Latin America. Additionally, China has engaged in a public diplomacy campaign to enhance its soft power in the region. This has been led by its flagship cultural exchange program, the Confucius Institute. To what extent have China's activities in the region shaped the public perception of China? This study utilizes research from the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey. Analysis is conducted for the years 2015 and 2018. The results suggest that Chinese economic activities have had mixed and minimal effects while its Confucius Institutes have been counterproductive.

Introduction

The rise of China into the ranks of the most powerful states in the international system is the defining characteristic of the first half of the 21st century.[1] In the last twenty years, China's international activity has steadily increased. The ambitious 'Belt and Road' initiative seeks to spread China's influence globally, including in Latin America, a region of the world where the United States is the preponderant power. Many scholars have documented the growing activities of Chinese actions in Latin America (Ellis 2009, 2014, Hearn and León-Manríquez 2011, and Jenkins 2019). China's actions in the region have evolved from the economic domain to increasingly political and even nascent military activity.[2] China's strategic goals for the region are less clear. Some, like Ellis (2009), view China's activities in Latin America as part of a broader geopolitical strategy to undercut a world order dominated by the United States. At the same time, others like Jenkins (2019) suggest that the relationship is primarily motivated by economics and driven by the commercial interests of China, Latin America, and transnational companies.

As a rising great power, China is following a similar pattern that the United States took in the 20th century. Like the United States before it, China is not only seeking to secure political and economic dominance in its region of the world but also seeks to increase its political and economic influence in other regions of the world. It is very likely that in the future, China will seek to disrupt the US's dominance in the region.[3]

In the 20th century, two great external powers (Germany and the Soviet Union) sought to disrupt the dominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and failed. The failure of those previous attempts hinged on many factors, including economic weakness relative to the United States and the strong relationship between Brazil and the United States (see Lochery 2014 and Poggio 2012). Although Germany was stronger in its relative economic situation to the United States than the Soviet Union, it was not able to appeal broadly to the people of the region. The universal claim of its ideology well-positioned the Soviet Union to challenge US hegemony in the region. Unlike Germany, which only offered political nationalism, the Soviet vision of Marxism-Leninism offered a strategy and a guide for indigenous political movements to follow. The broader attempt was undercut by the Soviet Union's economic fragility. In economic terms, China is a better position than any previous great power to challenge the United States. It is fast becoming a peer economic competitor to the United States. The ability of China

[1]By China, I am referring to the People's Republic of China.

[2]In March 2018, China opened operations of a space station in Argentina. Argentina gave China a 50-year tax-free lease on the $50 million station run by the People's Liberation Army. The station, designed to assist in China's planned mission to the dark side of the moon, sits isolated in Patagonia outside of the town of Las Lajas. The Chinese government agreed only to use the base for civilian purposes. Nevertheless, the Chinese military runs China's space program, and the base remains closed to the public. There is concern that the facility could be used by China to jam, disrupt, and possibly destroy US satellites (see Londoño, 2018). Argentina is also negotiating with China to purchase JF-17 fighter aircraft (see https://en.mercopress.com/2022/02/14/argentina-to-send-military-team-to-china-to-discuss-arms-deal)

[3]This study is grounded in an "offensive realist" theoretical perspective. Offensive realism suggests that great powers seek to maximize power with the goal of being the only great power in the system. Although global dominance by a single state is beyond reach given current technological limitations, in the interim, states seek regional dominance or 'hegemony.' As great powers seek regional hegemony, they also seek to deny regional hegemony to other great powers (Mearsheimer 2001). It also incorporates a view of power that extends beyond material capabilities and utilizes the notion of 'soft power' (Nye 2002).

to displace the United States in Latin America depends heavily on China's efforts to convince the people of the region that they have a "shared destiny" with China (Cui 2016, 20). The purpose of this paper is to test to what extent have Chinese activities in Latin America improved the popular perception of China in the region and thus increasing the likelihood of China supplanting the United States in Latin America. The evidence suggests that the United States has little to worry about for now.

This article proceeds in three sections. The first section briefly describes the expansion of Chinese economic activities in Latin America in the 21st century. In the second section, I present other Chinese activities in the region, including attempts by the Chinese government to promote its 'soft power' through cultural exchanges, with a particular emphasis on its Confucius Institutes. This necessarily includes a discussion of the Chinese government's view of soft power along with its emphasis on treating all countries based on strict sovereignty without concern for internal domestic politics.

In the final section, I empirically test the hypothesis that China's economic and cultural activities have increased the positive view of China held by the people of that country. Using logistic regression analysis, I assess which factors positively influence individuals' views toward China. I analyze survey research from the region of Latin America using datasets from the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey. An analysis is conducted for the years 2015 and 2018. In conclusion, I find that Chinese economic activities have had mixed and minimal effects. Countries that export to China tend to have slightly higher odds of having a positive view of China, while imports, loans, and investments tend to decrease the odds of having a positive view of China. The most startling finding is that China's attempts to improve its image through its Confucian Institutes are counterproductive.

China's Growing Economic Influence in Latin America

The Chinese economy has rapidly grown since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. For three decades, the economy has doubled in size every eight years (Zakaria 2009, 89). The boom in manufacturing in China and the ready access to US consumers fueled this growth. China's growth has led it to be a major consumer of raw materials and agricultural products. China has sought to secure a steady supply of resources to sustain its growth, not only in Latin America but also in Asia and Africa. According to the World Bank, the value of China's imports of raw materials has increased from $8 billion in 1992 to $444 billion in 2017. Although the Asia Pacific region remains the largest source of raw materials for China, its Latin American imports are not trivial.

In 2018, China's imports from the region amounted to almost $158 billion, consisting of almost 7.5% of China's overall imports (Sullivan and Lum 2019). Latin America's exports to China are highly concentrated, with 80 percent of the region's total exports consisting of four commodities: soya beans, crude oil, iron ore, and copper (Casanova, Xia, and Ferreira 2016, 216). Growth in overall trade has been phenomenal, with total China-Latin America trade increasing from $55 billion in 2005 to almost $308 billion in 2019.[4] China is the top trading partner for Brazil, Chile, and Peru, the second largest for Uruguay, and the third largest for Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela (Koleski and Blivas 2018, 8).

China has also been engaged in 'renminbi diplomacy.' Reminiscent of the US's 'dollar diplomacy' of the early 20th century, China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the region has averaged $10 billion a year. As with its trade, the Asia Pacific region remains the largest recipient of Chinese FDI (70 percent of the total); nevertheless, Latin America is the second largest of China's recipients of FDI.[5] Chinese banks have also been active, with the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank becoming the largest lenders in Latin America. "Accumulated loans have surpassed $140 billion (2005-2018); Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina are the top recipients of that lending" (Sullivan and Lum 2019). For Ecuador and Venezuela, this financing has taken the form of loans for oil. In Ecuador, China financed a massive hydroelectric project building the dam at Coca Codo Sinclair. Although this project did not turn out well for Ecuador, as the dam has developed cracks, the Chinese will still get their money as they have secured the right to 80 percent of Ecuador's oil exports until the repayment of the loan (Cassey and Krauss 2018).

Twenty-one countries in the region have signed on to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Argentina being the latest country to join in February of 2022.[6] The BRI, launched in 2013, is a massive Chinese infrastructure and investment project designed to create a transportation and energy network to facilitate Chinese economic growth and, by extension, global economic growth. In 2018, at the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Ministerial Forum in Santiago, China formally invited countries of the region to participate in the BRI. The effects of membership in the BRI will not be measured in this study since its inception falls outside the time period of analysis. However, a recent study by Rhys

[4] All trade data not specifically attributed to a cited source comes from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en

[5] This ranking is debatable as the figures come from the Chinese government. Sullivan and Lum (2019) caution that "these figures include flows to territories with large offshore financial sectors and may not reflect the final destinations of the FDI."

[6] In addition to Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela in South America, the twenty-one includes countries in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama) and the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago).

Jenkins (forthcoming) provides evidence that very little has changed in the economic relations of the countries in the region with China. The BRI simply represents a repackaging of preexisting economic relations. The BRI may reshape Chinese/Latin American relations in the future and contribute to China's soft power in the region, but that is yet to be determined.

China's Soft Power Campaign

The Chinese government has fully embraced Joseph Nye's concept of soft power (Li 2008). Soft power is the ability to influence the behavior of others without the use of coercion or inducements (Nye 2002). Soft power is the power of attraction and the ability to get others to want what you want. John Givens (2011) correctly suggests that "China uses its soft power to pursue its interests, neither working actively for or against, human rights and democracy" (10). Although there is no overarching ideological motivation for Chinese foreign policy, Beijing does seek to promote the ideas of "non-interference and the supremacy of sovereignty, an anti-hegemonic anti-Americanism, developing world solidarity, and a self-interested pragmatism" (Givens 2011, 12). China's foreign policy is driven by the need for resources, but it is also very concerned with its image, particularly in the Western world.[7] China wants to avoid inducing fear in other countries and instead promote itself as a benign alternative to the hegemonic United States.

Although Nye argues that government promotion of soft power is not effective, China has nonetheless embarked on a diplomatic campaign to do so. The Chinese public diplomacy programs have received heavy investments from the Chinese government. China's leaders have made visits to the region as well. In his first three years in office, President Xi has visited the region three times. Xi made his fourth visit in April 2018 to attend the Summit of the Americas conference held in Lima, Peru. This was the first time that China attended a meeting of the Summit of the Americas (Serrano 2018). China has made major diplomatic inroads in the region, establishing 'strategic partnerships' with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Sullivan and Lum 2019). China has also been able to get countries in the region to break their diplomatic relations with Taiwan, recently luring El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Panama to switch their recognition to China (Kahn 2018). In late 2021, Nicaragua broke relations with Taiwan and recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China (Lee Myers 2021). Currently, in the Western Hemisphere, only Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay still recognize Taiwan.

The flagship of Chinese public diplomacy has been its global Confucius Institutes (CIs). Wei-hao Huang and Jun Xiang (2019) have empirically demonstrated that the Chinese government has designed the CI program to not only promote its educational and economic interests but its political interests as well. When China establishes a CI program in a country, it represents the full commitment of China's public diplomacy campaign in that country. Only countries that recognize Beijing as the legitimate government of China can host a CI. Jennifer Hubbert argues that China sees its CI program as a way to counter the prevailing narrative that China's rise is a threat to the world order. Chinese officials, she interviewed, suggest that "if foreigners understood the 'real' China, they would view China's rise to power less skeptically" (Hubbert 2019, 11). China started its Confucian Institute project globally in 2004, led by the Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), which is housed in the Ministry of Education.[8] The first CI program in Latin America opened in Mexico in 2006. This coincides with China's growing economic ties to the region. Most of the larger countries in Latin America, which had recognized Beijing since the 1970s and early 1980s, were the first to open CIs.

The focus of the CIs is to develop Chinese language and cultural teaching resources. Language and cultural exchanges also are designed to help facilitate business activities. Hanban sets up joint ventures with host countries' universities and schools to provide human and material resources to teach Standard Chinese (Mandarin or Putonghua), the official language of the People's Republic of China (Lo and Pan 2016, 521). CIs are established in various countries as joint ventures with local universities. China provides the teachers, books, and course materials. China also provides a deputy director, while the local partner provides the facilities and the administrative staff (Hartig 2016, 106). In addition to language education, the CI often hosts events like cultural exhibitions, film screenings, readings, concerts, and lectures. Additionally, the CI serves to facilitate scholarship programs for students to study in China (Kulver 2017). Through its CIs, China has set up programs for student educational exchanges and programs to bring political leaders from the region to visit China.

By 2018, China's Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in Latin America served over 50,000 students and involved more than eight million people in its cultural activities (Koleski and Blivas, 2018, 16).[9] According to the Constitution and Bylaws of the Confucian Institutes:

[7] Except for small pockets of people who have completely maintained their Pre-Columbian culture, Latin American culture is generally a Western culture.

[8] In 2021, the Chinese government changed the name of the Confucius Institutes Headquarters to the Center for Language Education after a wave of closing of CIs at US universities in response to the introduction of Senate Bill S.3453 - Transparency for Confucius Institutes. See the text of the bill at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3453/text?r=7&s=1

[9] Confucian classrooms are associated with secondary schools in the Confucian Institute network, while the Confusion Institute is partnered with a university.

> Confucius Institutes devote themselves to satisfying the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by these peoples, to strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation between China and other countries, to deepening friendly relationships with other nations, to promoting the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world.[10]

Falk Hartig argues that China sees "CIs as an important tool in China's public diplomacy which the Chinese government uses to communicate specific strategic narratives about China and its place in the world to foreign publics" (Hartig 2015, 299). This strategic dialogue is designed to promote a positive image of China to the world. Chen Qiang and Zhenge Guilan argue that the Confucius Institutes are a "pro-active expansion [. . .] to change China's image" (quoted in Hartig 2016, 102). Even the name Confucius Institute is a conscious attempt at positive branding.

There is nothing typically Confucian about teaching Mandarin. They could have easily been called Mao Zedong Institutes. But as John Lennon accurately pointed out over 50 years ago, "if you go carrying pictures of Chairman Mao, you ain't going to make it with anyone anyhow." Very few countries would host a Mao Zedong Institute, and that would be counter to the goal of Chinese public diplomacy. Xu Lin, the Director General of Hanban, argues that the purpose of the CIs is to promote an understanding of China. "If foreigners don't understand us, they will fear our development, and this will prevent business and trade overseas" (quoted in Hartig 2016, 107). The CI seeks to introduce China and Chinese culture to the world. Nevertheless, not all subjects are open for viewing. There are topics that are taboo at CIs, such as the so-called three Ts: Tibet, Taiwan, and Tiananmen square, along with the Dali Lama and the Falun Gong.

The Popular Perception of China and Chinese in Latin America

Latin America is exceedingly diverse, and most of the people of the region define themselves by their nationalities. There are different national responses to China and Chinese. Chinese immigrants fought alongside the other Cuban rebels in the war for independence from Spain. Cuban history records the Chinese as patriots. In contrast, Peruvian history casts Chinese immigrants as traitors. In the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), over 1000 Chinese agricultural workers in southern Peru joined the invading Chilean military (López 2014).

Chinese encounters in what is today Latin America extends back to the very earliest colonial days of Spain. The Spanish colony in the Philippines brought Chinese and other Asian peoples to New Spain (Mexico) in the early 1600s (see Mann 2011, 323-328). "*Chino* barbers in New Spain performed both medical and non-medical services, which included bloodletting, dental surgery, cutting hair, shaving beards, and ear cleaning" (Slack 2009, 45). In the 1800s, Chinese laborers came in large numbers to the region. As in the United States, many of these workers came to construct railroads.

In some parts of Latin America, like Central America, Mexico, and Peru, they came in large enough numbers to form communities that persist today (Ellis 2014, 180). Chinese laborers were often "simultaneously promoted as efficient workers for progress and prosperity and criticized as harmful to the physical and moral well-being of the nation" (López 2014, 182). And as in the United States, there were episodic violent acts carried out against Chinese communities, such as the 1911 massacre of Mexico's Chinese community in Torreón, Coahuila (Jacques 1974 and Hu-Dehart 2010). Violent acts against Chinese Latin American communities are not historical artifacts. In 2004, shops of ethnic Chinese in Maracay and Valencia, Venezuela, were looted by angry mobs (Ellis 2014, 183).

Anti-Chinese sentiments remain prevalent in Latin America today. In an innovative study by Ariel C. Armony and Nicolás Velásquez (2015), the authors use Facebook's Application Programming Interface to examine users' comments on news articles about China from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Their analysis revealed a distrust of Chinese products and their quality. Chinese businesses are viewed as illegal, morally wrong, or abusive. Half of the negative comments "refer to local retail shops owned by Chinese immigrants" (Armony and Velásquez 2015, 332). These businesses offer an opportunity for direct interaction with Chinese immigrants and thus receive more negative comments than large Chinese corporations. Nearly 70 percent of the negative comments about Chinese culture are related to "preconceptions of cultural/educational differences (particularly culturally determined lack of hygiene), different food habits (such as the consumption of pets), and cruelty towards animals" (Armony and Velásquez 2015, 334). Language differences are seen as insurmountable.

A recent study by Miguel Carreras (2017) finds similar results. Latin Americans do not view China's authoritarian political system favorably. "Moreover, most Latin Americans do not like or do not know the Chinese popular culture (music, television, and movies), making it harder for China to seduce the Latin American publics" (Carreras, 2017, 23). All this implies that China's soft power campaign has not provided results.

[10] (https://confucius.nju.edu.cn/_t489/94/9f/c6277a169119/page.htm)

The Popular Perception of China in the 21st Century

The popular perception of China in Latin America has generally been positive throughout the 21st century (see Figure 1). In only two years, 2003 and 2015, less than half of the respondents from the Latinobarómetro survey said that they had a positive view of China.



Figure 1. Latinobarómetro various years.

Nevertheless, the trend from 2001 to 2018 for those indicating that they had a bad opinion of China grew. This marks a period of greater activity by China in the region. Of course, the region of Latin America contains many different countries, each with different levels of interaction with China. In 2018, the country that had the highest percentage of respondents indicating that they had a "very good" opinion of China was Costa Rica, followed by Brazil. For that same year, the two countries that had the highest percentage of respondents with a “very bad” opinion of China were Ecuador and Venezuela. Both Ecuador and Venezuela have had extensive economic interactions with China and have a very small percentage of respondents (8.9 percent and 12 percent) who do not have an opinion of China. Some countries like Guatemala and Honduras have a high percentage of respondents (41.4 percent and 33.1 percent) who have yet to form an opinion of China.

As discussed earlier, China has been very concerned with the concept of soft power and its ability to portray itself as a leader of the Global South.[11] In order to claim that role, it must be seen positively by the people of the Global South. Research on the role of Chinese activities in the world on its popular perception has generally been limited. To date, only one study has attempted to quantitatively assess the effect of China’s aid, trade, and investment on China’s image in Latin America. In an analysis of Latin American public opinion for the period 2002-2013, Vera Z. Eichenauer, Andreas Fuchs, and Lutz Brückner find “no average effects of China’s economic activities. . .” (2021, 484). They do find that Chinese economic activities have a polarizing effect, with some individuals developing very negative or very positive opinions of China. This they conclude “that China’s economic engagement creates winners and losers” (Eichenauer et al. 2021, 484). This finding dovetails with Rhys Jenkins’s (2019) findings in the important book, *How China is Reshaping the Global Economy,* that some individuals, and some countries, benefit handsomely from China’s need for raw materials. At the same time, others find themselves displaced from the flood of Chinese products. Chinese investments and aid also had mixed results in the Eichenauer et al. study.

[11]The Global South refers broadly to those countries in the regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and excludes Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.

Testing the Effects of Chinese Activities on the Popular Perception of China

Building on the research of Vera Z. Eichenauer, Andreas Fuchs, and Lutz Brückner (2021), this study seeks to test the effects of Chinese economic activities on the popular perception of China in Latin America. This study will update the previous study with an analysis of the years 2015 and 2018. Additionally, instead of measuring the variables of interest as a percentage of each country's GDP, I measure economic activity annually per capita. Since this study is concerned with popular perceptions, it is better to assess the effects based on the size of the population and to determine how much China's economic activities trickle down to the broader population. Additionally, my study will test the effects of the Chinese soft power strategy by including a variable on Confucius Institutes.

Using pooled data from the Latinobarómetro survey for 18 countries in the year 2015 and 17 countries in 2018, I attempt to measure the effect of Chinese activity on the popular perception of China.[12] For each survey year, the dependent variable is captured by a question that asks, "I would like to know your opinion about the following countries that I'm going to read you. Do you have a very good, good, bad, or very bad opinion of?: China." The variable was transformed into a dichotomous variable. For the question, a response of "very good" or "good" was coded as 1 and a response of "bad" or "very bad" as 0. For the 2015 survey, I have two additional dependent variables that seek to assess the respondent's perceptions of China. One asks, "In general, how much confidence do you have in the ability of China to deal responsibly with Latin American problems" and the other asks, "In general, how much confidence do you have in the ability of China to deal responsibly? With world problems." These two variables are transformed into dichotomous variables. For the questions, a response of "a good deal" or "a fair amount" was coded as 1 and a response of "not very much" or "not at all" as 0.[13]

There are four economic variables of interest for each country: exports to China (*Exports*); imports from China (*Imports*); loans made by the China Development Bank and China-Export Import Bank (*Loans*), and investments and construction projects funded by various private and state-owned Chinese business entities (*InvestCon*). For each of these economic variables, I assess each in per capita dollars and measure changes in $10 increments.[14] To control for what might be a deeper economic relation, I include a variable for a free trade agreement. Three countries in this study have a free trade agreement with China. Chile signed an agreement with China in 2006, and both Costa Rica and Peru signed one in 2010. I constructed a dichotomous variable (*FTA*) with a value of 1 indicating a free trade agreement with China and 0 indicating no such agreement.

Unlike some other studies, I have opted not to try and measure the effect of Chinese Official Development Assistance or "foreign aid" (Zhicheng Phil Xu and Yu Zhang 2020 and Eichenauer et al. 2021). I do so for two reasons. One, China does not report its foreign aid and considers it to be a state secret. Therefore, we do not have any information that can approximate the accuracy of OECD reports or USAID's Greenbook. Studies that use Chinese aid data have had to rely on approximations that track underreported financial flows.[15] I am not comfortable using this data, particularly to compare it to the effects of other countries' foreign aid programs that have detailed reporting systems. Second, even by these approximations of Chinese foreign aid, the aid to Latin America is negligible except for Cuba, and Cuba is not considered in this study.

For both *Exports* and *Imports,* I lagged the data by two years for the 2015 and the 2018 surveys. This allows the effects of trade to permeate throughout the entire country. Since the effect of loans, investments, and construction projects can take time to register in the popular psyche; I use the value over an extended period. For the 2015 survey, I use the period 2005 to 2013, and for the 2018 survey, 2005 to 2016. As with the variables *Exports* and *Imports,* these are also assessed in per capita dollars and measured in changes in $10 increments.

To assess Chinese soft power action on the popular perception of China in the region, I measure the effects of the presence and duration of operations of Chinese Confucian Institutes (*ConfYears*) in the target country. As stated above, the Chinese flagship entity of their public diplomacy is the Confucian Institutes. These institutes seek to actively promote Chinese culture and the Chinese language. Only countries that recognize Beijing as the legitimate government of China can receive a CI.

We can use the presence of a Confucian Institute as a proxy measurement for Chinese commitment to a soft power public diplomacy campaign in the target country. The CI is far more than just a language program institution. It also serves as the platform for student and faculty exchange and scholarship programs. As Ying Zhoua and Sabrina Luk argue, establishing CIs

[12]The 18 countries in 2015 are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In 2018, Venezuela was excluded. The political turmoil along with the refugee crisis in the country makes the survey data results questionable. Additionally, the last reliable trade data for Venezuela is from 2013. This is useful for the 2015 survey but not for 2018. Information on the Latinobarómetro survey data is available at http://www.latinobarometro.org

[13]I opt to transform the dependent variable into a dichotomous variable as a matter of clarity and certainty. The difference between "good" and "bad" is clear for everyone. The difference between "very good" and "good" could vary widely for different individuals.

[14]The trade date is from World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en Loan data is from The Dialogue https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/ Investment and construction data from https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/

[15]See https://www.aiddata.org/methods/tracking-underreported-financial-flows

in foreign countries has become China's main effort to enhance soft power and "is part of the Chinese government's efforts to enhance China's positive image" (2016, 631). According to Jake Gilstrap (2021, 20), the CI program serves "to create a generation of future political and business leaders that will support [China's] ascent and serve as its diplomatic allies in the international order." Given the long-term nature of the CI program, we should expect to see it leading to an increased attraction to China in the target country over time. That is if the program is successful.

For each country, I measure if a Confucian Institute is present and for how many years it has operated in that country to the year before the survey. For those countries hosting a CI in 2015, the range in years was from four to nine years, with Mexico as the longest host and Bolivia as the most recent. In the 2018 survey, the range was twelve years to one year, with Mexico at twelve and Panama at one year. Panama recognized China in 2017 and was immediately given a CI located at the University of Panama. All the countries in the two survey years for this study that recognize Beijing have a CI program, except for Uruguay. China opened a CI at the University of the Republic, Uruguay, in 2018, which falls outside of the variable's domain for this study. Some large countries like Brazil have many Confucian Institutes in multiple cities, while smaller countries often only have one. An interesting preliminary finding is that those countries that recognize Taipei as the legitimate government of China have, on average, a 10 percent higher approval rating of China than those that recognize Beijing.

To assess how regime type may affect the popular perception of China, I constructed a variable (*Free*) using data from Freedom House for the years 2015 and 2018, each year of the survey. Freedom House rates each country's level of freedom of political rights and civil rights on a scale of one to seven, with one being the "most free" and seven the "least free." I combine each country's assigned scores of political rights and civil rights and reverse the scale so that the higher the number, the greater the level of freedom. Many researchers use the Freedom House data as an indicator of democracy. By contrast, this study follows the argument advanced by Diego Giannone (2010), which suggests that we should understand Freedom House as an instrument of the US government that does not measure "freedom" but instead measures how much a state conforms to the neoliberal ideological model advanced by the United States.[16]

Finally, variables that account for the individual characteristics of the respondents that may influence their attitude toward China were incorporated. The sex of the respondent is coded as 1 for male and 0 for female (*Male*). Two more variables were included, one for the actual age of the respondent in years (*Age*) and a second for the number of years of education of the respondent (*Educ*).[17]

I begin the analysis by examining the same dependent variable of the respondent's opinion of China using binary logistic regression on the pooled data from all 18 countries for the 2015 survey and from 17 countries for the 2018 survey. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Models three and four measure the respondent's confidence in China's ability to deal with the problems of Latin America and the world, respectively (Tables 3 and 4). The results are drawn from the 2015 survey. These questions were not asked in 2018. Since the purpose of this analysis is to assess the impact of the independent variables controlling for other effects in the model, the test statistic of concern is the odds ratio (Exp[B]). "The odds ratio is an exact summary measure of the net multiplicative impact on the odds of an event for each unit increase in a given predictor and is, therefore, a multiplicative analog of the partial slope in linear regression" (DeMaris 1993, 1057)

Table 1. Opinion of China – 2015

Variable	*B*	*Std. Error*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Exports	0.003	0.001	9.99	0.002	1.003
Imports	-0.001	0.001	141.076	0.001	0.989
Loans	-0.001	0.001	1.289	0.286	0.999
InvestCon	-0.004	0.002	7.682	0.006	0.996
FTA	0.363	0.065	31.157	0.001	1.438
ConfYears	-0.039	0.006	37.178	0.001	0.961
Free	0.002	0.015	0.012	0.914	1.002
Male	0.087	0.036	5.715	0.017	1.091
Educ	0.013	0.005	7.806	0.005	1.013
Age	-0.009	0.001	57.822	0.001	0.991
Notes: n = 14,548 pseudo-R squared = .030. Negative—31%; positive—69%					

Table 1 reveals that a majority of Latin Americans had a positive opinion of China in 2015 (69 percent). This fits with

[16] Eighty percent of Freedom House funds are derived from the US government (Giannone 2010, 75)

[17] A variance inflation factor test was conducted to check for multicollinearity, and it was found not to be a problem. The data were weighted.

Table 2. Opinion of China – 2018

Variable	*B*	*Std. Error*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Exports	0	0.001	0.001	0.973	1
Imports	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.855	1
Loans	0.003	0.001	5.722	0.017	1.003
InvestCon	-0.008	0.001	29.836	0.001	0.992
FTA	0.288	0.075	14.792	0.001	1.333
ConfYears	-0.028	0.005	30.406	0.001	0.972
Free	0.036	0.014	6.229	0.012	1.036
Male	0.295	0.039	56.675	0.001	1.343
Educ	0.005	0.005	115.676	0.001	1.056
Age	-0.006	0.001	25.344	0.001	0.994

Notes: n = 14,405 pseudo-R squared = .035. Negative 25%; positive—75%

the pattern revealed in Figure 1 above.[18] Of the ten variables, we find that eight of them are significant at the .10 or .05 level. Neither *Loans* nor *Free* is significant. Therefore, we can conclude for 2015 that Chinese loans by the China Development Bank and China-Export Import Bank had no effect on the public's opinion of China. Since the variable *Free* is not significant, this indicates that regime type is not a factor. This supports John Givens's (2011) argument that China treats all countries the same regardless of political and civil rights policies.

In 2015, an increase in exports to China increased the odds of having a positive opinion of China, while an increase in imports reduced the odds of the respondent having a positive opinion. Both are statistically significant but of limited effect, with less than a half a percent increase for every $10 per capita change of exports for a positive view and a one percent increase in the odds of having a negative opinion of China for an increase in imports. Chinese investments and construction projects have a slightly negative effect on the odds of having a positive view of China. For respondents in those three countries with a free trade agreement with China, the odds of them having a positive view of China are 44 percent higher.

The most striking finding is the effect of Confucius Institutes on the popular opinion of China. This Chinese soft power program was designed for people to get to know and like China. According to the data, it has had the opposite effect. In 2015, the odds of having a negative opinion of China increased by 4 percent for every year that a Confucian Institute was in operation in that country and by 3 percent in 2018. More will be said about this in the conclusion.

In the 2018 survey, neither exports nor imports are significant. This further supports the supposition that general trade relations do little to nothing in shaping public opinion toward China. However, having a free trade agreement again increases the odds of having a favorable opinion, this time by 33 percent. Loans and investments and construction are both significant in 2018, with loans having a slight positive effect and investment and construction having a negative effect on public opinion. Interestingly the variable *Free* is significant in the 2018 survey and suggests that respondents in countries that are more like the United States are slightly more likely to have a positive view of China.

Finally, there is a clear gender gap when it comes to having a favorable opinion of China. Men are more likely than women to see China favorably. Those with higher levels of education are more likely to have a favorable opinion of China, while older people are less likely. People with higher levels of education are often more open to different cultures. The older generation is likely still influenced by the anti-communist orientation of Latin America during the cold war. China today is far from following the state-socialism advanced by communist countries in the 20^{th} century. It is best described as a state-capitalist model. Nevertheless, the rule by the Communist Party still colors many people's perceptions.

The next two models address the respondent's view on the ability of China to deal with the problems of Latin America and with the problems of the world. In both cases, the majority of the population does not have confidence in China's ability to deal with the problems at either level. In contrast, in that same survey year, 57 percent of the respondents said that they had confidence in the US's ability to deal with the problems of Latin America, and 55 percent said that they had confidence in the ability of the United States to deal with the problems of the world. Unfortunately, these questions were not asked in the 2018 survey, so we cannot determine if China has made progress with its continued economic growth or that perhaps that confidence in the United States fell with the presidency of Donald Trump.

The results from Table 3 reveal the variables *Export, Imports*, *InvestCon, Free*, and *Age* were not significant. *Loans* have a slight positive effect and, there is and an education and gender gap in the results. The presence of a free trade agreement has an

[18] In Figure 1, those with a positive view are lower than the results found in Table 1. For all the models, those individuals who responded that they did not know their opinion of China were excluded from the study. In 2015, 27. 5 percent responded, "Don't Know"

Table 3. China's ability to deal with Latin America's problems – 2015

Variable	*B*	*Std. Error*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Exports	0	0.001	0.009	0.962	1
Imports	-0.001	0.001	1.161	0.281	0.999
Loans	0.003	0.001	16.559	0.001	1.003
InvestCon	0.001	0.001	0.396	0.529	1.001
FTA	0.632	0.056	125.542	0.001	1.881
ConfYears	-0.037	0.006	43.332	0.001	0.963
Free	-0.003	0.012	0.047	0.829	0.997
Male	0.142	0.032	20.206	0.001	1.152
Educ	0.032	0.004	61.989	0.001	1.033
Age	0	0.001	0.048	0.827	1
Notes: n = 16,592 pseudo-R squared = .028. No—55%; yes—45%					

even larger positive effect on the perception of China's ability to deal with Latin America's problems than on a respondent's general opinion of China. Once again, the presence of a Confucian Institute had a negative effect, reducing the odds that a respondent would have confidence in China's ability to deal with the problems of Latin America by 4 percent for every year of operation of the CI. Table 4, the ability of China to deal with the problems of the world, is very similar to Table 3.

Table 4. China's ability to deal with world's problems – 2015

Variable	*B*	*Std. Error*	*Wald*	*Sig*	*Exp(B)*
Exports	0.001	0.001	1.143	0.285	1.001
Imports	0.001	0.001	2.18	0.14	1.001
Loans	0.002	0.001	11.171	0.001	1.002
InvestCon	0.004	0.001	1.11	0.292	1.001
FTA	0.683	0.057	145.32	0.001	1.979
ConfYears	-0.034	0.006	36.375	0.001	0.966
Free	-0.034	0.012	7.502	0.006	0.966
Male	0.128	0.032	16.4	0.001	1.137
Educ	0.04	0.004	93.95	0.001	1.041
Age	0	0.001	0.133	0.715	1
Notes: n = 16,580 pseudo-R squared = .034. No—55%; yes—45%					

However, regime type (*Free*) is significant and negative. The presence of a free trade agreement has an outsized positive effect. Finally, as in the previous three models, *ConfYears* is significant and has a modest negative effect (3 percent per year) on the perception of China's abilities to deal with the world's problems.

Conclusion

China's economic activities have continued apace. Although the pandemic has slowed global trade, economic activities are quickly rebounding. Argentina's trade with China expanded 56 percent from 2007 to 2019, driven by exports of beef and soya. China even surpassed Brazil as Argentina's most important trade partner for part of 2020 (Sweigart and Cohen 2021). China remains the largest export and import partner for Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Investments have also continued, with billions of dollars being invested in major countries of the region for projects such as railway construction in Argentina, energy projects in Chile, and monorail systems in both Brazil and Colombia.[19]

Nevertheless, from the analysis above, trade only has a minor effect on the popular perception of China. Countries that have found a market for their commodities in China do benefit economically, but the economic relationship fits the pattern of dependency as described by scholars such as André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Osvaldo Sunkel. This type of relationship makes many Latin American countries vulnerable and leaves them in a precarious position vis-à-vis China.

[19]Since 2019, China has invested $5.8 billion in Argentina, $5.4 billion in Brazil, $7 billion in Chile, $6.4 billion in Colombia, $2.73 billion in Mexico, and $7.98 billion in Peru.

Investments from China were shown to have a negative effect on the popular opinion of China. Chinese mining and petroleum activities have sparked protests in Ecuador and Peru. In addition to the environmental damage caused by these investments, modern mining and resource extraction are no longer labor intensive and thus do not provide many jobs for the local people. Furthermore, China has not hesitated to use its economic leverage to achieve its goals. Countries like Argentina, which are highly dependent on China for trade and financial backing, remain vulnerable to Chinese coercion. In 2015, President Macri of Argentina told China that he wanted to suspend the construction of two dams in southern Patagonia. The Chinese government informed him that all investments in Argentina were linked together, and the suspension of the dams would lead to a suspension of a Chinese railroad project that Macri favored. China also told Macri that it would reduce imports of Argentine soybeans by 30 percent. Macri quickly backtracked. Both Ecuador and Venezuela find themselves trapped in a situation where they must repay loans to China with oil. Ecuador has to pay for the faulty Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam project. Venezuela struggles to repay its $20 billion debt to China in its oil for loans relationship as oil production in Venezuela has faltered (Sweigart and Cohen 2021).

The findings of this article are preliminary because they only account for a brief period in the history of China and Latin American relations. Nevertheless, the most important finding of this study is the effect of China's premier public diplomacy program, its Confucian Institutes, on the popular opinion of China in Latin America. The CI program which China developed as a means to enhance soft power is backfiring. Whereas the Chinese government hoped that their CIs would advance a narrative of solidarity in a harmonious world and promote a positive image of China, the evidence suggests that each year of operation of a CI in a country only reduces the odds of having a positive view of China. China has continued to open new CIs throughout Latin America with a new program in Uruguay in 2018 and in the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2019. Recall from figure 1 above that there is a sizable percentage of respondents who have yet to form an opinion about China. Evidence from the recently released 2020 Latinobarómetro survey does not bode well for China's CI program. After two years of activities from the CI in Uruguay, the evidence shows a 14 percent drop in those who had a positive view of China and a 25 percent increase in those who had a negative opinion. The percentage of the respondents in Uruguay who responded that they did not know their opinion of China dropped from 27 percent to 14 percent

China's CIs are not likely to sway 'the undecided' about China to a positive opinion and are likely to change the opinion of those who currently hold a positive view of China. Rudolph Kulver has observed "that economically and politically important countries with large publics suspicious of China seem to merit a large number of CIs, while nations with a largely positive public opinion toward China have fewer" (2014, 204). The evidence presented here suggests that this strategy is counterproductive in the long term, at least in Latin American countries

Why have CIs been so unsuccessful? In her study comparing a Confucian Institute to two private Chinese language schools in Costa Rica, Monica DeHart (2017) finds deficiencies in the pedagogical approach of the CI. In her field research over a period of five summers, she saw nothing in her observations that indicated an overt ideological agenda in the CI. Nevertheless, in comparison to the privately run Chinese language schools, the CI rarely addressed Chinese culture and focused more on pure language training. According to Dehart (2017, 194), the CI instructor she observed: "tended to draw upon characters from popular animated films (at that time Kung Fu Panda or Madagascar) to illustrate her points." DreamWorks Animation, the producers of Kung Fu Panda, is not known to address controversial topics.

According to Falk Hartig (2015), CIs suffer from the problem of credibility that emerges from an authoritarian government that seeks to strictly control the strategic narrative. Instead of introducing the 'real China' to the world, CIs promote a 'correct China.' This creates a credibility problem as the Chinese government provides the material for Chinese language training, and these materials consistently represent Chinese people in a positive light and describe very few social tensions in China.

Kennesaw State University (KSU), my home institution, used to host a CI. One of my students, Joe Aldridge, related to me the incongruity of an event he went to presented by KSU's CI. It was a cultural dance performance of the many ethnic groups in China. This included the Uyghurs, the ethnic group in China that is experiencing cultural genocide. According to Joe, there was no mention of human rights, repression, or any ethnic tension, just cheerful and happy dancers in their traditional costumes. "They seemed desperate to project a sense of harmony between the major ethnic groups in China that ran counter to the reports coming out of Xinjiang, which made the performance feel eerily dissonant."[20]

With certain topics off limits, such as Taiwan, Tibet, Tiananmen, and the genocide of the Uyghurs, CIs become propaganda machines and not soft power enhancers. The people of Latin America are generally connected to the rest of the world and have access to information about topics that the Chinese government would not like to address. Evidence from the 2018 Latinobarómetro survey shows that 90 percent of households have a cell phone, 46 percent have a smartphone, and 43 percent have a computer. Of those households that have a computer, 32 percent do not have a smartphone, and 30 percent of those that have a smartphone do not have a computer. This indicates that more than half of the population has access to a device that connects to the internet. In 2018, the World Bank reported that almost 67 percent of the region's population had

[20]The event took place in late 2018. Quote from Joseph C. Aldridge, email message to author, April 29, 2022.

access to the internet.[21] According to Nye (2011, 83), "[s]oft power depends upon credibility, and when governments are perceived as manipulative, and information is seen as propaganda, credibility is destroyed." Therefore, Confucian Institutes are counterproductive to other aspects of China that enhance its soft power, like its striking economic success over the last 20 years.

The United States should not worry that the countries of Latin America will embrace China to the detriment of the United States. Concerns of R. Evan Ellis (2014) that China is replacing the United States in Latin America are overblown. Jake Gilstrap's (2021) view that China is making a leftist/corrupt connection with Latin American countries is also exaggerated.[22] Ultimately, China is politically and economically at odds with Latin America, and even more so today since the ascendancy of Xi Jinping.

Xi has been moving the Chinese economy away from the liberal market reforms of his predecessors. Chinese capitalists like Jack Ma, who were once ubiquitous, have disappeared from public view (Zhong 2021). Xi has also spoken of the Communist Party pursuing common prosperity for all (Buckley et al., 2021). In contrast, Latin Americans remain committed to the market economy. In the 2020 Latinobarómetro survey, 65 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the "Market economy is the only system with which the country can become a developed country." Even in a country often perceived as socialist, such as Bolivia, we find 70 percent supporting the market economy. As the Chinese Communist Party exerts more control over the Chinese economy, it also gains more political control.

China has turned in a more authoritarian direction politically under Xi as he prepares for a precedent-breaking third term as president. Chinese authoritarianism does not match current governing structures in Latin America. The democratic government continues to be the norm throughout the region, with only two exceptions among the countries in this study, Nicaragua and Venezuela.[23] Again from the 2020 Latinobarómetro, 55 percent of Latin Americans say that democracy is preferable to all other forms of government, and only 15 percent said that under some circumstances would, an authoritarian government be preferable.

China has displaced the United States as the most important economic partner for many countries in the region. Nevertheless, the United States remains a strong second in many countries and the most important trade partner for Mexico. Large-scale trade activities alone by China are not a threat to US dominance in the region. Dinorah Azpuru (2016) has shown that Latin Americans continue to perceive the United States as the most influential country in the region, and she concludes that the United States will likely continue to be so. She does caution that the "U.S. needs to make more efforts to reach out to more informed and educated Latin Americans who, at the end of the day, will more likely be in charge of government and businesses in the region" (Azpuru 2016, 466). The United States remains broadly popular in Latin America, and as long as the United States remains positively engaged in the region, its influence can continue well into the future.[24] From the 2020 Latinobarómetro survey, a majority of Latin Americans (56 percent) have a favorable or very favorable opinion of China. Nevertheless, a much larger percentage (72 percent) have a favorable opinion of the United States, with 20 percent compared to 14 percent for China having a very favorable opinion. China has a long way to go to overtake the United States in Latin America. The Confucius Institutes will not help close that gap.

References

Armony, Ariel C. and Nicolás Velásquez. 2015. "Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Latin America: An Analysis of Online Discourse." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 20: 319-347. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-015-9365-z

Azpuru, Dinorah. 2016. "Is US Influence Dwindling in Latin America? Citizens' Perspectives." *The Latin Americanist*. December: 447-472. https://doi.org/10.1111/tla.12092

Buckley, Chris, Alexandra Stevenson and Cao Li. 2021. "Warning of Income Gap, Xi Tells China's Tycoons to Share Wealth" *New York Times* November 11, 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/07/world/asia/china-xi-common-prosperity.html (Assessed April 28, 2022).

Carreras, Miguel. 2017. "Public attitudes toward an emerging China in Latin America." *Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs* 53 (1): 1-28.

[21] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=ZJ

[22] Moreover, Gilstrap's analysis is flawed and suffers from many factual mistakes. He identifies both Chilean President Sebastián Piñera and Peruvian President Alan Garcia as leftists. Although Garcia was left of center in his first term as president in 1985, he had clearly embraced the right-of-center neoliberal economic model for his second term in 2006. To label the billionaire Piñera as a leftist is risible. He also asserts that Mexican President Felipe Calderon was hostile to the United States without any evidence. In 2007, Calderon ordered 30,000 military personnel into the fight against drug traffickers, a policy clearly aligned with US interests.

[23] Cuba is not considered in this study. Freedom House classified Nicaragua as "not free" in 2019 and Venezuela "as not" free in 2017. Nevertheless, support for democracy is still high in both countries, 56 percent in Nicaragua and 73 percent in Venezuela (see https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp)

[24] By positive engagement, I mean such things as the US government attending all multilateral functions, maintaining regular country visits by senior State Department officials, and having high-level representation at presidential inaugurations. Vice President Harris's attendance at the inauguration of Xiomara Castro, the first female president of Honduras, in January 2022 is an excellent example. Expanding the Peace Corps in Latin America is another means of positive engagement (see Nisley 2018).

Casanova, Carlos, Le Xia and Romina Ferreira. 2016. "Measuring Latin America's export dependency on China." *Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies* 9 (3): 213-233. http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/JCEFTS-08-2016-0022

Cassey, Nicholas and Clifford Krauss. 2018. "It Doesn't Matter if Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid." *New York Times*. December 24, 2018.https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html (Assessed May 22, 2022).

Cui, Shoujun. 2016. "China's New Commitments to LAC and Its Geopolitical Implications." In *China and Latin America in Transition: Policy Dynamics, Economic Commitments, and Social Impacts,* edited by Shoujun Cui and Manuel Pérez García, 15-33. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

DeHart, Monica. 2017. "Who Speaks for China? Translating Geopolitics through Language Institutes in Costa Rica" *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 13 (2): 180-204. https://doi:10.1163/17932548-12341354

Demaris, Alfred. 1993. "Odds versus Probabilities in Logit Equations: A Reply to Roncek." *Social Forces* 7 (4): 1057-1065. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2580130

Eichenauer, Vera Z., Andreas Fuchs and Lutz Brückner. 2021. "The effects of trade, aid, and investment on China's image in Latin America." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 49 (2): 483 498. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.08.005

Ellis, R. Evan. 2009. *China in Latin America: The Whats & Wherefores*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO.

Ellis, R. Evan. 2014. *China on the Ground in Latin America.* Palgrave MacMillan: New York

Giannone, Diego. 2010. "Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement of Democracy: The Freedom House Case." *Democratization* (17) 1: 68-97.https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340903453716

Gilstrap, Jake. 2021. "Chinese Confucius Institutes in Latin America: Tools of Soft Power" Perry Center Occasional Paper, October National Defense University, the US Department of Defense.

https://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication_associated_files/Chinese%20Co fucius%20Institutes%20in%20LATAM.pdf (Accessed April 30, 2022)

Givens, John Wagner. 2011. "The Beijing Consensus is Neither: China as a Non-Ideological Challenge to International Norms." *St Antony's International Review* 6 (2): 10-25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26226762

Hubbert, Jennifer. 2019. *China in the World: An Anthropology of Confucius Institutes, Soft Power. And Globalization*. University of Hawai'i Press: Honolulu.

Hartig Falk. 2015. "Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China's Strategic Narratives." *Politics* 35 (3-4): 245-258. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12093

Hartig, Falk. 2016. *Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Rise of the Confucius Institute*. Routledge, New York.

Hearn, Adrian H. and José Luis León-Manríquez (eds). 2011. *China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO.

Hu-DeHart, Evelyn. 2010. "Indispensable Enemy or Convenient Scapegoat? A Critical Examination of Sinophobia in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1870s to 1930s." In *The Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean* edited by Walton Look Lai and Chee-Beng Tan, 65-102. Boston:Brill.

Huang, Wei-hao and Jun Xiang. 2019. "Pursuing Soft Power through the Confucius Institute: a Large-N Analysis" *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 24 (2): 249-266. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9571-6

Jacques, Leo M. Dambourges. 1974. "The Chinese Massacre in Torreon (Coahuila) in 1911" *Arizona and the West* 16 (3):233-246. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40168453

Jenkins, Rhys. 2019. *How China is Reshaping the Global Economy: Development Impacts in Africa and Latin America*. Oxford University Press: Oxford

Jenkins, Rhys. Forthcoming. "China's Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America: What has Changed?" *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211047871

Kahn, Carrie. 2018. "China Lures Taiwan's Latin American Allies." *NPR*. October 13, 2018.
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/13/654179099/china-lures-taiwans-latin-american-allies
(Assessed October 24, 2021).

Koleski, Katherine and Alec Blivas 2018, *China's engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean*, Staff research report / U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Engagement%20with%20Latin%20America%20and%20the%20Caribbea

Kulver, Randolph. 2014 "The Sage as Strategy: Nodes, Networks, and the Quest for Geopolitical Power in the Confucius Institute" *Communication, Culture & Critique* 7 (2): 192-209. https://doi.org/10.1111/cccr.12046

Kulver, Randy. 2017. "Chinese Culture in a Global Context: The Confucius Institute as a Geo Cultural Force." In *China's Global Engagement: Cooperation. Competition and Influence in the 21st Century*, edited by Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, 389-416. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press: 389-416.

Lee Myers, Steven. 2021. "Taiwan Loses Nicaragua as Ally as Tensions with China Rise" *New York Times*. December 9, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/world/asia/taiwan-nicaragua -china.html?searchResultPosition=1 (Accessed May

10, 2022).
Li Mingjiang. 2008. "China Debates Soft Power." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2 (2): 287–308. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615
Lo, Joe Tin-yau and Suyan Pan. 2016. "Confucius institutes and China's soft power: Practices and paradoxes." *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 46 (4): 512–532.https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2014.916185
Lochery, Neill. 2014. *Brazil: The Fortunes of War.* New York: Basic Books
Londoño, Ernesto. 2018. "From a space station in Argentina, China expands its reach in Latin America."
New York Times, July 28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/americas/china latin-america.html?searchResultPosition=1 (accessed on 29 October 2020).
López, Kathleen. 2014. "In Search of Legitimacy: Chinese Immigrants and Latin American Nation Building." In *Immigration and National Identities in Latin America 1850-1950* edited by Nicola Foote and Michael Goebel, 182-204. Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida.
Mann, Charles C. 2011. *1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created.* New York: Alfred A Knopf.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Nisley, Thomas J. 2018. *The Peace Corps and Latin America: In the Last Mile of US Foreign Policy.* Boulder, CO. Lexington Books.
Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2002. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nye Jr., Joseph S 2011. *The Future of Power.* New York: Public Affairs.
Poggio Teixeira, C.G. 2012. *Brazil, the United States, and the South American subsystem: Regional politics and the absent empire*. New York: Lexington Books.
Serrano, Miguel. 2018. "China Fills Trump's Empty Seat at Latin America Summit." *New York Times.* April 13, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/opinion/china-trump-pence-summit-lima latin-america.html?searchResultPosition=1 (Accessed October 24, 2021).
Slack, Edward R. (2009) "The Chinos in New Spain: A Corrective Lens for a Distorted Image." *Journal of World History* 2 (1): 35-67. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40542720
Sullivan, Mark P. and Thomas Lum. 2019. "China's Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean." *Congressional Research Service* (Updated April 11, 2019) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982/3 (Accessed May 10, 2022)
Sweigart, Emilie and Gabriel Cohen. 2021. "Latin America's Evolving Relationships with China." *Americas Quarterly.* October 19, 2021. https://americasquarterly.org/article/latin-americas-evolving relationships-with-china/ (Accessed May 10, 2022).
Zakaria, Fareed. 2009. *The Post American World.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Zhicheng Phil Xu and Yu Zhang. 2020. "Can Chinese aid win the hearts and minds of Africa's local population?" *Economic Modelling* 90 (August): 322-330. *https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.12.017*
Zhong, Raymond. 2021. "A Chastened Alibaba Tones Down Its Singles Day Retail Bonanza." *New York Times* November 10, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/technology/china-alibaba -singles-day.html (Accessed May 10, 2022)
Zhou, Ying and Sabrina Luk. 2016. "Establishing Confucius Institutes: a tool for promotion China's soft Power? *Journal of Contemporary China* 25 (100): 628-642. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132961

Sexual Assault Victims Have No Privacy: Updating Georgia's Victim Privacy Statute

Valerie Cochran[1]

[1]Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of North Georgia

ABSTRACT

In the early 1900s, Georgia was among a handful of states with a law to protect against the publication of a sexual assault victim's identity. These laws started facing constitutional challenges in the 1970s and were struck down as a violation of the press's freedom of speech. Florida rewrote its law to meet the constitutional standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court. Georgia, however, has not rewritten its law to protect a victim's identity from publication. The U.S. Supreme Court has provided an outline to do so. Georgia, and other states, should enact laws to protect victim privacy, particularly in light of the psychological repercussions and the unique risks posed by modern social media.

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to examine the ability of sexual assault victims to legally prevent their identities and personally identifiable information from being made publicly available without their consent in Georgia specifically, but the case law discussed herein may apply in other jurisdictions as well. Protecting the privacy of sexual assault victims may encourage more victims to report while also protecting the victims from harassment.

The importance of the issue was highlighted as recently as 2021 when a lawmaker in Idaho publicly revealed the identity, photo, and personal details of a 19-year-old female who reported she was sexually assaulted by another legislator without the victim's consent. After testifying at a committee hearing investigating her allegations, the victim was followed and harassed. Even after the legislator resigned, the victim continued to suffer attacks on social media and other forums (Boone 2001). In 2018, a decorated Olympic gymnast found herself targeted for public harassment. Even though Olympic medalist Jamie Dantzsher filed a lawsuit against the USA Gymnastics and Larry Nassar as the anonymous "Jane Doe," her coaches and friends outed her and disparaged her character on social media (May 2018). In early December 2014, the alleged rape victim at the center of the University of Virginia scandal was involuntarily identified on Twitter. Although Rolling Stone had to retract the alleged victim's story about a year later when a subsequent investigation showed the alleged victim's story was fabricated, in the meantime, the alleged victim's identity had been made public without her consent. The alleged victim had requested the magazine use an alias when it published the story to protect her identity. A young teenager from Missouri who accused another student of rape in 2012 had mysterious fires set at her home. She and her family eventually had to move from the community (Slifer 2013). These are examples of serious threats to the safety and well-being of sexual assault victims, and it is not entirely clear that a state, through its police, has the ability to keep these victims safe once their identities are made public.

These are four high-profile examples of what can happen when a sexual assault victim is involuntarily publicly identified. Tracking less publicized instances of involuntary publication is not easy. If a jurisdiction does not have a law prohibiting the revelation, it is unclear whom a victim would complain to or who would track such incidents in a comprehensive and reliable way. In jurisdictions with laws prohibiting involuntary publication, it would likely not be a criminal violation. It would be a civil tort, invasion of privacy. For violations of civil law, the only recourse for the victim would be to file a lawsuit in civil court. To file the civil lawsuit, a sexual assault victim would have to voluntarily come forward, publicly identify themselves in the court filing, and go through the legal process. For the same reasons discussed below regarding why sexual assault victims do not report assaults to law enforcement, this is unlikely. While the F.B.I. tracks crime statistics, it does not track civil lawsuits. Civil lawsuits may be settled out of court, resulting in the case's dismissal. If the case is dismissed, there may not be much information provided about the reason in legal databases (American Bar Association 2019). Similar to when jurisdictions lack legal prohibitions, it is unclear who would monitor all invasion of privacy lawsuits, sort out those related to sexual assault victims, and monitor outcomes. If there were a legal standard, perhaps a victim services organization would be able to gather some data from victim-clients. Without a legal standard, tracking incidents in a systematic way appears difficult.

Despite the lack of formal data and tracking, there have been media reports of victims who have had their identities revealed without their consent or approval. Moreover, the issue of whether victims of sexual assault should be identified by the media is not a new one. Even before the last victim privacy statute, Florida's, was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court

in 1994, the media was reconsidering standing policies against identifying victims of sexual assault (State v. Globe 1994).

Victim Outcomes

Regardless of what the policy is of traditional news outlets regarding the release of a rape victim's name, a backlash against victims of sexual assault who speak out is not uncommon. After the Palm Beach victim's identity was released, a number of people expressed concern that rape victims would not report their rape or would choose not to go to trial as a result of seeing what happened to the Palm Beach victim (Kantrowitz 1991). A rape victim in Oakland, California, told law enforcement she would drop the charges against her attacker if she were publicly identified (Kantrowitz 1991). A single instance of a victim's identity being made public on a local talk show in 1983 led the victim to move to Florida from Massachusetts and her death in a car accident (Kantrowitz 1991). Her friends believed the accident was actually a suicide (Kantrowitz 1991).

As these examples demonstrate, a sexual assault victim's privacy concerns are not without cause. Victim privacy is not just about preventing harassment, though. There is research showing female victims fear others finding out they were assaulted or raped as they decide whether to report the assault to law enforcement (Denno 1993). A 2006 study of college students showed that college-age men were more concerned about privacy and confidentiality when reporting a sexual assault than college-age women (Sable et al. 2006). U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics also shows that 20% of those who did not report their assault between 1994 and 2010 did not do so because they feared retaliation (Rain and Incest National Network 2022). In fact, a key 1992 study directly contradicted the argument that the media publishing a sexual assault victim's name would encourage reporting. Instead, fully half of rape victims included in the study said exactly the opposite- they would be more likely to report if the media couldn't publish their identities or identifying information (Kilpatrick 1992). Other privacy concerns included their families or other people generally finding out and being blamed for the assault (Kilpatrick 1992). Confidentiality concerns were a key factor in the decision to pass a law in the U.K., making an exception to the media's free speech rights in that country (Boyle 2012). More generally, rape victims experience P.T.S.D. and nervous breakdowns at higher rates than other crime victims (Kantrowitz 1991). A 1992 study found that 31% of rape victims developed P.T.S.D., increasing their risk for other problems such as alcohol and drug abuse (Kilpatrick 1992). Some experts contend that forced public identification of a rape victim recreates the rape trauma, reigniting feelings of helplessness and powerlessness (Kantrowitz 1991). Privacy and confidentiality concerns may explain why the Rape and Incest National Network (2022) reports that only one-quarter of sexual assaults are reported to law enforcement. The media's inconsistent approach to releasing a victim's identifying information is part of the problem.

Media Policy

In 1989 an article in The Newsletter on Journalism Ethics (1989) identified the media's policy of not publicly identifying victims of sexual assault as an ethical one, not a legal one. The Central Park Jogger found this out the hard way when she was publicly identified by the New York Times, with other outlets following suit (Elliot 1989). The Times and the other news organizations then apologized or had to explain their actions (Elliot 1989). Elliott (1989) states that some journalists believe not naming policies are the result of increased female power in the field, while others see the policy as discriminatory to both parties. Michael Gartner, the then-president of N.B.C. news, says the press's refusal to name the victim contributes to the ongoing tendency of the public to blame the victim because withholding the identity creates mystery (Elliot 1989). Gartner also expresses concern that those accused of sexual assault are not afforded the same protection, and their name and character can be dragged through the mud prior to a trial (Boyle 2012). Despite this view, Gartner says he wouldn't have the courage to be the first, second, or third editor to name a rape victim (Elliot 1989). However, the new managing editor, Michael Rouse, at the Fayetteville (N.C.) Observer expected to carry on his policy, begun in the 1970s, of naming both the prosecuting witness and the defendant in rape cases (Elliot 1989). The policy was ended when Rouse left because the new editor was told there were sexual assault cases that didn't go to trial because the victims feared being publicly identified (Elliot 1989). Similarly, Charles Gay, an editor of the Shelton-Mason (W.A.) County Journal, continued naming names, defying community petitions, and picketing (Elliot 1989).

The debate continued when, in 1991, the woman who accused William Kennedy Smith of rape was publicly identified by N.B.C. She had already been named by British newspapers and a tabloid. While many news outlets did not follow suit, the New York Times subsequently published a profile of the woman, and a handful of other outlets identified her, too (Warren 1991). The public was treated to detailed descriptions of everything from her high school grades and traffic tickets to being an unwed mother (Kantrowitz 1991). While a number of local and national news outlets refused to name the victim, the Des Moines Register also won a Pulitzer Prize for a series of stories about a rape victim who self-identified and recounted her ordeal (Warren 1991). The victim, Ziegenmeyer, subsequently claimed she would never have reported her rape if she'd known her name would be made public (Denno 1993). She eventually lobbied the Iowa Legislature for a bill to stop police from releasing victim names to the public until after criminal charges were filed (Kantrowitz 1991). The managing editor of the

Chicago Tribune at the time, F. Richard Ciccone stated the paper would be formally re-examining their policy of not naming rape victims (Warren 1991). Additionally, as seen in the examples in the introduction, friends and family of the victim can also reveal the victim's identity and contribute to harassment.

Historical Attempts

Therefore, the question of how to balance the concerns of victims with the role of traditional media in reporting on crime and the criminal justice system is not a new one. Several methods have been tried or encouraged in order to keep a victim's identity confidential. A 2004 article evaluated the efficacy of victims' rights statutes and rape shield statutes to protect sexual assault victims' privacy (Reidy 2004). Generally, neither are effective tools for preventing the publication of victim names. While a rape victims' rights statute prevents the victim's identifying information from publication, it does not stop their sexual history from being released to the public, and the victim is tried in the court of public opinion before the trial begins. This is harmful because it defies credulity to believe jurors are able to forget all they have heard once they enter the courtroom (Reidy 2004). However, victims' rights statutes apply broadly and prohibit any person, from mainstream media to private individuals, from publicly revealing the victim's identity.

In the past, a 2014 National Crime Victim Law Institute (2014) publication encouraged victim advocates to use the right to privacy found in the Constitution to ask courts to protect a victim's identity. The right to privacy is not explicitly found in the Constitution; instead, the right to privacy was implied in the 9^{th} Amendment and was the basis of the landmark *Roe v. Wade* decision (Roe v. Wade 1973). The Institute's recommendation to cite the federal right to privacy may need to be re-evaluated in light of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Dobbs*, which overturned the *Roe* decision and throws the very existence of a federal right to privacy in question (Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization 2022). Moreover, these suggestions only address the pre-trial publication of a victim's identity once the court process has begun. Release of the victim's identity through police reports, news interviews of lawyers or defendants, etc., done prior to the court process would not be prohibited.

After the trial is over, a victim's identity remains available in trial transcripts, indictments, motions, etc., stored at the courthouse. Historically, a person would have to physically go to the courthouse and request to review the documents. However, more and more court records are available online free or close to free. Anyone can "google" anyone else and potentially have access to a wide-ranging amount of information. It is getting easier and easier to find potentially embarrassing or even damaging information on the internet. When combined with the ability to share this information nearly instantly and widely across multiple social networks, it is easy to see why a sexual assault victim would hesitate to move forward with a public trial if the victim is concerned with how others will react.

Many times, it is simply beyond the authority and ability of law enforcement to keep a sexual assault victim safe. However, the responsibility should not lie solely with law enforcement since more parties are directly involved and able to help protect victims. Before greater protections can be put in place, though, it is important to understand how victims found themselves in this position and what the courts have said about a victim's right to privacy. In light of all this, the questions become should Georgia protect their identities, and, if so, can Georgia do anything to protect victim identities?

Marcy's Law

As previously mentioned, victims' rights statutes that apply to all crime victims fail to address privacy at all (Reidy 2004). For example, over the past several decades, there has been a growing and powerful push by Marsy's Law advocates to ensure all states pass constitutional amendments giving victims specific rights in the state's constitution. The Marsy's Law movement grew out of a 1983 California case where a young woman was stalked and murdered by her ex-boyfriend (Marsy's Law 2022). Years later, in 2007, the young woman's family mounted a campaign to amend the California State Constitution to provide crime victims (or their families) with more information about and opportunities to participate in the criminal justice system (Wikipedia 2022). For example, prior to 2008, victims of crime in California typically did not "address the court until after a conviction or plea" and could be excluded from the courtroom during a trial if the judge granted a motion to exclude (or sequester) witnesses made by either the prosecution or the defense (Wikipedia 2022). Called "Proposition 9, the Victim's Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law," the California State Constitution now provides victims with several protections, including the right to be "reasonably protected from the defendant and persons, acting on behalf of the defendant," and to have the victim's safety considered in bail decisions (Office of the Attorney General 2022). The Marsy's Law for All organization offers model legislation language for lawmakers interested in passing Marsy's Law protections in their state (Marsy's Law 2018).

Interestingly, in 1995 Georgia passed its own Crime Victims Bill of Rights that closely tracked the future model Marsy's Law language (Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia 2022). Georgia's statutory Crime Victims Bill of Rights provides victims of crime with the following rights:

1. to be notified and kept updated about scheduled court proceedings;

2. to be updated on the custodial status of the accused;
3. to be present at court proceedings unless excluded by law;
4. to be heard at court proceedings about the custodial status, plea deals, or sentencing of the accused;
5. to file an objection during parole proceedings;
6. to speak with the prosecutor regarding the prosecution of the accused;
7. to restitution;
8. to have the case resolved without unreasonable delay; and
9. to be treated with dignity and respect by all criminal justice agencies involved.

Nevertheless, beginning in 2017, Georgia was targeted by Marsy's Law advocates, and in November 2018, Georgia voters approved an amendment to the state constitution adding specific protections for crime victims to paragraph XXX of Article 1, Section 1 of the state's constitution (Ballotpedia 2022). Paragraph XXX currently provides victims with rights identical to the first four rights originally enumerated in the statutory Crime Victims' Bill of Rights. A victim who believes there has been a violation of their constitutional rights can file a motion with the court to request a hearing on the issue (Georgia State Constitution 2019). The sole remedy for a violation of these first four rights is for the court or the prosecuting attorney to recuse themselves from the case (O.C.G.A. §17-17-15 (c)(6) (2019)). Rights 5 – 9 of the original bill of rights remain only statutory rights with no enforcement mechanism.

Marsy's Laws, as general crime victim statutes, do not address victim privacy, and Georgia has no separate law addressing a sexual assault victim's privacy.

Georgia's Privacy History

The history of whether a sex crime victim's name and other identifying information can be made public is complicated. As described in *Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cox* (1975), as far back as 1890, there was nationwide recognition of a "zone of privacy" surrounding private individuals that the press could not invade without consequence unless the information was publicly available in judicial proceedings. Traditionally, this "zone of privacy" prevented the appropriation of one's likeness, a physical or tangible intrusion into a private space, or the publication of private and false, but not necessarily defamatory, information. Historically, this right to privacy required a finding that the release of private but true information would offend a reasonable person's sensibilities in order to receive protection.

Georgia has recognized a zone of privacy since at least 1905. Georgia is one of four states that passed laws in the early 1900s prohibiting the publication or broadcasting of a sex crime victim's name by the media (Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn 1975). These laws went unchallenged until 1975. Before the 1970s, the majority of news organizations did report the identity of rape victims in states where it was legal to do so (Cox 1975). This changed in the 1970s when women's rights activists developed relationships with news organizations and journalists. The activists were able to convince the media to voluntarily refrain from identifying victims out of respect for the victims' sense of privacy in the states where the publication was otherwise legal (Cox 1975). From the 1970s to the 1990s, news reports nationwide generally did not publicize the names of sex crime victims (Johnson 1999). Georgia's privacy law was only challenged once during this time.

Case Law

In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court took up a Georgia case to address the limited question of whether the state could punish the accurate publication of a rape victim's identity when the identity was obtained from judicial records (Cox 1975). In 1971 six people were charged with the rape and killing of a young woman. A reporter from a television station attended the jury trial of the lone defendant who requested a jury trial. During the trial, the reporter was able to view the indictments, which identified the victim. The T.V. station later reported the information in two separate broadcasts. The victim's father sued and sought monetary damages.

Georgia's confidentiality statute made it a misdemeanor to publicize a rape victim's name and did not include an exception for the publication of lawfully obtained information about a victim (Cox 1975, footnote 1). The Georgia Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of the statute, and the limited decision to find the criminal statute did not create a civil cause of action for invasion of privacy. However, since the confidentiality statute included language declaring there was no public or general interest in the name of a rape victim sufficient to require disclosure and publication under the First Amendment, the case proceeded based on common law invasion of privacy.

Cox was fundamentally about unwanted publicity about private but true information when such a release would offend a reasonable person's sense of privacy. In its decision, the Court ruled the state could not punish the accurate publication of a rape victim's identity obtained from public judicial proceedings. The Court refused, however, to decide if states could ever define and protect an area of privacy from unwanted media publicity.

In its reasoning, the Court stated an average citizen relies on the press to fully and accurately report on the proceedings of government since the average citizen does not have the time to do so. When it comes to judicial matters, this reliance is doubly important as press coverage helps ensure the fairness of trials and can develop improvements brought on by public scrutiny. When combined with the constitutional mandate to hold trials on public property and open to the public, press coverage of the judicial system and criminal trials becomes especially important. As a result, there was no invasion of privacy when the television station published the victim's name in *Cox*. However, the Court said the situation might have been different if the victim's name had never made it into the public record via public documents or proceedings (Cox 1975). If there had been privacy interests to protect in the judicial proceedings, the State had the responsibility, and the ability, to avoid public documentation or other exposure of this information (Cox 1975). Since the State puts the information in the public domain through court records, the presumption is that the public interest is served by the release of information (Cox 1975). The U.S. Supreme Court next questioned the constitutionality of a Florida confidentiality statute prohibiting the law enforcement agency from releasing a victim's identity and penalizing the publication of the victim's identity.

In *Florida Star v. B.J.F.* (1989), law enforcement had a legal obligation to redact victim information prior to releasing incident reports to the public and failed to do so; consequently, the victim's identity was publicized in a local newspaper. The victim made a robbery and sexual assault report to local police, who made a report and put it in their pressroom without redacting the victim's identifying information. A reporter copied the report word for word, and the information was published, including the victim's identity, in a crime section of the newspaper. Both Florida law and the Star's internal policy forbade the publication of a sexual assault victim's name.

Addressing the constitutionality of holding a newspaper civilly liable for publishing legally obtained information, including the name of a rape victim, the Court found the Florida law violated the First Amendment. Specifically, it was illogical to hold a newspaper liable for publishing information the paper lawfully obtained when less dramatic options existed to protect victim privacy. The Court pointed out that the law enforcement agency was not legally obligated to release the information and was in the best position to prevent the victim's identity from being made public. Consequently, requiring the media to decide whether it was legal to publish the information was too high a burden and might result in self-censorship. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Florida statute only applied to mass communications and would not have prohibited other forms of dissemination, such as a private citizen sharing the information. Florida's law also did not require any finding that the publisher failed to exercise the same level of care as a reasonably prudent person as both common law and *Cox* required. However, the Court refused to make a sweeping declaration that the publication of a sexual assault victim's name could never receive constitutional protections or that the media could never be legally liable. The decision did render all similarly worded rape victim confidentiality statutes unconstitutional, including Georgia's.

Briefly summarizing, under *Cox* (1975), as soon as a victim is identified in publicly available documents or judicial proceedings, the press cannot be prohibited from reporting the information unless the release of such information would offend a reasonable person. *Star* added all confidentiality statutes must prevent the victim's identity from entering the public domain, apply to all forms of communication, apply to private citizens and the media equally, and require an individualized assessment of whether a reasonable person would find the publication highly offensive, and hold the actual entity making the identification public responsible.

The next case directly addressing a confidentiality statute was another Georgia case, *Doe v. Board of Regents*, in 1994. The alleged victim reported a sexual assault on the University of Georgia (hereinafter "U.G.A.") campus. During the investigation by campus police, the alleged victim revealed the sexual assault did not take place in the location and manner originally reported, although she maintained an assault did take place. The alleged victim declined to prosecute, and campus police dropped the investigation. Days later, the campus newspaper filed an open records request with the university police to obtain the incident report. U.G.A. contacted the alleged victim, notifying her of the request and of U.G.A.'s intent to comply with the request. She filed suit to prevent the disclosure, asserting the incident report was protected from disclosure under the Rape Victim's Confidentiality Statute and exceptions to the open records act. The superior court agreed and granted her an injunction, preventing the university from releasing any information. The university appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals found the incident report, U.G.A., and the Board of Regents were subject to the open records act and the rape victim's confidentiality statute provided the necessary exception to the open records act. Next, the court had to decide if the language of the confidentiality statute covered situations where no prosecution took place. At the time, the Georgia statute covered sexual assault victims who "may have been" assaulted; no proof was needed in order for the protections to apply. Since the alleged victim maintained an assault took place, the confidentiality statute's protections still applied. To require otherwise would have been counterproductive since proving the assault occurred would involve judicial proceedings where the victim's

identity would become public and subject to publication under *Cox*. This would have the effect of making the confidentiality statute superfluous.

In *Doe*, neither the campus newspaper nor the university challenged the statute's constitutionality or raised any First Amendment violations, so the court of appeals never addressed the constitutionality of Georgia's in light of *Star*. *Doe* is important, though, because it demonstrates an instance where the confidentiality statute worked to prevent a victim's identity from becoming publicly available, after which the identity could be published or broadcast by the media. In *Doe*, the lack of prosecution meant the victim's name was never revealed to the public via court documents or other judicial proceedings. Campus police did not leave any identifying information about the victim where members of the public could access it, unlike in *Star*. In effect, U.G.A. campus police did exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court previously said in *Star* was necessary to further the state's interest in maintaining a victim's privacy while remaining in compliance with the constitution – kept the information from the public domain in the first place. *Doe* demonstrated exceptions to open records acts could work in conjunction with victim confidentiality statutes to keep victim identities private even if an alleged sexual assault was never referred for prosecution or a prosecution did not result.

Seven days after *Doe,* the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision in *State of Florida v. Globe Communications Corporation* (1994). A reporter identified the victim through "standard investigative techniques," including reports in several British newspapers identifying the victim (Globe 1994). Florida's statute imposed liability when a person published, broadcast, or printed (or allowed the same) any identifying information about the victim in any mass communication (Fla Stat. 92.56 (2018)). The court found the statute imposed liability without the individualized determination that a reasonable person would have found the publication highly offensive, as required by *Star* (1989). Since the victim's name was already published and available to the public, the court reasoned further publication was unlikely to offend a reasonable person's sensibilities. Florida's statute also limited liability to situations where the information appeared in an "instrument of mass communication," a violation of *Star* (Globe 1994). The U.S. Supreme Court had previously said in *Star* that such underinclusiveness raised doubts that the state's significant interests were satisfactorily served since limiting the prohibition to mass communications was no guarantee as the victim's identity could still be publicized widely through other means (Star 1989). The Constitutional rights of the press were restricted even though it would not necessarily result in the specific outcome the state was looking to achieve. As a result, Florida's statute violated both the United States and Florida constitutions.

To recap, there are several standards a confidentiality statute must meet to be constitutional, effective, and enforceable. It must not prohibit the reporting of publicly available information, except when, after an individualized hearing, the release of that information would offend a reasonable person. However, law enforcement may prevent a victim's identity from entering the public domain altogether through redaction and careful record keeping or adherence to other privacy regulations. Additionally, any victim confidentiality statute must cover all forms of communication, apply equally to private citizens and the media, and hold responsible the entity that makes the information public, not just the instrument of mass communication.

Georgia did not have occasion to specifically test the constitutionality of its confidentiality statute until 2001. At the time of *Dye v. Wallace* (2001), the relevant section of the Georgia statute read as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and publish, broadcast, televise or disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication published in this state or through any radio or television broadcast originating in the state the name or identity of any female who may have been raped or upon whom an assault with intent to commit the offense of rape may have been made.

A subsection provided an exception for truthful information obtained from public court documents. Any person or corporation found in violation of the code section was guilty of a misdemeanor. In *Dye,* the media had obtained the victim's information legally. The victim's family sued the newspaper for invasion of privacy. The Georgia Supreme Court found that, although the privacy of sexual assault victims is one of the "highly significant interests" the state can protect, the state must use a more narrowly tailored method. Consequently, the court struck down the statute as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Dye 2001). Georgia's statute also contained the same broad negligence per se standard and underinclusive language the *Star* decision found objectionable. It was unnecessary to test the circumstances of publication against what would offend a reasonable person. The simple act of doing what the law prohibits was all the evidence necessary to demonstrate guilt or liability. Further, the Georgia statute seemingly applied only to public mass communication and did not prohibit the sharing of identifying information in private conversations as required by *Star*. Although the statute remains on the books, it has not been revised to comply with the standards set out in *Dye* or other case law. As a result, Georgia's statute cannot protect victim privacy.

The U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on the issue of victim privacy have left a labyrinth for legislators to navigate to enact privacy rules that will withstand constitutional challenges. How can legislators reconcile Georgia's long-standing commitment to privacy with the constitutional requirements set out by the Supreme Court? How can the law protect a sex crime victim's identity, particularly a child victim, while also complying with the Constitution? There are three places legislators can look to

for guidance: juvenile law, a Florida statute, and federal victim protections.

Georgia Juvenile Law

When considering how to protect the privacy of victims of sexual assault, it is beneficial to look to other court systems for ideas. The juvenile system is one such place. Most people believe juvenile records are sealed and juvenile proceedings are confidential. Although not always true in Georgia, some victim privacy protections are available.

From the beginning, juvenile courts have stood in contrast to adult systems with a focus on rehabilitation and guarding against the collateral consequences that can come with a criminal history that are too much for children to bear for youthful indiscretions (Juvenile Law Center 2014). In Georgia, when the child has not been previously adjudicated delinquent and is not accused of a designated felony, the juvenile court proceedings and court records are regularly shielded from public view (O.C.G.A. §15-11-700(b)(1) (2018)). However, if the opposite is true, and the child has been previously adjudicated delinquent or is accused of a designated felony, court proceedings and records are open to the public and available to review (O.C.G.A. §§15-11-700 et seq (2018)). This means any victim's information would be publicly available, either by examining the court records or by attending the hearing in person.

During court proceedings, if the judge finds any individual's presence would be contrary to the best interests of a child who is a party to the proceeding, would impair the fact-finding process, or would be against the interests of justice, then the individual can be excluded from the otherwise public hearing (O.C.G.A. §15-11-700 (f) (2018)). Unfortunately, it is unlikely a court could exclude all persons, though, and so there would be observers who could publicize information about an involved child. Currently, the law does not provide protections against persons other than the media from revealing identifying information of a child involved in a hearing (O.C.G.A. §15-11-700 (i) (2018)). In stark contrast to the law discussed above, current juvenile court laws allow the court to order the media not to release the identifying information of any child involved in a public hearing. Available victim identity protections are unequal during court proceedings.

Outside of a court hearing, Georgia law allows the court to "seal any record containing information identifying a victim of an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a [specified] sexual offense" (O.C.G.A. §15-11-701 (f) (2018)). These offenses include rape, sodomy, statutory rape, and child molestation (O.C.G.A. §16-6-1 et seq (2018)). If anyone reveals the victim's information, the possible punishment is 20 days in confinement or a fine of up to $1,000 (O.C.G.A. §15-11-31 (2018)). However, if the person discovered the information from a different source, such as observing a court proceeding, there is no consequence for publicizing the information.

Current confidentiality rules in juvenile court are not specifically written to protect witnesses or victims, leaving gaps that would still allow a victim's identifying information to become public. Sealing court records does not stop a person from attending court proceedings in person and discovering the child's information. Limited prohibitions on media outlets identifying children participating in court proceedings ignore the real possibility that another court observer could make the information public and that social media has the power to spread the information just as quickly and widely as traditional media. While gaps exist, a template for protecting child victims in adult courts exists in juvenile law.

Protections under Federal Law

Federal protections are comprehensive. Federal law includes specific language protecting the identifying information of children who are the victims of crime. 18 U.S.C.S. §§3509 (d) and (e) create an affirmative duty to keep all documents containing a child victim's information secure and only share the documents with people directly associated with the case. This duty applies to all persons involved in the case, including court employees and members of the jury. If a document filed in court contains the name or other information about a child, the document is automatically sealed. Only a redacted copy is available in the public record. During court proceedings, the court is authorized to close the courtroom to anyone who does not have a direct interest in the case if the court finds the child would suffer substantial psychological harm or the child's ability to testify would be impaired. Under the law, the press and members of the public could be excluded during the child's testimony, thereby reducing the number of court observers able to make a child victim's identifying information public. If members of the public or the media are allowed to remain in the courtroom, the law still protects the victim's identity through the affirmative duty to keep the information confidential.

The Supreme Court made clear in *Star* that once a victim's identity is in the public domain, the government cannot proscribe or punish further publication or dissemination (Star 1989). The federal rules combine an affirmative duty to keep the information from the public domain with the ability to exclude persons from the courtroom during testimony works to keep a victim's identity from the public domain. The victim's privacy interests outweigh the media and public's interest in open and transparent monitoring of the judicial system. Current federal law narrowly limits public access to protect juvenile victim privacy in accordance with current U.S. Supreme Court rulings. However, the protections do not extend to adult victims of sexual assault.

Florida Legal Protections

Florida law is more expansive and applies to child victims of child abuse or human trafficking, and all victims of sexual assault, regardless of age (Fla. Stat. §92.56 and Fla. Stat. §§119.071 2(h)1.a, b, c, and (j) 1., 2. a, b (2018)). A strict reading of the victim privacy statutes appears to leave out adult victims of human trafficking, though. Under Florida law, anything identifying a victim of one of these crimes is exempt from Florida public records, with limited exceptions (Fla. Stat. §§119.071 2(h)1.a, b, c, and (j) 1., 2. a, b (2018)). The protections specifically include documents, videos, photographs or other images (Fla. Stat. §§119.071 2(h)1.a, b, c, and (j) 1., 2.a, b (2018)). Furthermore, the courts, the prosecution, and the defense must keep the information confidential (Fla. Stat. §92.56 (2)). If someone files a petition to gain access to the information, the court can refuse to release the information if the victim meets the following criteria:

The victim's identity is not already known in the community;
The victim has not called public attention to the offense;
The victim's identity is not a reasonable subject of public concern otherwise;
Disclosure of the victim's identity would offend a reasonable person;
And the disclosure would
Endanger the victim's safety because the assailant is unknown to the victim and
hasn't been apprehended
Endanger the victim due to retaliation, harassment, or intimidation;
Cause severe emotional or mental harm;
Cause the victim to be unwilling to testify;
Or be inappropriate for good cause (Fla. Stat. §92.56 (2018)).

Violations of the statute constitute contempt. Unlike the federal statute, Florida law covers both adult and child victims of sexual assault. While Florida law does not allow a judge to exclude people from a courtroom, the law does allow a judge to order those present during the trial to refrain from disclosing any identifying information about the victim without the victim's written consent, much like the federal law discussed above. Unlike federal law, this allows the press and the public unfettered courtroom access to accurately report on court proceedings without exposing the victim to undue attention and scrutiny, providing broader protections for victims while allowing the press to provide oversight of the justice system.

Conclusion

"Doxing" is the public identification or publishing of private information without the consent of the individual (Merriam-Webster 2022). Typically, doxing is done as revenge or punishment, but this is not always the case. Given the backlash victims have faced for making sexual assault allegations, the simple act of making a victim's information public can have significant consequences for the victim, even if this is not the publisher's intent. Faced with this possible "collateral consequence" of coming forward to report a sexual assault, many adults choose to stay quiet and maintain their privacy and confidentiality (Forde 2018). When it comes to children, society wants to protect them from harm and encourage them to report. Caregivers of all stripes are mandated reporters if they suspect any form of child abuse (O.C.G.A. §19-7-75 (c) (2018)). Children have no choice, and yet they face the same risk of public humiliation and threats to their and their family's physical safety as adults. In Georgia's juvenile courts, child victims only receive privacy protections when their alleged assailant meets certain criteria. In the adult judicial system, no victim receives privacy protections once the case is referred for prosecution.

Future Policy

As federal and Florida law demonstrate, there is a path to passing constitutionally sound confidentiality laws. Open records acts should exempt all types of evidence or documents that identify victims of any age of child abuse or sexual assault. Current exemptions should extend to include reports of sexual assault referred for prosecution. Next, courts must be allowed to keep victim identity information confidential, except when a petition is filed, and certain standards are met, similar to the standards found in Florida's laws. If a court filing contains identifying information of the victim, rules should require automatic sealing of the record and a redacted copy be substituted in the public record.

Mirroring federal law, victim privacy laws should create an affirmative duty to keep all documents containing a victim's info secure, and the duty should apply to all persons involved in a case, including jurors, court staff, and law enforcement employees, with limited exceptions. Specific, serious consequences, such as contempt of court, should be set out for any violation of the confidentiality laws.

In order to protect the greatest number of victims, victim privacy laws should allow a judge to put a "gag order" on any and all courtroom observers, preventing the release or publication of the victim's identifying information without the victim's written consent.

Adults can weigh the pros and cons of coming forward to make a report of a sexual assault. Children, on the other hand, cannot, and the decision of whether to involve the police or refer a case for the prosecution is completely out of their hands.

When adults make these decisions for children, the adults may not fully comprehend the risks to privacy or mental health if the child's assault becomes widely known. In either case, under current law, once the report is made, there is a real risk the victim's identifying information will be published alongside the details of the crime. New sexual assault confidentiality laws will provide real protections. Real privacy protections can help more victims of all ages feel safe enough to come forward, report, and follow through with prosecuting alleged perpetrators of sexual assault.

References

American Bar Association. "How Courts Work." American Bar Association. September 9, 2019. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/cases_settling/.

Ballotpedia. "Georgia Amendment 4, Marsy's Law Crime Victim Rights Amendment (2018)." Accessed August 8, 2022. https://ballotpedia.org/Georgia_Amendment_4,_Marsy%27s_Law_Crime_Victim_Rights_Amendment_(2018).

Boone, Rebecca. "Idaho Legislative Intern Reports Rape, Is ID'd by Lawmaker." A.B.C. News. May 4, 2001. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/idaho-intern- reported-rape-faced-overwhelming-harassment-77476436?cid=clicksource$_4380645_{6h}eads_{p}osts_{h}eadlines_{h}ed$.

Boyle, H. "Rape and the Media: Victim's Rights to Anonymity and Effects of Technology on the Standard of Rape Coverage." *European Journal of Law and Technology* 3, no. 3 (2012). https://ejlt.org/index.php/ejlt/article/view/172/262, (citing Gartner, Michael. "The Privacy Rights of Rape Victims in Media and the Law: Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victim's Names." *Fordham Law Review* 61, no. 5 (1993): 1133-1135. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3033&context=flr)).

Chin, Caitlin. "What Privacy in the United States Could Look Like without Roe v. Wade." Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 25, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-privacy-united-states-could-look-without-roe-v-wade.

Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 487, 493 (1975).

Denno, Deborah W. "Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims' Names." *Fordham Law Review* 61, no. 5 (1993): 1113-1131. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=3032&context=flr.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 US _(2022). https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/19-1392.

Doe v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 215 Ga.App. 684, 452 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. App., 1994).

Dye v. Wallace, 274 Ga. 267, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga., 2001) (quoting O.C.G.A. §16-6-23 (2018)).

Elliot, Denni, "Anonymity for Rape Victims." *The Newsletter On Journalism Ethics* 1, no. 3 (June 1989): 1,2. https://ethicscasestudies.mediaschool.indiana.edu/cases/naming-newsmakers/anonymity-for-rape-victims.html.

Fla. Stat. §92.56 and Fla. Stat. §§119.071 2(h)1.a, b, c, and (j) 1., 2.a, b (2018).

Fla. Stat. §§119.071 2(h)1.a, b, c, and (j) 1., 2.a, b (2018).

The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).

Forde, Kaelyn. "Why more women don't report sexual assaults: A survivor speaks out." A.B.C. News. September 27, 2018. https://abcnews.go.com/US/women-report-sexual-assaults-survivor-speaks/story?id=57985818.

Georgia State Constitution, paragraph XXX of Article 1, Section 1 (2019).

Johnson, Michelle. "Of Public Interest: How courts handle rape victims' privacy suits." *Communication Law & Policy* 4, no 2 (Spring 1999): 201-242. https://doi.org/10.1080/10811689909368675.

Juvenile Law Center. "Juvenile Records: a national review of state laws on confidentiality, sealing and expungement." 2014. https://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/publications/national-review.pdf.

Kantrowitz, Barbara. "Naming Names." Newsweek. April 28, 1991. https://www.newsweek.com/naming-names-202306.

Kilpatrick, Dean. "Rape in America: A Report to the Nation [Abstract]." National Victim Center and the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center. 1992. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/rape-america-report-nation#:~:text=Data%20from%20two%20national%20studies,forcible%20rapes%20occur%20each%20minute.

Kilpatrick, Dean. "Rape in America: A Report to the Nation." National Victim Center and the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center. 1992. https://mainweb-v.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/sa.shtml.

Marcus, Nancy. "Yes, Alito, There Is a Right to Privacy: Why the Leaked Dobbs Opinion Is Doctrinally Unsound." (2022). IdeaExchange@UAkron. https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=conlawnow.

Marjorie Sable et al. "Barriers to Reporting Sexual Assault for Women and Men: Perspectives of College Students." *Journal of American College Health,* 55, no 3 (2006): 157-162.

"Marsy's Law: a model state constitutional amendment to afford victims meaningful rights." Last modified February 28, 2018. http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/marsyslawforall/legacy url/1086/Marsys-Law-Short-Form-Model-Language-2.28.18.pdf?1533058098.

Marsy's Law. "About Marsy's Law." n.d. Accessed August 8, 2022. https://marsyslaw.us/about-marsys-law/.

May, Ashley. "Sexual assault survivors risk lives, reputations to stand up to powerful men." U.S.A. Today. Last modified September 26, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/09/21/christine-blasey-ford-kavanaugh-death-threats-reporting-sexual-assault/1355798002/.

Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, s.v. "dox," accessed August 8, 2022, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox.

Mindlin, Jessica and Liani Reeves. "Confidentiality and Sexual Assault Survivors: A toolkit for state coalitions." National Crime Victim Law Institute. 2005. https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/6471-confidentiality-and-sexual-violence-survivors-a.

National Crime Victim Law Institute. "Protecting Victims' Privacy Rights: The Use of Pseudonyms in Criminal Cases." 2014. https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/27405-protecting-victimsprivacy-rightsthe-use-of.

O.C.G.A. §15-11-31 (2018).

O.C.G.A. §§15-11-700 et seq (2018).

O.C.G.A. §16-6-1 et seq (2018).

O.C.G.A. §17-17-15 (c)(6) (2019).

O.C.G.A. §19-7-75 (c) (2018).

Office of the Attorney General, California Department of Justice. "Victims' Rights Under Marsy's Law." Accessed August 8, 2022. https://oag.ca.gov/victimservices/marsys_law.

Ordway, Denise- Marie. "Why many sexual assault survivors may not come forward for year." The Journalist's Resource. October 5, 2018. https://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/criminal-justice/sexual-assault-report-why-research/.

Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia. "Georgia Crime Victims Bill of Rights." Accessed August 8, 2022. https://pacga.org/resources/for-victims-of-crime/georgia-crime-victims-bill-of-rights/.

Rape and Incest National Network. "The Criminal Justice System: Statistics." Accessed July 22, 2022.

https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system.

Reidy, Megan. "The Impact of Media Coverage on Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a 'Fair Trial'?." *Catholic Law Review* 54, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 297 – 334.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18.

Slifer, Stephanie. "Maryville Alleged Rape: Mo. prosecutor says charges dropped in Mo. teen sexual assault case over lack of evidence, alleged victims say otherwise." C.B.S. News. October 15, 2013. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maryville-alleged-rape-mo-prosecutor-says-charges-dropped-in-mo-teen-sexual-assault-case-over-lack-of-evidence-alleged-victims-say-otherwise/.

State v. Globe Communications Corp., 648 So.2d 110 (Fla., 1994).

United States Courts. "Covering Civil Cases - Journalist's Guide." Accessed July 7, 2022. https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/covering-civil-cases-journalists-guide.

Warren, James and Media Writer. "Naming Rape Victims A Debate for Media." Chicago Tribune. April 18, 1991. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1991-04-18-9102040444-story.html.

Wikipedia. 2022. "Marsy's Law." Wikimedia Foundation. Last modified July 13, 2022, 02:07. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marsy%27s_Law#Impact_of_Marsy's_Law.

Go West, Young Liberals! How The Critical Election Of 1992 Pioneered A Win Streak For The Democrats

John Tures[1]

[1]Professor of Political Science, LaGrange College

ABSTRACT

On Election Night, members of the media touted Biden's win in the swing states of Nevada and Arizona. But the seeds of success for the Democrats in the West were sown back in the Critical Election of 1992. Before that year, Democrats only won *any* Western state in four of ten presidential elections, from 1952 through 1988, and a majority of seven states only once during that time frame. But from 1992 to 2020, Democrats dominated the Western region in presidential elections. Our research explains the origins of how the Democratic Party flipped the West, with a series of political, economic and demographic events from 1988 to 1992. In addition, this shift allowed Democrats to prevail in a majority of presidential contests from 1992-2020 (winning nearly 90 percent of popular vote contests in that time frame), after losing 70% of elections from 1952-1988. By placing Kamala Harris on the 2020 ticket, the first Democratic Party candidate for President or Vice-President from the West (west of Texas or the Plains States), Biden recognized the importance of the region for his party's fortunes.

Critical Election Theory

In 1955, V.O. Key Jr was credited with coining the term "critical elections," cases where a realignment of parties occurred. In these elections, the prior elements of the party system faced massive disruption. "Decisive results of voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate," Key wrote (1955, 4)." Such events were accompanied by a spike in voting enthusiasm. These critical elections would also set the tone for future contests at the ballot box.

Walter Dean Burnham (1970) supplemented Key's critical elections by noting that such events occurred regularly. "There has long been agreement among historians that the elections of those of 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 and 1932, for example, were fundamental turning points in the course of American electoral politics (Burnham 1970, 1)."

Burnham (1970) and others (Sundquist 1983) added the notion that specific "new" issues play a role in generating such realignments. Gerald Pomper (1967) also contributed to the study of critical elections by positing the presence of third parties as often playing a role in disrupting the traditional party system, enabling one side to take advantage of the shift in the electorate. He also classified elections as realigning, "maintaining" (continuing the party system role set by the realignment), and "deviating" (a short-term disruption in the dominance of one party set by the last critical election). Furthermore, Lichtman (1976) argued that such changes were more likely to occur based on crises than the candidates. These occur not due to "the personal appeals of particular candidates, but rather from the ramifications of. . . crises" such as war or a severe economic recession (Lichtman 1976).

Critics of Critical Elections

Excitement over critical elections from the 1950s began to receive challenges in the early 2000s from Mayhew (2000), who wrote. "The claims of the realignments genre do not hold up well, and the genre's illuminative power has not proven to be great." Noting a less than 100% agreement among critical election scholars about necessary and sufficient conditions for such events, he pounced on the nearly one dozen claims about realignments from various professors.

Others joined Mayhew, either attempting to discredit cases of critical elections (Mayhew 2002) like the election of 1860 (Smith 2015) or claiming the inability of a single election to move a vast and disparate polity like the United States (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Other critics (Hui and Sears 2018) argue that groups are not switching sides, or at least not rapidly over short periods. They contend that either party identification measures remain relatively immutable (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), or people are now leaving parties in a phenomenon known as dealignment (Knuckey 1999) as a means of explaining why no critical election has been identified since 1932.

Pressed to explain the persistent presence of shakeups in party systems and switching of support for parties among groups, Mayhew and critics have taken to admitting that such changes do occur but argue that these are "secular" in nature, occurring for a myriad of reasons, and taking place over long periods. These "rolling" realignments are evolutionary, not revolutionary, they contend. So confident are the critics that they have argued, "Although there have been a handful of dissenters. . . we view

the current consensus claiming that, since the New Deal, we have experienced what Key called a secular realignment, i.e., a pattern of gradual change," write Brunell, Grofman, and Merrill (2012). Hui and Sears claim, "Realignment, as a long list of studies has confirmed, is rarely caused by a critical election. It is usually an incremental process brought on by a complex mix of political and demographic processes. Our paper reaffirms that general theoretical proposition (2018, 171)." Mayhew (2002, 185) adds, "The ambitious version of the realignments perspective had its fruitful days, but it is too slippery, too apocalyptic, and it has come to too much of a dead end."[1]

Answering the Critical Election Critics

Criticisms of critical elections, however, must stand up to scrutiny. In their analysis of legislative elections, Brunell, Grofman, and Merrill (2012, 818) state, "Our first test for critical elections involves a search for outliers in the magnitude of inter-election in seat share (for the Congress) and popular vote share for the presidency." However, a party realignment that led to a new system would not be an outlier. One domination would be replaced by another; such a critical election is not a stand-alone or "one-off" by definition. Such events would better explain Pomper's (1967) "deviating" election than a realignment.

Moreover, measures reflecting party identification may be similarly misleading. As Sundquist (1973) points out, party identification is highly resistant to change, even during the Great Depression. "Millions of northern Republicans who, according to the rationale of ideology and class, should have become Democrats did not change parties; they simply deviated in their vote for president. They rejected Hoover and Landon in favor of Roosevelt but continued to support their party in state and local politics, attempting to liberalize it. Moreover, in the South, the reverse of that phenomenon took place. Conservative Democrats remained in their party despite their abhorrence of the New Deal and all it stood for."

A voter is unlikely to head to the local county elections registrar or even the Department of Motor Vehicles and demand a change in registration under party affiliation.[2] He or she will simply vote for his or her party of preference in the subsequent elections, making the same rational judgments. Some may be unaware of their original party registration being on the books. Alternatively, family and local loyalties keep them in a particular party. However, which is more critical: ascertaining why someone claims a party ID early in life and rarely, if ever, changes it, or how that individual actually votes?

For all the focus on dealignment, Sundquist (1983) finds the party system to be relatively stable, without independents dominating the process. Furthermore, Sabato (1988) adds that people care a lot about political parties, even if it is trendy to claim political independence or a lack of interest in elections. Even with sharp realignments, party identity remains a strong predictor of one's vote (Sabato 1988); it does not take huge, double-digit masses of voters to flip regional or national elections. And Stonecash (2011), often listed as a critical elections critic, discovered that party line voting made a comeback in the 1990s, even if such a phenomenon was not as high a level as it was in the 1950s.

The Political Culture of a Region

Elazar (1984: 109) contends that three overarching factors shape states' political structures, electoral behavior, and modes of organization for political action. They include "*political culture*—the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded; *sectionalism*—the more or less permanent political ties that link together groups of contiguous states with bonds of shared interests; and the continuing *frontier*—the constant effort of Americans to extend their control over their environment for human benefit and the consequent periodic reorganization of American social and settlement patterns as a result of the impact of that effort."

For Elazar (1984, 110), "[p]olitical culture is particularly important as the historical source of differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence political life in the various states. Sectionalism is particularly important as a major source of geographically rooted variations that influence state-by-state differences in response to nationwide political, economic, and social developments. The frontier is particularly important as the generator of the forces of change."

Elazar argues that there are three types of political culture: individualistic, traditional, and moralistic. To summarize, "individualistic political culture emphasizes the democratic order as a marketplace" with a utilitarian government to serve peoples' functional needs (Elazar 1984: 114-115). The traditionalistic political culture prefers a hierarchically-oriented society with a paternalistic regime charged with maintaining the status quo and is more ambivalent toward the market (Elazar 1984: 118-119). The moralistic political culture sees government as a positive force where power enables the public good, and partisanship is deemphasized (Elazar 1984: 117-118).

Instead of traditional geographies, Elazar divides up compass directions of America into a new map of political cultures. As a result, there is no unified West but a hodgepodge of individualistic, moralistic, and traditional political cultures. However, it is the same story with other regions, from the Northeast and South to the Midwest, with the various political cultures overlapping within states; in other words, there is no unique New England or Dixie. Thereby, only one state (Tennessee) is

[1] One wonders if the term apocalyptic may have been an accident in its placement, given its meaning as revealing an event.

[2] Those who have written about the costs of voting should also investigate the costs of changing party affiliation.

traditionalistic-dominant, only three (Vermont, Minnesota, and Utah) are moralistic-dominant, and five (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Nevada, and Alaska) are individualistic-dominant (Elazar 1984: 136).

While it is fascinating to contemplate some unexpected similarities between Vermont and Utah despite their radically differing political outcomes, Elazar's work is not without its critiques. Hero and Tolbert (1996, 853) find that "Elazar attributes political processes and outcomes to dominant or predominant cultural values and related normative tenets. Those values, in turn, are said to derive from a state's dominant ethnic and religious groups (these political values and beliefs of racial minorities and non-European groups are not extensively considered in the political-cultural framework)." Both authors find "political culture is itself heavily shaped by state racial/ethnic diversity." Hero and Tolbert contend that political cultures in Elazar's model do not change despite the Hispanic and Asian population increases in the 1960s, as well as African-Americans being tangential at best for the nature and evolution of state political cultures.[3]

Hero and Tolbert's findings show that "Racial/ethnic diversity explains many variations in the grouping of state political cultures. Increased minority diversity (bifurcation) is associated with lower overall education and social policy outcomes. But when the policies are disaggregated by race, we find that policies for minorities are especially poor in homogeneous states. The unique contribution of the diversity interpretation is that it can account for policy variation in the aggregate, as well as with respect to specific policies as they affect minorities (Hero and Tolbert 1996, 851)."

Rather than presume that one explanation is better, it is best to see if there is a unique West with a common historical, economic, demographic, and political experience. Moreover, we would examine whether there would be political ramifications for the region facing so many changes at once that might flip the voters from one party to another, a partisan realignment changing the fortunes of both political parties and America's political outcomes.

From 1850 to 1948: The Wild West Follows The Winners

This section will not provide an exhaustive history of the political culture of the West, only covering the region's role in critical elections. A myth has persisted that the West is always conservative, but this is not the case, as Nugent (2018) points out. Others claim the place has been part of the populist movement (Budger et al. 1981), lumping in the West with the South as part of the William Jennings Bryan faction. But Rogin's (1969) research reveals that California, with its extensive agricultural holdings and budding cities, was not a populist country. And Sarasohn (1980) discusses the role California played in Democratic Party's fortunes in Woodrow Wilson's win in 1916 as challenging that assessment.

Nor was California part of the alleged 1928 critical election that Key claims existed (Shover 1967). Shover claims that the contest was a "backward step" for Democrats, which was replaced by the 1932 election. Sure enough, Democrats did quite well from 1932 through the 1940s. As Ewing (1962) notes, the West followed whoever was the winner and did not serve as the trendsetter.

From 1952-1988: Republicans Rule the Rockies & the Region

Party fortunes changed in the West as the New Deal's influence waned and General Dwight D. Eisenhower began his run of victories. The Democrats won the 1960 election, though not with much Western support. LBJ defeated Goldwater, a son of the Southwest, partially by emphasizing his Texas roots (Young 2019) and winning the region. Nevertheless, such success would resemble one of Pomper's "deviating" elections. That is because Republicans went on to win the region, and by wide margins, through the Nixon and Reagan years, culminating in Bush's continued domination in the 1988 election. The area remained GOP country even in narrow losses in 1960 and 1976.

What enabled the Republicans to win over the region on a widespread basis? Some reasons include the West's focus as a region of Cold War militarization. The Republicans were able to appeal to the reputed "rugged individualism" of the region. Candidates from the GOP railed against the urban decay of the Democrats and championed the rural character of the West (Rankin 2009). The Republican Party also did an excellent job promoting candidates with ties to the region. This included Vice-President and later President Richard Nixon of California, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, and California Governor Ronald Reagan.[4] Ballantine and Webster (2018) document these cases and the role the West played in producing members of the legislative leadership. Furthermore, on multiple occasions, the Republicans were ahead of the Democrats in locating nominating convention sites in the West, like San Francisco.

Much attention has also been given to anti-government sentiment (Nugent 2018), the so-called "Sagebrush Rebellion," Randy Weaver, the Aryan Nation, the Unabomber, and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building by those living in the West.

[3]To be fair to Elazar, the first edition of his book *American Federalism* came out in 1966, when the ink was barely dry on the Voting Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act had only been passed two years earlier, which fundamentally changed the ability of African Americans to participate in the political and economic processes in America. Moreover, his first edition predated extensive migration from Latin America and Asia into the USA and the West.

[4]Though Texas has some Southwest characteristics, while would bring in George H. W. Bush and even LBJ, the Census Bureau, the Centers for Disease Control, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Energy Information Agency, and others have placed Texas in the South, perhaps a combination of geography, history, and the locus of demography in the Eastern portion of the state.

However, for those Westerners who were not in the ranks of the extremists, Rankin (2009) also demonstrates how the West responded warmly to campaign lines like Reagan's "government is the problem, not the solution" types of quips. That "rugged individualism" of the region fit with the Republican agenda (Young 2019), or appeared to, at least. As a result, it was possible to refer to the GOP as having an "Electoral College lock" over the prior six elections (1968-1988), winning 21 states with 171 Electoral College votes in each contest and another 17 states with 217 Electoral College votes in a majority of those six contests (Pomper 1993, 134), making it nearly impossible for a Democratic Party nominee to prevail nationwide.

For those who study critical elections, it is essential to recognize that while dramatic elections may demonstrate a shocking realignment, there may be secular trends that contribute over time to combine with rapid shifts to produce such change. These include the "Second Great Migration" of African-Americans moving to the Pacific Coast during and after World War II and changes in immigration policies beginning in 1965 (Nugent 2018). But secular demographic trends are not the same as secular electoral realignments.

There were also the contradictions of the GOP pushing a pro-military, anti-government series of slogans or appealing to the Libertarian character of the West's population, along with a rigid social conservative platform and anti-drug policy that demanded full conformity. There was also the decidedly anti-regulation agenda in its application to nature, which did not work so well for those who thrived in the tourist trade, hunting, and recreational sports, which required eco-friendly sites (Ballantine and Webster 2018). Therefore, the electoral change may be sudden, mainly owing to recent events. However, some rolling variations can contribute to sudden electoral alterations when mixed with shocking shifts over a short period. Certain changes must explain why the shift occurred in 1992, as opposed to 1984, 1988, 1996, or 2000.

The Critical Events Of 1992

In his post-mortem of the Republicans in 1992, Walter Dean Burnham discussed President George H. W. Bush's landslide rejection and the vote of no confidence in Reaganomics. "This fact makes the 1992 election of far more than usual confidence," he wrote. "Rejections of this order of magnitude have not happened very often over the course of American political history (Burnham 1992, 2)."

What caused the Republican dominance of the national presidential elections in general and regional president contests at the state level, in particular, to evaporate almost overnight? All or some of the following events may have had external influences, but the confluence of so many occurring in a short period held enormous consequences for the GOP in the region and nationally due to those shifts. These quick regional shocks came from the termination of the Cold War, the Economic Recession of 1990-1992, the increasing diversity of the region, the L.A. Riots, the Ross Perot phenomenon, the RNC's disastrous conservative convention, and the ascendancy of Bill Clinton, all occurring during the 1992 campaign season.

Post-Cold War Consequences

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, America's long, expensive arms race with the USSR came to an end. What also came to an end were all of those Defense-related jobs, especially high-paying positions in the highly technical industries. As Nugent (2018) reveals, over 800,000 total jobs were lost, including 60,000 in the aerospace field. These were skilled craft workers, scientists, and engineers (Nugent 2018). And when all of those positions were swept away, so too were all of the businesses which relied upon their income too, from the banking industry to the service sector.

In addition to the loss of defense-related jobs in the West, the United States underwent several rounds of closing military bases. We analyzed four rounds of closures from the Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) Commission: 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. We compared how many closures occurred in the 13 Western states and the 38 Non-Western states plus the District of Columbia and divided the closures by averages per state. We also compared the cases designated as "major" cases versus those that were judged to be "minor" by the BRAC Commission (Congressional Research Service 2019).

Table 1. BRAC Cuts By Region, By Round & Size Of Base: 1988 and 1991

Region/BRAC	*1988 BRAC Major*	*1988 BRAC Total*	*1991 BRAC Major*	*1991 BRAC Total*
West Total	7	12	9	11
West Avg (Per State)	0.538	0.923	0.692	0.846
Non-West Total	9	24	15	16
Non-West Avg. (Per State)	0.237	0.631	0.395	0.421

Table 2. BRAC Cuts By Region, By Round & Size Of Base: 1993 and 1995, and Total

Region/BRAC	*1993 BRAC Major*	*1993 BRAC Total*	*1995 BRAC Major*	*1995 BRAC Total*	*1988-95 BRAC Major*	*1988-95 BRAC Total*
West Total	9	12	6	13	31	48
West Avg (Per State)	0.692	0.923	0.462	1	2.385	3.692
Non-West Total	17	43	14	37	55	120
Non-West Avg. (Per State)	0.447	1.131	0.368	0.973	1.447	3.158

As the data reveal in Table 1, the West did suffer a disproportionate number of hits from the base closures compared to the rest of the country. The average major base closures from both 1988 and 1991 rounds showed the West averaged twice as many losses as the other states and for the 1991 total base closures. For BRAC 1988, the number of total base closures was still nearly 1.5 times greater in Western states than those other 38 states and DC. Though Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush were not personally micromanaging the base closure process, the ax fell during their presidencies.

When it comes to the remaining two rounds, when Bill Clinton was the U.S. President (see Table 2), the cuts did not hit the West with the same level of intensity. Though the major base closures were more in the West on average in 1993, the total base closure average was greater in non-Western states. It was the same case in 1995, where the cuts were not as disproportionately harsh upon the 13 Western states as those from other regions. This is perhaps one reason why the Democrats were able to consolidate their hold on the region, which began with the 1992 election.

This drawdown in government funding from the late 1980s through 1991 coincided with the small government rhetoric of the Reagan-Bush years. That "government is the problem" quip came back to haunt those professionals who saw the lack of a government paycheck as the real problem those days at the beginning of the 1990s. It exposed the contraction of the Republican economic message of being pro-military and anti-government (Ballantine and Webster 2018). And the economic woes of the West were only just beginning.

Economic Recession

The economic recession of the early 1990s does not rank among the most severe to strike the United States in comparison to the Great Recession or even the cases from the early 1980s. But the economic downturn during the latter half of Bush's first term hit the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts especially hard (Dzialo et al. 1993; Nardone et al. 1993).[5]

"During 1993, unemployment rates in all the census regions showed some improvement, but the rates remained relatively high in the Northeast and the West. At the end of the recession, the jobless rates for the four regions were relatively close—ranging from 6.5 percent in the West to 7.1 percent in the Northeast. Since then, the rates have diverged substantially. By the fourth quarter of 1993, unemployment rates varied from a low of 5.8 percent in the Midwest to a high of 7.5 percent in the West. Of all the States in the West, California had the highest unemployment rate during the past year—an average of about 9.0 percent—reflecting in part large cutbacks in defense-related activities (Gardner et al. 1994)." From 1991 through 1993, the West's unemployment rate exceeded the national average (see Table 3).

Table 3. Unemployment In The Early 1990s Recession, By Region

Region/Unemployment	*1990 IV*	*1991 IV*	*1992 IV*	*1993 IV*
USA	6	7	7.3	6.5
Northeast	6	7.6	8.1	6.9
South	6.3	6.8	6.9	6.2
Midwest	5.8	6.6	6.1	5.8
West	6	7.1	8.5	7.5

Source: Gardner et al. 1994.

And though the recession technically ended in 1991, the economic pain persisted up until the 1992 election itself. "Unemployment continued to worsen long after the NBER-designated endpoint of the 1990-91 contraction," writes Gardner (1994). "The increase in the number of unemployment continued for 15 months past the official ending date, and between July 1990 and June 1992, totaled 46 percent."

This recession also occurred just as George H. W. Bush broke a key promise, one that angered Western voters. "President Bush's decision to raise taxes to contend with the Federal deficit despite asking voters to read his lips to the contrary did not play well in many Western states (Rankin 2009)."

Not only did the recession have a particular regional component, but a racial one as well. Evidence from Gardner (1994: 8) showed that African-Americans, Hispanics, and younger people were disproportionately affected by the unemployment from the recession. Nardone et al. (1993) add that blacks lagged behind whites in median earnings during the downturn. These would help serve as the underlying cause for a devastating trigger event just a few months later.

L.A. Riots

At the end of April of 1992, the GOP's woes continued with the Los Angeles Court acquittal of the officers charged with beating motorist Rodney King (on March 3, 1991), despite being captured on video. This triggered several days of rioting,

[5]Southern California, like New England, was also particularly hard hit by the collapse of the commercial housing industry, the bank failures from these, and depressed real estate values, which would not recover until the middle of the decade (Burton, 1998).

which led to more than 60 deaths, thousands of injuries, and millions of dollars of damage.

Of course, race riots are hardly unique events. Several cities across America had them in the 1980s and 1990s. But is the riot in Los Angeles significantly worse than others? We look at the ten most prominent race riots of the 1980s and 1990s, comparing them in terms of deaths, injuries, and arrests.

Table 4. Comparing The L.A. Riot To Other Major Race Riots Of The 1980s and 1990s

Ten Most Extensive Race Riots Of The 1980s and 1990s	*Deaths*	*Injuries*	*Arrests*
1980 Miami Riots	18	350	855
1984 Lawrence, Massachusetts Riot	0	17	50
1985 MOVE Bombing in Philadelphia	11	4	1
1989 Miami Riot	2	10	250
1990 Wynwood (Mercado) Riot	0	0	
1991 Crown Heights Riot	2	190	129
1991 Overtown Miami Riots	0	3	20
1991 Washington D.C. Riot	0	50	230
1992 L.A. Riot	63	2383	12111
1996 St. Petersburg Riot	1	11	20

What these results from Table 4 show are that the Los Angeles Riot had nearly twice as many deaths as all of the other nine major race riots of the 1980s and 1990s combined. The L.A. Riot had 3.75 times more injuries than the other nine cases of race riots in the two decades and more than seven times as many arrests as the other nine riots over racial issues in the 1980s and 1990s.[6]

President George Bush angered African-Americans with his characterization of the events. Instead of seeking to understand the motives behind the frustration, he focused on "the brutality of a mob, plain and simple (Hunt 2012)," treating the event as crude criminality instead of a response to years of structural inequality and police brutality.

Hunt (2012) documents how the response to the King verdict was more than just about that case alone. It was to "the process of deindustrialization in South Central Los Angeles, which was accompanied by a devastating loss of quality jobs in the region. The gap between the haves and have-nots widened considerably in Los Angeles as the ranks of the working poor (e.g., Latino immigrants) and non-working poor (e.g., blacks) grew. This precarious situation was inflamed further by decreases in federal support for housing, education, and inner-city community building during the neoconservative Reagan and Bush presidencies (Hunt 2012, Xiii)."

The Los Angeles Riot would not only expose concerns about law enforcement but would also trigger an angry response from conservatives, which would be exposed later that year at the Republican National Convention in Houston.

Diversity: The 1990s

The last time L.A. experienced such a devastating riot, back in 1965 in the Watts neighborhood, California Governor Pat Brown enlisted ex-CIA Director John McCone to investigate. The McCone report, more than 100 pages in length, labeled "Violence in the City: An End or A Beginning?" identified several causal agents: police hostility, poor socioeconomic conditions, as well as minimal job opportunities, and access to quality health care and education.

Nearly 25 years later, the *L.A. Times* published the review "25 Years After the Watts Riots: McCone Commission's Recommendations Have Gone Unheeded." That article, by Darrell Dawsey, was published nearly two years before the riots in response to the Rodney King verdict (1990). In other words, the original Watts riot and its report mirrored its 1990s case. Would California and the whole Western region be more diverse than it was decades earlier?[7]

To determine if this is the case, we analyze the Diversity Index from the Census Bureau from the U.S. Census Bureau, as measured by the National Equity Atlas (https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Diversity_index#/?breakdown=1&geo=02000000000054000).

[6]Data are not available for damages for all cases, but the combination of four other cases of property damages from race riots does not come within a tenth of all damages to the city of Los Angeles.

[7]The combination of the Cold War Defense Department drawdown, coupled with the disastrous Pacific Coast recession, triggered a wave of out-migration from the State of California (Nugent 2018) and similarly affected regions. Many of these were white and formerly affluent, leaving for other regions, never to return. Others chose to move to other areas within the West (Nugent 2018).

Attached are the comparisons of Western states to non-Western states from the 1980s through 2019. In addition, we also look at whether the difference between the two averages is statistically significant or not.

Table 5:

Table 5. Diversity Index By Region And By Census

Diversity Index	*1980*	*1990*	*2000*	*2010*	*2019*
Mean: Western States	0.6092	0.6792	0.8638	0.9477	0.9992
Mean: Non-Western States	0.4874	0.4764	0.7105	0.8253	0.8924
T-Ratio	1.55	2.22	1.77	1.44	1.29
Statistical Significance	P<.10	P<.05	P<.05	P<.10	P>.10

As Table 5 shows, Western states were already more diverse than their non-Western counterparts before 1990, but not significantly so. That changed in the 1990 analysis, where the gap between the two groups was statistically significant at the .05 level. That significant difference of means between Western states and other states persisted in 2000 until non-Western states came closer in diversity to the West in 2010, and just before 2020, the differences were not significant enough even at the .10 level. This increases the confidence in our theory that the early 1990s reflected a significant change, a gap in diversity in the West much greater than that of other states in the USA.

Ross Perot

Viewing the weaknesses of the Bush Administration and Bill Clinton's many scandals, Texas businessman H. Ross Perot sensed an opportunity. Through talk shows and with his sizeable bank account, Perot parlayed both into an independent candidacy that put him within striking distance of both party nominees in the popular vote in May, leading into June. In fact, Perot's decision to jump into the 1992 presidential contest had the greatest impact on the West, more than any other region.

As noted earlier, the West is known for its independent streak (Young 2019). But such independence in action had previously not shown up as significant in prior academic studies. Vandello and Cohen (1999) developed a measure of individualism vs. collectivism, examining an eight-variable index and applying them to states. But our five-point scale (most individualistic = five points to most collectivist = 1 point) revealed that the West was not more likely to be individualistic than other regions (2.615 scores vs. 3.12 for non-Western).

Similarly, to test for political independence, we looked at how voters declared themselves on exit polls. Did they claim to be a Democrat, Republican, or Independent on CNN's Exit Polls (1998) in 1992? Our research found that 25.84% of Westerners claimed to be Independent, no different from the 25.92% of non-Westerners who professed political independence.

Not all states provided their voter registration by party identification with an option for independence or non-affiliation. Of the 29 states that provided such data (eight Western states, 21 non-Western states), we found that non-Western states reported 24.92% registered as an independent or political party other than a Republican or Democrat, compared to 23.79% for Western states.

According to the Pew Research Center (2019), "Independents often are portrayed as political free agents with the potential to alleviate the nation's rigid partisan divisions. Yet the reality is that most independents are not all that "independent" politically." The Pew Research Center finds that 38% of Americans call themselves independent, compared to 31% of Democrats and 26% of Republicans. At the same time, more than 80% of those declaring themselves to be independent clearly lean toward a particular party (Pew Research Center, 2019).

But when it came to making a political choice of an independent candidate, it was a different matter. In Western states, Perot received 23.59% of the vote on average in the 1992 election, compared to 18.1% of the vote in non-Western states. The results of the difference in means are statistically significant as well.

Table 6. Political Independence and Perot Vote: The Western States vs. Non-Western States

Diversity Index	*Independent: Voter Registration*	*Independent: Voter ID On Exit Polls*	*Perot Vote 1992*
Mean: Western States	0.2379	0.2584	0.2359
Mean: Non-Western States	0.2492	0.2592	0.181
T-Ratio	0.15	0.54	3.2
Statistical Significance	P>.10	P>.10	P>.001

Such independent candidates are seen as having an important role in critical elections (Pomper 1967), appealing to new voters (Schofield et al. 2003), and wrenching voters away from their traditional parties and positions. And Perot's independent-minded positions did just that in the West (Rankin 2009), though his strong emphasis on deficit-cutting perhaps seemed too close to the GOP for a region suffering from their own Defense Department drawdowns.

Bill Clinton's Balancing Act

As the campaign devolved into charges and counter-charges between Perot and Bush, Clinton was freed up to display his considerable talents for bringing people together to find common ground. He found ways to link Reagan Democrats together with African-Americans, looking for positive solutions to the riots while distancing himself from more extreme elements by condemning Sister Souljah for calling blacks to take a week off of killing each other to go after white people (Baker 1993).

Such outreach to both groups appeared authentic. McWilliams (1993) reported that with Ron Brown as leader of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), African-Americans were insiders, not outsiders, who asked for votes and little else. He quoted William Julius Wilson, who said Clinton spoke: "to those who had grown weary of destructive racial rhetoric" and added, "this year, that disposition counted (McWilliams 1993).

Pomper (1993) also revealed data showing that Clinton was more than just a lucky beneficiary of a Bush-Perot spat. He won over more Bush voters in 1988 than Perot took from Bush and also swiped more Bush voters than Perot and Bush took from Democrats in 1992, more than twice as many combined (see Table 7). He also wooed about twice as many new voters than Bush and Perot combined (Pomper 1993).

Table 7. Shifting Voters Preferences In The 1992 Election

Pomper The Election of 1992 (1993)		
Clinton	Loyalists (Had Voted With Dukakis In 1988)	23.50%
Clinton	Converts (From Bush In 1988)	12.20%
Clinton	Recruits (New Voters)	8.00%
Bush	Loyalists (Had Voted With Bush In 1988)	32.00%
Bush	Converts (From Dukakis In 1988)	1.50%
Bush	Recruits (New Voters)	3.80%
Perot	Converts From Dukakis In 1988)	3.40%
Perot	Converts (From Bush In 1988)	11.30%
Perot	Recruits (New Voters)	4.20%

The Houston RNC Convention Hyper-Conservatism

While Perot dropped out due to sagging poll numbers and questions about his use of private investigators against political opponents, Clinton's surge gave the Democrats the lead nationwide. Bush needed to make up for lost ground, but the Republican National Convention in Houston produced the opposite effect.

Academic and journalistic sources agree that the GOP Convention pulled the Republicans well outside of the mainstream. "The Republican convention in Houston was a turning point in the campaign," writes *Congressional Quarterly* (2002, 84). "Strategists decided to shore up Bush's right-wing support.... The party's platform committee was dominated by the right-wing Christian Coalition. Speeches by Patrick Buchanan, Pat Robertson, and Marilyn Quayle, questioning the Democrats' patriotism and arguing for a rollback of civil liberties, played badly." It was the most conservative convention since the GOP in San Francisco in 1964 (White 1967), coincidentally the last time the Democrats won the West. This is more than just a matter of punditry. The far-right message provided no more than a statistically insignificant 3-point uptick in surveys in comparison to the Democrat's post-convention 20-point bounce in the polls after their New York City convention (*Congressional Quarterly* 2002, 84).

Abramson et al. (1994, 43) agree. "Contrary to expectations, Bush received no significant postconvention bounce in the polls," the authors write. "Whatever the full set of reasons, one part of the explanation was that the Republican convention was not as well managed as most had been in the past...[T]he Christian Coalition, an organization that was a vestige of Pat Robertson's 1988 presidential campaign, had a greater than expected influence in drafting the Republican platform, and the final document was even more conservative on social issues than the 1988 Republican platform had been...the most conservative forces in the party got extensive prime time coverage."

The authors continue, "It appeared to many viewers that the Republican party included too many extremist elements among its leadership....The Republican platform, as we have noted, was very conservative: it continued the party's stringent

opposition to abortion (debate over that issue was prohibited at the convention), it opposed various measures advocated by gays and lesbians, and it denounced government support for art deemed obscene or offensive (Abramson et al. 1994, 43-44)."

The authors went on to show how the RNC Convention pulled the party well away from political moderation, ceding the center to the Democratic Party. "Pat Robertson delivered a speech that was harsh and strident. . . .Not only did this sequence of speeches and positions suggest that the Republican Party might be far to the right of the American mainstream, but it also seemed to suggest that Bush had lost control over his party and the convention (Abramson et al. 1994, 44)."

The worst moment for the Republican Party occurred during Pat Buchanan's message, which was given a prime-time slot, ahead of even Ronald Reagan's speech. "Instead of seeking assurances of a conciliatory address by his chief opponent, Bush's campaign had let Buchanan speak as he wanted. 'There is a religious war going on in this country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold War itself, for this is a war for the soul of America. And in the struggle for the soul of America, [Bill] Clinton and [Hillary] Clinton are on the other side, and George Bush is on our side (Abramson et al. 1994, 44).'"

Columnist Molly Ivins (1992) slammed the speech, claiming it probably sounded better in its original German, hinting that it had totalitarian undertones. That's because the message had particular links for the West, as Buchanan concluded his address by cheering the military occupation of Los Angeles in the wake of the riot over the verdict against the police officers accused of beating Rodney King.

Such angry speeches, targeted at liberals and minorities, may have been intended to unite whites around the Republican banner. But such efforts by the GOP Convention speakers backfired as they turned off whites, even in the West. As *The New York Times* Exit Polls on the West reveal, Bush went from winning the white vote in the West by a 58-41% percentage in 1988 to losing whites narrowly to Clinton, 37% to 39% to 24% for Perot.

1992 Election Results

Much has been made of the argument that Perot, who jumped back into the race later in the year, cost Bush the election and handed the contest to an undeserving Clinton. Such claims ignore Clinton's rise in the polls at Perot's expense and that evaporation of such a big lead when the Texas businessman reentered the race in the Fall of 1992. Moreover, Pomper's (1993) evidence shows that Clinton drew more from Bush than Perot did. Clinton also brought in more new voters than Bush and Perot combined. His loss of Dukakis voters to Bush or Perot was much lower than Bush's losses of votes to others. And as Pomper (1993) demonstrates, not only did Clinton improve upon Dukakis in 1988, but nine Western states experienced large shifts in two-party support (1976-88 to 1992), while the remaining four Western states found at least moderate shifts in the two-party vote (1976-88 to 1992).

As Burnham (1993) claimed earlier, such a victory was of such a great magnitude as to be a rare case in U.S. politics was displaced. Bush would join William H. Taft, Herbert Hoover, and Jimmy Carter, as well as John Adams, John Q. Adams, Martin Van Buren, Grover Cleveland, and Benjamin Harrison, on that list of defeated presidential incumbents (Burnham 1993).

Post-1992 Western Trends Persist

The 1992 election would not become an "outlier" in the West but a sharp shift in electoral politics with the capacity to build a durable foundation for the Democrats. The events in the West that launched this trend would not only persist but would be joined by additional factors that would solidify such a realignment.

Contradictions Revealed

Ballantine and Webster (2018) reveal the contradictions within the Republican Party of pushing more national military spending in the region from 1952-1988 while toeing an anti-government line. The decision of the Republican Party to lurch rightward into their opposition to government spending had not only decimated the Defense industry in the West, but the anti-regulatory policies now threatened those who made a living off the West, either in hunting, fishing, tourism, or outdoor recreational sports. Ballantine and Webster (2018) even noted the shift in support for Democrats in Western ski towns. Those who loved and needed the land for their living looked with alarm at the greater powers of mining companies and corporations polluting. Attempts to supplement the energy needs with less impactful and more eco-friendly methods like solar, wind, and geothermal industries were met with disdain by most Republicans but embraced by Democrats.

Additionally, the libertarian character of the region, so praised by Republicans, began to chafe under the new social conservative regime in charge of the GOP, with a series of mandates for behavior conformity based upon extremely narrow interpretations of the Bible, which further alienated the rugged individualists from their Republican roots. It was hard to justify a "hands-off government" that opposed marijuana legalization, even for medicinal purposes, so vehemently. One could not push deregulation in economic affairs and behavioral regulation in one's private life without another contradiction.

Diversity Advances The Democratic Party

While Hunt (2012) pointed out the problems the Reagan-Bush years had upon the African-American community, it was a slightly different story for the Hispanic community. Gone were the days of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill during the Reagan years, or even the relatively open invite from the Democrats, balanced against the will of labor unions to avoid having wages devalued with a surplus of potential workers. Registration showed a nearly even distribution among the Republican Party, Democratic Party, and independent status. The recession of 1990-1992 may have opened the door for the Democratic Party with Hispanics on economic issues, just as the Houston GOP Convention seemed to display a "Not Welcome" sign from the Republican Party.

Then came a disastrous decision of the Republican Party, in a bid to appeal to whites in the region, which had gone slightly for Clinton over Bush and Perot. It began in Pete Wilson's California, where the GOP Governor sought to ride a series of propositions to electoral victory. One targeted denial of service to illegal aliens in 1994, while another took aim at Affirmative Action two years later. In 1998, Republicans supported another proposition, this one opposing bilingual education in schools. Many of these may have passed, though some were undone by courts. But the effect upon nonwhites, and even whites, were highly damaging.

Nugent (2018) argues that such propositions drove off the Hispanic population. Hui and Sears (2018) produce evidence that shows Hispanics weren't moved to the Democratic Party by these ballot initiatives. But their data begins in 1992 and tests whether such changes occurred thereafter. It fails to show the shift from 1988 to 1992, which means that the propositions did not cause the change in support but merely reinforced it. Korey and Lascher (2006) find a trend toward the Democratic Party that predates the GOP-backed propositions. Specifically, "We assess macropartisanship in the Golden State from 1980 through 2001, drawing on Field Polls of California adults. We find that essentially there have been two eras in recent state history: a period of increasing Republican identification up to 1991 and an era of increasing Democratic identification thereafter (Korey and Lascher 2006)." Furthermore, Segura and Fraga (2008) agree with Nugent (2018) that not only did Latinos grow in the state, but they are also dominating the state in political power through the Democratic Party.

The harsh anti-immigration rhetoric typically targeting the Hispanic population did not go unnoticed by the Asian-American community. Once touted as a "model minority" for the American dream for their values and success, Asian-Americans rewarded the Republican Party with a majority of support in 1992. However, the combination of the GOP anti-immigration mantra, along with attacks on Al Gore for fundraising at a Buddhist Temple, seemed to have a greater issue with the "different" religion than the money brought in. By 2000, Asian-Americans preferred the Democratic Party by the same margins they used to back the GOP and solidified their support for the party over the next several elections, persisting through 2020, as most took a dim view of President Trump's "China Virus" label for COVID-19 and the microaggressions against Asian people from more nationalistic sources.

Anti-affirmative action policies merely reinforced the role of the party in the minds of African-Americans, continuing the trends of the Reagan-Bush years that turned off the black population (Hunt 2012).

Additionally, a number of whites may not have been entirely pleased with the attacks upon nonwhites. Clinton came within a percentage point of repeating his 1992 success with Western white voters in another three-way contest four years later. While George W. Bush may have brought back white voters west of the Mississippi in his two wins, these two elections were by much closer margins than the GOP enjoyed in the region in the 1970s and 1980s, according to *New York Times* exit polls. And Barack Obama narrowly won the white vote in the West in 2008.

Rocky Mountain High-Tech

While some abandoned the West after the devastating recession of the early 1990s, others gravitated to new areas, putting their highly skilled talents to good use. Silicon Valley became replicated across the region, and these areas prefer the Democratic Party. "Democrats had been gaining among higher-income, skilled professionals in rapidly growing and high-tech areas such as Bellevue and Redmond, Washington," wrote Rankin (2009). He cites Judis and Teixeira (2004) and their "Ideaopolis" of Seattle, Portland, joining Silicon Valley. They "back regulatory capitalism and reject GOP social conservatism (Rankin 2009, 161)." And the attraction of good talent worldwide just does not seem to work well with the anti-immigration rhetoric or policies of the Republican Party.

And it's not just along the Pacific Coast. Rankin noted the role of Denver and Boulder as areas growing in diversity and greater levels of higher education, now resembling Los Angeles in voting patterns (Rankin 2009, 167). These younger voters in the region are also shifting their preferences. Whereas Reagan won the 18-29-year-old vote with 59% of that estimated tally, Obama took this same youth vote with 66% of the vote.

West Coast Democratic Stars

Republicans continued to try and highlight the importance of the region through convention sites and candidates. They chose San Diego for their 1996 Republican National Committee Convention. Vice-Presidential nominee Jack Kemp (born in L.A., played for Occidental College) enjoyed success with the Los Angeles, then San Diego Chargers before going to Buffalo to play and run for Congress. Arizona Senator John McCain won the 2008 GOP nomination and picked fellow Westerner Sarah Palin,

Alaska's Governor, as his running mate. Republican Party nominee Mitt Romney (2012) had ties to Utah and the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games. And actor Arnold Schwarzenegger brought star power to California Republicans as "the Governator" from 2003 to 2011, "the kind of socially moderate Republican who can win elections in California," wrote Rankin, [who could] "save the Republican Party from itself (2009, 174)."

But Democrats were no longer ignoring the region anymore. The Democratic National Committee held its 2000 convention in Los Angeles, and Hawaiian-born Barack Obama accepted the 2008 nomination at Invesco Field in Denver 2008 (Rankin 2009). By then, California Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi had become Speaker of the House, and Nevada Senator Harry Reid was Senate Majority Leader. All of this culminated in Joe Biden's selection of California Senator Kamala Harris as the first Vice-Presidential nominee for the Democrats west of Texas in 2020. Such greater focus on the region forced the GOP to try harder to appeal to the region, to no avail.

Recessions Reinforce Anti-Republicanism

Any in-roads that moderates like Governor Schwarzenegger or Senator McCain, or Presidents like George W. Bush (who sought closer ties with the Hispanic community) may have made were swept away by the Great Recession of 2007-2009, which fell disproportionately not only on California but also cities like Las Vegas, Nevada, and Phoenix, Arizona (Rankin 2009, 165).

The fact that the failures happened under President George W. Bush's watch reinforced the notion that GOP policies just didn't work for the region. The area rewarded Obama with strong majorities. And the infiltration of the coronavirus into the West Coast triggered yet another devastating economic downturn thanks to the President Donald Trump Administration's inept response. Anger over requiring members of the region to wear masks and engage in social distancing did not seem to be outweighed by the shocking death toll, and the refusal of some Republicans to either acknowledge the presence of COVID-19 or adopt the safety measures helped deliver the greatest level of Western support to the Democratic Party since LBJ's sweep in 1964.

Conclusions About The Role Of The 1992 Election, In The West And Nationwide

So far, we have uncovered a myriad of sources that have indicated (a) that the West is more favorable to the Democratic Party than it used to be and (b) that there are a number of good reasons why such a shift has taken place, ranging from the Defense Department drawdown in the region, the economic recession of the early 1990s, diversity in the West, political moderation by the Democrats and ideological extremism by the Republicans, as well as the political manifestation of individualism. We also know that (c) the 1992 election was an important victory for the Democratic Party, and (d) candidates like Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden have experienced more success than George McGovern, Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis, in the region and in national contests.

But even as critical election critics have admitted that party fortunes have changed across regions, they cling to the notion that such alterations, if they do exist, are secular in nature, occurring over a long period of time. We should see the region incrementally creep from the GOP to the Democratic Party over many elections at a more glacial pace. They claim that we should not expect a dramatic realignment in party support at the ballot box in a single election. We will test whether the 1992 election did create a fundamental change not just in regional support in presidential contests in the region, but we will see if such results affect the overall outcome of subsequent presidential elections nationwide.

Theory and Hypothesis

To determine whether or not the arguments in this paper are on the right track, we propose putting forth a theory of critical elections which contends that the presence or absence of critical regional realignments are likely to alter trends in presidential contests for a political party, where the independent variable reflects rapid changes in regional support for a political party, while the change in national party fortunes in presidential elections is the dependent variable.

We examine two hypotheses, which are testable versions of the theory. In the first hypothesis, we test whether there was a significant change in electoral support for the Democratic Party in both Western states won and the percentage of regional Electoral College votes won from the West, which helped deliver the 1992 election to the Democrats (after years of humiliating defeats). Then we look at a second hypothesis that tests whether the critical changes in the 1992 election in Western state victories and the percentage of votes won in the Electoral College from the West persisted through the next several elections, through 2020.

If the hypotheses are supported, we should see a significant spike in Democratic Party fortunes both the West and nationwide in 1992, one where the eight contests of 1992-2020 are significantly different from Democratic Party fortunes in the 10 presidential elections before 1992. This would also indicate the presence of a positive relationship, where an increase in the independent variable produces a corresponding increase in the dependent variable. Should those advocating a more secular explanation be right, we should see little to no significant difference between the two time periods, neither a spike nor a fundamental shift in average electoral performance, both in percentages of popular votes and in Electoral College contests.

Table 8. Analytical Method

Theory: The presence or absence of regional critical realignments are likely to alter trends in presidential contests for a political party.	
Independent Variable:	Dependent Variable:
The presence or absence of a significant shift in states won by a party in a narrow time frame, which persists over subsequent elections.	The presence or absence of a regional critical election in a particular year.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a significant change in Democratic Party support in Western states occurred began during the 1992 election, producing a regional critical election.	
Independent Variable(s):	Dependent Variable:
The percentage of Democratic Party victories in states in the Electoral College (and their Electoral College vote percentages) in the West.	The Presence Or Absence Of A Regional Critical Election In The West In 1992
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a Western critical election in 1992 produced a change in national Democratic Party election results beginning in 1992 and continuing through the 2020 contest	
Independent Variable:	Dependent Variable:
The presence or absence of a critical election in the West in 1992	The Performance Of The Democratic Party In National Presidential Elections, 1992-2020

Research Design

Ballantine and Webster (2018) list several Western states but strangely exclude California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii from their list. Nugent (2018) expanded his list to include prairie states like the Dakotas, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas. Several of these resemble the plains states more, while Texas, based on its history, has been historically included among the original Southern states. Ballantine and Webster (2018) also exclude Oklahoma and Texas, as I do.

For the purposes of this research, we identify the West as constituting the following 13 states: Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico. The U.S. Census Bureau, Centers for Disease Control, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Energy Information Agency, etc., include these 13 states in the West.

Such a map includes those based on geography and common interests (mining, drilling, and ranching) and less on the farming more common in the Midwestern region. Much of the region can encompass Joel Garreau's (1981) famous map of the Pacific Coast (Ecotopia), the Southwest (MexAmerica), and the "Empty Quarter" of Rocky Mountain states, leaving the others in the South (Dixie) or nation's "Breadbasket" in the Midwest, as he appears to do.

As for the temporal domain, we first look at whether the Democratic Party won a state or not, beginning in 1952 and concluding in 2020. We then compare the percentage of Western states won by the Democratic Party in each of the 18 elections (1952-2020) and test the means of each of the two samples: the 1952-1988 U.S. Presidential Elections and the 1992-2020 U.S. Presidential Elections. We look to see if the t-test of these two different time frames is statistically significant.

In addition, we look at what percentage of the Electoral College votes for the 13-state region were won by the Democratic Party. Again, we compare the percentage of Western state Electoral College votes won by the party in the 10 elections before 1992 (1952-1988) and the eight elections from 1992 to 2020. These involve conducting a t-test to see if the difference in the means of the two samples is statistically significant.

Finally, we examine the national presidential contests from 1952-1988 and those from 1992-2020, both for their popular vote differences, as well as their Electoral College results. Given the presence of third parties in contests, we also look at the percentage of votes garnered by both major parties as a percentage of two-party votes to determine if any differences exist.

Results

The Western Region From Republican Rule to Democratic Dominance

Popular Vote: Before 1992 and Through 1992

In the popular vote total for the Western states, Republicans saw their streak of popular vote totals end in 1992, as Democrats went on to run the table in the next several elections.

Table 9. The Democratic Party Share Of The Western Vote, All Parties Candidates

West	*Political Party/Year*	*1972*	*1976*	*1980*	*1984*	*1988*	*1992*	*1996*	*2000*	*2004*	*2008*
	Democratic	40	46	34	38	46	43	48	48	50	57
	Republican	57	51	53	61	52	34	40	46	49	40
	Independent			10			23	8	4		
	T = 2.58 (p<.05)	Mean 1972-1988: 40.8%					Mean 1992-2008: 49.2%				

Though critics are sure to point out that Clinton received a smaller share of votes in 1992 than Dukakis did in 1988, the nature of the two-party system belies Clinton's strength. When looking at the two-party share of the vote, his totals in 1992 (and in 1996) are 55% of the vote.

Table 10. The Democratic Party Share Of The Western Vote: Two Party Only

West	*Political Party/Year*	*1972*	*1976*	*1980*	*1984*	*1988*	*1992*	*1996*	*2000*	*2004*	*2008*
	Democratic	40	46	39	38	46	55	55	50	50	57
	Republican	57	51	61	61	52	45	45	48	49	40
	T = 5.14 (p<.001)	Mean 1972-1988: 41.8%					Mean 1992-2008: 53.4%				

Regardless of how you measure it, the Democratic Party did significantly better after 1992 than before 1992 in the popular vote, in both differences of means tests.

Electoral College: Before 1992 and Through 1992

Our analysis of the Western states shows a dearth of support for the Democratic Party with the ascendancy of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Democrats failed to take a single state in the 1950s and only took three of 13 states in 1960, two in 1968, none in 1972 and 1984, and only one Western state (Hawaii) in 1976 and 1980. The party only captured three of 13 Western states in 1988. The only exception was 1964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson, a Texan, bested Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater in 12 of 13 Western states.

But even with that clear outlier, Democrats won a mere 22 Western state contests out of 126 from 1952-1988, with more than half occurring in a single election. Republicans, meanwhile, won 108 of 126 possible Western states in the Electoral College over that same time frame, or 85.7% of all possible Western state contests in those 13 elections.

Even with the 1964 election, the Democratic Party only averaged 16.9 percent of all Western states per presidential election from 1952 to 1988. But that all changed in 1992 when the Democratic Party took eight of 13 Western states. The party proceeded to win a majority of Western states in five of the next seven elections, concluding with 2020 when the party took another eight of 13 states. That boosted the Democratic Party, with an average of 51.13% of Western states for the 1992-2020 elections, an increase of more than 30 percentage points from the prior 10 elections. As Table 10 shows, the t-ratio of the difference of means tests is 3.25, which is statistically significant at the .01 level, indicating that the increase in Democratic Party support in the West is statistically significant.

Such results are even stronger when we account for the percentage of Electoral College votes of the 13 states and not just the number of states. As you can see from the graphic, the percentage of Western Electoral College votes won by the Democratic Party from 1952-1988 was minuscule. Democrats did take 95% of the Electoral College votes in the West in 1964 but averaged 13.9 percent of the Western states in the Electoral College for all ten elections, even with 1964 in the mix. In 1988, Democrats only won 10 percent of the Western Electoral College votes and none in the election before that.

That all changed in 1992 when the percentage of Democratic Party votes in the Western states in the Electoral College jumped from 10% in 1988 to 81 percent. And the 1992 election was no fluke. From 1992 to 2020, the Democratic Party averaged 76 percent of the votes among the Western states in the Electoral College, taking 85% of that total in 2020. That



Figure 1. Number Of Western States Won By The Democratic Party, 1952-2020

Table 11. Difference Of Means Test, Percentage Of Western States Won By Democrats Comparing 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (% of Western States Won By Democrats)	16.90%	51.10%	32.11%
Difference Of Means		34.22%	
T Ratio and Significance Level	3.25 (p<.001)		



Figure 2. Number Of Western State Electoral College Votes Won By The Democratic Party, 1952 to 2020

average culminated in a t-ratio of 5.98, which is statistically significant below the .0001 level, showing that the Democratic Party did significantly better in the eight elections from 1992-2020 than they did in the ten before 1992 (see Table 11).

Table 12. Difference Of Means Test, Percentage Of Western State Electoral College Votes Won By Democrats, Comparing 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (% of Western State Electoral College Votes Won By Democrats)	13.90%	76%	41.50%
Difference Of Means	62.10 percentage points		
T Ratio and Significance Level	5.89 (p<.0001)		

Such Electoral College numbers were not inconsequential. While the media focused on the Midwest and the Southeast for Joe Biden's electoral fortunes in 2020, it's clear that he could not have won with 14 percent of the 128 Electoral College votes in the West among the 13 states in the old days (1952-88). Now, with 85 percent of the Western states' Electoral College votes, it helped him prevail in the 2020 presidential contest.

Of course, the Democratic Party's fortunes out West are hardly an accident. Democrats began to take an increased interest in the region, from hosting the 2000 DNC Convention in Los Angeles and the 2008 DNC Convention in Denver, where Barack Obama was nominated at Mile High Stadium in a show event. Moreover, when California Senator Kamala Harris was nominated for the Vice-Presidential choice by the Democratic Party, it was the first time a candidate occupied a spot on the party's ticket which was from west of Texas, with only a handful ever from a state west of one with the Mississippi River in it.

National Presidential Election Implications

But did the Democrats' ability to flip more than 80 percent of the Western votes in 1992, and maintain the majority of that region, assist in helping the national party prevail in U.S. Presidential elections? At first glance, it isn't as easy to spot. Republican popular vote turnout appears all over the place, with highs and lows before 1992 and afterward.



Figure 3. Percentage of the Popular Vote Won by the Republican Party, 1952-2020

But a closer look at the averages indicates that from 1952 to 1988, Republican Presidential candidates average more than 51 percent of the vote, on average. That number dipped to 45.33 percent from 1992-2020, a statistically significant drop in performance in national elections for chief executive, in Table 12. Table 13, which reveals the GOP share of the two-party vote, has a similar six-point decline.

Table 13. Difference Of Means Test, Percentage Of National Presidential Election Popular Vote, Comparing Republican Vote % 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (% of National Presidential Election Popular Vote for the Republican Party)	51.65	45.33	48.8
Difference Of Means		6.23 percentage points	
T Ratio and Significance Level	2.21 (p<.05)		

Table 13:

One must remember how Pomper (1993) wrote about the GOP's "Electoral College Lock" before the 1992 election. This is confirmed by our analysis that from 1952 to 1988, which shows that Republicans averaged 367.1 Electoral College votes.

That Republican Party average slid to an average of 224.875 Electoral College votes after 1992, after the defection of the West, where Democrats were now capturing the overwhelming majority of the region in those 13 states. The plunge in GOP performance is also statistically significant (see Table 14). The party went from an average of nearly 100 Electoral College votes ahead of what was necessary to win to an average deficit of almost 50 Electoral College votes.

Table 14. Difference Of Means Test, Percentage Of National Presidential Election Popular Vote, Comparing Republican Vote %, Two-Party Shares Of Votes, 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (% of National Presidential Election Popular Vote For Republican Two-Party Shares Of Votes)	53.13%	47.97%	50.84%
Difference Of Means	5.16 percentage points		
T Ratio and Significance Level	2.13 (p<.05)		



Figure 4. The Electoral College Vote Won by the Republican Party, 1952-2020

Table 15. Difference Of Means Test, Electoral College Votes From The National Presidential Election, Comparing Republican Vote %, Two-Party Shares Of Votes, 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (Electoral College Votes From The National Presidential Election, Republican Two-Party Shares Of Votes)	367.1	224.88	303.89
Difference Of Means	142.23 vote decline		
T Ratio and Significance Level	2.42 (p<.05)		

Democrats, on the other hand, appear to have reversed their poor performance beginning in 1992. Their party has climbed almost four percentage points on average to a 49 percent clip, and that's with several elections with a third party depressing overall numbers.



Figure 5. Percentage of the Popular Vote Won by the Democratic Party, 1952-2020

The results at just statistically significant at the .10 level, though in three of the last four years, the party has exceeded 50% in the polls, in Table 15. The GOP has only done so one time since 1988, and that was in 2004. When looking at Table 16, the Democratic Party's share of the two-party vote, the results are even stronger in showing the difference in the popular vote contest after 1992, a nearly six-point swing from just above 46% to 53%.

Democratic Party fortunes have especially increased over the last several election cycles. Whereas from 1952-1988, the party averaged only 162.9 Electoral College votes (even with the rout of 1964 included), 1992 was a different story for the Democratic Party.

Since that year, the party can now count on 312 Electoral College votes in each Presidential Election, enabling the party to win more often than not (see Table 17). Moreover, that increase brought on by changes in the West represents a statistically significant increase in Electoral College performance.

Answering Critics Of Critical Elections & The West's Impact On The 1992-2020 Elections

Is It Only California?

From 1952 to 1988, the Democrats only won the largest state in the USA once, and that was in 1964. From 1992 to 2020, the Democrats have California every year by wide margins. But what about the rest of the region? Is the Democrat's success in the West just a result of one state, California, flipping from the Republican Party to the Democrats?

To determine if this is the case, I look at how the Democrats performed in the West from 1992 to 2020 without California, the most populous state in the West, and the USA, for that matter (see Table 19).

In 1992, the Democrats took the rest of the West without the benefit of California, with 42 Electoral College votes to 23 for the GOP. The Clinton-Gore team repeated their success four years later, with a 39-26 advantage in the West, not counting California's 55 Electoral College votes. California was necessary to help the Democrats take the West in 2000 and 2004, but in both elections, the Democrats still did better than Dukakis in 1988 (with California, the Democrats won the West 82%-35% in 2000 and 77%-42% in 2004). By 2008, the Democrats reestablished their wider margin of victory, winning 41-28 non-California Electoral College votes. It was a similar story in 2012, with Democrats winning the West again with the Golden State 46-30.

Table 16. Difference Of Means Test, Percentage Of National Presidential Election Popular Vote, Comparing Democratic Vote %, 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (% of National Presidential Election Popular Vote for the Democratic Party)	45.46%	49.05%	47.06%
Difference Of Means		3.59%	
T Ratio and Significance Level	1.39 (p<.10)		

Table 17. Difference Of Means Test, Percentage Of National Presidential Election Popular Vote, Comparing Democratic Vote %, Two-Party Shares Of Votes, 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (% of National Presidential Election Popular Vote For Democratic Two-Party Shares Of Votes)	46.87%	52.03%	49.16%
Difference Of Means		5.16%	
T Ratio and Significance Level	2.13 (p<.05)		

Table 18. Difference Of Means Test, Electoral College Votes From The National Presidential Election, Comparing Democratic Vote %, Two-Party Shares Of Votes, 1952-1988 To 1992-2020

	1952-1988	*1992-2020*	*Total*
N (elections)	10	8	18
Mean (Electoral College Votes From The National Presidential Election, Democratic Two-Party Shares Of Votes)	162.9	312	229.17
Difference Of Means		149.1	
T Ratio and Significance Level	2.57 (p<.05)		



Figure 6. The Electoral College Vote Won by the Democratic Party, 1952-2020

Table 19. The Performance Of Both Parties In The West, Without California

Party/Year	*1952*	*1956*	*1960*	*1964*	*1968*	*1972*	*1976*	*1980*	*1984*	*1988*
Dem	0	0	10	55	13	0	4	4	0	21
GOP	47	47	43	5	42	57	53	53	64	43
Party/Year	*1992*	*1996*	*2000*	*2004*	*2008*	*2012*	*2016*	*2020*		
Dem	42	39	27	22	41	46	46	57		
GOP	23	26	35	42	28	30	30	19		

Even in defeat in 2016, Hillary Clinton also won the West without California, 46 Electoral College votes to Trump's 30 E.C. votes in the West. In 2020, the Biden-Harris team won 57 Electoral College votes without California to Trump's 19. Clearly, the evidence shows that even without California, the Democrats prevailed in the West in six of eight elections in the Electoral College: 1992, 1996, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020. Only in the remaining two (2000, 2004) did the Democrats need California to prevail in the West in the Electoral College. It is fair to say, with a 75% success rate without the state of California; we cannot conclude that the Democratic Party won the West only because they won the largest state.

The Democrats in 2000 and 2004

Clearly, the presidential teams of Al Gore in 2000 and John Kerry in 2004 did not perform as well in the West and nationally as the Bill Clinton teams of 1992 and 1996, as well as Barack Obama's ticket in 2008 and 2012. But, that does not invalidate the results for these reasons.

First, as the preceding section shows, the Democrats still won the West in 2000 and 2004. It was the only time since 1992 that the party needed California to do it. Second, the Democrats dramatically improved their performance in gubernatorial and senatorial races between 1998 and 2008. As these results show, Republicans held an 8-5 advantage in the governor's mansion in 1998. By 2008, the Democrats flipped the region to a 7-6 lead in governorships (see Table 20).

Table 20. Western Governor's Races By Party, 1998 To 2008

GOV	*1998*	*2000*	*2002*	*2004*	*2006*	*2008*
Alaska	D		R		R	
Arizona	R		D		D	
California	D		D		R	
Colorado	R		R		D	
Hawaii	D		R		R	
Idaho	R		R		R	
Montana		R		D		D
Nevada	R		R		R	
New Mexico	R		D		D	
Oregon	D		D		D	
Utah		R		R		R
Washington		D		D		D
Wyoming	R		D		D	

In 1998, in the 13 Western states, Republicans held a 15-11 advantage in Senators. Ten years later, Democrats converted that number into a 16-10 lead in U.S. Senators (see Table 21).

Table 21. Western U.S. Senate Races By Party, 1998 To 2008

SEN	*1998*	*2000*	*2002*	*2004*	*2006*	*2008*
Alaska	R		R	R		D
Arizona	R	R		R	R	
California	D	D		D	D	
Colorado	R		R	D		D
Hawaii	D	D		D	D	
Idaho	R		R	R		R
Montana		R	D		D	D
Nevada	D	R		D	R	
New Mexico		D	R		D	D
Oregon	D		R	D		D
Utah	R	R		R	R	
Washington	D	D		D	D	
Wyoming		R	R		R	R

A map of campaign spending in 2004 shows only five Western states received any ad-buys of $1 million in the 2004 election:

New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington (Pfeiffer 2014). Clearly, the region received less attention from the party that contest than the individual parties, which were able to expand the reach of the Democrats during the same time frame.

It's Who Wins

It can be argued that since the days of FDR and Truman, no party has won five straight elections. In fact, since then, only one party has won three straight presidential contests (the GOP: 1980, 1984, 1988). But that belies two major facts. From 1952-1988, the GOP wins 7 of 10 Electoral College contests, all but one by margins of more than 7.5 percent in the popular vote and victories averaging 373.86 points. For the Democrats' 3 wins, there were two nail-biters (0.17 percentage points, 2.1 percentage points) and only one landslide: 22.6 percentage points, with a 100+ E.C. vote advantage once (1964).

It was a definite change in the following electoral cycle, from 1992-2020. In those, Democrats won seven of eight popular vote elections, losing only 2004 by 2.4 percentage points. They still won five of eight presidential elections by an average of 162.8 E.C. votes. Their three losses were by an average of 39 E.C. votes (see Table 21).

Table 22. Performance By Both Parties, Electoral College & Popular Vote, 1952-2020

Party Performance and Contest	*Electoral College Wins*	*Popular Vote Wins*	*Landslide (Win EC By 100+ E.C. Votes)*
1952-1988 Republicans	70%	70%	7
1952-1988 Democrats	30%	30%	1
1992-2020 Republican	37.50%	12.50%	0
1992-2020 Democrats	62.50%	87.50%	4

None of the close state "controversial" margins for the Democrats in 2000 and 2016 were from the West. These close states that invited "controversy" for their narrow margins were Florida, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. In the 2020 election, Trump's unsupported allegations of fraud were only centered in a single Western state: Arizona, whose votes would not have provided the margin of victory that year. The other scrutinized states include Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and now Georgia.

How the West Helped Democrats Offset the Loss of the South in Party Politics

There is a realization among scholars that the Republicans were able to strengthen their hand in presidential elections with the victory of Richard Nixon in 1968 and the subsequent "Southern Strategy." This enabled the GOP to make historic gains in the South that it had never made, during presidential contests once dominated by the Democrats in the New Deal Era into regular landslide victories.

The West changed all of that in 1992. While the region went for Republicans in every election from 1952 to 1988 with one exception, the evidence shows a dramatic swing towards the Democratic Party in 1992, dumping the Reagan-Bush coalition that had produced three straight victories. And those gains persisted after 1992, as Democrats (1) won the West every election from 1992 to 2020, (2) won 7 of the next 8 popular vote contests for U.S. President, and (3) a majority of presidential elections in the Electoral College, even with two historic setbacks after receiving the most votes (2000, 2016).[8] Just as the South helped the GOP win several landslides, the West in 1992 put Democrats back in the game, even enough to win more contests.

Conclusion

The results show that 1992 was a watershed year for the Democratic Party, both in the West and in national contests. The secular change theory cannot explain both the spike in Western support for the Democratic Party, sharply increasing in 1992, and persisting through 2020. Nor can that theory explain the reversal of Democratic Party defeats from the 1950s-1980s, producing a majority of wins from the 1990s through 2020 with average performances in the popular vote and Electoral College, which are statistically significant improvements in results between those two different time frames.

The most obvious question is why so few have recognized this dramatic shift for the Democratic Party in the West and how this has significantly upgraded their performance in presidential contests. Here are a few reasons why such a realignment has gone relatively unnoticed in the media.

[8]There is some wonder whether the overwhelming shift of the West to the Democratic column could possibly set up the party for more cases of winning popular votes yet losing the Electoral College, given the nature of the latter to have small states have a disproportionate advantage in the ratio of Electoral College to popular votes.

First of all, myths are hard to shake. When asked to conjure up a Westerner, many think of someone from eras past, like a rancher, a miner, an oilman, a logger, and a hunter or fisherman. We don't even consider the geeky white computer scientist, the Asian-American engineer, the Hispanic entrepreneur, the African-American attorney, or the female Senator, yet all are Westerners today. Nor do we consider the wind turbine as readily as the oil derrick or how the hunter and fishing industry workers have rethought their priorities as their livelihoods are threatened by anti-green initiatives. The John Wayne movie is no longer the only story of the West nor the best representation of today's West.

Second of all, the Democratic victories of 1992 and beyond don't look as dramatic as the Nixon and Reagan landslides, but we're not comparing apples with apples in such analyses. Compared to the showing of the McGovern and Mondale, Clinton and Obama have far more impressive performances, even if their wins are 53%-47% victories. And that's where the real analysis must be made to determine if a realignment has taken place. Moreover, with a sizable third-party presence in Perot, the waters look more muddied yet become even more clear when looking at two-party support for candidates. Even without such measures, the graphic representations make the spikes visually apparent, reinforced by statistical tests.

Third, some critical elections supporters often relied heavily on anecdotal and non-quantitative evidence, ignoring the in-depth statistical tests of Key's 1955 research and work others have done to reveal such realignments. As a result, the field appeared to be ceded to those critics quick to discredit critical elections. Critics have also confused secular trends with secular results, and critical trends do not receive the same attention. As a result, some in the scholarly community have declared the secular realignment thesis as having won the debate, leading us to miss such huge fundamental shifts which would have been easier to spot with an open mind.

Acknowledgements

LaGrange College undergraduate Nicole Morales contributed to the research for several hypothesis tests. The author would also like to thank Chase Davis, Benjamin Taylor, Sean Richey, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

References

Abramson, Paul R., John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde. 1994. *Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections.* Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Baker, Ross K. 1993. "Sorting Out and Suiting Up: The Presidential Nominations." In *The Election of 1992*. Gerald M. Pomper, ed. Chatham, NJ. Chatham House.

Balentine, Matthew D. and Gerald R. Webster. 2018. "The Changing Electoral Landscape of the Western United States." *The Professional Geographer*. 70(4): 566-582.

Brunell, Thomas L. and Bernard Grofman. 1998, "Explaining Divided U.S. Senate Delegations, 1788-1996: A Realignment Approach." *American Political Science Review*. 92, 2 (June):

Brunell, Thomas L., Bernard Grofman and Samuel Merrill III, 2012. "Magnitude and Durability of Electoral Change: Identifying Critical Elections in the U.S. Congress 1854-2010." *Electoral Studies*. 31: 816-828.

Budge, Joel. et al. 1981. "The 1896 Election and Congressional Modernization: An Appraisal of the Evidence." *Social Science History*. 5, 1 (Winter): 53-90.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1993 "The Legacy of George Bush." In *The Election of 1992*. Gerald M. Pomper, ed. Chatham, NJ. Chatham House.

Burton, Steven. 1998. Bank Trends - Ranking the Risk of Overbuilding in Commercial Real Estate Markets. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Bank Trends - Ranking the Risk of Overbuilding in Commercial Real Estate Markets.

Campbell, Angus, et al. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley.

Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Congressional Quarterly. 2002. *Presidential Elections, 1789-2000.* Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Congressional Research Service. 2019. "Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC): Background and Issues for Congress. EveryCRSReport.com. R45705. April 25.
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45705.html

Dawsey, Darrell. 1990. "25 Years After The Watts Riots: McCone Commission's Recommendations Have Gone Unheeded." *L.A. Times.* July 8. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-07-08-me-455-story.html

Dzialo, Mary C.; Shank, Susan E.; Smith, David C. 1993. "Atlantic and Pacific Coasts' Labor Markets Hit Hard in the Early 1990s." *Monthly Labor Review*. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 116 (2): 32–39.Retrieved April 6, 2011.

Elazar, Daniel J. 1984. *American Federalism: A View from the States, 3rd Edition*. New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers.

Ewing, Cortez A. M. 1962. “Constitutional Crisis in the American Party System.”
The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (June): 8-18
Gardner, Jennifer M. 1994. “The 1990-1991 Recession: How Bad was the Labor Market?” *Monthly Labor Review.* Bureau of Labor Statistics. 117 (6): 3–11. Retrieved April 6, 2011. "The 1990-1991 Recession: How Bad was the Labor Market?"
Gardner, Jennifer, Steven Hipple and Thomas Nardone. 1994. “The Labor Market Improves in 1993.” *Monthly Labor Review*. February. Gardner Hipple Nardone Monthly Labor Review 1993 1990-1991 Recession.pdf
Garreau, Joel. 1981. *The Nine Nations of North America*. New York City, NY: Avon Books.
Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1996. "A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S." *American Journal of Political Science*. 40, 3 (August): 851-871.
Hui, Iris and David O. Sears. 2018. “Reexamining the Effect of Racial Propositions on Latinos’ Partisanship in California.” *Political Behavior*. 40: 147-174.
Hunt, Darnell. 2012. "American Toxicity: Twenty Years After the 1992 Los Angeles Riots." *Amerasia Journal*. 38, 1: ix-xviii.
Ivins, Molly. 1992. “Notes From Another Country.” *The Nation*. September 14.
Johnston, Ron. 2017. "Was the 2016 United States presidential contest a deviating election? Continuity and change in the electoral map – or ’Plus ça change, plus ç’est la mème géographie.”’ *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties*, 27 (4): 369-388.
Judis, John B. and Rudy Teixeira. 2004. *The Emerging Democratic Majority*. New York, NY: Scribner.
Key, Jr. V. O. 1955. “A Theory of Critical Elections.” *The Journal of Politics*. 17, 1 (February): 3-18.
Knuckey, Jonathan. 1999. “Classification of Presidential Elections: An Update.” *Polity*. 31, 4 (Summer): 639-653.
Korey, John and Edward L. Lascher. 2006. Micropartisanship in California. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 70(1).
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. et al. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited.* Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Lichtman, Allan J. 1976. “Critical Election Theory and the Reality of American Presidential Politics, 1916–1940.” *American Historical Review* 81(2): 317–51.
Mayhew, David R. 2000. “Electoral Realignments.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. 3: 449-474.
Mayhew, David R. 2002. *Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre, 1st Generation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Mayhew, David R. 2008. *Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre, 2nd Generation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1993. In *The Election of 1992*. Gerald M. Pomper, ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Nardone, Thomas, Diane Herz, Earl Mellor, and Steven Hipple. 1993. “1992: Job Market In The Doldrums.” *Monthly Labor Review*. February.
National Equity Atlas. 2022. “How Equity Matters.” National Equity Atlas.
https://nationalequityatlas.org/indicators/Diversity_index#/?breakdown=1&geo=02000000000005000
New York Times. 2008. “Election Results 2008.” *New York Times*, November 5. http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/national-exit-polls.html (accessed November 4, 2011).
Nugent, Walter. 2018. *Color-Coded.* Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press.
Pew Research Center. 2019. “Political Independents: Who They Are, What They Think.” PRC. March 14.
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/03/14/political-independents-who-they-are-what-they-think/.
Pfieffer, Abigail. 2014. "Battleground and Swing States." Politicize Ultimate Politics Theme. cphcmp.smu.edu/2004election/battleground-swing-states/
Pomper, Gerald M. 1967. “Classification of Presidential Elections.” *The Journal of Politics*. 29, 3 (August): 535-566.
Pomper, Gerald M. 1993. *The Election of 1992*. Gerald M. Pomper, ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Rankin, David M. 2009. “The West On the Electoral Frontier.” In *Winning the White House*, Kevin J. McMahon, ed. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rogin, Michael. 1969. “California Populism and the "System of 1896” *The Western Political Quarterly*, 22, 1 (March): 179-196
Sabato, Larry. 1988. *The Party’s Just Begun*. Northbrook, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co.
Sarasohn. David. 1980. “The Election of 1916: Realigning the Rockies. *Western Historical Quarterly* 11, 3 (July): 285-305.
Schofield, Norman, Gary Miller, and Andrew Martin. 2003. "Critical Elections and Political Realignments in the USA: 1860-2000." *Political Studies*. 51: 217-240.
Segura, Gary M. and Luis R. Fraga. 2008. “Race and the Recall: Racial and Ethnic Polarization in the California Recall Election.” *American Journal of Political Science*. 52, 2 (April): 421-435.
Shover, John L. 1967. “Was 1928 a Critical Election in California*?” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 58, 4 (October): 196-204.
Sides, John. 2016. “How Did The Dramatic Election of 1968 Change U.S. Politics? This New Book Explains.” *Washington Post*. May 25.

Smith, Adam I. P. 2015. "Beyond the Realignment Synthesis: The 1860 Election Reconsidered." *America at the Ballot Box*, 59-74. Gareth Davies and Julian E. Zelizer. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sterner, Bernard. 1975. "The Emergence of the New Deal Party System: A Problem in Historical Analysis of Voter Behavior" *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 6, 1 (Summer): 127-149

Sundquist, James L. 1973. "Whither the American Party System?" *Political Science Quarterly*. 88, 4 (December): 559-581.

Sundquist, James L. 1983. *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*. Revised ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Vandello, Joseph A. and Dov Cohen. 1999. "Patterns of Individualism and Collectivism Across the United States." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. August 1.

Young, Nancy Beck. 2019. *Two Suns of the Southwest: Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater, and the 1964 Battle Between Liberalism and Conservatism*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

Chasing Secretariat: Plato, Socrates, and the Education of the Horseman

John LeJeune[1]

[1]Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia Southwestern State University

ABSTRACT

If, in recent years, Plato's zoological analogies have drawn particular interest, pride of place goes to the horse. Drawing evidence from Plato's Apology, Phaedrus, Symposium, and Alcibiades, among others, I argue that situating Socrates' horse analogies in the context of Greek horse culture, Athenian class politics and education, and the city's recent political history deepens our understanding of Socrates' rhetoric and Plato's political thought. First, I argue that by calling Athens a noble horse and reiterating the horse analogy in the Apology, Socrates balances his harsh critique of Athenian democracy with a positive appraisal of the city's potential. The question is not how to change what Athens is but how to identify, train and harness its strengths. Second, Socrates' famous depiction of the soul in the Phaedrus—as a charioteer steering two horses, one noble, one ignoble—suggests an intimate philosophical link between the education of a horse and that of a human. Like the breaking and training of a noble horse, the purpose of noble education is not to weaken or enfeeble the spirit but to strengthen and cultivate noble spirits while also teaching them discipline. Third and finally, what bridges these themes is the problem of democratic leadership. In democratic Athens, Socrates does not depict himself as a metaphorical charioteer or even a trainer of Athens. Instead, he attempts to prepare other potential trainers, jockeys, and charioteers—aristocratic youths like Alcibiades and Critias—to play those roles. These spirited figures, as I discuss via the treatment of Plato's Alcibiades and Symposium, are Socrates' horses, which in turn are to be the trainers and jockeys of a more noble Athens. Viewed from this perspective, the horse analogy represents not only Socrates' political philosophy but also his practical political theory. Unfortunately, those training methods were ineffective.

Introduction

Plato's writings are steeped in images and allegories (Collobert et al. 2012; Destrée and Edmonds III 2017). As Debra Rosenthal wrote, "Plato made the political world intelligible by using metaphors and analogies" (Rosenthal 1982, 283), and we should take this literally.[1] Even for philosophers, absolute knowledge is fugitive, and images are a helpful place to start. But for the masses as well, familiar images democratize philosophic discussion by opening it to the layman. They engage common sense and encourage people to share opinions, which can then be tested and criticized, withdrawn or modified. This is the beginning of philosophical dialog, and it is no surprise that Socrates the philosopher embraced this approach to engage the person in the street. Analogies can also mislead, however, and that too is part of their use. For as Michael Naas writes, the use of "analogy or metaphor allows one to select out some common attributes of disparate things without having to affirm any kind of identity between those things" (Naas 2015, 52). If an interlocutor can illuminate to others where simple analogies do not hold, that too is instructive.

Analogies are not just tools of analysis—they are tools of rhetoric. And while many analogies can be profitably analyzed absent any context at all, their use is culturally embedded. Accordingly, analogies inherently and often deliberately have a social, historical, political, and rhetorical resonance all their own, which their audience will understand without explanation, and which will vary by time and place. Consider for example the relative ease, until today, of digesting Socrates' frequent references to craftmanship in Plato's works. On the surface, Socrates uses craftsmanship analogies to make a simple point to his interlocutors—that while the people naturally defer to experts with regard to most crafts (and thus recognize the legitimacy of the rule of knowledge with regard to those things), they curiously do not do so with politics, and therefore should seek to better understand this contradiction and correct it.[2] At the same time, when Socrates turns the Athenian craftsman's technical

[1]Famous examples of Platonic imagery are myriad. To mention the most obvious, they include the *Republic*'s "allegory of the cave" and "parable of the ship," which illustrate the experience of philosophy and the flaws of democracy. In addition, Plato's use of medical and medicinal images (King 1954; Lidz 1995; Naso 1990; Moes 2001; Levin 2014), the metaphor of light and the Sun (Notopoulos 1944a; 1944b; Wheeler III 1997), and Euclidean exercises like the *Republic*'s "divided line" (Notopoulos 1936; Hackforth 1942; Denyer 2007) and *Meno*'s geometric lessons (Bedu-Addo 1983; 1984) have been studied at length. Finally, and as referenced below, the analogy between city and soul virtually defines Platonic political theory (Williams 1997; Ferrari 2005; Blössner 2007). For all his attention to unvarnished truth, it seems that images are Plato's main teaching heuristic.

[2]In a representative passage, Socrates says to the title character in the *Protagoras* (Plato 1997, 319b-d): "I maintain, along with the rest of the Greek world, that the Athenians are wise. And I observe that when we convene in the Assembly and the city has to take some action on a building project, we send for builders to advise us; if it has to do with the construction of ships, we send for shipwrights; and so forth for everything that is considered learnable

knowledge on its head—to highlight its political and philosophical limitations—this marks a sharp social and political critique of democratic Athens that Plato's audience would have recognized, and which may have contributed to Socrates' death.[3]

In recent years, Plato's zoological analogies have drawn special interest. And among the many of Plato's "philosophical beasts" (Bell and Nass 2015), pride of place goes to the horse. For as Jeremy Bell writes, "the horse has forged an exceptionally broad path throughout Plato's corpus, one that cuts across nearly every text and terrain therein," appearing in "no fewer than twenty of the dialogues," and "invoked in order to illustrate issues as varied as rhetoric (*Phaedrus* 260b-c), recollection (*Phaedo* 73e), eugenics (*Republic* 459b), education (*Republic* 413d; *Apology* 20a), ontological difference (*Phaedo* 78e), military training (*Republic* 467e, 537a), hedonism (*Philebus* 67b), and eroticism (*Phaedrus* 253d-254e)" (Bell 2015, 116 and 128, nt. 1). And like craftmanship, the horse and horsemanship were not value-neutral, but imbued in Athens with rich social (wealthy vs. poor; noble vs. vulgar) and political (democratic vs. oligarchic) significance.

Amongst Plato scholars, two horse analogies have received the most attention—one equine, the other equestrian. The first example, found in Plato's *Apology*, occurs immediately prior to Socrates' conviction on charges of corrupting the youth and impiety. As usually translated, it finds Socrates comparing himself to a "gadfly," and the city of Athens to a "great and noble horse":

Indeed, men of Athens, I am far from making a defense now on my own behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you from wrongdoing by mistreating the god's gift to you by condemning me; for if you kill me you will not easily find another like me. I was attached to this city by the god—though it seems a ridiculous thing to say—as upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. It is to fulfill some such function that I believe the god has placed me in the city. I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company. (Plato 2002, 30d-31a)

The second example, which occurs in the *Phaedrus*, involves a discussion about the relation between erotic love, sexual gratification, and moderation, in which Socrates analogizes the human soul to the image of a charioteer steering two very different horses:

Of the nature of the soul, though her true form be ever a theme of large and more than mortal discourse, let me speak briefly, and in a figure. And let the figure be composite—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteers of the gods are all of them noble and of noble descent, but those of other races are mixed; the human charioteer drives his in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a-b)

In Plato scholarship these images are usually analyzed separately, drawing little attention to the continuities suggested by the horse analogy. But in what follows, I link these and other related Socratic texts via this bridge. I argue that close attention to Socrates' horse analogies, read in the context of Greek horse culture, Athenian class politics and education, and the city's recent political history, deepens our understanding of Socratic rhetoric in Plato's texts, as well as Plato's (and/or his Socrates') political thought as a whole. I argue that of all analogies in the Socratic corpus, the horse most encapsulates Socrates' practical approach to politics.

But making this argument requires some rehabilitation. For even in the *Apology*'s famous account of the "gadfly," the horse suffers from neglect. As Jeremy Bell (2015, 115) rightly notes, there is a "pervasive tendency of scholars to overlook, dismiss, or downplay the other image that Socrates invoked in this passage, the image of the horse." "To be sure," he writes, "Socrates is a gadfly, but only insofar as Athens is a horse."

In an otherwise highly nuanced analysis of the passage, for example, Michael Naas (2015) focuses almost exclusively on the political and philosophical significance of the "gadfly," even crediting Socrates' Greek with indirectly coining an English term: "Socrates," he writes, would "seem to have been the first example or first specimen of this uniquely American species of gadfly, an individual who might be considered a horsefly, from the point of view of those being provoked, but who is considered to have a positive influence or to administer a positive stimulus by those who truly understand the role of gadfly" (Ibid, 54). Drawing parallels between Socrates and the tradition of American civil disobedience and free speech, Naas argues that "Socrates would

and teachable. But if anyone else, a person not regarded as a craftsman, tries to advise them, no matter how handsome and rich and well-born he might be, they just don't accept him. They laugh at him and shout him down until he either gives up trying to speak and steps down himself, or the archer-police remove him forcibly by order of the board. This is how they proceed in matters which they consider technical. But when it is a matter of deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born, low-born—it doesn't matter—and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without any prior training under a teacher."

[3]Oded Balaban (2007, 7), for example, has argued that Plato's frequent use of craftsman analogies "does indeed intend to introduce a new meaning of craft by shifting its focus from the expert knowledge of means (the tacitly presupposed view of common sense shared by the Sophists) towards the knowledge of ends." By criticizing the lack of philosophical wisdom among Athens' working classes, Socrates directly (and daringly) challenges the political competence of precisely that class of citizen—the middle-class tradesmen—who benefitted most from Athenian democracy. On this point and at some length, I.F. Stone (1989, 119) details how Socrates, in the *Apology* and elsewhere, expressed "the kind of disdain that an aristocrat felt for the 'vulgar tradesmen' who had begun to make their appearance in politics, of 'low birth' but sometimes of larger fortune than the aristocrats." Stone goes on to cite how, "A private case pleaded by Demosthenes about half a century after the death of Socrates reveals that snobbish remarks about a person's humble origins or trade were then punishable in Athens under the law against *kakegoria* ('bad-mouthing'), which covered various forms of slander," and how "Socrates' own attitude towards 'traffickers in the market-place' may have played its part in provoking his chief accuser," the "master tanner" Anytus (Stone 1989, 119-120).

appear to be the very essence of a *political* gadfly, an individual who stings, awakens, goads, and rouses, who is anything but blind and who knows what is best for the state and its inhabitants, or who at least knows that complacency and stupor are not in their best interest" (Ibid, 55).

This argument is compelling on its face—there is no better proof than Martin Luther King, Jr.'s description of himself from a Birmingham jail as a "nonviolent [gadfly]" that exists to "create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal" (King 1992, 87). But in giving analytical pride of place to the "gadfly," it overlooks the symbolism of the horse. Socrates did not call just *any* city a horse—he called *Athens* a horse; and he chose a *horse* over all other animals. Why was this? Focusing solely on the gadfly, at the expense of the horse, obscures the interaction between the two, and how the symbolism of being called a great and noble, but sluggish horse, would have resonated in particular ways to an Athenian audience. [4]

In another study, Josiah Ober (2003) calls Socrates' equine metaphor "tongue-in-cheek," because Socrates himself says it "seems a ridiculous thing to say" (30e, Grube translation). But there is equally compelling reason to take the analogy seriously on its face, for as Ober also notes, the gadfly-horse image "recalls the point of [Socrates'] earlier horse-training analogy when refuting Meletus: the mass of Athenian citizens, like their children, can best be regarded as a lazy beast in need of being disciplined by the rare individual who understands what is in fact good for them. On this reading, popular ideology is no better than a state of sleep, popular opinions are mere dreams. The people only come awake, and then momentarily, when stung by Socrates." Thus, however ridiculous the analogy may "seem," the horse analogy binds two critical moments in the *Apology*—the moment when Socrates criticizes Athenian political institutions most directly, and the moment when he defends his philosophical pursuits in religious terms. It is therefore no Olympian leap to take the horse analogy seriously, and to credit Socrates for his irony.[5]

Finally, in the aforementioned analysis by Jeremy Bell, the *Apology*'s horse analogy does receive a refreshingly sustained treatment. Bell highlights, for example, that "What comes to the fore in the image of Athens' equinity is not the horse in an unqualified sense but the horse as the embodiment of an animal whose endogenous vigor has been lost amid the myriad and unbridled values, beliefs, and desires structuring the daily life of the *polis*" (Bell 2015, 117). In this context, argues Bell, Socrates' philosophy represents a "politics of care" (Ibid, 117), and Socrates' actions vis-à-vis Athens are "to be likened to one who trains an otherwise wild or unruly horse to be tame and good" (Ibid, 118). Tameness should not be misunderstood as docility. It is, rather, a certain training of the spirit, the practice of self-government or care over the soul's desires, a philosophical cultivation that steers those desires in the right direction, at the right pace (Ibid, 124). The process of philosophy is thus something more akin to the "process of breaking an untamed foal or colt, which, because of its excessive wildness, requires many bridles or trainers" (Ibid, 120).

Bell's analysis clears a path for further inquiry. Perhaps most notably, it builds an explicit bridge between Plato's *Apology*, where Socrates compares Athens to a horse, and the *Phaedrus,* where Socrates analogizes the soul to two struggling horses steered by a charioteer. Bell (Ibid, 125-6) highlights, for example, how "in contrast to the *Apology,* where Socrates had compared himself to a gadfly or trainer taming his fellow citizens, the relationship [in the *Phaedrus*] has been internalized: one now stands in relation to *oneself* as a trainer stands in relation to a horse. One must tame oneself, one must become moderate (*sōphrōn*), in order to live a good life. Moreover, the necessity of training, taming, and ruling oneself extend beyond one's own good; it is also necessary in order to be of any benefit to another." Drawing the political implications of this, Bell writes that "this means that one must first rule oneself before ruling others."

On this sound theoretical foundation, however, Bell leaves many questions to others. First, if Socrates' "politics of care" is expressed through the metaphor of horsemanship, what does this mean *practically* for Athens? To what extent, and how, did Socrates think his actions would improve Athens? Second, taking Socrates' *Apology* seriously as rhetoric, how would Socrates' audience have processed this metaphor, and to what effect? In contrast to a beast of burden, a horse requires a trainer to break and exercise it, and a jockey or charioteer to steer it. If Socrates is neither of these—a mere "gadfly"—then who or what are these things in his normative scheme, and where does Socrates fit in? And finally, what might *that* training or steering—political education and leadership proper—actually look like? For provocatively, if Socrates accuses Athens of being a "somewhat sluggish" horse, then Athens' problem would seem to be of impotence, not excess.

In pursuing these questions, we inevitably risk stretching the horse image beyond its original intent, misleadingly turning a "tongue-in-cheek" metaphor into a political thesis. But the attempt is warranted not only because of the critical moments in which the metaphor appears, but also because it offers a novel and meaningful path into Plato's Socratic texts, where whatever Socrates' (or Plato's) larger intent, the symbolism of the horse is relevant and recurring. In addition, to focus on the horse metaphor enables a synthesis of diverse Platonic texts that shines a fresh light on the coherence of Plato's corpus and his

[4] At the conclusion of this study, it may be worth asking how our reading of King's use of "gadfly" would change if the same metaphor—the noble but sluggish horse—were used to describe America. Would the horse analogy have the same meaning to an American audience as to an Athenian one?

[5] See also Marshall (2017, 171), who argues in this context that "there is nothing inherently ridiculous about a god sending a gadfly; in [Aeschylus's] *Suppliant Women* and *Prometheus Bound*, it is treated as a serious matter that causes real pain." Ironically, Marshall writes this to support an argument that the Greek word in question, μωψ (*myops*), means "spur" rather than "gadfly" in this particular passage.

Socrates' larger philosophical project. This is especially true when also placed within the social and political context of ancient Athens. Thus, and only after a brief foray into ancient Greek horse culture, I make three distinct arguments.

First, I argue that by calling Athens a noble horse, and using the horse analogy multiple times in the *Apology*, Socrates balances his harsh critique of Athenian democracy with a positive appraisal of the city's essential character. In the *Apology*, Socrates does not call Athens a mule or an ass; he calls it a horse, an animal celebrated for precisely those things any noble city would desire—strength, energy, courage, even wealth. The question is therefore not how to change what Athens *is* at its core, but how to help Athens realize its unique potential—i.e. how to best train it.

Second, Socrates' famous depiction of the soul in the *Phaedrus*—as a charioteer steering two horses, one noble, one ignoble—suggests that there is an intimate philosophical link between the education of a horse and that of a human; that, in some sense, horses and humans are best educated in the same way. Until today, no animal more powerfully symbolizes the link between strength and spirit, beauty and grace, and education and nobility, than the horse. And like the breaking and training of a noble horse, the purpose of noble education is not to weaken or enfeeble that spirit, but to strengthen and cultivate noble spirits while also teaching them discipline. By Socrates' time, horse training techniques were well-developed, and a protracted discussion of horse training, used as a metaphor for human education, would have naturally inspired comparison.

Third and finally, I argue that what bridges these themes in the *Apology* and *Phaedrus* is the problem of democratic leadership. In democratic Athens, Socrates does not depict himself as a charioteer, or even a trainer of Athens proper—and indeed, his role is less direct. Day-to-day, he tries to prepare other potential trainers, jockeys, and charioteers—particularly the aristocratic Athenian youths like Alcibiades and Critias who follow him, and who *can* persuade an audience—to play those roles instead. These spirited figures, as I discuss with additional treatment of Plato's *Alcibiades* and *Symposium*, are Socrates' horses, who in turn (and if well trained by Socrates) are to be the trainers and jockeys of a more noble Athens. Viewed this way, the horse analogy represents not only Socrates' political philosophy, but his practical political theory as well; although to his unfortunate demise (as well as Athens'), his training methods were ineffective.

Horses and Horsemanship in Ancient Greece

As a point of entry, it is helpful to consider the cultural status of horses in ancient Greece and Athens; and here my summary draws extensively on Mark Griffith's extraordinary two-part analysis of this topic (2006a; 2006b). The first thing to note is that, in Socrates' world, the horse's social symbolism would have been widely assumed. As Griffith notes, "In Archaic and classical Greece, a high proportion of men and women of all social classes, both rural and urban, lived and worked closely with and alongside equids," and "many households kept one or more of these equids on the premises" (Griffith 2006a, 192). Moreover, "[I]t is no exaggeration to say that the Greeks of the Archaic and Classical periods were obsessed with horses" (Ibid, 201), although horse ownership (as distinct from donkeys or mules) was a privilege of the wealthy.[6]

In Plato's and Socrates' time, cavalry was not the dominant branch of Athens' military, particularly given the rough terrain of Attica and the growing preference during the era of the *polis* for hoplite infantry.[7] But its size had increased substantially in the mid-fifth century B.C. to as many as one thousand Athenian cavalrymen, as did its military role and *esprit de corps* during the Peloponnesian War against Sparta (431-404 B.C.) (Bugh 1988, 39, 80-81). Notwithstanding its late development, throughout Greece and not least in Athens, the horse in general had long been linked to the warrior's spirit and other forms of prestige. And as late as 600-400 B.C., the peak of hoplite warfare, Griffith reports that "horses and horsemen appear to be far more emblematic of Greek mentalities and fantasies of heroism than infantry warriors" (Griffith 2006a, 201).

Furthermore, "A domesticated horse's most positive characteristics (from a human point of view) were/are its speed, docility, loyalty, and elegant appearance. On the negative side, horses tend to be fragile, expensive to maintain, often skittish and panicky, and also sexually very excitable; and in the case of the Greeks, they were not bred to be sturdy enough to carry or pull heavy loads. So, because horses were generally employed only for battle, racing, elite transportation, and display, rather than menial 'work,' they might be regarded by some as 'lazy"' (Ibid, 198). This description reveals what, in ancient Greece, was an "aesthetic and ethical prejudice in favor of the horse's nobility and quasi-heroic status" (Ibid, 198, nt. 53), so that "*Hippotrophia* (horse breeding, training, and riding) was recognized throughout Greece as perhaps the most precious and distinctive marker of wealth, brilliance, and style (or, in the eyes of the less aristocratically minded, of luxury, extravagance, and waste)" (Ibid, 200). In Athens, *hippotrophia* was specifically associated with "excessive luxury, waste, and antidemocratic (or specifically pro-Spartan or pro-Persian) tendencies" (Ibid, 202). It would not have been lost on Socrates' audience, for example, that "In Sparta, *hippeus* was the official title for a full Spartiate" (Ibid, 201, nt. 68), drawing an analogy between the disciplined Spartan warrior citizens and a well-bred war horse.[8]

[6] "Since a horse consumes as much as six times the amount of barley that a man eats in one day, and the cost of buying one in the first place could support a family of six for two years, only the wealthy could afford one." (Stuttard 2018, 54)

[7] This is, of course, to say nothing of Athens' dominant navy for much of the century.

[8] Sparta's horse championing, like Athens,' shows that the military symbolism of horses did not depend on a correspondingly strong cavalry—that is to say, the horse's military symbolism was not an artifact of nationalism, but a Greek cultural phenomenon. Sparta, of course, fielded the most famous and mighty

Horses in Greece were not bred for menial tasks. They were bred "for war, for hunting, for play, for show. Rarely were they used to do *work*" (Ibid, 203). Perhaps most notably, as a symbol of luxury, ambition, and aristocratic display, they were often kept by the rich for chariot racing. This was in marked contrast to, say, the donkey, for which the cultural tendency "is one of condescension and disapproval: donkeys are inferiors, incapable of higher culture, and deserving only of the roughest treatment," and there is a "deeply entrenched cultural binary between the 'high-class' horse and 'low-class' donkey": "The horse is tall and elegant, long-haired, luxurious, refined, militarily spectacular and respected, distinctively named, finely adorned, expensive to keep, and fastidious in its diet, voice, and activities—and thus 'noble,"' whereas "the donkey is rough, cheap, coarse, noncombatant, hardworking (but sometimes recalcitrant), low-maintenance, anonymous, and thus 'ignoble, asinine,' even 'slavish"' (Ibid, 228).

The Greeks were thus prodigal in attaching human qualities—noble, slavish, or otherwise—to equids; and the upshot of this is at least two-fold. First, the appearance of a horse, donkey, or mule would naturally elicit associations of class, education, culture, and status, to which different citizens may have different reactions. Where (at least stereotypically) the poor or middle-class might cast resentful glances at horses and their owners for their luxurious and oligarchic propensities, those of wealthy or aristocratic backgrounds might see in horses a symbol of noble breeding, high culture, and imperial success. On the other hand, whether in religious or warlike depictions of Athenian figures and heroes, and whether on the Parthenon Frieze or the side of a large amphora, the horse image could ennoble Athens and all its citizens universally. Thus, when Socrates compares Athens to a "great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size," this analogy would resonate both strongly, and in several diverse ways. In some, it might invoke feelings of class resentment or social pride; in others, more charismatic images of brilliance and nobility, war and heroism, Olympic victory and citizen pride, would come to mind.

During Socrates' trial in 399 B.C., whatever polarizing tendencies that horse imagery may have had would have been amplified by events. The Athenian jury would likely have been dominated by the poor,[9] and their memories of the Athenian cavalry's collaboration with the cruel, traitorous, and oligarchic regime of the Thirty Tyrants (404/403 B.C.) would no doubt have been fresh. The cavalry fought bravely during the Peloponnesian War, and this period saw the height of its prestige. Recognizing the necessity of effective cavalry by the mid-5^{th} century, the Athenians supported its one thousand cavalrymen via state loans for horse purchases (*katastasis*), state supplements for horse depreciation, and an additional grain allowance (*sitos*) (Bugh 1988, 56-61). But "Whatever good service the cavalry had provided in the great war with Sparta was soon to be lost in the events of 404/3" (Ibid, 119). The restored democracy "immediately attacked the financial foundations of the cavalry" (Ibid, 129), and as Anderson (1961, 133-4) reports, when the Thirty were ousted, a prohibition on future political activity by their collaborators "seems to have been enforced especially strictly against the cavalry, who had held out in Athens until the end, camping under arms in the concert chamber, guarding the walls as infantry by night and carrying out dawn patrols on horseback." Even if cavalry service had not been disqualifying for certain offices, nonetheless "If it became known that a man seeking office had been a cavalryman in 404/3, he became open to attacks by his personal enemies or opportunistic rivals" (Bugh 1988, 140).

In addition to, and distinct from, these social and political resonances, there was also the philosophical. Unlike the donkey or mule, the horse (while not philosophical itself) bears a certain relationship to the philosophical. The donkey is built and bred for menial labor, and is not specially trained or skilled. As a pure physical specimen, it is not expected to learn, but only to work; and accordingly, there is little care by its owner for the capacity of its intellect or strength of its soul. The horse, on the other hand, learns. If it cannot be reasoned with, it can at least be taught, and it certainly can improve. The horse is a relational animal. It works closely and even intimately (in a physical sense) with humans. And while the relation between human (trainer/rider/charioteer) and horse is one of subordination, it is not simple domination. The horse is physically superior to the

hoplite army in all of Greece, and did not organize a cavalry until 424 B.C. out of military necessity (Bugh 1988, 12, 94). The Spartan example also shows how oligarchic and militaristic elements could smoothly combine in the symbolism of the horse.

Perhaps not coincidentally, horse politics proved more complicated in democratic Athens, often intersecting with class. As described by J.K. Anderson (1961, 128-9), "The ancient principle, that the capacity in which each man served was determined by his landed estate, was established at least as early as the beginning of the sixth century B.C. When the lawgiver Solon reformed the Athenian constitution he divided the citizens into four classes. . . the second class (called *hippeis* or 'knights') being required to furnish themselves with horses and serve as cavalry. This division of the citizens into classes persisted into the fourth century B.C., but by that time had long been an anachronism[.]" Indeed, "It may in fact be doubted whether any effective force of cavalry was ever raised under Solon's system," and it was only between 445-431 B.C., following a bungled invasion of Thessaly in which the weaknesses of heavy infantry against cavalry defense were exposed, that Athens raised a cavalry in earnest, consisting of one thousand men, and organized into ten squadrons of one hundred men from each of the city's ten tribes (Ibid, 130-131). But, and as discussed below, if "The pride taken by the whole city in this cavalry is reflected in the Parthenon frieze, carved in about 440 B.C.," then by Plato's/Socrates' time (and only a few years before Socrates' death) their reputation had soured dramatically, as members of this cavalry ("committed in a body") were known to be among the last holdouts in support of the oligarchic Thirty Tyrants (404/3 B.C.) (Ibid, 132-134; see Bugh 1988, 120-153).

[9] As an attempt to bring the poor into politics, Athens paid jurors a meaningful sum, although the composition of a typical Athenian jury at different times has been subject to dispute. Markle (2004, 96-97) argues that "jury and assembly pay was sufficient to allow citizens, who otherwise would have been compelled to work full time to support their households, to have leisure to serve on juries and to attend the assemblies," and that "those historians who maintain that Athenian juries and assemblies were composed predominantly of citizens of moderate property have misinterpreted statements made by the Attic orators. Contrary to their views, I will attempt to show that the orators are addressing juries and assemblies in which the poor, that is citizens who had no leisure, constituted the majority."

rider, and can easily hurt the rider or sabotage his aims.[10] One can beat a horse into submission, but few people can literally strong-arm it. Riding a strong horse leaves one especially vulnerable; but the alternative of a feeble horse that is so weakened or beaten as to lack strength and spirit (and thus danger) is also no good. So the art of horsemanship—breaking, training, and exercising a horse—involves much. On one hand, one must rear a horse to be physically and spiritually strong, even courageous. On the other hand, one must teach that horse to willfully respond to guidance. This in turn requires approaching the horse in relational terms, as a subordinate but also a partner.

Along these lines, in Athenian culture horse training was both a literal and symbolic model of the most noble education of Athenian youth. A symbolic depiction of this mindset is the famous Parthenon Frieze, sculpted in Socrates' early adulthood, in the age of Pericles. It is, writes Griffith, "perhaps the most celebrated of all sculptural monuments to have survived from Classical Athens," and "depicts a procession of Athens' finest, 165 young horsemen with their horses and chariots, arrayed in a glorious profusion of poses and costumes." Griffith further explains how, "It is indeed striking that, even at a period when hoplites and rowers were recognized... as providing the backbone of the city's military might, and the 'masses'... were properly regarded as the dominant sovereign political body, horses and horsemen continued to play such a central role in the city's self-image" (Griffith 2006b: 320). The inclusion of young elites alongside their horses is instructive, for in Greek writings, "Similar vocabulary (and mythology) is applied to the schooling of horses as to that of 'herds' of elite children and adolescents that were trained in gymnastic exercises, dance, athletic/military manoeuvers, and races. Diet, coordination of team formation, and, especially, musical responsiveness and elegance received close attention. For horses too, like these youthful humans, were thought to be distinctively 'musical' in ways that donkeys and mules were not" (Ibid, 317).

Historically, horse riding itself had been a vital component of aristocratic Greek education which, like other forms of physical education, was as much concerned with character as it was fitness (Demirel and Yildiran 2013, 193). These youths received not only the education of their bodies, but in learning to handle a horse, they acquired the moral and temperamental education of a leader, or even (metaphorically) a lover. A Greek rider "sat directly on his horse's back," which was "a very intimate and direct kind of contact" (Griffith 2006b, 322). And as they led the horse, they learned to balance the thrill of its power with the necessity of friendship, trust, and moderation in order to harness that power for mutual benefit. As Griffith's fascinating description continues:

Like a car or motorcycle, a horse or team of horses is far stronger and faster than a human rider or driver, and if properly directed—with just a quick dab on the gas pedal or brakes, or a deft flick of the steering wheel—can provide an exhilarating, superhuman surge of power as a virtual extension of the rider/driver's own potency and will. But, unlike a motorcycle or car, and more like a sexual partner, the horse has feelings and a mind of its own, and responds not just mechanically to the promptings and programmed directions of the rider (reins, voice, hands, knees, heels, goad, whip, etc.) but also out of its own experience, anticipation, desires, and (often most importantly) its previously learned sense of trust in the rider. (Ibid, 324).

Education of youths was similar to that of horses: the former "needed to learn to be obedient and disciplined, while still preserving a free and noble spirit; they had to be willing, dependable servants of others (their teacher or leader; their rider or driver) and yet also trusty and self-reliant comrades to their peers, as well as being potential leaders of others in due course" (Ibid, 332). Learning to ride a horse thus represented a symbolic consummation of a kind of educational cycle in which he who must learn to be led (like a spirited horse) was in turn being trained to lead.

The analogy linking this noble model of education to citizen or political education required no Olympian leap. In an echo of Aristotle's description of the virtue of a citizen as "the capacity to rule and be ruled finely" (Aristotle 2013, 1277a25-30), the most laudable education trained Athenian youths both to be ruled by virtue, and to nobly rule (or steer) others in the same way. If for some, particularly the poor and middle class, democratic political education was grounded in regular participation in Athenian juries and magistracies drawn by lot (rather than public education[11]), then for those with means, the foundations of political virtue were associated with private training of a more classical variety. Central to that training was a relationship with horses.

[10] My late father, a great horseman himself, lost one of his front teeth after being thrown from a quarter horse, and broke a leg after being tossed from another. On the life of a contemporary horseman, see Carey LeJeune, "A Wonderful Ride: A Tribute to Kenny LeJeune." *Thoroughbred Daily News* (online), December 10, 2020. This paper is dedicated to his memory.

[11] In his monumental work on Athenian democracy, Hansen (1999, 312) writes that in democratic Athens "[S]chools were private and perhaps too expensive for poor citizens. It is indeed a paradox that Athenian democracy on the one hand presupposed that its citizens could read and write and on the other hand took no public action to ensure schooling for them. In Plato's and Aristotle's utopias schooling is universal and compulsory and the lack of a public educational system was one of the most insistent criticisms directed by the philosophers against the democracy." However, compare with I. F. Stone (1989, 42), who writes that, "Elementary education for all citizens was achieved early in Athens, at least a century before Socrates, and literacy seems to have been widespread. This reflected the rise of democracy. But the higher education remained the monopoly of the aristocracy until Sophists came along. They provoked upper-class antagonism by teaching the arts of rhetoric—for an ability to speak well in public was the open door to middle-class political participation in the debates of the assembly and the higher offices of the city."

Socrates' Apology and the Education of Athens

This background in equine culture and Athenian education helps situate Socrates' description in the *Apology* of himself as a "gadfly" and of Athens as a "great and noble horse." On one hand, it suggests an extraordinarily limited political role for Socrates. A "gadfly" may awaken, annoy, or even stir to action, but a horse's typical response to this (swatting its tail, flexing its muscles, shaking its head, scratching its belly) hardly analogizes to training, leading, or exercising. Not much of the whole is affected by a single fly. Analogously, as Warman (1983, 48) notes, throughout the Platonic dialogues, "Socrates claims to use persuasion on individuals (not crowds, juries, etc.)." And as he says in the *Apology*, "It may seem strange that while I go around and give this advice privately and interfere in private affairs, I do not venture to go to the assembly and there advise the city," but "Be sure, men of Athens, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago," for "A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time" (Plato 2002, 31c-32a).

Socrates concedes, then, that he works on *only* individuals, shunning the role of statesman, politician, or even lawyer, and the charge against him of corrupting the youth is consistent with this approach. But this raises a question of efficacy, for his eventual fate notwithstanding, it is reasonable to ask why Socrates, if he genuinely intended to improve the city, did not attempt something more analogous to the jockey or trainer—if not as a statesman or Assembly speaker, then perhaps as an orator or speech-writer like the later Demosthenes. For in democratic Athens the stakes of effective speaking were high. Consider the example of Pericles, who convinced Athenians to expand their empire and use their imperial bounty to beautify the city; or Themistocles, who convinced Athens to use the spoils of their silver mines to build a navy; or, for that matter, notorious demagogues like Cleon, who could recklessly appeal to the irrational, selfish, and base desires of the masses. This is not to claim that Pericles or Themistocles represented ideal leaders (or Cleon the worst), but such men could and did decisively steer Athenian politics, empire, and culture into unexplored territories, even if the masses only erratically followed their lead.[12]

The pressure for further explanation is exacerbated by Socrates questionable claim that "if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I should have died long ago." This is not clear, for as Hansen (1995, 20-21) writes, "The trial of Sokrates is, in fact, the only attested case of an Athenian having been put on trial for what he thought and said," and that while "the condemnation and execution of Sokrates demonstrates that the Athenians did not always live up to their own ideals," nonetheless, "that those ideals were not just empty words is apparent both from the presumption that the trial of Sokrates was unique in Athenian history, and from the fact that Sokrates, after all, lived to be seventy although he must have criticized the democratic institutions regularly throughout his adult life." Socrates himself supports this point unambiguously in the *Crito*, in the conversation he constructs with the Athenian Laws to convince Crito that fleeing his death sentence under watch of bribed guards would be unjust (Plato 2002, 50a-54e), leading Hanna Pitkin (1966, 42) to conclude that Socrates "can find no fault with the Athenian laws, nor even with the Athenian way of administering them," but that "Only his own particular conviction and sentence are (almost fortuitously) unjust," and his "focus on his past acceptance of the laws and his gratitude to them is in fact an evaluation of the Athenian government."

So much for Socrates' curious abjuration of Assembly speaking. A separate forum for influencing the public in Athens was the courts, where lawyers, orators, and speechwriters, speaking to large citizen juries, and initiating or contesting criminal charges themselves, gave Athenian law its life. But Socrates also rejects this role—indeed he sneers at it.[13] They key moment comes in Socrates' cross examination of his accuser Meletus, where the charge against him of corrupting the youth is broached directly:

> Tell me, my good sir, who improves our young men? – The laws.
>
> That is not what I am asking, but what person who has knowledge of the laws to begin
>
> with? – These jurymen, Socrates.
>
> How do you mean, Meletus? Are these able to educate the young and improve them? –
>
> Certainly. [. . .]
>
> What about the members of the Council? – The Councillors, also.
>
> But, Meletus, what about the assembly? Do members of the assembly corrupt the young,
>
> or do they all improve them? –They improve them. (Plato 2002, 24e-25a)

In a stunning reproach of the very court (and jury) to which he is speaking, Socrates rejects the Athenian ideal of citizen education through (paid) public participation. Instead, and following this interchange, he refutes Meletus via an analogy to horse training. He says:

[12] Themistocles was famously ostracized, while Pericles was censured and fined after the first year of the Peloponnesian War, though he was quickly reelected as general. On the latter, see Thucydides (1972, 163).

[13] On the legal profession in Ancient Athens, see Chroust (1954) who notes, among other things, the extent to which "Socrates, when on trial for his life, emphatically refused to resort to such practices" (Ibid, 374) as were typical of Athenian lawyers, giving some sense of his attitude towards the profession.

> Tell me: does this also apply to horses, do you think? That all men improve them and one individual corrupts them? Or is quite the contrary true, one individual is able to improve them, or very few, namely, the horse breeders, whereas the majority, if they have horses and use them, corrupt them. Is that not the case, Meletus, both with horses and all other animals? (Plato 2002, 25b)

Socrates' analogy to horses is calibrated to challenge Meletus's (and the jury's) democratic sensibilities, and to force Meletus into a posture of self-critique. In light of the charges against Socrates, the symbolism is clear. The "horses" in question are the noble/wealthy youths he is accused of corrupting; and Socrates, assuming by analogy the role of their trainer, suggests that he, who provides a philosophical education, offers more of value to these young Athenian horses than democratic socialization via the Athenian Assembly or courts. In this respect, too, there may be an undertone of snobbery, insofar as the "horses" themselves would represent an elite class of citizens whose oligarchic sympathies would clash with the jurors.'

But by later casting Athenian democracy itself as a "noble horse," Socrates also hopes to *incorporate* the jurors, by appealing to their *own* noble spirits—to rein them *within* this analogy and the noble standard it sets. First, by posing the horse analogy to Meletus as a reasonable premise from which to discuss Athenian education, Socrates lures him into a snare; for though the mention of horses will no doubt trigger a panoply of class-based resentments amongst the jurors, it simultaneously cannot be rejected, for the horse image is deeply woven into Athens' noble self-image. Who would not want to be compared to a horse? Miletus, thus compelled to accept the premise that horse education is a reasonable analogy to Athenian youth education, can no longer consistently defend his prior argument that socialization to Athenian democratic institutions via public participation is sufficient.[14] When pressed on this issue, his becomes silent.

The philosophical contrast between Socrates' and Miletus's theories of education could not be starker. Miletus's attitude reflects a democratic political culture that Bernard Manin has defined by its "distrust of professionalism" based on a "general presumption. . . that every political function was performable by non-specialists unless there were compelling reasons to think otherwise," and all this "designed to safeguard the political power of ordinary citizens" (Manin 1997, 32; Sobak 2015). Socrates' horse analogy, on the other hand, draws a distinct contrast between Athenian amateurism and the professionalism with which a truly noble education—like that of a horse by a horseman—would be approached.

Thus, when Socrates later compares Athens to a "great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size," his purpose is not simply to castigate Athens, but to shame Athens via a direct appeal to its Greek sense of nobility—an appeal to the ideal reflected on the Parthenon Frieze, or the pride all Athenians attached to horse- and chariot-racing victories at the Olympic festivals, notwithstanding their monopoly by the wealthy.[15] Athenians, for all their democratic leanings, fancied themselves to be classically noble, and horse imagery contributed to that strong, courageous, and warlike self-image. Socrates' judgment in the *Apology* and *Crito* thus turns out to be not a one-sided indictment of Athens, but rather a strategic, rhetorical appeal to traditional conceptions of honor, tailored to a democratic audience. For the sake of their city, he urges them to consider a training regimen more befitting a horse, and less befitting an ass.

But how might this look in practice, and how does Socrates' role as "gadfly" realistically advance his cause? In the *Apology* and *Crito*, Plato does not pursue the analogy this far, and to answer these questions requires two further steps. The first step is to examine more finely the problem of democratic education, and Socrates' noble alternative to the Athenian model. For this, we turn to Plato's *Phaedrus*, which analogizes the human soul to a horse-drawn chariot. The second step is to link this model of education directly to political leadership. And this, I will proffer, can be done through consideration of Socrates' interaction with Alcibiades, perhaps the most spirited horse in all of Athens, in Plato's *Alcibiades* and *Symposium*.

Phaedrus, the Chariot, and the Erotic Model of Education

Plato's *Phaedrus* is a dialogue about love, moderation, and rhetoric; but its sum achieves a whole greater than its parts, for it offers a model of Socratic education refracted through the equine spirit and the art of horsemanship. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates analogizes the aspirational soul, the noble soul, to a "natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer," a team in which, of the horses, "one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed." Later in the dialog, Socrates further distinguishes the horses not only via their noble and ignoble status generally, but also (and part and parcel of this) via their respective virtues, drives, and self-discipline: "The [noble] right-hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose; his colour is white, and his eyes dark; he is a lover of honour and modesty and

[14] One might compare Socrates' approach here to the discussion in the *Republic* where Socrates compares those who seek resolution of social ills via the legal system to "those who are sick but, due to licentiousness, aren't willing to quit their worthless way of life. . . For all their treatment, they get nowhere, except, of course, to make their illnesses more complicated and bigger, always hoping that if someone would just recommend a drug, they will be—thanks to it—healthy" (Plato 1991, 425e-426a). Legal penalties are a paltry substitute for genuine education.

[15] Golden (2011, 5) calls it "remarkable that the Athenian democracy encouraged and supported sport despite the fact that successful competitors – in athletics as well as horse- and chariot-racing – were overwhelmingly drawn from the elite. The reason? The Athenians regarded training for and participating in sport as a physical and ideological preparation for war." In this vein, it is perhaps no surprise that Socrates' initial proposal for punishment was free meals at the Prytaneum, an honor typically bestowed on Olympian victors for their service to the state.

temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs no touch of the whip but is guided by word and admonition only," whereas "The other [ignoble] is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of a dark colour, with grey eyes and blood-red complexion; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur" (Plato, *Phaedrus*, Jowett trans.).

This description recalls a similar three-part image of the soul (and city) posited by Socrates in the *Republic*. There, Socrates suggested that the soul, like the city, was composed of rational, spirited, and appetitive parts, and the role of philosophy was to ensure that each part adopted "the practice of minding one's own business," which, "when it comes to being in a certain way, is probably justice" (Plato 1991, 433b). A healthy and harmonious order, argued Socrates, be it in the soul or city, depended on the rule of the philosophic over the whole, aided by a strong alliance between the philosophic and spirited parts. In this model, appetites are not banished from the soul or regime, and they remain essential and productive components; but they are subordinate to the other parts. The appetites must not rule the whole, nor ever coax the spirit to align with it instead of reason. As Ferrari (2007, 174) writes, "So long as both the calculative and the spirited elements have been properly educated and acculturated, [Socrates] explains, they will work together to ensure that the desiring element does not grow strong through satisfying bodily pleasures and then attempt to usurp authority and enslave the other elements." Instead, philosophy aligns with, ennobles, and ultimately guides the spirit in the pursuit of beautiful endeavors.

At least superficially, Socrates' chariot analogy in the *Phaedrus* aligns with this approach. In the *Phaedrus*'s charioteer analogy, the soul has three parts. The charioteer, the leader who steers the two horses, seems analogous to reason; the "noble" or "good" horse represents the timocratic (or noble warrior) spirit; while the "ignoble" or "bad" horse represents the baser appetitive drives (see Guigon 2021, 20-21, and nt. 8; Bell 2015, 130, nt. 23). But upon inspection, the comparison is not so simple. The two horses (which seem to correspond to spirit and appetite) are not related (as in the *Republic*) by a clear relationship of rank or subordination; in fact, they appear to be equal partners, running in parallel and equally subject to the rule of the charioteer, who must somehow not only discipline both but get them to cooperate on equal terms. The climax of this problem comes at a moment when, as Socrates describes it to Phaedrus, the soul is confronted with the image of beauty and consumed by the erotic desire to consummate, and must determine how to act. The scene, which is loaded with sexual imagery, is worth quoting at length:

Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul warmed through sense, and is full of the prickings and ticklings of desire, the obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains from leaping on the beloved; but the other, heedless of the pricks and of the blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them.

And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved; which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty like an image placed upon a holy pedestal. He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and his whole soul is bathed in perspiration; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow-steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion. Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time. When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he, on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near again. And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth. and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever; he falls back like a racer at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and-jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear. And from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear.

And so the beloved who, like a god, has received every true and loyal service from his lover, not in pretense but in reality, being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer, if in former days he has blushed to own his passion and turned away his lover, because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced, now as years advance, at the appointed age and time, is led to receive him into communion. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, Jowett trans.)

This passage has received substantial analysis. Recently, for example, Guigon (2021) has highlighted the brutality of the scene, arguing that, throughout the Platonic corpus, one finds a consistent theme through which the appetitive drives can only really be subordinated through violence, even where reason or philosophy must command that violent attack. Meanwhile, Belfiore (2006) interprets the example as a religious allusion to the sublimation of enthusiasm in religious choral dances, with

Socrates playing the role of charioteer, and the black horse functioning as a satyr-like creature that initiates a necessary (if also reckless) engagement with beauty. This initiation is important because the white horse may, because of its extreme discipline, be too modest to engage erotically with beauty. In other words, modesty that is itself excessive is also debilitating, for it blocks any consummation at all with beauty. Therefore it, too, needs an erotic push. These arguments are complementary. They address how modesty and desire must, through philosophic engagement, work in coordination to achieve a proper relationship. Beauty must be engaged, and true love should be consummated—but not pruriently.

To reiterate, three points warrant emphasis. First, as Belfiore points out, the scene illustrates how, "All three capacities [reason, spirit, and appetite], and not only a rational part of the soul, are given an essential and positive role in striving towards the good and the beautiful, and each capacity is represented as having certain defects." Second, and subsequently, a noble and philosophical disposition, itself a product of education, requires a certain harmony or balanced relation between the three, and in particular between noble modesty and erotic desire, mediated by philosophy: "The black horse represents an impulse to move in bold and disorderly fashion toward erotic objects, while the white horse represents the impulse to stand still and to resist these objects. Both horses are able to use and to follow reason and are therefore capable of being trained by the charioteer, who must also train himself to guide them without imposing excessive restraint or yielding to the impulse to move forward without any restraint" (Belfiore 2006, 190-1). Third and finally, erotic desire is not to be despised; it is, rather, a force to be harnessed and guided. For spirit to approach beauty, it must be spurred by desire; but for desire to not profane beauty, it must be restrained. Erotic desire is satisfied as beauty is approached—but at a noble trot, not a sprint.[16]

Reading the charioteer myth as a statement on Socratic education, a glance at Greek horsemanship may again be instructive, if only by the roughest analogy. Most fundamentally though, and as discussed in a thorough study of Ancient Greek horsemanship by J.K. Anderson (1961), who in turn leans heavily on Xenophon's study "On Horsemanship" (Xenophon 1997), it was widely recognized that the best horseman would similarly recognize that the proper training of a horse was not to weaken its spirit or desire, but to strengthen its body and nurture its spirit while, at the same time, making both amenable to the sound direction of the rational rider.

In this vein and provisionally, it is instructive to first contrast the philosophy of horse training with the lack of art used with donkeys. As Anderson reports, dating to the Bronze Age, cart animals like donkeys "had their heads left completely free, being guided only with a long whip or stick, with which they could be tapped on this side or that... Sometimes they were urged on with a goad, but it does not seem to have been thought necessary to have a means of restraining them—a fact which suggests that they were often overloaded and in miserable condition" (Anderson 1961, 66). Donkeys thus had no appreciable spirit or intellect, and were not "taught" anything. In contrast, "Most nations have managed their horses through direct control of the head. This is generally achieved either by pressure upon the outside of the nose, or by pressure upon the sensitive parts inside the mouth, or by a combination of both" (Ibid, 40); and, "In the classical period—roughly the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.—when men rode more than they drove, bits of new forms, with very severe mouthpieces, had been devised" (Ibid, 64). Greek horses had no stirrup or saddle; and though they were appreciably smaller than the modern horse, the absence of these tools made the importance of sound training—for spirit, strength, courage, *and* obedience—all the more important, given how easy it would be to throw, let alone buck off a rider.

The most important reference of the period is Xenophon's (1997) *On Horsemanship*, and careful reading of this treatise gives added relevance, and some interesting contrast, to the analogies we have drawn between noble Socratic education and horsemanship. Xenophon was a follower of Socrates and an accomplished horseman (Ibid, 65). And his writings on horsemanship mark an insightful moment of intersection in this regard.

Much of what Xenophon says about horses and horse training will by now sound familiar. A well-trained horse, he says, will be neither too sluggish, nor too spirited, for "those [horses] which are either so sluggish that they often need urging on, or so high-spirited that they often need careful coaxing, make constant demands on a rider's hands and adversely affect his morale in times of danger" (Ibid, 101). Accordingly, Xenophon frequently advises on how to encourage spiritedness and test a horse's character (Ibid, 98, 100). He gives specific advice on "the best way of managing a horse in case it turns out to be either excessively lively or excessively sluggish," noting for example that, "the first thing to appreciate is that spirit in a horse is the equivalent of anger in a human being. So just as the best way to avoid infuriating someone is not to say or do anything that will irritate him, you are least likely to arouse a high-spirited horse if you avoid annoying it" (Ibid, 112). When a horse is very spirited, the rider should avoid a "sudden wrench" to calm it down, and should "stop a spirited horse from ever reaching its top speed," and "of course you should never let it race against another horse (remembering that the most high-spirited horses are also the most competitive)" (Ibid, 112-3). Regarding "managing a lazy horse," his explanation is terse: "always do the opposite of what I said for a lively horse" (Ibid, 113). The art of training a horse, then, is very much an art of balance—of exciting a horse's spirit to the point of being useful, but not overly so. Xenophon even calls "the best piece of advice I can give" that "if

[16]There is much in all this that alludes to male relations in Athens between the older, pursuing *erastes* and youthful *eromenos*. On homoerotic themes in the *Phaedrus*, see Dubois (1982); and on the general theme of Greek norms surrounding homoerotic pursuit and flight, courtship and copulation that bears some relation to the *Phaedrus*'s charioteer myth, see Dover (2016, 81-100).

you need a horse for war. . . to not get one that is too high-spirited" (Ibid, 113).[17]

This sounds fine in theory. But the challenge of horsemanship involves the complexity of lessons to be taught to an animal not endowed with reason. For to be useful, a horse must be dignified and disciplined; cooperative, trusting, and trustworthy; and it must get along with people as if they shared a common sense; and yet it must do so without philosophy, since "Whereas the gods have given us human beings the ability to use reasoned argument to teach other people what to do, you can obviously not used reasoned argument to teach a horse anything." And so the approach must accordingly be more crude: "The best way for you to teach a horse what it is supposed to do is to reward it when it does what you want and punish any disobedience" (Ibid, 111-2).

Still, Xenophon is adamant that a horse, even if it is not philosophically rational, must at least *understand* what it is doing, and not simply be brutalized into submission. For not only is this likely to be counterproductive (with responses varying depending on its strength of spirit), but "when a horse acts under compulsion it does not understand what it is doing, and the action is just as inelegant as a dancer's movements would be if he were trained by whip and spur." Indeed, "Under that kind of regime the same goes for a horse as a human being: both of them are far more likely to look ugly than attractive. No, however dazzling and attractive a display the horse is required to put on, it always has to do so of its own accord, acting only on the aids the rider gives it" (Ibid, 117). A well-trained horse thus must develop trust with its rider or trainer—believing especially that good actions will be rewarded, and that so far as it listens to commands, it will never be harmed. It must also be trained for courage, rather than fear, relying again on its confidence in the rider, as well as familiarity with different situations through prior exposure and positive associations, and a general composure in novel situations modeled to it by its rider and other horses: "The single most important precept and lesson is never, in any of one's dealings with the horse, to get angry with it. The point is that anger and foresight do not go together, and so we often do something that we are bound to regret later." In potentially frightening situations, for example, "Compulsion and blows only make the horse more afraid" (Ibid, 106). One is more apt to succeed through patience, camaraderie, and stern but mostly positive reinforcement.

Finally, under extraordinary circumstances, particularly where there is early need of moral training, the horse may require a slightly violent intervention to move it towards understanding. Thus, though Xenophon offers little description of the early "breaking" in of a horse, he does suggest that a trainer early on carry "at least two bits," and that, "One of them should be smooth and have good-sized discs, while the other should be rough and have heavy, small discs." Indeed "the pimples of the rough bit should be sharp enough to hurt the horse when the bit is inserted into its mouth and make it drop the bit into place; when it is given the smooth one instead, then, it will be such a relief that it will carry out on the smooth bit everything it has been trained to do on the rough bit" (Ibid, 114). Elsewhere, particularly when a horse hesitatingly confronts a ditch or fearful jump, he suggests that "someone with a whip or a switch should give it as hard a whack as he can. . . and from then on you will never need to do that again." The rider should also use the spur to ensure that the horse jumps "with its whole body rather than trailing its hindquarters" (Ibid,110).

In sum the Greek art of horsemanship, though not a direct parallel with elite Athenian education, still offered a useful analogy to the philosophy behind it. Though the horse itself was not "rational," if its soul could be trained to respond to the reasoned guidance of the rider or charioteer, then the combination of man and horse would simulate—almost literally—the image of the soul Socrates depicts in the *Phaedrus*. Man himself plays the steering role of philosopher, and the art of horse training is to cultivate a strength of spirit and character in the horse that, without proper instruction, would be liable to excess and danger, but that with instruction can be capably (and in some sense knowingly, with some degree of understanding) steered towards the good. The harsh bit and painful whip are used briefly at early critical stages, but more enduring is an education in courageous experience, trustful camaraderie, and positive reinforcement. The spirited horse obeys the rider because he/she has come to understand that doing so is good. And though the relationship involves subordination, it is also one of love, and they are virtuous companions.

Conclusion: Socrates and the Tragedy of Alcibiades

To conclude, I want to suggest that from the combination of the images thus-far discussed—from the *Apology*, the image of Socrates as gadfly and of Athens as a great and noble but sluggish horse; and from the *Phaedrus*, of the noble soul as a horse-drawn chariot driven actively but moderately towards erotic love—it follows that Socrates' interaction with the noble aristocratic youths of his time can be interpreted, in alignment with this imagery, as a kind of noble horse-training, which prepared these same youths to one day ride the horse of Athens.

Though Socrates did not actively participate in the Assembly or the courts, as he notes at trial, he nonetheless *did* attempt to influence the politics of Athens, in a manner consistent with this model, through his sustained interactions with, and mentoring of, the noble aristocratic youths of his time. These were charismatic and influential men—speakers with the capacity to move

[17] Socrates makes much the same point in the *Republic* (Plato 1991, 491e), when he says to Adeimantus that, "Won't we say for souls too. . . that. . . those with the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get bad instruction? Or do you suppose an ordinary nature is the source of great injustices and unmixed villainy? Don't you suppose, rather, that it's a lusty one corrupted by its rearing, while a weak nature will never be the cause of great things either good or bad?"

the Assembly and either spur or calm its desires, plus the financial resources to influence Athenian public opinion (and beautify the city) in a variety of other ways. Notwithstanding Athenian democracy's general reliance on lotteries to fill most public positions, these young men had the potential to lead the city through elected positions like the generalships, their rhetoric in the courts and, perhaps most importantly, their speeches and proposals at the Athenian Assembly.

Socrates' interactions with these aristocratic young men, and their subsequent involvement in a number of sordid or seditius activities, including two short-lived but brutal overthrows of Athenian democracy in 411 and 404 B.C., contributed to the charge against him of corrupting the youth, and his subsequent conviction and death sentence for the same (see esp. Hansen 1995; Stone 1989). As Socrates saw it, though, these were potentially noble and spirited horses that, if properly trained, might in turn become the trainers, jockeys, or charioteers to lead the noble horse Athens towards its fullest, most beautiful potential.

If sluggish in learning, Athens certainly did not lack the spirit. As is well known, it was throughout Socrates' life the most wealthy, cosmopolitan, influential, and daring city in Greece. And in an extraordinary analysis of Athenian political culture, drawn from Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*, Steven Forde (1986, 439) attributes this spirit to—and describes imperial Athenian patriotism in terms of—"a kind of erotic attachment," or "erotic passion," through which "Athenians should become devoted, willing servants of the city by beholding its power, manifested every day in deeds, and becoming lovers of it." Pericles, the architect of Athens' empire, appreciated this disposition and encouraged it, for this erotic desire for glory, expansion, and propagation was the cultural basis of Athenian imperial greatness.[18] But like a good trainer, he also sought to rein that spirit in, as he saw in advance the catastrophic potential of unbridled Athenian spirit-desire without restraint. "Pericles' appeal to *eros*," writes Forde, "circumvents or supplants those conventional mechanisms of community, and seeks to bind the Athenians directly or immediately to the city, depicted as a beloved object." While on the other hand, "His policy for the war [with Sparta] in particular is to resist all temptation to indulge in imperial expansion for the duration" (Ibid, 439). But, "This is precisely the part of Pericles' policy that proved most untenable after his death," for "Among other things, [the Athenians] proved unable to resist the imperial temptation, and embarked on a vast project to conquer the island of Sicily. They did so, according to Thucydides, under the influence of erotic passion" (Ibid, 440).

Pericles rode the Athenian horse until his death. But in Socrates' account, he did not train it for virtue. The cultivation of Athenian spirit and desire was not disciplined under the bridle or bit, and the spirited horse had never truly been broken.[19] In Xenophon's terms, Pericles made the mistake of letting the Athenian horse run at top speed, at which point he was fated to lose control, while Athens would buck off and kick any rider who tried to rein it in. The erotic empire was consummated, not after a long period of education and nurture, but at the first moment of opportunity. And this corrupted Athens' relationship with empire from the start. Meanwhile, through his relationships with other talented and charismatic youths, Socrates hoped to train a different horse who might one day, in turn, transition to the role of trainer/rider himself, one with the capacity to add noble discipline to Athenian *eros* in ways Pericles had not.

Socrates' most famous attempt at such training was the charismatic Alcibiades—the adopted nephew of Pericles. "He was naturally a man of many strong passions," writes Plutarch, "the mightiest of which were the love of rivalry and the love of preeminence... But it was the love which Socrates had for him that bore strong testimony to the boy's native excellence and good parts... and, fearful of the influence upon him of wealth and rank and the throng of citizens, foreigners and allies who sought to preempt his affections by flattery and favour, he was fain to protect him, and not suffer such a fair flowering plant to cast its native fruit to perdition" (Plutarch 1916, 2.1, 4.1). Plutarch describes how "the love of Socrates, though it had many powerful rivals, somehow mastered Alcibiades. For he was good of natural parts, and the words of his teacher took hold of him and wrung his heart and brought tears to his eyes." And Alcibiades, "whenever Socrates found him filled with vanity and wantonness, was reduced to shape by the Master's discourse, and rendered humble and cautious" (Plutarch 1916, 6.1, 6.4).

[18] The Corinthians argued this to the Spartans in a debate preceding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, in language reminiscent of the *Phaedrus*: "[Y]ou have never yet tried to imagine what sort of people these Athenians are against whom you will have to fight – how much, indeed how completely different from you. An Athenian is always an innovator, quick to form a resolution and quick at carrying it out... Then again, Athenian daring will outrun its own resources; they will take risks against their better judgment, and still, in the midst of danger, remain confident... Think of this, too: while you are hanging back, they never hesitate; while you stay at home, they are always abroad; for they think that the farther they go the more they will get... *Of them alone it may be said that they possess a thing almost as soon as they have begun to desire it, so quickly with them does action follow upon decision*" (Thucydides 1972, 75-6, emphasis added).

[19] On this point Socrates criticizes Pericles most directly in the *Gorgias*, in a passage that leaves little doubt about the salience of the analogy between political education and horsemanship: "But tell me this as well," he asks Callicles, "Are the Athenians said to have become better because of Pericles, or, quite to the contrary, are they said to have been corrupted by him? That's what *I*hear, anyhow, that Pericles made the Athenians idle and cowardly, chatterers and money-grubbers, since he was the first to institute wages for them." Then, after highlighting the Athenians' censure of Pericles' prudent war policy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (when the people "came close to condemning him to death"), Socrates observes that "A man like that who cared for donkeys or horses or cattle would at least look bad if he showed these animals kicking, butting, and biting him because of their wildness, when they had been doing none of these things when he took them over. Or don't you think that any caretaker of any animal is a bad one who will show his animals to be wilder than when he took them over, when they were gentler?" Socrates then asks Callicles, "Is man one of the animals, too?" and when Callicles agrees, asks, "Wasn't Pericles a caretaker of men?...Well? Shouldn't he, according to what we agreed just now, have turned them out more just instead of more unjust, if while he cared for them he really was good at politics?...But Pericles certainly showed them to be wilder than they were when he took them over, and that toward himself, the person he'd least want this to happen to." (Plato 1997, 515e-516c)

Alcibiades appears in several Platonic dialogues, but for our purposes two are especially important.[20] First, in the *Alcibiades*, Socrates approaches Alcibiades as a young man for the first time. The dialog occurs just as Alcibiades is preparing to enter politics, and Socrates, apparently smitten with Alcibiades' beauty and spiritual potential, hopes to influence Alcibiades, who declares unabashedly his desire to, in Socrates's words, be "the most influential man in the city, and if you're the greatest here, you'll be the greatest in the rest of Greece, and not only in Greece, but also among the foreigners who live on the same continent as we do." Indeed, says Socrates to Alcibiades as the dialog commences, "you want your reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind" (Plato 1997, 105b-c).

Socrates claims to be the only man who can help Alcibiades achieve his goals; but in the process, he tries to convince Alcibiades that, since he knows little about justice (and mistakenly thinks that the skill of achieving "advantage" for Athens, absent a concomitant knowledge of justice, will be sufficient for successful leadership), it may be necessary to delay his entry into politics until his education with Socrates is complete. Socrates persuades Alcibiades that knowledge of justice is not only an end in itself, but will be essential if he is to achieve his political goals; and that if the city is to prosper under his leadership, then "it isn't supreme power you need to get for yourself or the city, but virtue" (Ibid, 135b). In the process, Socrates will often tickle Alcibiades' pride and ambition with comparisons to other great empires, like Sparta or Persia.

Horses also play a role. On more than one occasion, Socrates highlights to Alcibiades that, in attempting to understand how to rule a city, they must agree that they are no longer dealing with horses, but rather with people or citizens (Ibid, 124e, 125b). This statement would resonate, for not only was Alcibiades arguably the most famous horse owner in all of Greece, but the prestige of his horses would, later in life, become meaningfully intertwined with his political ambitions.[21] Alcibiades took seriously the prestige associated with his horses, and with rearing them properly. Now Socrates both raises and lowers the ante. On one hand, as Helfer (2017, 79) notes, "Rule over horses, Alcibiades recognizes, is nothing grand," and therefore he must come to understand "what is it about human beings living together in a political community that makes presiding over them so prestigious?" Alcibiades must see that his political ambitions are both more serious and important than horse racing (a pure competition), and also fundamentally different in nature, and potentially more noble and glorious if done well. At the same time, contrasting citizens with horses exposes a danger from the citizens not present in horses—a horse may be corrupted by a trainer, but it is not capable of *corrupting* its trainer in the same way as the people. Socrates thus expresses to Alcibiades his "greatest fear, that a love for the common people might corrupt you, for many Athenian gentlemen have suffered that fate already"—that is, his fear that Alcibiades' erotic desire for fame may seek early consummation before he knows what he is doing. "Get in training first," Socrates says, as if speaking to a noble horse, "and learn what you need to know *before* entering politics. That will give you the antidote against the terrible dangers" (Plato 1997, 132a-b).

The theme of Plato's *Alcibiades* thus centers on the relationship between Socratic education, political action, and the training of *eros*. Socrates recognizes Alcibiades' extraordinary spirit for politics, and the great potential for good or bad it harbors. As such, Socrates attempts to both spur and tame Alcibiades' spirit, to make it amenable to philosophic riding; in an erotic sense, it is to persuade Alcibiades that, if he truly desires glory, and thinks glory a noble and beautiful thing, he should not seek to consummate his erotic political desires just yet, or to run at a political sprint (as it were), until he has been broken, and until a philosopher has taken his reins.

Socrates tried his hand at horsemanship with Alcibiades, but in the end one cannot help but judge his attempt a failure. For while arguably no Greek of his time was ever more courageous (Alcibiades was known to have saved Socrates' life on the battlefield, served in the Athenian infantry, cavalry, and navy, and was a brilliant commander), or more skilled politically (having been appointed general at several points; having negotiated critical military alliances seemingly at will; and having miraculously rebuilt the Athenian navy after the failed Sicilian Expedition), none also was more infamous for his reckless ambition and self-indulgence—whether erotic indulgence in the physical sense (including impregnating a Spartan queen), ambition in a political sense (persuading the Athenian Assembly to approve and fund a suicidal mission into Sicily while still at war with the Spartans, which he would naturally lead, and in direct conflict with Pericles' advice), or shamelessness in a moral sense (having betrayed Athens to Sparta right after laying these plans, and after having been accused of numerous religious violations).

Socrates' failure is alluded to in Plato's *Symposium* in which, set "some fifteen years later, at the peak of Alcibiades' fame and shortly before the launch of the Sicilian Expedition" (Helfer 2017, 7), Alcibiades arrives to the party late and drunk, and acknowledges that although "Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame," yet "the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd" (Plato 1989, 216b). In this respect, the words of

[20] The most complete analysis of the engagement between Plato's Socrates and Alcibiades that I am aware of is Helfer (2017). I have benefitted greatly from this text.

[21] At the 416 B.C. Olympic Games, "Alcibiades entered…not one but seven chariots for the four-horse chariot race. Which meant that he brought with him no fewer than twenty-eight horses…It was both a shameless flaunting of extraordinary wealth and a naked statement of pure power—the acknowledged power of Athens and, more pointedly, the power to which Alcibiades aspired himself" (Stuttard 2018, 129). In an almost ludicrous outcome where both personal and political prestige were at stake, and where supporting an Athenian victory would be considered an act of significant public service, Alcibiades' horses won first, second, and third place.

Diotima delivered just earlier and approvingly by Socrates, on the topic of *eros*, anticipate our full previous discussion: "[W]hat Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is," she says to Socrates, but "Reproduction and birth in beauty," for "Look, if you will, at how human beings seek honor. . . I believe that anyone will do anything for the sake of immortal virtue and the glorious fame that follows; and the better the people, the more they will do, for they are all in love with immortality" (Ibid, 206e, 208c-e). Alcibiades, like the Athenian citizens, was pregnant with ambition. The Athenian masses erotically desired a glorious and wealthy empire for their city and themselves, and pursued immediate consummation; Alcibiades erotically desired the fame and glory of his leadership of these masses and this empire, and pursued immediate consummation.

Putting this together, we can better understand David Stuttard's recent argument that "It was partly Plato's ambition to clear his mentor's name by scorching any suggestion that Socrates was a malign influence on the *jeunesse dorée* of Athens, and demonstrating that it was in spite and not because of his teaching that they behaved the way they did," and that with respect to Alcibiades in particular, "we must be aware of Plato's agenda: if only Alcibiades had given himself over to Socrates' teaching, his fate and that of Athens could have been very different" (Stuttard 2018, 4). But the point must be understood in two senses—it is not just that Socrates did not corrupt Alcibiades (or, for that matter, others like Critias who would briefly lead the Thirty Tyrants)—it was that he tried his best to train him. For Alcibiades was a strong and spirited horse who needed training, and so was Athens. As the cultural legacy of Athens amply testifies, no city in the Greek world had a greater appreciation for beauty; and as history informs us, at its best no city in Greece had a more energetic and graceful spirit. Socrates was not only a "gadfly" to Athens, he was a "spur" to Athens towards something more noble and beautiful.[22] As his life, words, and actions attest, he thought Athens to be a noble and spirited horse, that needed a much better, and much different training. Socrates' courting of Alcibiades was an attempt to train one spirited horse to lead another. If the failure of this training contributed to his death, it was not for lack of desire.

References

Anderson, J.K. 1961. *Ancient Greek Horsemanship*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Aristotle. 2013. *Aristotle's Politics*, second edition. Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Balaban, Oded. 2007. "The Meaning of >Craft<($\tau\chi\nu\eta$) in Plato's Early Philosophy." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 49: 7-30.

Bedu-Addo, J. T. 1983. "Sense-Experience and Recollection in Plato's Meno." *The American Journal of Philology* 104, no. 3: 228–48.

Bedu-Addo, J. T. 1984. "Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's Meno." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 104: 1–14.

Belfiore, Elizabeth. 2006. "Dancing with the Gods: The Myth of the Chariot in Plato's 'Phaedrus."' *The American Journal of Philology* 27, no. 2 (Summer): 185-217.

Bell, Jeremy. 2015. "Taming Horses and Desires: Plato's Politics of Care." In *Plato's Animals: Gadflies, Horses, Swans, and Other Philosophical Beasts*, edited by Jeremy Bell and Michael Nass, 115-130. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Bell, Jeremy and Michael Nass, eds. 2015. *Plato's Animals: Gadflies, Horses, Swans, and Other Philosophical Beasts*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Blössner, Norbert. 2007. "The City-Soul Analogy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*, edited by G. R. F. Ferrari, 345-385. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bugh, Glenn Richard. 1988. *The Horsemen of Athens*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Chroust, Anton-Hermann. 1954. "Legal Profession in Ancient Athens." *Notre Dame Law Review* 29, no. 3: 339-389.

Collobert, Catherine, Pierre Destrée, and Francisco J. Gonzalez, eds. 2012. *Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths*. Leiden: Brill.

Demirel, Dugyu Harmandar and Ibrahim Yildiran. 2013. "The Philosophy of Physical Education and Sport from Ancient Times to the Enlightenment." *European Journal of Educational Research* 2, no. 4: 191-202.

Denyer, Nicholas. "Sun and Line: The Role of the Good." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*, edited by G. R. F. Ferrari, 284–309. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Destrée, Pierre and Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, eds. 2017. *Plato and the Power of Images*. Boston: Brill.

Dover, K. J. 2016. *Greek Homosexuality*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Dubois, Page. 1982. "The Homoerotics of the 'Phaedrus."' *Pacific Coast Philology* 17, no. 1/2: 9-15.

Ferrari, G.R.F. 2005. *City and Soul in Plato's Republic*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Ferrari, G.R.F. 2007. "The Three-Part Soul." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*, edited by G.R.F. Ferrari, 165-201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Forde, Steven. 1986. "Thucydides on the Causes of Athenian Imperialism." *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 2: 433-448.

[22] For the thesis that the proper translation of $\mu\omega\psi$ is "spur" rather than "gadfly" in the *Apology*, see Marshall (2017).

Golden, Mark. 2011. “War and Peace in the Ancient and Modern Olympics.” *Greece & Rome*, Second Series 58, no. 1: 1-13.
Griffith, Mark. 2006a. “Horsepower and Donkeywork: Equids and the Ancient Greek Imagination.” *Classical Philology* 101, no. 3: 185-246.
Griffith, Mark. 2006b. “Horsepower and Donkeywork: Equids and the Ancient Greek Imagination, Part Two.” *Classical Philology* 101, no. 4: 307-358.
Guigon, Camille. 2021. “Psychology and Violence in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*.” *The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence* 5, no. 2: 19-33.
Hackforth, R. 1942. “Plato’s Divided Line and Dialectic.” *The Classical Quarterly* 36, no. 1/2 (Jan.-Apr.): 1-9.
Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1999. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology*. Translated by J.A. Crook. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1995. “The Trial of Sokrates – from the Athenian Point of view.” *Historisk-filosofiske meddelelser* 71. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
Helfer, Ariel. 2017. *Socrates and Alcibiades: Plato’s Drama of Political Ambition and Philosophy*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
King, Lester S. 1954. “Plato’s Concepts of Medicine.” *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 9, no. 1: 38-48.
King, Jr., Martin Luther. 1992. *I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, edited by James M. Washington. San Francisco: Harper Collins.
LeJeune, Carey. 2020. “A Wonderful Ride: A Tribute to Kenny LeJeune.” *Thoroughbred Daily News*, December 10, 2020. https://www.thoroughbreddailynews.com/a-wonderful-ride-a-tribute-to-kenny-lejeune/
Levin, Susan B. 2014. *Plato’s Rivalry with Medicine: A Struggle and Its Dissolution*. Oxford University Press.
Lidz, Joel Warren. 1995. “Medicine as Metaphor in Plato.” *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 20, no. 5: 527-541.
Manin, Bernard. 1997. “Direct democracy and representation: selection of officials in Athens.” In *The Principles of Representative Government*, 8-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Markle, M. M. 2004. “Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens." In *Athenian Democracy*, edited by P. J. Rhodes, 95-131. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marshall, Laura A. 2017. “Gadfly or Spur? The Meaning of $\mu\omega\psi$ in Plato’s Apology of Socrates.” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 137: 163-174.
Moes, M. 2001. “Plato’s conception of the relations between moral philosophy and medicine.” *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 44, no. 3: 353-67.
Naas, Michael. 2015. “American Gadfly: Plato and the Problem of Metaphor.” In *Plato’s Animals: Gadflies, Horses, Swans, and Other Philosophical Beasts*, edited by Jeremy Bell and Michael Nass, 43-59. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Naso, William B. 1990. “Plato’s Physician Model.” *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 33, no. 4: 589-597.
Notopoulos, James Anastasios. 1936. “Movement in the Divided Line of Plato’s Republic.” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 47: 57-83.
Notopoulos, James A. 1944a. “The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the Republic of Plato. I.” *Classical Philology* 39, no. 3: 163-172.
Notopoulos, James A. 1944b. “The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the Republic of Plato. II.” *Classical Philology* 39, no. 4: 223-240.
Ober, Josiah. 2003. “Gadfly on Trial: Socrates as Citizen and Social Critic.” In “Athenian Law in its Democratic Context” (*Center for Hellenic Studies On-line Discussion Series*) edited by Adriaan Lanni. Republished in *Dēmos: Classical Athenian Democracy*, edited by A. Mahoney and R. Scaife, *The Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities* edition of July 31, 2003. https://www.stoa.org/demos/article_socrates@page=all&greekEncoding=UnicodeC.html
Pitkin, Hannah. 1966. “Obligation and Consent—II.” *The American Political Science Review* 60, no. 1: 39-52.
Plato. 1997. *Complete Works*, edited by John M. Cooper. Indianapolis, Hackett.
Plato. 2002. *Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo* (Second Edition). Translated by G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Plato. *Phaedrus*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedrus.html
Plato. 1991. *Republic*. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books.
Plato. 1989. *Symposium*. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Plutarch. 1916. *Alcibiades*. In Plutarch, *Plutarch’s Lives*, vol. 4. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Accessed at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0006
Rosenthal, Debra C. 1982. “Metaphors, Models, and Analogies in Social Science and Public Policy.” *Political Behavior* 4, no. 3: 283-301.
Sobak, Robert. 2015. “Socrates among the Shoemakers.” *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 84, no. 4: 669-712.

Stone, I.F. 1989. *The Trial of Socrates*. New York: Anchor.
Stuttard, David. 2018. *Nemesis: Alcibiades and the Fall of Athens*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thucydides. 1972. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin.
Warman, M.S. 1983. "Plato and Persuasion." *Greece & Rome* 30, no. 1: 48-54.
Wheeler III, Samuel C. 1997. "Plato's Enlightenment: The Good as the Sun." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 14, no. 2: 171-188.
Williams, Bernard. 1997. "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*." In *Plato's Republic: Critical Essays*, edited by Richard Kraut, 49-60. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Xenophon. 1997. *Hiero the Tyrant and Other Treatises*. Translated by Robin Waterfield. New York: Penguin.

Cryptocurrency Regulation Around the World

Daniel Weaver[1]

[1]Undergraduate Student, Department of Political Science, Valdosta State University
[*]2021 GPSA Pajari Award for best undergraduate paper.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this quantitative study is to examine the factors that predict cryptocurrency policy across 220 countries, with a focus on regulation and adoption. Cryptocurrency is rapidly becoming the center of attention in the realm of financial technology. The decentralized structure of crypto causes difficulty for countries to regulate and adopt it. This study analyzes seven independent variables: the amount of transparency, Freedom House score, per capita gross domestic product, foreign investment, school life expectancy, the population density of people, and the region/continent of countries. The impact of these variables on regulation and adoption is measured in this study using correlation analyses, scatterplot analyses, multivariate regression analyses, and boxplots. Five variables were found to be statistically significant: Freedom House score, per capita gross domestic product, foreign investment, school life expectancy, and region/continent of countries. Regional differences are evident, with regulation and adoption occurring less in the Eastern Hemisphere. Mixed evidence was found regarding the statistical significance of per capita gross domestic product and Freedom House score per country. The results of this study suggest that cryptocurrency regulation and adoption policy is dependent upon a country's Freedom House score, school life expectancy, per capita gross domestic product, foreign investment, and region.

Introduction

Cryptocurrency is the new phenomenon of the 21st century and has gained the most traction in 2021. A crypto coin is a digital asset that strives to become adopted as a currency like the U.S. dollar (USD). The U.S. dollar is losing value as time passes, but cryptocurrency is only in the beginning and increases value far faster than any other investment. However, because this "currency" or technology is so new, countries have yet to properly regulate or approve it for utilization. Most countries have reacted differently to regulating or adopting crypto, and several factors relate to how their actions differ. This project is driven by the research question of what factors predict cryptocurrency policy across countries.

This quantitative study examines the factors that influence how cryptocurrency is adopted and regulated in most countries around the world. Cryptocurrency operates on blockchain technology to solve real-world problems. One huge goal for cryptocurrency is to eliminate banks in the economy. Crypto allows for the users to be their own bank rather than use a third party to source the currency. This is one possible reason why some countries have banned crypto rather than trying to adopt it. People and governments also associate cryptocurrency with crime, but some argue otherwise. High rates of crime lead to corruption within a country and can end up corrupting a government. There are many challenges cryptocurrency faces before becoming widely adopted as it is in the developing stages. The following sections of the study will consist of a literature review, the data and methods, findings, and a conclusion, including which hypotheses were accepted or rejected and future directions for research.

Literature Review

Digital Currency

Money serves to function as an exchange, to be a unit for counting, and stores value for the people that utilize it. Fiat money has existed for centuries and has been used in a physical form until recently in the 21st century. The advancement of technology led to the creation of electronic money, which can now be exchanged across countries seamlessly. E-money is still considered to be fiat currency because it is centralized. Gurguc and Knottenbelt (n.d.) stated, "Fiat money is backed by a central government and allows central banks to conduct monetary policy, whereas cryptocurrency is a digital asset that operates independently of a central bank." Cryptocurrency is unique because it is decentralized and provides no single point of control or regulation. Both fiat and cryptocurrency value are based on supply and demand. Even though they compare, a sharp contrast is that fiat has existed for centuries while cryptocurrency has for a little over a decade.

Is cryptocurrency bad?

Although crypto expanded in 2021, it still faces several challenges in becoming widely adopted. Most governments have yet to figure out how to implement crypto as a currency to be taxed and regulated properly. Jeffrey mentioned cryptocurrencies

"are purely digital products, and our authorities are not geared to handle this advanced technology. That is why the lack of legislation regulating these digital currencies and providing any sort of user protection has become a huge challenge" (2020). Since crypto is entirely digital more people are being scammed every day because the same people getting scammed via phone calls and emails are the same type of people that become new investors. However, crypto scams can be very deceptive and fool more experienced people. The only real deterrent currently for scams is by sharing knowledge on detecting and avoiding scams. Informing people to keep personal data safe is essential when becoming a new investor in the crypto space. Without legislation supporting cryptocurrency, there are no consequences for people that steal crypto from investors or protection for the victims.

A big challenge for the crypto market is "the ability to track every transaction without the ability to track who sent the transaction will change the relationship between the citizen and the state" (Hughes 2017). There is not a solution invented yet that can track every transaction in the cryptocurrency market. Governments see this as a problem because they must rely on an honest system with the people. The problem is people lie and will hide these transactions from the government to avoid paying taxes or consequences, especially in countries that have banned the buying and selling of cryptocurrency. However, in the United States, the "IRS works with blockchain companies to identify cryptocurrency users" (Klasing 2018). Chainalysis works with the IRS to help track down potential users who are hiding their investments. Chainalysis is a blockchain analysis company that helps government agencies, cryptocurrency businesses, and financial institutions understand and engage the crypto space (Chainalysis 2021). The IRS also obtained a crypto user list from Coinbase back in 2017-2018 (Klasing 2018). Even if investors try to hide from the IRS, there is a good chance they will not be able to hide for long before the IRS finds out.

The Cyber-Digital Task Force (2020) stated three illicit uses for cryptocurrency: 1) buying and selling drugs, weapons, or servers, 2) money laundering and tax avoidance, 3) hacking and stealing crypto in exchanges or scamming investors (like a rug pull). Utilizing cryptocurrency for criminal activity is a huge threat for any government and a challenge that crypto needs to overcome before it becomes widely adopted. The bad reputation for crypto is based upon its use for buying and selling illegal items or services like drugs, child pornography, weapons, explosives, money laundering, and stolen identification which is not good for the future of its adoption. Many people may think that the hype around cryptocurrency in the last year would cause an exponential increase in the use of criminal activity surrounding cryptocurrency, when in fact, it is the opposite. A study released by Chainalysis in 2021 stated, "Cryptocurrency-related crime is falling, it remains a small part of the overall cryptocurrency economy, and it is comparatively smaller than the number of illicit funds involved in traditional finance." Based on the Chainalysis Crime Report (2021) data, cryptocurrency used for illicit activity has dramatically decreased since the massive increase in 2019. Ransomware and stolen funds were the only illegal activities that increased since 2019, while dark web activity and scams decreased. The crime report elaborates in great detail the relationship between criminal activity and cryptocurrency from 2017 to 2020. Cryptocurrency sounds like a gamble, but it has plenty of time for redemption and to prove that there is a utility with profit to gain.

The United States is opening a door for crypto: "As of 2019, 32 U.S. states have introduced legislation accepting or promoting the use of Bitcoin and blockchain distributed ledger technology (DLT), while a few have already passed them into law" (Insider 2021). Most of the U.S. states have passed legislation for crypto to tax and try to regulate it. New York was the first U.S. state to ratify legislation that regulates cryptocurrency companies (Insider 2021). Congress is currently working on legislation to pass regarding virtual currency, and it could shine some light on how to properly regulate it (De 2021). The Library of Congress released a statement on global cryptocurrency policy, "Some countries have passed policy to regulate crypto even to the extent of prohibiting the use, and others have left it unregulated, while the rest are adopting it" (2018). Even central banks within some countries have issued warnings to their customers that cryptocurrency is not an actual currency and they are highly volatile. Many of these banks are also required by law from their governments to include cryptocurrency under the same policies as money laundering, counterterrorism, and organized crime (Library of Congress 2018). Algeria, Bolivia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, and Vietnam all ban activities involving crypto (Library of Congress 2018). Countries like Spain, Belarus, and Luxemburg have developed regulation policies for cryptocurrency but ones that do not hurt the markets to help adopt the blockchain technology (Library of Congress 2018). Once countries start to realize the real-world use and potential that cryptocurrency holds, more countries will start to adopt it instead of just banning it or treating it as taxable security.

Predictors of Cryptocurrency Policy

Although cryptocurrency may be looked upon as magical, confusing, and risky, it is controlled by supply and demand just like any other market. Traders, investors, and users of cryptocurrency see freedom in the market because transactions are not stored by a third party. Privacy is a huge concern for most people, and crypto can help to protect that privacy. Privacy and freedom in human rights are traded for security from a government. People see cryptocurrency as an avenue to secure private matters such as online browsing or in-store transactions. Africa contains many countries where the population uses cryptocurrency. "Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria rank among the top ten nations globally for cryptocurrency usage" (Nault 2021). Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria all provide at least some individual rights to their people, according to Freedom House (2021). In comparison, the people in Algeria, Chad, Libya, and Zimbabwe are not free and utilize cryptocurrency less.

Freedom may play a role in the adoption and regulation of cryptocurrency, so education may do the same. Education

typically has a relationship with investments and financial decisions. "Lower income, wealth, age and education are associated with less diversified portfolios, higher trading frequency and lower financial performance" (Ante et al., 2021). A German study found that "crypto investors are significantly more likely to be male, significantly younger, earn significantly more, and are significantly more educated than the rest of the population" (Ante et al., 2021). According to the CIA's World Factbook, Germany has a school life expectancy of 17 years, which is higher than males in the United States (2019). Since education relates to crypto investments in Germany, other educated people around the world are likely to follow.

One of the most populated countries is India, with over a billion people and one of the fastest growing economies. Jani found that "Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have been operating within India for a number of years now" (2018). They even have Bitcoin ATMs throughout the major cities. Even though India has adopted and regulated cryptocurrency, China, another country with over a billion people, has banned cryptocurrency trading (Jani 2018). However, most countries with a high population density are friendly toward cryptocurrency. These countries have either adopted it or passed regulations to allow the use of crypto for their residents. For example, the United States and Canada have passed legislation that taxes cryptocurrency transactions just like trading stocks or other assets. Mexico has one of the largest financial technology markets in the region and is a leader in the crypto exchange trading of Latin America (Jani 2018). The majority of the Western Hemisphere accepts cryptocurrency and is looking to regulate it while providing legal access for their population.

A Russian study conducted in 2018 concluded that out of 40 countries, 19 allowed cryptocurrency in their country (Krivoruchko, Ponamorenko, and Nebula). The 19 countries equaled 59 percent of the gross domestic product of the total examined at 36.179 trillion dollars (Krivoruchko, Ponamorenko, and Nebera 2018). Twelve countries had banned cryptocurrency, which amassed 27 percent of the total GDP studied at 16.256 trillion dollars (Krivoruchko, Ponamorenko, and Nebera 2018). The rest at the time were neutral on cryptocurrency regulation and adoption. The foreign investment includes capital flows from one country to another. This can be from individuals, corporations, and governments. Countries with scarce capital may not see cryptocurrency as a worthwhile investment for research purposes. According to The World Bank, at least 14 countries have negative foreign investment in millions of dollars, and these include Denmark, Iceland, Iraq, Qatar, Yemen, South Sudan, and Bolivia (2019). All of these 14 countries have either no regulation and/or adoption of cryptocurrency (Trading Education 2021). Nauru and Libya both have zero foreign investment and no regulation or adoption of cryptocurrency (The World Bank 2019) (Trading Education 2021). Afghanistan has 23.40 million dollars, Haiti 75 million dollars, and The Bahamas 264.60 million dollars in foreign investment, while cryptocurrency is a controversial issue where no regulation or adoption has occurred (The World Bank 2019) (Trading Education 2021).

Data and Methods

The units of analysis in this study are 220 countries with two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is regulation (the regulation score per country using the data through Trading Education). The second is adoption (the adoption score per country utilizing the Chainalysis data). The seven independent variables are the amount of transparency (Transparency), Freedom House score (Freedom House), per capita gross domestic product (The World Bank), foreign investment (The World Bank), school life expectancy (CIA: The World Factbook), the population density of people (The World Bank), and the region/continent of countries (Wikimedia).

Table 1. Variables, Characteristics, and Sources

Variables	*Min*	*Max*	*Mean*	*Std. Deviation*	*Source*
Regulation	0.1	7.8	3.295	2.0457	Trading-education.com
Adoption	0	1	0.11764	0.174948	chainalysis.com
Transparency	12	88	43.6	18.905	transparency.org
Freedom	1	100	58.55	30.247	Freedomhouse.org
Per Capita GDP	784.9	129451.1	23400.866	23979.4975	data.worldbank.org
Foreign Investment	-87212.09	351631	7799.9606	31802.93425	data.worldbank.org
Education Level	6	21	13.63	3.103	cia.gov
Population Density	0	19199	438.34	2025.925	data.worldbank.org
Region	1	6	2.54	1.349	meta.wikimedia.org

Regulation is the process of ratifying a law, policy, or rule to prevent illegal and unfair activity as a result of the object in question. A great example of regulation is digital customer data privacy laws that had to be passed within the last decade. These laws protect consumers from businesses that hold their personal data like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. All companies must comply with privacy laws to avoid legal penalties and reputational damages. The dependent variable,

regulation, ranges from .1 found in Yemen, which means there is no regulation of cryptocurrency, to 7.8 in France, meaning it has the highest amount of regulation out of any other country while crypto is still legal. The mean for regulation is 3.295 and represents the average over all 220 countries. The mean shows that most countries have low regulation over crypto. However, this does not mean it is 100% legal in these countries; a high score means it is mostly legal and regulated, so the lower scores could also represent a ban on cryptocurrency in the country. The standard deviation is 2.0457 for regulation.

The regulation score measure is based on several ranking factors. The first factor determines if bitcoin is legal in the country. Initial coin offerings or ICOs are similar to initial public offerings in the stock market. IPOs occur when a private company decides to turn into a publicly tradeable company. However, ICOs are slightly different because the investor does not own a stake in the crypto project. The next ranking factor discovers which countries restrict ICOs, preventing investors from participating in a project. When a country restricts more ICOs, their rank will decrease. When a crypto project wants to become an ICO, then it must register within a country. This factor establishes what countries are most friendly to ICOs, which will increase their regulation score. Crypto exchanges allow investors and traders to buy and sell cryptocurrency. A country may restrict the use of an exchange, and this will decrease the country's regulation score. The max rank for regulation is 10; however, the highest current score is 7.8.

In the second dependent variable, adoption, .000 is found in Guyana, Bermuda, Afghanistan, Algeria, Cape Verde, Chad, Fiji, Laos, Libya, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Zimbabwe, which means these countries have the lowest amount of adoption for cryptocurrency. A score of 1, ranked only in Ukraine, is the highest amount of adoption for cryptocurrency. The lowest or low scores do not mean the country has no cryptocurrency activity. It just means there is little. The higher scores mean there is a lot of crypto activity throughout the country. The mean out of 154 countries at .11764 shows that most countries have little adoption and cryptocurrency activity. The standard deviation is.174948.

Adoption scores are calculated from four metrics: on-chain cryptocurrency value received, on-chain retail value transferred, on-chain cryptocurrency deposits, and peer-to-peer exchange trade volume (Chainalysis 2021). The on-chain cryptocurrency value received metric is weighted by purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita or the wealth per resident in a country. This metric ranks each country by total cryptocurrency activity while weighting them based on the wealth per person and valued money within the country. The on-chain retail value transferred metric is also weighted by PPP per capita. The metric measures the activity of non-professional crypto users compared to the wealth per person (Chainalysis 2021). On-chain cryptocurrency deposits are weighted by the number of internet users. This metric ranks countries based on their residents' crypto transactions. A ratio is created between cryptocurrency deposits and the total number of internet users. When the ratio increases, so do the ranking. The peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange trade volume is weighted by PPP per capita and the number of internet users (Chainalysis 2021). The last metric ranks countries by where residents are positioning their larger sum of wealth into P2P cryptocurrency transactions. Once all the countries are ranked by the four metrics, the geometric mean for each country is normalized into a final number between 0 and 1 (Chainalysis 2021).

Independent variable clarification

Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is calculated by dividing GDP by a country's midyear population. GDP at purchasing price is found through the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidiaries not included in the value of products (The World Bank 2019). Per capita GDP is measured by the thousands. Foreign investment references direct investment equity flows in the economy. It involves capital flows from one country to another, and this can include individual investments, corporation investments, and government investments. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment earnings, and other capital (The World Bank 2019). Foreign investment is evaluated by the millions in U.S. Dollars. Population density is the number of people per square kilometer of land area.

Transparency scores or the Corruption Perceptions Index was established to measure perceptions of corruption in the public sector around the world (Transparency 2020). Each score is calculated through four steps before entering the Index. Data sources must be selected that meet every requirement. A couple of these requirements must be from a credible institution and be based on a reliable and valid methodology. 13 different data sources were utilized for the 2020 Index (Transparency 2020). The data sources are then standardized on a scale of 0 (highest level of corruption) to 100 (lowest level of corruption). Standardization equals the subtraction of the mean of each source in the baseline year from each country's score and then dividing by the standard deviation of that source in the baseline year (Transparency 2020). The third step calculates the average of standardized scores available for a country. Each score is rounded to a whole number. The last step is to report a measure of uncertainty which is a standard error and confidence interval associated with a score (Transparency 2020). This shows a variation in the scores of the data sources for each country.

Freedom House releases an annual global report on political rights and civil liberties called *Freedom in the World* (Freedom House 2021). Freedom scores range from 1 (not free) to 100 (free). The scores are the sum of political rights and civil liberties indicators. For each of the 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties indicators, 0 to 4 points are awarded. These indicators are questions asked to determine the degree of freedom people have in a country. The highest score for political rights is 40, while

60 is for civil liberties. School life expectancy is the total number of years of schooling, primary to post-secondary, that a person can expect to receive (CIA 2019). This assumes the enrollment probability in school at any future age is equal to the current enrollment ratio at that age (CIA 2019). School life expectancy scores range from 6 years of expected school to 21 years of expected school. Lastly, the nominal independent variable Region is coded from 1-6: 1) Africa and the Middle East, 2) Asia, 3) Europe, 4) Central and South America, 5) North America, and 6) Australia and Oceania.

The hypotheses tested in the study are:

- H1: The more transparency in a country, the less cryptocurrency is adopted and regulated.
- H2: The more freedom a country's people have, the more cryptocurrency is adopted and regulated.
- H3: The higher the per capita GDP in a country, the more cryptocurrency is regulated and adopted.
- H4: The lower foreign investment is in a country, the less cryptocurrency is adopted and regulated.
- H5: The higher the school life expectancy is in a country, the more cryptocurrency is regulated and adopted.
- H6: The more population density per square kilometer in a country, the more cryptocurrency is adopted and regulated.
- H7: The Western Hemisphere (North America, Central, and South America) regulates and adopts crypto more, while the Eastern Hemisphere (Asia, Europe, Australia, Oceania, Africa, and the Middle East) regulates and adopts it less.

Findings

In the bivariate correlation analysis, five independent variables proved to be highly significant in relation to the regulation score. The five independent variables with a statistical relationship for regulation are amount of transparency, amount of freedom, per capita GDP, foreign investment, and school life expectancy (Education Level). All of these have a positive relationship with the regulation score. The adoption score has one variable that is significant at p<.01 (foreign investment) and one variable that is statistically significant at p<.05 (school life expectancy). Both have a positive relationship with the adoption score. The population density was the only interval independent variable with no statistically significant relationship with either dependent variable.

Table 2. Correlation Analysis of Cryptocurrency Adoption and Regulation

Independent Variables	*Regulation*	*Adoption*
Transparency	.611**	0.001
Freedom	.479**	-0.004
PerCapGDP	.550**	-0.017
ForInvest	.324**	.400**
EduLevel	.647**	.150*
PopDensity	-0.003	-0.049
n = 210; p < .01**, p < .05*		

Figures 1 and 2 highlight the strongest relationship with each dependent variable. Figure 1 is the relationship between regulation and school life expectancy. Figure 2 shows the relationship between adoption and foreign investment.

In Figure 1, the correlation of .647** between the score of regulation and school life expectancy is highly significant at p<.01. This relationship is positive because the regression line is ascending, not descending or horizontal. The R-squared is 0.419 and reveals that school life expectancy per country explains 41.9% of the variance in the regulation score of cryptocurrency per country. The constant (alpha) or intercept on the line is -2.59, meaning if school life expectancy were 0, then the average regulation score per country would be -2.59. The beta or slope on the regression line is 0.46, implicating that for every 1 unit increase in school life expectancy, the regulation score increases by 0.46. The slope coefficient is highly significant at p<.01, which explains that countries with a higher expectancy of school per person will also regulate cryptocurrency more.

In Figure 2, the correlation of .400** between the score of adoption and the amount of foreign investment per country is highly significant at p<.01. The relationship is positive as the line is ascending. The R-squared is 0.160 and reveals that the amount of foreign investment per country explains 16% of the variance in the adoption score of cryptocurrency per country. The constant (alpha) or intercept on the line is 0.1, meaning if the foreign investment were 0, then the adoption score per country would be 0.1. The beta or slope on the regression line is 1.97 E-6 indicating that for every billion dollar increase of foreign



Figure 1. Scatter Plot of Regulation Score



Figure 2. Scatter Plot of Adoption Score

investment, the adoption score increases by .00197. The slope coefficient is highly significant at p<.01, which reveals that those countries with a higher amount of foreign investment will have more cryptocurrency adoption and activity. The two major outliers in Figure 2 are China and the USA. The relationship between adoption scores and foreign investment is statistically significant with and without the outliers.

Table 3. Multiple Regression Analysis of Regulation Scores

Independent Variables	*Unstandardized Regression Coefficient*	*Standard Error*	*T-Score*
Transparency	-0.023	0.014	-1.634
Freedom	0.20	0.006	3.129**
PerCapGDP	3.74E-05	0	3.903**
ForInvest	1.18E-05	0	3.212**
EduLevel	0.272	0.061	4.477**
PopDensity	-8.98E-05	0	-0.597
n = 210, p < .01**, p < .05*, R2= 0.588			

As noted in Table 3, the six independent variables explain 58.8% of the variance in the regulation scores across nations. The constant is -1.050, meaning if all the independent variables were 0, then the average regulation score per country would be -1.050. For the dependent variable, the lower the regulation score, the less regulated cryptocurrency is in that country. Four variables are highly significant at p<.01. These four are Freedom House scores, per capita GDP, amount of foreign investment, and school life expectancy per person. The Freedom House score's slope coefficient shows that for every one unit increase, the regulation score will also increase by .020. The t-score of 3.129 is highly significant at p<.01. The slope coefficient for per capita GDP describes that for every $10,000 increase, the regulation score will also increase by .3741. The t-score of 3.903 is highly significant at p<.01. The slope coefficient for foreign investment demonstrates that for every billion dollar increase, the regulation score will also increase by .01175. The t-score of 3.212 is highly significant at p<.01. The slope coefficient for school life expectancy illustrates that for every year increase, the regulation score will also increase by .272. The t-score of 4.477 is highly significant at p<.01.

Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis of Adoption Scores

Independent Variables	*Unstandardized Regression Coefficient*	*Standard Error*	*T-Score*
Transparency	-0.002	0.002	-1.187
Freedom	5.47E-05	0.001	0.08
PerCapGDP	-9.62E-07	0	-0.913
ForInvest	2.07E-06	0	5.454**
EduLevel	0.018	0.007	2.501*
PopDensity	-9.73E-06	0	-0.62
n = 145, p < .01**, p < .05*, R2 = 0.241			

Table 4 reveals that the six independent variables account for 24.1% of the variance in the adoption scores across countries. The constant is .038, meaning if all the independent variables were 0, then the average adoption score per country would be .038. For the dependent variable, the lower the adoption score, the less cryptocurrency activity and adoption per country. One variable is highly significant at p<.01, and another one is statistically significant at p<.05. The highly significant variable is foreign investment. The slope coefficient for foreign investment per country clarifies for every billion dollar increase; the adoption score will also increase by .002071. The t-score of 5.454 is highly significant at p<.01. Another statistically significant variable is school life expectancy. The slope coefficient of school life expectancy demonstrates for every year increase; the adoption score will also increase by .018. The t-score of 2.501 is statistically significant at p<.05. After removing the two outliers (USA and China), foreign investment and school life expectancy remain statistically significant.

The boxplot in Figure 3 shows the dispersion between regulation scores and the regions/continents around the world. The higher scores indicate the countries located in that region regulate cryptocurrency more than the countries with lower scores. Africa and the Middle East, along with Central and South America, show the most outliers out of all the regions. The highest



Figure 3. Boxplot for Regulation Score by Region

Table 5. Median and Mean of Region's Regulation Score

Region	*Median*	*Mean*
Africa and Middle East	1.9	2.119
Asia	2.25	2.924
Europe	6.2	5.345
Central and South America	2.7	3.11
North America	4.8	4.925
Australia and Oceania	2.6	3.114

mean and median are evident for Europe, while the lowest for both can be found in Africa and the Middle East (see Table 5). After conducting a difference of means test between Europe and Africa/Middle East, the relationship between the two is highly significant at p<.01, and the t-score is -10.266.



Figure 4. Boxplot for Adoption Score by Region

Table 6. Median and Mean of Region's Adoption Score

Region	*Median*	*Mean*
Africa and Middle East	0.022	0.07144
Asia	0.059	0.131
Europe	0.113	0.15318
Central and South America	0.05	0.11742
North America	0.196	0.27767
Australia and Oceania	0.105	0.105

The boxplot in Figure 4 shows the dispersion between adoption scores and the regions/continents around the world. The higher scores indicate the countries located in that region have higher activity and adopt cryptocurrency more than the countries with lower scores.

Africa and the Middle East reveal the most outliers out of all the regions. The highest mean and median are evident for North America, while the lowest for both can be found in Africa and the Middle East (see Table 6). After conducting a difference of means test between North America and Africa/Middle East, the relationship between the two is statistically significant at p<.05 with a t-score of -2.369.

Conclusion

This study found the following factors are the most significant predictors of cryptocurrency adoption and regulation: Freedom House score, per capita gross domestic product, foreign investment, school life expectancy, and region/continent of countries. All these demonstrate positive relationships to regulation scores. Foreign investment and school life expectancy per country

evidenced a positive relationship with adoption scores. Hypothesis 1 is rejected, and the null is accepted because, in the multiple regression analysis, transparency scores were not significant with regulation or adoption. Hypothesis 2 is partially accepted because freedom scores are a significant positive predictor of regulation (freedom scores increase when regulation increases), but there was no relationship with adoption. Hypothesis 3 is partially accepted as per capita GDP increases per country, and so does the country's regulation of cryptocurrency. However, there was no statistical relationship with adoption scores which leads to accepting the null in the second half of H3. This study accepts hypothesis 4 and rejects the null, as a country with less foreign investment, cryptocurrency will be less adopted and less regulated. Hypothesis 5 is accepted, and the null is rejected; when the school life expectancy per country increases, so does the regulation and adoption of cryptocurrency. This study rejects hypothesis 6 and accepts the null because there was no statistical relationship between population density and either dependent variable. The averages of the Western Hemisphere on regulation and adoption are 4.0175 and .197545. The averages of the Eastern Hemisphere regulation and adoption are 3.3755 and .115155. Since the Western Hemisphere averages are higher, it regulates and adopts cryptocurrency more than the lower Eastern Hemisphere averages. The relationship between region and adoption as well as regulation scores is statistically significant, so the direction hypothesized in hypothesis 7 is accepted.

As cryptocurrency becomes more popular, countries will begin to see the real use crypto brings to the table. For a recent update on Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency, El Salvador legally ratified it as tender for payment in September. All businesses are required to accept Bitcoin for all payments (Gerard 2021). Although this is good for the future of crypto, El Salvador's government rushed to pass the new Bitcoin Law and create ATMs and a digital transaction service like PayPal called Chivo. Due to the swiftness of creating Chivo and not hiring the right people to lead the project, Gerard (2021) notes the servers and transactions failed on launch day. Then the price of Bitcoin dropped by 10,000 dollars in a matter of a few minutes. This may seem like Chivo caused the crash, but it was actually related to Coinbase, a popular crypto exchange company, threatened by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. New customers of Chivo received a free 30 dollars when creating an account. When bitcoin crashed, the 30 dollars turned to 25 dollars inducing outrage among the people of El Salvador, which led to protesting (Gerard 2021). This is one reason countries are so cautious regarding the regulation and adoption of cryptocurrency because of potential outcomes like El Salvador. Along the lines of adoption and regulation, Ripple Labs (the company known for founding the popular crypto project XRP) is being sued by the SEC for allegedly trading unregistered securities (Gasparino and Terrett, 2021). The lawsuit began in December of 2020 when the SEC claimed Ripple failed to register XRP as a security. Ripple argued that XRP does not fall under the definition of security and is a commodity like Bitcoin or Ethereum. The world is beginning to acknowledge cryptocurrency as a potential digital currency. The case against Ripple will be a major deciding factor for the future of crypto and will either have a positive or negative impact.

Crypto has a massive future ahead to apply solutions to issues that current technology cannot provide. To be an isolated market in such a technologically advanced decade contains the potential to revolutionize the global economy by providing a digital currency for everyone. Although this may sound exciting in the future, regulation is needed to place limitations on the such currency. Regulation applies restrictions to set standards and limits on the power to prevent corruption. Adoption will be the focus for cryptocurrency so that it can gain traction to be utilized in countries and by people of the world. For future research, it would be interesting to see a study of the adoption and regulation of cryptocurrency over time. A study on Ripple Labs and XRP on whether the crypto project is a security or commodity would be a great place to begin. The impact or controversy of manipulation in the crypto markets is an idea for research. Another good research topic would be how social movements and financial turmoil impact the adoption and regulation of cryptocurrency. With all the hype around cryptocurrency from 2020 to 2021, it would be interesting to update this study in 2022 or 2023 to see how much 2020 and 2021 affected cryptocurrency regulation and adoption around the world.

References

Ante, Lennart, Fiedler, Ingo, Meduna, Marc von, and Fred Steinmetz. 2021. "Individual Cryptocurrency Investors: Evidence from a Population Survey." *Blockchain Research Lab*, November 1, 2021. BRL working paper series 6.

Chainalysis. 2020. "The 2020 Geography of Cryptocurrency Report: Analysis of Geographic Trends in Cryptocurrency Adoption, Usage, and Regulation." September 2020.https://go.chainalysis.com/2020-geography-of-crypto-report.html.

Chainalysis. 2021. "The 2021 Crypto Crime Report." February 16, 2021. https://go.chainalysis.com/rs/503-FAP-074/images/Chainalysis-Crypto-Crime-2021.pdf.

CIA. 2019. "The World Factbook: School Life Expectancy (primary to tertiary education)." Accessed May 7, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/school-life-expectancy-primary-to-tertiary-education/.

Cyber Digital Task Force. 2020. "Report of the Attorney General's Cyber Digital Task Force." *United States Department of Justice.* October 2020. https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/page/file/1326061/download.

De, Nikhilesh. 2021. "State of Crypto: Congress Takes One Step Closer to Regulatory Clarity." *coindesk,* September 14, 2021. https://www.coindesk.com/congress-regulatory-clarity.

Freedom House. n.d. "Countries and Territories." Accessed May 7, 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.

Gasparino, Charles and Eleanor Terrett. 2021. "SEC vs. Ripple Case could Establish Limit on Agency's Future Involvement in Crypto Regulation: Sources." *Fox Business,* September 20, 2021. https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/sec-vs-ripple-case-crypto-regulation.

Gerard, David. 2021. "El Salvador's Bitcoin Law is a Farce." *Foreign Policy,* September 17, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/17/el-salvador-bitcoin-law-farce/.

Gurgaon, Dr. Zeynep, and Prof. William Knotttenbelt. n.d. "Cryptocurrencies: Overcoming Barriers to Trust and Adoption." *Imperial College London.* Accessed May 7, 2021. https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/research-centres-and-groups/ic3re/CRYPTOCURRENCIES–OVERCOMING-BARRIERS-TO-TRUST-AND-ADOPTION.pdf.

Hughes, Scott D. 2017. "Cryptocurrency Regulations and Enforcement in the U.S." *Western State Law Review* 45: 1.

Insider Intelligence. 2021. "How the Laws & Regulations affecting Blockchain Technology and Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, can Impact its Adoption." January 27, 2021.https://www.businessinsider.com/blockchain-cryptocurrency-regulations-us-global#.

Jani, Shailak. 2018. "The Growth of Cryptocurrency in India: Its Challenges & Potential Impacts on Legislation." *ResearchGate*, April 26, 2018. 10.13140/RG.2.2.14220.36486.

Jeffrey, Claudia. 2020. "2020 Global Challenges for Cryptocurrency." *Global Trade Daily,* July 2, 2020.
https://www.globaltrademag.com/2020-global-challenges-for-cryptocurrency/.

Klasing, David. 2018. "How Does the IRS Track Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies?" *Klasing-Associates.* Last modified January 3, 2022. https://klasing-associates.com/irs-track-bitcoin-cryptocurrencies/.

Krivoruchko, Svetlana, Ponamorenko, Vladislav, and Anatoly Nebera. 2018. "Central Bank Policy and Cryptocurrencies." *Journal of Reviews on Global Economics* 7: 549-561.

Library of Congress. 2018. "Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World." June 2018.https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2018298387/2018298387.pdf.

Nault, Derrick. 2021. "Money, Technology, and Human Rights: Cryptocurrencies and the Right to Development in Africa." *Human Rights and Foreign Policy,* June 2021.

The World Bank. 2019. "Population Density (people per sq. km of land area)." Accessed May 7, 2021.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST?end=2019&start= 1961.

The World Bank. 2019. "Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, current US$)." Accessed May 7, 2021.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD.

The World Bank. 2019. "GDP per Capita, PPP (current international $)." Accessed May 7, 2021.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.

Trading Education. 2021. "Cryptocurrency Regulation Around the World in 2019 Ranked!" July 23, 2021. https://trading-education.com/cryptocurrency-regulation-around-the-world-in-2019-ranked.

Transparency International. 2020. "Corruption Perception Index." Accessed May 7, 2021.
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl.

Wikimedia. 2021. "List of Countries by Regional Classification." Last modified July 13, 2022.
https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_regional_classification.