Questions

in

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Questions in Politics Editorial Staff

About the GPSA

Founded in 1968, the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA) is the professional association for political science practitioners and educators in Georgia. Membership is drawn from the public, private, and academic sectors. We welcome members, attendees, participants, and students from around the world.

Questions in Politics is the official journal publication of the GPSA.

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Volume II

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Preface

Welcome to Volume II of *Questions in Politics* (*QiP*), the scholarly journal of the Georgia Political Science Association (GPSA). The articles in this volume began as papers presented at the 2014 Annual Conference of the GPSA. The authors then submitted the manuscripts to the journal, where they were anonymously reviewed. Further review and editing commenced, and out of 21 manuscripts submitted, nine are published here.

We are also pleased to announce that the first article in Volume II, "The Paradox of State Failure in Mexico" by Dr. Dwight Wilson of the University of North Georgia, is the McBrayer Award winner for 2014. The McBrayer is given annually to the best paper presented at the Annual Conference. The winning author or authors have traditionally received a certificate and a cash award. To further recognize this achievement, the McBrayer winner is the first article in this volume.

The journal's title, *Questions in Politics*, has been trademarked in 2015. The title, as mentioned in the preface to Volume I, reflects a broad approach to the scholarship in political science. The source of the articles remains papers presented at the Annual Conference, and this volume covers all the fields of the discipline except political theory, including public administration and public policy, as well as teaching and learning in political science. All of these topics are addressed in a rigorous and scholarly manner with attention to the larger and enduring questions in politics and the discipline of political science.

We look forward toward further enhancing and developing the organization's scholarly journal in the future. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers as well as the Editor, James "Larry" Taulbee, and the Managing Editor, Matthew E. Van Atta, for their efforts toward this end.

As the University System of Georgia continues consolidation, your editors find themselves with new institutional affiliations. Tom Rotnem is now a faculty member at Kennesaw State University, and as of January 2016, Adam Stone will be a faculty member at Georgia State University.

Thomas E. Rotnem and Adam Stone

Questions in Politics

Abstracts

The Paradox of State Failure in Mexico *Page 1*

Dwight Wilson, *University of North Georgia*

Is Mexico a failed state? Violence in Mexico presents a paradox. The Mexican state has much in its favor, including a stable democratic political system, a booming economy that ranks among the largest in the world, and a strong national identity with centuries of history. On the other hand, the state appeared to have entirely lost control of the situation in its southern states as vigilante groups recently took up arms and violently confronted criminal gangs. This article will argue that Mexico's current outbreak of violence must be attributed to state failure, but proposes a reconsideration of state failure as a concept to include a limited, or segmented, form of state failure. Such a concept allows us to understand how state failure can occur, though in circumscribed functions and spaces while national state failure does not occur.

**Counterterrorist Finance Measures and the
Extent of Culpability within the GCC** *Page 21*

Lauren Nicole Coughlin, *Troy University*

The region of the Arab Gulf has long been held responsible for the continued threat of Islamist terrorism with good reason. Contained in one of the world's most important economic blocs, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are six states that seem to inspire radical sympathies from within. American journalists and officials routinely chastise the region's leaders for failing to stop the flow of capital from their wealthy citizenry into terrorist hands. This research tests the validity of such accusations according to international law based on Gulf legal material. Despite their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities since 9/11, the Gulf monarchies balance their own susceptibility to terrorist ideologues with the interests of Sunni populations and Western trading partners. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates lead in counterterrorist involvement, Oman and Bahrain act generally independently due to their unique social makeup, and Qatar and Kuwait are criticized for passing off their collective security burdens as they weigh political repercussions with regional defense obligations.

Are You Experienced? African American Candidates in Statewide Elections, 1964–2014

John A. Tures, *LaGrange College*

Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965, African Americans have increased their numbers in elected office from the hundreds to the thousands. Yet African American candidates for governor or the US Senate have not been as successful at winning their elections. In only ten cases have African American candidates won higher statewide office over the last 50 years. Instead of overt race-based ads, black candidates face a series of code words, including questions about job qualifications. This research examines whether holding a lower statewide elected office can help African American candidates overcome these attacks and prevail. Additional factors concerning the candidate, position, and the state in question are also examined.

What's Time Got to Do with It? Ballot Measures, Strategic Timing, and Midterm Elections

Joshua R. Meddaugh, *Clayton State University*

The past few decades have seen a wide variety of research into direct democracy ranging in topics that include, but are not limited to, the effect of ballot propositions on voting behavior, issue agenda-setting, and political knowledge. With all these advances, there is surprisingly little work on the effect timing has on proposition proposal and passage rates. Knowing that the uninformed electorate rarely participates in low-stimulus elections, and in accordance with the work on uninformed voters "no" vote as well as on vote cue taking, this research addresses the question: Is an initiative more likely to pass by direct vote in a midterm election, when there is low voter turnout, the demographic of uninformed "no" voters are removed, and biased voting cues from informed to uninformed voters are muted? Hypothesizing that initiatives are more likely to pass in midterm and off-year elections than during general elections, and that more initiatives will be proposed during low-stimulus elections, the study uses a panel data set of all initiatives from 1978 to 2014 in order to test the effect of time on proposal and passage rate. Preliminary results indicate that timing fails to have a significant effect, and that there is little difference in proposal rate. However the results suggest a large increase in the number of initiatives proposed during recent midterm elections. This finding alone demonstrates that initiative entrepreneurs may be strategically timing measures

for low-turnout elections, removing the potential of uninformed citizens voting against the measure, hopefully increasing the chance of passage.

The Enemy Within:
The Challenge of Domestic Terrorism *Page 91*

Saundra J. Ribando, *Georgia Regents University*

Amanda J. Reinke, *University of Tennessee*

Since the 9/11 attacks, the American media has focused heavily on terrorism, terrorist attacks, and the possibility of a "homegrown" terrorist threat. In this study, the researchers use the Global Terrorism Dataset to analyze terrorist incidents in the United States and its territories since 1970 to identify trends in domestic terrorism. The analysis demonstrates that the number of terrorism incidents has dramatically declined since the 1970s. However, the lethality of attacks has significantly increased. Over time, the pendulum between right- and left-wing-inspired attacks has also swung back and forth; currently, legitimate threats from both ends of the political spectrum exist in the form of the militia and sovereign citizen movement on the right and environmental groups on the left. While a legitimate concern exists about online radicalization of Muslim youth, the severity of the threat appears to be overblown in the media, as the Muslim community has itself been the prime source of information disrupting potential terrorist attacks inspired by radical Islam.

Pulling Back from the Brink in 2014:
A Case Study of the Civil War in Syria *Page 111*

Sarah Kuck, *Darton State College*

Jim Peterson, *Valdosta State University*

It is clear that the ongoing Syrian civil war is very disruptive to the international system, tragic for the citizens who suffer within that nation, and in need of both new thinking and innovative solutions. Refugees from that civil war and others have created a tremendous challenge for the European Union in the spring and summer of 2015. This analysis investigates the Syrian case study within the framework of the literature on ethnic conflict as well as authoritarian leadership. Since 2000, Hafez Assad has ruled in an increasingly authoritarian way as president of Syria and has ensured the continuance of the authoritarian legacy of his father. In Syria, Assad is part of the Alawite/Shi'ite group, while the vast

majority of his fellow citizens are Sunni Muslims. The combination of an authoritarian leadership model and membership in a minority group has been a lethal mix. Two hypotheses provide a framework of inquiry, including the idea that the greater the ethnic separatism, the greater the instability; and the more intense authoritarian leadership, the greater insecurity within a state. The analysis demonstrates the importance of ethnic separatism as an important factor within Syria. Speculation about alternative models that could create the basis for legitimacy and stability are also considered in the Conclusion. These would constitute efforts to pull Syria back from the brink.

In the Crosshairs: The American Radical Right and Government Employees   *Page 129*

Saundra J. Ribando, *Georgia Regents University*

Amanda J. Reinke, *University of Tennessee*

Scott Gorectke, *Georgia Regents University*

Government employees often find themselves dealing with unhappy citizens. But what happens when those situations involve members of the radical right wing and turn violent? This article examines two specific instances when government employees found themselves dealing with individuals who refused to comply with government orders based on right-wing ideology. In one case, violence ensued. In the second case, violence was avoided. We conclude by suggesting federal government representatives should avoid escalating the situation with shows of force and instead work more closely with local law enforcement to seek a peaceful resolution.

Crouching Dragon: The Role of Beijing in the South China Sea Embroglio   *Page 149*

Nalanda Roy, *Armstrong State University*

The South China Sea has long been regarded as one of the most complex and challenging ocean-related maritime disputes in East Asia. This region has become critical among the disputing parties because of its geographic position in major oceanic routes used by crude oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Asia and for transporting goods to the rest of the world, as well as for promising offshore oil and gas reserves. China is asserting its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea, maintaining its long-standing claim over the Taiwan Strait,

and even extending claims to areas of the Indian Ocean. This article analyzes whether China's blue-water strategy as well as her unclear intentions often create the image that South China Sea will be the best place for China to wage wars. The article ends with the discussion whether Beijing will learn how to share and bear in the South China Sea amidst chaos and tension.

**Modeling Student Success: How Model UN Programs
Can Enhance Performance and Persistence** *Page 167*

Martha Humphries Ginn, *Georgia Regents University*

Craig Douglas Albert, *Georgia Regents University*

Lance Hunter, *Georgia Regents University*

Kirsten Fitzgerald, *University of Florida*

Andrew Phillips, *Howard University*

Scholars and universities have made substantial efforts to resolve the student departure puzzle, yet it remains one of higher education's greatest dilemmas. Evidence suggests student persistence is closely connected to social and academic integration. In this case study of a university's Model United Nations program, we investigate whether this program encourages student persistence. Using a mixed methods approach, we find participants in the program have higher graduation rates, graduate on time, and see significant improvement in their cumulative GPAs. We also find participation has a significant positive impact on social and academic integration, which helps increase retention. The authors recommend that universities invest in similar outside the classroom programs to increase student retention.

The Paradox of State Failure in Mexico

Dwight Wilson
University of North Georgia

Is Mexico a failed state? Violence in Mexico presents a paradox. The Mexican state has much in its favor, including a stable democratic political system, a booming economy that ranks among the largest in the world, and a strong national identity with centuries of history. On the other hand, the state appeared to have entirely lost control of the situation in its southern states as vigilante groups recently took up arms and violently confronted criminal gangs. This article will argue that Mexico's current outbreak of violence must be attributed to state failure, but proposes a reconsideration of state failure as a concept to include a limited, or segmented, form of state failure. Such a concept allows us to understand how state failure can occur, though in circumscribed functions and spaces while national state failure does not occur.

The year 2013 put a dramatic exclamation point on discussions of crime, insecurity, and state capacity in Mexico. The rapid proliferation of "self-defense groups" that came into violent conflict with drug trafficking gangs, and even with the state itself, raised serious doubts about the capacity of the Mexican state. Groups of armed vigilantes are not new in Mexico, but their new numbers and power are unprecedented. Operating principally in the southern states of Guerrero and Michoacán, the groups have decisively seized control of the police powers of dozens of municipalities, jailing not just suspected criminals but also police officers. In doing so, they made apparent that the Mexican government had lost control of at least these two states. Further, they raised anew the questions concerning state failure in Mexico that have continually surfaced since the highly publicized war on drug gangs began in 2006.

Violence in Mexico presents a paradox. Though the concept of state failure is not clearly defined, and disagreements over borderline cases will

inevitably arise, in many instances of state failure (as is the case for a number of social science concepts) the Potter Stewart test applies: we know it when we see it. Such simple observation can lead us to two contradictory conclusions concerning the strength of the Mexican state. On one hand and by one standard, Mexico by no means resembles a failed state. While all manner of problems are evident, Mexico is not a candidate for the sort of state failure that has befallen Somalia, Lebanon, or Afghanistan. Indeed, despite high levels of violence associated with the militarized fight against organized crime, the Mexican state has much in its favor, including a stable democratic political system, a booming economy that ranks among the largest in the world,[1] and a strong national identity with centuries of history.

On the other hand, the state has appeared to lose control of the situation in its southern states. The state has simply sat haplessly by as vigilante groups took up arms and took the fight against drug cartels to the street. These events appear to be incontrovertible evidence that the Mexican state has allowed competing contestants for the monopoly on the legitimate use of force to fight it out and abandoning citizens to their fates. The Mexican state has failed to provide security, the most basic function of any state, without which the provision of other public goods becomes impossible, thus fitting a common-sense definition of state failure.

This article argues that part of the confusion surrounding Mexico's status stems from ambiguities in the concept of state failure. Definitions and measurements of state failure only account for national-level indicators, producing a single score of "failedness" for an entire national territory. Accordingly, Mexico scores fairly well—despite the chaos gripping municipalities across the country. Through comparison to Kuhn's framework for understanding the emergence of new scientific paradigms, the paper will argue that Mexico's current outbreak of violence must be attributed to state failure—though a limited, or segmented, state failure, which requires a rethinking of the conventional view of state sovereignty as indivisible but allows us to understand how state failure can occur in circumscribed functions and spaces while national state failure does not occur.

The Violence

The criminal organizations at the center of Mexico's security crisis have roots extending back several decades. Associated violence was minimal, however, until slow-moving democratic reforms led to the dismantling of the

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[1] Mexico provides the "M" for MINT, the recently coined term for a group of emerging economies in Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey.

corporatist regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which co-opted most political, social, and economic activity including the drug trade (Grayson 2009). By the turn of the twenty-first century, the trafficking cartels had become far more lethal. In 2006, when President Felipe Calderón launched a militarized offensive against the cartels, they had accrued enormous economic resources, firepower, and influence over the government through corruption. At the end of Calderón's tenure in 2012, official estimates placed the death toll from the campaign at more than 60,000, the large majority of which the government maintains were people involved directly in the drug trade, though the toll may be far higher and may include many more civilians uninvolved in criminal activity (Malloy 2013). In addition to deaths, insecurity extends to robberies, kidnappings, and extortion that affects people from all social classes throughout the national territory.

The government has been deeply affected by insecurity not just in its inability to control the spiral of violence, but also from within as a pattern of corruption emerges from the lowest to the highest levels and accusations of human rights violations have stemmed from the militarization of the anti-drug trafficking efforts. Political assassinations have become routine, and violence and intimidation aimed at journalists has effectively suppressed robust investigation of the cartels' activities ("Mexico: Freedom of the Press" 2014). In recognition of the failure to curtail the power of the cartels, in 2012, the PRI's presidential candidate Enrique Peña Nieto campaigned on a promise to change direction in the war, focusing on public security rather than on arresting cartel leadership. Part of his plan involved the creation of a new police force to bring a government presence to those municipalities marked by "institutional weakness" and absence of police (CNN Mexico 2012), though in his first years in office no dramatic reversal in the security situation took place.

Levels of violence had thus reached proportions unprecedented in Mexico, and consecutive administrations did not appear to have a winning strategy for bringing the chaos under control. However, a new dimension in public insecurity opened with the highly publicized appearance of the armed vigilante groups, commonly calling themselves *grupos de auto-defensa* (self-defense groups), or *policía comunitaria* (community police). These bands of sometimes ill-equipped and presumably ordinary citizens began violently ejecting organized gangs from crime-infested municipalities in early 2013. Police, too, often viewed as complicit in criminal enterprises or incompetent to combat it, fell under the target of the groups and were in many cases disarmed and informally disbanded.

Such groups appeared throughout the country, but were heavily concentrated first in the southern state of Guerrero. By the end of 2013, the groups were present in more than half of the municipalities in Guerrero,

comprising more than 60 percent of the population of the state. As the year progressed, much of the action—gun battles and media attention—shifted to neighboring Michoacán, where pitched battles raged between self-defense groups and members of the powerful Michoacán-based cartel the *Caballeros Templarios*. It bears remembering that the drug war commenced when Calderón mobilized the army to regain control of Michoacán. Eight years later, control over the state was more tenuous than ever.

The self-defense groups have claimed that they were defending themselves in response to the failure of the state to offer protection and entered into hostilities not just with crime gangs, but in some cases with the government itself by assuming police powers, and holding suspected criminals and police officers captive. Adding another layer of complexity, civilians have clashed with the self-defense groups, as residents in at least one municipality in Michoacán blockaded streets and torched buses to prevent the arrival of their self-appointed guardians ("Habitantes de Parácuaro Protestan Por Autodefensas" 2014). As was the case in Guerrero, by the end of 2013, much of the territory of Michoacán had been effectively put under the command of self-defense forces.

The groups publicized their aims and justified their creation by appealing directly to the citizenry, dramatizing their plight under the rule of the crime gangs in print and online videos. Declaring their desperation after years of abuse at the hands of the criminals and official neglect, and protesting their lack of alternatives for protecting their lives and livelihoods, spokesmen announced their intention to forcefully rid their communities of crime gangs and initially rejected any suggestion of disarmament or submission to state authority ("El Pueblo Que Venció" 2013).

Self-defense groups are not new in Mexico, but the current wave of vigilantism can be traced directly to the more recent history of community police forces in Guerrero dating to the 1990s. In response to a perception of increasing insecurity, indigenous communities in Guerrero began assuming police powers in the form of community police. These were given official recognition as part of the *Sistema de Seguridad y Justicia Comunitaria*, which includes not only police powers but traditional forms of punishment and rehabilitation. These groups have acted as inspiration for the ad hoc vigilante committees that sprang into action in 2013, but the later organizations have operated decidedly outside the law and represent—as far as is known and despite persistent concerns of infiltration—a grassroots movement emerging out of frustration with an increasingly dire security situation and lack of adequate response from government authorities charged with maintaining security.

The outburst of the self-defense groups only added fuel to a raging debate over the appropriate response to the violence and caused consternation among government officials and human rights activists who expressed alarm over the potential for uncontrolled vigilantism similar to that represented by the paramilitary groups of Colombia, and for the possibility that the groups were initiated or infiltrated by the crime gangs themselves. Throughout the year, the most common sentiment expressed by state officials was condemnation of these groups as dangerous renegades that would likely only worsen an already precarious situation (Asfura-Heim and Espach 2013). Not only did the PRI-led government of Peña Nieto initially condemn the lawlessness, but the leadership of the opposition National Action Party (PAN) voiced its concerns over the danger presented by the groups (Notimex 2014).

Amnesty International, while an outspoken critic of the government's militarized war against the cartels, also warned that vigilante groups are untrained and lack oversight, increasing the possibility that they will abuse their power and become indistinguishable from the crime groups they purport to combat ("Grupos de Autodefensas" 2014). Notably, upon its formation the Michoacán-based *Familia Michoacana* proclaimed itself a vigilante group dedicated to eradicating the scourge of criminal activity by drug trafficking gangs before itself becoming one of the most powerful criminal gangs in itself. Upon its breakup, a splinter group emerged to take its place, the *Caballeros Templarios*, similarly claiming to fight for justice and protect civil society. It is this group that came to occupy the greatest attention as the principal antagonist of self-defense groups in Michoacán.

Additionally, accusations immediately began to circulate that the self-defense groups were not spontaneous outgrowths, but were organized and financed in Michoacán by outside cartels intent on displacing their rivals. Though denied by the membership of the groups, these questions concerning the groups' increasingly expensive gear and heavy firepower only heightened concerns over this new chapter in the violence ("Narco Se Ilfiltra" 2014).

Throughout 2013, the government vacillated and failed to articulate or pursue a consistent policy and different levels of government took disparate approaches to the spiraling violence. In Guerrero, the state government came to the direct aid of the groups by providing funding and equipment (Sosa 2014); while in Michoacán, the governor swore to quash their growing influence and declared that dealing with the groups would be an admission of state failure ("Fausto Vallejo Advierte Con Detener a Autodefensas" 2013), only to reverse course and recognize them as a de facto power in the state that must be acknowledged and negotiated with ("Fausto Vallejo Se Reunirá Con Autodefensas | El Economista" 2014).

The government of Peña Nieto in 2014 similarly changed course after condemning the groups as an outbreak of lawlessness and demanding that they disarm, finally embracing the groups as a positive force in the fight against crime and planning to recognize them as part of the official Rural Defense Corps (CNN 2014). Throughout 2014, the government deputized thousands of members of the groups and attempted to suppress those that remained uncooperative and refused to submit to government control (País 2014).

Civil Conflict in Mexico?

An initial question concerning the problem of state failure in Mexico is whether the case of organized crime and the recent outbreak of vigilante violence can be labeled a case of civil conflict. Civil conflict is often cited as a requisite or even equivalent of state failure, and one of the most contentious debates on security in Mexico concerns whether it can properly be defined as such. So corrosive has the violence been that suggestions of state failure were aired at the highest levels of the US government. The US Joint Forces Command in the 2008 *Joint Operating Environment* also placed Mexico alongside Pakistan as one of two cases of potential rapid collapse, and Mexico's insecurity has been elevated to the status of national security concern for the United States (Schaefer, Bahney, and Riley 2009, 47). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made waves when she categorized the Mexican cartel's use of violence as a case of insurgency like the one in Colombia, sparking a high-profile debate over the potential for state failure ("Clinton Says Mexico Drug Crime Like an Insurgency" 2010).

Assessments like these meet with skepticism. Predictably in Mexico, government officials reacted with scorn, but the concern was taken seriously in the Mexican media. President Obama publicly disagreed with Clinton's judgment and reassured the Mexican government that that view did not represent an official one (James 2010). Mexico observer Shannon O'Neil (2009) flatly rejects the notion that Mexico will fail and terms these speculations "hysteria." Mexican historian Enrique Krauze (2009), while calling the current crisis perhaps the most serious one since the Revolution of 1910 and terming it a war, also dismissed any immediate potential for state failure, calling it a "caricature" and part of a long history of distortions of Mexico by those in the United States.

Does the drug-related violence in Mexico rise to the level of war according to social science criteria? The comparison to Colombia—a clear case of civil conflict—is common, and perhaps unavoidable: In both cases, enormously powerful drug cartels operate practically at will and groups labeling themselves as self-defense organizations offer security outside that

afforded by the state. In the question of numbers, the total number of deaths in recent years in Mexico attributed to drug-related violence since the militarized campaign begun by President Calderón is typically placed at around 100,000 (including those following Calderón's presidency). Doyle and Sambanis (2000) list six criteria for war, including at least 1,000 deaths, which would appear to make it a case of armed conflict similar to that of Colombia. The cases are distinct, nevertheless. Another of Doyle and Sambanis's criteria includes a challenge to sovereignty. In Colombia, a revolutionary movement with clear political goals has for decades sought to gain power and exercise sovereignty, and self-defense groups have been linked to the state and its campaign against the guerrillas; while in Mexico, no significant guerrilla presence presents a serious challenge to state authority. Neither the drug gangs nor the self-defense groups would appear to pose a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the Mexican state, lacking any discernible aim for total control of the political system.

However, some have labeled the drug gangs operating in Mexico and Central America "criminal-" or "narco-insurgencies" because their methods and goals have mutated beyond recognition from what is usually expected of criminal enterprises—simply to avoid capture and make money. Rather, as Sullivan illustrates (2012), the enormously powerful drug gangs use sophisticated weaponry, undertake political assassinations, provide social services, and construct political narratives justifying their bloody campaigns that they communicate directly to the population. Though criminal gangs do not seek to conquer the state, they can be understood as creating a "dual sovereignty" as they seek to dominate illicit activities in certain areas and create "lawless zones" outside the purview of the state.[2]

Similarly, the self-defense groups have issued a challenge to the sovereignty of the state by assuming direct control over the security of a number of municipalities. Just as the cartels have well-known, though ever-shifting, territories, the self-defense groups made advances through Guerrero and Michoacán throughout 2013, with their territorial gains and attendant shootouts reported in the media as the progress of a war's frontlines might be. The self-defense groups target not only the organized crime gangs that they proclaim as their principal enemy but agents of the state as well, even engaging the Mexican military in their attempts to take control of key municipalities ("Chocan Autodefensas" n.d.). Though most of these groups have been at pains to deny any hostility toward the state as such, their actions similarly produce dual sovereignty, wherein they have appropriated the most

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[2] Similarly, a number of African "revolutionaries" and "insurgencies" have aimed primarily at control of mineral wealth rather than political control.

basic function of the state in providing security while eschewing larger aims to appropriate all of the duties of the state. The act of taking up arms in defiance of the state to provide security where the state has not suggests that the state has lost a significant degree of legitimacy. Visible members of the groups have made lengthy declarations to this effect, justifying their organization and use of arms as a legitimate response to repeated aggression by criminal gangs and failure of the state to offer protection ("El Pueblo Que Venció" 2013). From all outward appearances, then, the events of 2013 and early 2014 present the aspect of a minor civil war with the sovereignty of the Mexican state severely threatened, if only temporarily and in certain areas.

Keeping this in mind, the most recent irruption of violence in southern Mexico between self-defense groups and elements of organized crime groups is perhaps captured by the concept of "symmetric non-conventional war." In this type of conflict two nonstate actors come into conflict following the "implosion" of the state (Kalyvas 2007, 429). Given that the central government of Mexico has hardly imploded, the current situation in Mexico cannot be considered a war like those more typically considered symmetric nonconventional wars—such as in Lebanon, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. These actors do, however, engage in active hostilities, control territory, and take control of security procedures such as roadblocks with near impunity and very little participation by the state.

If the analogy is apt, as it appears, *prima facie*, to be, the presumption must be that the Mexican state has opened the door to this conflict by its inability to prevent it, that it has failed. Yet this claim is a complex and contested one, as well as being deeply politically sensitive. As long as the state and organized crime are the only participants in conflict, it might be difficult to consider this as more than a case of highly sophisticated crime organizations operating as illegal enterprises in the face of a state without the resources to effectively combat it, or of a narcostate in which criminal gangs exercise undue influence over government. These could certainly be argued to be true of Mexico; however, the events of 2013, in which ad hoc militias acting wholly outside the state's imprimatur have taken measures to provide security and have engaged in hostilities against cartels in which the government takes little or no part, call for much greater attention to the claim that Mexico is a candidate for state failure.

State Failure

The paradox presents itself once more. Can Mexico be characterized as a failed state? Again, on the surface, the Mexican state bears hardly any resemblance to the conventionally agreed-upon cases of state failure, most

notably that of Somalia. An ineffective government that exercises little control of territory outside the capital, warlords that administer much of the state, and breakaway regions that perform all of the functions of states without recognition make for a fairly clear-cut case of state failure in Somalia. Those arguing that Mexico has failed in some important way continue to point to the near absence of state authority in southern regions afflicted with persistent violence. The differing perspectives would appear to be arguing past each other. Skeptics of the applicability of state failure in this case take a top-down view of Mexico, seeing the relatively strong state described in the introduction. Those arguing in favor of state failure's applicability (or its threat) take a bottom-up approach, wherein the failure of the state to provide security has allowed contestants for sovereignty to appear at the local level. Which one is the more appropriate view of state failure? Deciding the issue requires reviewing attempts to put a definitional point on the state failure concept.

What most can agree on is that states exist to provide public goods to those living within its territory and that among these public goods are security, infrastructure, and education and health facilities, among others. There is also widespread agreement that some states perform these functions better than others and in some cases fail to provide these. Beyond this, however, there is no agreement as to how exactly to define state failure or how to measure it.

A host of definitions has been offered, and scholars sometimes employ a variety of different terms used as synonyms or as preexisting conditions to failure—"weak states" or "fragile states," for example. King and Zeng (2001) write that state failure "refers to the complete or partial collapse of state authority" that have "governments with little political authority or ability to impose the rule of law … associated with widespread crime, violent conflict, or severe humanitarian crisis." Rotberg (2004, 2) writes that states "exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders)" and that states may be classified as failed "according to the levels of their successful delivery of the most crucial political goods," the principal of which is human security. The Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State Failure Task Force) defines state failure somewhat narrowly as "crises and conflicts including revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides" ("Political Instability Task Force" 2012).

Alternatively, rather than pose a hard definition, some approaches assert characteristics of failed states. The World Bank, for example, lists the characteristics of fragile states as "weak institutional capacity, poor governance, political instability, and … continuing violence" (The World Bank 2014). A similar approach takes various characteristics and measures what might be

termed "failedness" along a spectrum. The Fund for Peace, which compiles a yearly Failed States Index, lists twelve indicators such as "group grievance," "sustained human flight," "legitimacy of the state," and "progressive deterioration of public services" (Fund for Peace 2014). Each country is scored on the twelve dimensions to produce a score, indicating its position along a spectrum from stable to failure.

The various definitions and measures of state failure might be grouped into two larger categories. Howard (2010, 12) identifies two principal approaches to the study of state failure: those that take an absolute view of state failure, and those taking a view of state failure as a process. The first identifies only those states gripped by corrosive internal warfare as failed states; while the second, more flexible, understanding conceives of failure as the conclusion of a process that begins with weakness, leading to failure, and may in extreme cases end in collapse, or the complete absence of state authority. The wider process view better captures the complexity of a widely varying event, and it typically conceives failure as a process beginning with inability to provide security and spiraling into wider failures to provide the further goods that states are expected to guarantee such as education, infrastructure, and regulation of economic activities.

State failure has generated a great deal of disagreement among scholars, and declarations of state failure are fraught with controversy, as status of failed state carries serious political ramifications (Patrick 2007). Some scholarly critics of the concept charge that measurements of state failure can include such a wide array of characteristics that the concept becomes stretched so widely that it ceases to have much meaning (Easterly and Freschi 2014). Conceptual fuzziness extends so far that, as in other difficult concepts, critics have declared it altogether unhelpful and leads to lumping together disparate problems faced by very different countries.

Though these definitions differ in emphasis and no consensus exists concerning either the concept of state failure or when a state has failed, at bottom these definitions and measurements rest on the assumption that the most basic characteristic of the state is the exercise of sovereignty. The modern state is defined by the exercise of supreme authority within its territory; if state failure is to be intelligible, then, the narrowest understanding should be of the state's loss of sovereignty. Critiques of state failure as a concept include its Western bias toward the sovereign, territorial state, but this is unavoidable given that these are taken to be the defining characteristics of the modern state. State failure must be understood as the failure of this form of territorially defined, sovereign political organization. The territorially defined state, taken as the unit of analysis of most IR and comparative research, biases

our lens toward the top-down view of state failure as implosion of the central state authority.

Sovereignty, of course, is not an unambiguous concept, either. Krasner (1999, 3–4) identifies four understandings of the meaning of sovereignty: international legal, Westphalian, domestic, and interdependence sovereignty. These may be more simply captured in two conventional dimensions, internal and external sovereignty. External sovereignty describes the independence of the state from outside interference (which corresponds with different aspects of Krasner's international legal, Westphalian, and interdependence sovereignty), while internal sovereignty concerns the state's authority and control over its territory. Krasner's domestic sovereignty, which he defines as "the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity" may be taken as internal sovereignty, and it is this variety of internal control that impinges on the question of state failure. Clear cases of state failure are those in which the public authorities have unquestionably failed to exercise effective control; the Somali government controls only a portion of the territory recognized as belonging to the internationally recognized sovereign state of Somalia (Krasner's international legal sovereignty).

Limiting the concept in this way, to loss of effective domestic control, makes the concepts of sovereignty and state failure easier to grasp but, of course, does not make its application in fuzzier cases more straightforward: How can one know for certain when the state has moved beyond a simple security threat, a common problem in many states, and has lost sovereignty, an exceedingly rare judgment? This simpler view does, however, seem to suggest a resolution to the Mexican paradox: the Mexican state not lost sovereignty in the aggregate and is the supreme authority within its territory. The top-down approach taken by most observers of state failure predispose our conclusion toward exempting Mexico from state failure.

Beyond the hotly debated statements made in the Joint Operating Command and by other officials, Mexico does not typically appear on lists of failed states or states in immediate danger of failure. The Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index for 2014 ranked Mexico 105th of 178 countries, placing it in an intermediate "warning" category between "sustainable" and "alert" (Fund for Peace 2014). Limiting our definition to a central political authority's loss of domestic sovereignty does make for a cleaner conceptual box in which to place our cases. In doing so, however, we risk overlooking the magnitude of the crisis in Mexico simply for the sake of conceptual clarity. A bottom-up view of the violence in Mexico still demands that we treat this case as a failure on the part of the Mexican state.

Even the strongest states cannot guarantee perfect safety; cities and remote areas in highly developed countries present their own dangers. In

Mexico, however, violence has transcended the proportions of epic crime wave; in some areas of Mexican territory, the government has simply ceded control and offers citizens nothing in the way of security. In Michoacán, for example, it has been widely reported that in many municipalities, the *Caballeros Templarios* effectively operated with the monopoly on force, without fear of capture or challenge by police or military, and self-defense groups began to challenge and in some cases replace them. Mexico should, then, meet the definition of failed state since it fails to fulfill the most basic function of states, though not at the national level and not according to most conceptions of state failure.

Rethinking State Failure

In light of the apparently paradoxical Mexican case and of the contested nature of the state failure concept itself, we might fruitfully make a comparison to Kuhn's concept of an anomaly within an established scientific paradigm, wherein observations arise that are incompatible with expectations supplied by prevailing disciplinary theories, in this case a dominant view of state sovereignty. Accumulated anomalies lead to a crisis that finally culminates in a revolution and emergence of a new paradigm that resolves the puzzle presented by anomalies (Kuhn 1996). Widespread acceptance among scholars of states' claims to exclusive possession of sovereignty yields a concept of state failure that is not capable of capturing an increasingly complex reality. A reworking of our definition of sovereignty—already underway in different avenues of political science research—allows us to resolve the paradox, retaining both a meaningful conception of state failure and its application to the outwardly stable Mexican political system. State failure should continue to mean the loss of sovereignty, but sovereignty itself should not be viewed as an all-or-nothing prospect. If we consider sovereignty as divisible, operable in some functions and areas of the state while absent in other functions and areas, the Mexican case becomes intelligible as a case of a loss of sovereignty in limited areas, of segmented state failure.

Given the conventional definition of sovereignty as effective control within a territory, and given that the state is the most common unit of analysis in political science, the concept of state failure has exhibited a bias toward viewing state failure as a quality obtaining throughout an entire state territory. At the international level, though, a lively discussion has emerged concerning the circumscription of external sovereignty, extending as far as speculation over the survivability of the sovereign state (Sassen 1996). Emerging human rights norms, humanitarian intervention, and IGOs like the European Union have led some scholars to revise the popular conception of sovereignty as

supreme within a territory. Through IGOs, states instead can "pool" their sovereignty in such a way that they are no longer absolutely sovereign in themselves (Keohane & Hoffman 1991). Bull (2012) wrote of the contemporary period as a "new medievalism" in which states share sovereignty with a patchwork of other bodies as happened in the Middle Ages. Similarly, Held (1995, 137) states that processes and institutions inherent in globalization "displace notions of sovereignty as an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form of public power." Some IR scholars have gone as far as to reject external sovereignty altogether as "myth" (see e.g., Glanville 2013; Osiander 2001).

Can internal or domestic sovereignty be divided? This view contrasts sharply from that of the indivisibility of sovereignty, voiced by classical theorists including Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes (Bartelson 2011), who claim that sovereignty is unitary and absolute. Against this assertion and in defense of the American Revolution, Madison argued for a "partition of power" between national and local governments that became the basis for the constitutional system of the United States and foundation of the federal form of government (Keohane 2002, 745). Twentieth-century theorists continued to chip away at the notion of absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the state as contrary to modern pluralist understanding of popular sovereignty and limited government (Philpott 2014). Not only do modern democracies limit sovereignty within their own territory singly; but in pooling sovereignty, European states have divided their internal sovereignty by ceding to an external authority control over internal regulatory and fiscal matters. Thus we find that the traditional conception of sovereignty has undergone profound shifts in the modern period and that a series of anomalous observations from international relations and democratic theory has clarified the need for a shift in our paradigmatic understanding of sovereignty as unified and absolute as well. Sovereignty is segmented horizontally, sharing governance responsibilities with IGOs and trade regimes; and sovereignty may be segmented at the domestic level, in vertical fashion, as well.

In practice, just as the process view of state failure makes it more complex, construing domestic sovereignty as divisible makes the definition more complex as well. It becomes clear in light of the Mexican case that segments of the state can fail, that the sovereignty of the national Mexican state is divisible, but in ways probably unforeseen in the Madisonian view. Federal systems divide the sovereignty of the state between levels of government providing different public goods or cooperating in the provision of public goods in overlapping capacities. We see in Mexico that the state (also divided between national and federal subjects) can operate providing some public goods alongside yet other, mutated, forms of sovereignty, in this case drug cartels and self-defense groups. Sovereignty understood as the supreme

and undivided authority within a territory does not in this case describe reality. As has become clear in Mexico, even a relatively strong state with an extensive bureaucratic presence can lose control over some aspects of the state territory, even in so vital an area as security, without leading to the implosion of the central state authority.

Challengers to sovereignty, like the drug gangs and self-defense groups, do not necessarily expel the state in all its forms. These actors instead operate within the state, challenging its authority particularly in the security domain, but act alongside the state without seeking to replace it as the principal governmental actor; indeed, drug cartels would unlikely wish to, but would instead prefer to take advantage of the extensive benefits—infrastructure, national, and even local security for the public—offered by the state that allow their functioning as money-making enterprises. Self-defense groups appear to have no such aspiration, but only seek to fill the void in the provision of security while continuing to observe the sovereignty of the state more broadly.

The notion of "dual sovereignty" can no longer be limited to powerful drug cartels in Mexico, but should also include the self-defense groups. Neither drug cartels nor self-defense groups seek to replace the state. They are not alternatives to the state but are in important ways dependent upon it for their continued existence. These carve out a space of partial domestic sovereignty within the sovereignty of the state, availing themselves of the larger array of public goods offered by the state.

Segmented State Failure in Mexico

That the community police and later self-defense groups originated in Guerrero and surrounding states is not surprising considering the history in these areas. These southern states display a history of violent contention. In the 1960s and 1970s, as part of a larger struggle against left-wing groups and students, the government fought various insurgency groups in Guerrero, which led to accusations of a dirty war against suspected insurgents involving assassinations and disappearances (K. Doyle 2003). Even today, the Ejército Revolucionario Popular (ERP) and Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI), minor but active guerrilla groups, make their bases in Guerrero.

Most famously, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) launched a brief military and extended media offensive beginning in 1994 in the southernmost state of Chiapas. Its stated goal is to struggle for the rights of marginalized indigenous people in the country's poorest state. Though the rebellion has languished in recent years and has few successes to show for its

efforts, the Zapatistas continue to administer "autonomous municipalities" throughout Chiapas without state interference.

The literature on the civil violence and state failure suggests that these violent outbursts concentrated in the relatively underdeveloped southern states are not coincidental. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that environmental factors such as mountainous terrain and poverty are the best predictors of civil violence in weak states. They find that that the best explanation for civil conflict is state capacity in terms of military, police, and administration, which they proxy with GDP per capita. They write, "Where states are relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough local justice while arrogating the power to 'tax' for themselves and, often, for a larger cause" (2003, 76) describing in basic outline the activities of the drug cartels.

State failure is typically predicted to occur in less developed regions. Measures of state fragility developed by the Brookings Institution include economic indicators like gross national income per capita, GDP growth, and income inequality; and social indicators like child mortality and education levels (Rice and Patrick 2014). The Fund for Peace includes "Uneven Economic Development," and "Poverty, Sharp or Severe Economic Decline" as measures of state weakness.

The southern states of Mexico lag far behind in development compared to the country as a whole. While the Human Development Index places Mexico among the ranks of states with "High Human Development" (behind Very High Human Development), the development levels of southern states are comparable to those of less-developed Guatemala, El Salvador, and Bolivia (United Nations Development Program 2014). The southern states of Michoacán, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas consistently rank at the bottom of development measures for the country. Guatemala, on Mexico's southern border, ranks 66th on the Fund for Peace's 2014 Fragile States Index, in the "Very High Warning" category. If Guatemala is a weak state, the southern states of Mexico are, in a number of ways, more similar to their small and poor independent neighbor than they are to some of the more highly developed states in the north of Mexico that would rank among the Very High Development countries if counted independently.

Conclusions and Implications

This article has made the case that our empirical observation leads us to reconsider our conventional theoretical categories. Observation indicates that though the Mexican state at the aggregate level appears sovereign and no widespread breakdown of its capacity is imminent, the government is wholly

incapable of meeting the challenge posed by heavily armed groups confronting each other within its borders. The state failure concept has been criticized for its ambiguity and bias toward the Western model of state sovereignty. Unfortunately, the messy world of politics does not often easily reduce to a set of formal analytic concepts. One option for resolving the paradox presented by Mexico is to reject the state failure concept altogether as an unfortunate and overly simple conceptual box lumping together too many distinct cases. While resolving the paradox, such a choice does not shed further light on the case and could obscure the severity of the crisis in Mexico and the very real institutional failures there.

Instead, this article presents the argument that we may understand the paradox as akin to a Kuhnian anomaly, perhaps one of many such anomalous observations of state behavior made in the last several decades that will produce a crisis and ultimately contribute to a revolution in scientific thinking that resolves the apparent paradox. The resolution of the paradox presented here, the notion that sovereignty is segmented and that the state therefore can fail in segmented fashion, suggests that state failure can take place in what are outwardly stable, economically prosperous democracies. This form of segmented state failure may be a more common event in an era of globalization and democratization. Though O'Neil rejects labeling Mexico as a failed state, she calls the violence gripping the state a side effect of precisely these processes (2009). Signs of impending state failure and the risk of civil conflict may be more subtle than previously thought. We may think of this as a variety of postmodern state failure; rather than ideologically driven political movements seeking the overthrow of power, international criminal networks and warlords carving out a sphere for conducting unfettered illicit business might be the principal threat to sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Control of the central state is no longer necessarily the highest goal of would-be sovereigns. Rather, the profit motive drives networks of criminal enterprises to establish dual sovereignty, rather than full sovereignty. If this is the case, we are once again confronted with the possibility of a revolution in our conception of sovereignty.

The irony of discussions of state failure in Mexico is that the PRI regime appeared practically invincible for much of the twentieth century. The party was often called "hegemonic" and the president seen as the unquestioned boss of the political system, a kind of elected monarch. Though these descriptions were exaggerated, the current inability of the Mexican state to control its territory may be attributable to the very structure of the PRI system that once appeared unshakable. The party's tendency toward cooptation of a wide variety of social segments—significantly including drug trafficking operations—broke down with the democratization process that empowered

opposition parties and civil society, leaving other actors—civic and legal ones, but also, unfortunately, criminal ones—there to pick up the pieces. The retrenchment of the state opened new avenues for would-be challengers to the sovereignty of the state. Integration with the United States has opened new economic opportunities not just for legal business, but the illicit traffic of substances and people as well. Drug gangs seek to control territory, and thus represent a challenge to sovereignty, but have no ideological program to offer as an alternative to that of the state, instead seeking to operate within the state—a dual sovereign.

Southern Mexico's descent into chaos has raised a red flag. As the government has made overtures to leaders of self-defense groups for their incorporation into the legal structure—and this has for the most part taken place—the crisis atmosphere of 2013 and early 2014 has faded away. The structural fragility of the state, particularly in the less-developed regions, remains, however, and a clear lesson of the self-defense groups is that the state's failure to provide security has contributed to the erosion of its legitimacy as the claimant to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a lesson unlikely to be forgotten in the long-neglected south.

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Counterterrorist Finance Measures and the Extent of Culpability within the GCC

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The region of the Arab Gulf has long been held responsible for the continued threat of Islamist terrorism with good reason. Contained in one of the world's most important economic blocs, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), are six states that seem to inspire radical sympathies from within. American journalists and officials routinely chastise the region's leaders for failing to stop the flow of capital from their wealthy citizenry into terrorist hands. This research tests the validity of such accusations according to international law based on Gulf legal material. Despite their enhanced counterterrorism capabilities since 9/11, the Gulf monarchies balance their own susceptibility to terrorist ideologues with the interests of Sunni populations and Western trading partners. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates lead in counterterrorist involvement, Oman and Bahrain act generally independently due to their unique social makeup, and Qatar and Kuwait are criticized for passing off their collective security burdens as they weigh political repercussions with regional defense obligations.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks cost Al Qaeda somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000, the 2013 attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi cost less than $5,000, and the Boston Marathon bombing cost about $500 (Cohen 2014; Roth, Greenburg, and Wille 2004, 3). The United States has never neglected the dynamics of terrorist financing networks in its counterterrorism (CT) strategy. Even before the 9/11 attacks and their resulting hard-learned lessons,

the US intelligence community benefited from follow-the-money strategies to locate terrorists and prevent attacks.

It is no secret that much of the money reaching terrorist coffers has originated from the countries bordering the Arabian Gulf. A combination of wealth from oil and Salafist Islamic ideology make these states ready financers for certain groups. Plenty of other countries within the region of the Middle East and North Africa house wealthy citizens, but the political-cultural dynamics of those states do not produce terrorist financers at the same rate as the Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formed in 1981 at the behest of Saudi Arabia, includes all of the states of the Arabian Gulf except Yemen. Yemen is considered a Gulf state but lacks the economic strength to be a substantial financer of terrorism or a member of the GCC. The GCC member states are The Kingdom of Bahrain, The State of Kuwait, The Sultanate of Oman, The State of Qatar, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and The United Arab Emirates. Beyond their representation in the most important trade union in the world after the European Union, these states form a surprisingly cohesive geopolitical unit. It is not uncommon for scholars to use "the Gulf" (or "*khaleej*" in Arabic) interchangeably with "the GCC."

Despite its importance, the GCC is "arguably one of the least understood and most misunderstood sub-regional organizations on the planet" (Anthony 2014). The states of the GCC began their bilateral relations with the United States during the period of rampant oil discovery in the region. Accordingly, US-GCC relations have been founded upon economic partnership, respect, and trust. The significance of US-GCC cooperation in military terms cannot be easily overstated. Bahrain is home to the US Fifth Fleet, and the rest of the GCC holds multiple assets to the American military. This relationship is, of course, not only based on land holdings, as the GCC "has been the one area more than any other on the planet to which the United States has mobilized, deployed, and led an internationally concerted coalition of the world's armed forces not once but *three times* in the last quarter-century" (Anthony 2014; emphasis original).

In exchange for American access to their natural resources and reliance on the US military, the Gulf states have demonstrated incredible loyalty to the United States, yet American politicians and media pundits frequently accuse the states of the GCC with allowing private donations to flow to terrorist organizations. These criticisms are not uniquely American but are used around the world; for example, in March 2014, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki directly accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of openly funding the Sunni insurgents of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) battling the Iraqi government in the Anbar Province during the opening ceremony of the Center for Development Education in Baghdad. What many pundits ignore is that the

GCC's American loyalty also extends in the realm of CT efforts. While the region has a history of providing funds for terrorist operations (in addition to providing the terrorists themselves in many cases), the regimes are very dedicated to the eradication of violent extremism in the region, driven by both political and religious motivations.

Theoretical Framework of Collective Action Theory

The study of terrorist financing at the state level is not rooted in political theory; however, international counterterrorist financing (CTF) can be analyzed through the lens of collective action theory. Collective action theory, formed by Mancur Olson in 1965, argues that when states come together in ensuring a public good, some states will shirk their responsibilities, passing them off onto other countries. Countering terrorist financing presents a classic collective action problem as Western states with greater incentive or resources bare more of the brunt of CTF costs than the third world countries that actually produce and support terrorists. A smaller representation of the problem can be seen within the GCC, as Kuwait and Qatar seem to pass CTF onto other states that they may view as facing fewer political consequences. Anne Clunan made this connection in her 2006 analysis of international CTF: "Yet every state has an incentive to pass the costs of constraining terrorist financing off the others, as long as the costs of doing so are less than the benefits of attracting financial clients craving secrecy and of appeasing domestic actors … who oppose government scrutiny" (572). Despite the Gulf's dedication to international cooperation, the case studies illustrate imbalances in CTF strategies among the six states.

Method of Research

This research is primarily a case study, focusing on all member states of the GCC, preceded by definitions of terms and concepts relevant to the case analyses. It relies most heavily on intergovernmental institution reports and official statements by US and GCC officials. This method inevitably produces a tone favorable to the states studied because nearly all supporting arguments are derived from diplomatic documents, unlike a study more reliant on off-the-record communications. Anti–money laundering (AML) efforts were also analyzed in the comparison between GCC countries. Money laundering, as its name indicates, is the opposite process of terrorist financing. Money laundering is the process of making dirty money (from criminal enterprises) clean; terrorist financing is the process of making clean money (from usually innocent charitable donations) dirty. AML legislative and judicial frameworks

are usually more established within countries and are easily applied when attempting to locate, track, and confiscate terrorist assets.

A number of country reports produced by third party organizations are useful in a comparative study of AML/CFT measures. Globally, these include the International Monetary Fund's Detailed Reports on AML and CFT, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluations, the Anti-Money Laundering Forum's country reports, and the Global Forum on Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes' Peer Reviewed Reports. The last could prove useful in addressing intergovernmental information sharing but was not consulted for the purposes of this research. While less recent, another valuable resource in comparing global counterterrorism efforts are the reports pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001. In the region of the Middle East and North Africa, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) Mutual Evaluations and Follow-ups serve as the best comparative analyses. The best sources produced by the US government are the State Department Annual Terrorism Country Reports and the International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INSCRs) on Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Contemporary Problems of Terrorist Financing in the GCC

Terrorist Organizations Present in GCC Member States

According to the *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (Schmid 2011), there are 52 organizations classified as extremist, terrorist, or associated with guerilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime, and cyber-crime present in the GCC, 38 of which are in Saudi Arabia. As a point of contrast, Iraq has 438 listings. Of these, the United States lists only one organization, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) (US Department of State n.d.). This of course is not an indication that citizens within the GCC do not sympathize or financially support additional organizations located elsewhere, such as Hamas or Hezbollah.

Funding of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh

In recent months, many writers have connected the Arab monarchies with the continued success of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS)/the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also frequently referred to by its Arabic acronym, Daesh. These accusations focus on governmental funding of the declared caliphate itself and governmental neglect of terrorist funding channels. Beyond these areas, Lori Plotkin Boghardt (2014b) suggests that an

understanding of ISIS's reliance on Gulf-originated funds is also useful when assessing the GCC's impact on increased violence in the region.

First, there is no credible evidence, and subsequently no real US governmental accusations that the GCC governments are financially supporting ISIS in any direct way. Nonetheless, journalists and scholars frequently make this claim. This accusation ignores the political realities of the states themselves—that ISIS threatens the regime security of all states, even more so than Al Qaeda ever did, because it created a new leader meant to be superior to the Gulf monarchies in the person of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the declared caliph. Saudi Arabia, for example, has declared the group a terrorist organization along with Yemen's Houthi rebels, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Nusra Front, which arguably has more domestic support than any group operating in Iraq (Boghardt 2014b, "Government Funding?").

HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia addressed the 2014 National Council on US-Arab Relations (NCUSAR) 2014 Arab-US Policymakers Conference on the issue of ISIS. The prince strongly condemned the group, refusing to call it either ISIS or Daesh, and instead selecting the Arabic term "*Fahish*," a Qur'anic word to refer to a filthy crime against God, usually used in The Kingdom in reference to adultery or homosexuality. The Saudi state acts as a religious figurehead within the Gulf and the *ummah* (the worldwide community of Muslims) at large, so its utilization of religion as a means to confront the existential threat of an Islamic State should not go underrated. Regarding private donations, as this research suggests, there is really no way to quantify the actual amount of funds that pass through the Gulf into terrorist hands, but all states have taken measures to outlaw and intercept terrorist financing through varying methods.

A final consideration is the actual relevance of private funds to the continuation and financial success of the Islamic State. Many journalists and researchers in the field have pointed out that ISIS's success stems from its acquisition of capital through the seizure of Iraqi assets, such as Mosul's central bank on June 11. This flow of capital is sustained through criminal activity, such as smuggling of oil, weapons, antiques, and humans and extortion in the form of "taxes" upon local businesses (Boghardt 2014b, "Private Donations").

In his September 2014 speech, President Barack Obama made the statement that the United States seeks to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIS/ISIL, the first step largely to be achieved by cutting off the group's finances. Unfortunately, this strategy is failing, and a US-led crackdown on private Gulf financers, as supported by Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Robert Cohen, has had little effect on ISIS/ISIL because the organization has established its own network of revenue generators besides private donors. A discussion on the efficacy of private

terrorist financing and the available countermeasures should center on an older generation of terrorist organizations, best exemplified by Al Qaeda.

Funding of Al Qaeda Affiliates in Syria

While not officially considered a terrorist group, Mona Alami pointed out in *USA Today* in June 2014 that some Syrian rebels have clear allegiances to Al Qaeda. This is evident in Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front) chief's pledge of allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Sheik Ayman al-Zawahri and the claim by the Islamic State of Iraq, Iraq's Al Qaeda affiliate, that the group would willingly work with the Nusra Front (Alami 2014). Despite these clear complications of allegiance, according to a 2013 *New York Times* article by Ben Hubbard, GCC states do little to stop public fund-raising of these groups, both online and in person. The Twitter page "Jihad bmalk" is an excellent example of how modern terrorist fund-raisers utilize and rely on social media to reach donors; translated to "wage jihad with your money," it is run by a Saudi sheikh based in Syria and offers perks to donators such as "silver" status by donating $175 for 50 sniper bullets or "gold" status with a $250 donation for eight mortar rounds. Fund-raising for Syrian rebels in Kuwait has been particularly successful by utilizing sectarian division, calling on Sunnis to donate in revenge of Shi'ites and Alawites, represented in proxy by Assad, according to Hubbard.

Exploitable Areas in GCC Economies

Hawala Networks

Hawala, or *hundi*, is an alternative payment or parallel remittance system prevalent in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. *Hawaladars* provide an efficient and low-cost method for sending remittance or other payments to people outside the traditional finance sector. *Hawala* is also appealing because it is a relatively low-cost method to transfer funds. Of course, it also appeals to people wishing to transfer money secretly and in avoidance of governmental regulation, like money launderers or terrorist financers.

The process is built upon secrecy, sometimes involving secret codes, digitally encrypted messages, or even agreed-upon signals such as handshakes shared between couriers and recipients (Vaknin 2001). It is difficult to penetrate and understand as *hawaladars* are usually unwilling to betray the trust that they have developed within their network and customer base; still, they receive a significant amount of attention from US departments dedicated to anti–money laundering. A testament to the difficulty of limiting use of *hawala* networks, 50 percent of the economy of India uses *hawala* despite its illegality (Waszak 2004, 703). The GCC has greatly cracked down on *hawaladars* lately. For example, in the UAE, the Central Bank requires

*hawala*s to register with the state by providing Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), after previously only requesting such disclosure (INL 2014, 203). Previously, Emirati *hawaladars* were only requested to register. Despite these efforts, the US State Department's 2013 terrorism report on the UAE indicates that *hawala*s are possibly still used to transfer money to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia (174). In Qatar, *hawalas* have been all but stamped out by harsh government crackdowns. *Hawala*s are not permitted in Oman, and government and Central Bank authorities have attempted to end all attempted *hawala* operations (US Department of State 2013, 165).

The Requirement of *Zakat*

Arab states face extra challenges when monitoring private donations because charity is so important to their cultures. One of the Pillars of Islam is *zakat*, or charitable giving. *Zakat* is a fundamental characteristic of Islam, and the religious period of Ramadan calls for extra generosity from the *ummah*. For these reasons, most GCC states have a Ministry of Islamic Affairs that regulates charitable giving and can ensure that monies transferred through official means do not make it into terrorist hands. Ministries of Islam justify illegalizing terrorist contributions on the grounds that such donations foment violence and unrest, disallowed in the Qur'an. As a means to consider the potential illegal wealth transfer through *zakat* were it to go unregulated, the Saudi royal family alone contributes $12 billion in *zakat* annually (Waszak 2004, 706). In Kuwait, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, in close coordination with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, enforces a ban on cash donations except during the period of Ramadan and implementation of an "enhanced receipt system" for cash donations during the month of Ramadan to reduce the possibility of *zakat* monies funding terrorism or otherwise criminal endeavors (US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013, 153).

International and Regional CTF Cooperation

FATF

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering was founded in 1989 based on an initiative of the G7 (United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, and Canada). Its most important contribution to the field of AML/CTF is its *40 Recommendations against Money Laundering and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorism Financing* of June 2003, which promotes general standards such as international cooperation, due diligence and record-keeping, and governmental oversight of all financial activities. FATF also calls for all states to implement specific anti–terrorist financing policies such as the freezing and confiscating of terrorist assets and

reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism. FATF produces its own mutual evaluations of compliance to these recommendations, but the GCC's mutual evaluations are compiled by their own regional FATF group, MENAFATF.

MENAFATF

In 2004, Arab states formed the Bahrain-based Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), modeled after the international Paris-based FATF. MENAFATF embraces the FATF *40 Recommendations*. At the time of the organization's inception, MENAFATF began compiling Mutual Evaluations of all its member states to gauge each other's progress in implementing the FATF recommendations (Jacobson 2007). At the time of this writing, all of the initial evaluations had been completed, and MENAFATF had begun to publish follow-up reports for all states; four follow-ups had been completed, two of which are the GCC states of Bahrain and Qatar. These mutual evaluations represent the feature of MENAFATF that is most useful and interesting to the United States, but some of their other special interest reports are also useful. The United States is an observer to MENAFATF meetings.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions after 9/11: UNSCR 1368 and UNSCR 1373

Based upon the pre-9/11 resolutions 1267 and 1333, which respectively established the Al Qaida Sanctions Committee and froze all assets of Osama bin Laden, on September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368 obligating all member states to suppress terrorism and terrorist financing. On September 28 that same year, the Security Council used strong language to call on all states to criminalize terrorism and to act against all terrorist organizations, not just Al Qaeda and the Taliban as required by UNSCR 1267. It also created the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to operate within the Security Council to monitor compliance with all required CT provisions. The Committee further required all states to submit evaluations of their CT efforts to the chairman within the following few years.

The Egmont Group of Financial Investigation Units

The Egmont Group of twenty countries formed in 1995 under the leadership of Belgium and the United States as an informal network for sharing money laundering information between governments (Clunan 2006, 577). Following 9/11, the network grew to 58 states and then to 101 by 2006; as of 2013, the Egmont Group included 139 members. Along with FATF, the Egmont Group is one of the few international bodies that has shown some success in underwriting the global terrorist finance regime (Clunan 2006, 595). The Egmont Group

operates as a forum for all member national Financial Investigation Units (FIUs) to share information, hold training workshops, and report on potential vulnerabilities in national anti–money laundering legislation. Four GCC FIUs are present in the Egmont Group: the Anti-Money Laundering Unit (AMLU) of Bahrain, the Qatar Financial Information Unit (QFIU), Wehdat Altahariyat Al Maliyah Saudi Arabia Financial Investigation Unit (SAFIU), and the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the UAE.[1] Kuwait's FIU is not a member.

Analysis of CTF Efforts in the Gulf

Overview

Military threats do not seriously concern the monarchies of the GCC, but all are concerned with regime stability and maximizing international influence. While the Gulf states were relatively unshaken by the Arab Spring (Bahrain as the obvious exception), it brought to light new existential threats to Gulf monarchies, forcing them to hold together with more aggressive rentier policies and incremental democratization. The new popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and rise of ISIS forced Gulf states to make decisions that appeared to either alienate or pander to right-wing Sunnis.

It is unwise to speculate too much regarding the motivations behind each state's level of commitment to CTF, but it is clear that each GCC country has incentive to concern itself with obligations that are often at odds with one another. These obligations are the interests of the West, usually represented by the interests of the United States, and the interests of domestic right-wing Sunnis that can back groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, and ISIS if they feel their monarchs were inadequate. Each country of the GCC must approach the subject of terrorism while weighing the above two interests and considering if they are even threatened by terrorism itself.

Some states of the GCC approach CTF uniquely, and some share common traits. Saudi Arabia, as the historical bull of the council with the largest and most Islamist population, has no equal in the region. Similarly, the UAE's modernity, international allegiances, and lack of obligation to Sunni groups to maintain regime stability also set it apart. Oman and Bahrain are the outliers that are least vocal in the CTF fight, while their regimes are likely to feel threatened by terrorists themselves; Bahrain must concern itself with popular Shi'a movements, while Oman is vulnerable at the Strait of Hormuz and along

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[1] Oman's FIU appears to be a likely future member of the Egmont Group, but both Oman's Financial Unit website and the 2013 State Department's Terrorism Report for Oman claim that it is already a member. An official at the State Department could not confirm Oman's membership.

its Yemeni border. Qatar and Kuwait have clear similarities both in the way the West accuses them of allowing funds to slip through to terrorist groups and in their dedication to their wealthy Sunni populations.

The State Department has never designated any GCC country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Regarding money laundering, which often appears coinciding with terrorist financing, the London-based Anti-Money Laundering Forum (AMLF) claims that all states of the GCC directly apply AML legislation to lawyers, rather than only enforcing it indirectly; but that they are lacking in adequate legislation or failing to make public the necessary information for such an assessment (AMLF 2014). Contrary to the frequent journalistic attention to the region, of the six GCC countries, only the UAE has appeared on the State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) list of countries/jurisdictions of primary concern from 2010 to 2014, but the reports from 2012 to 2014 list all six of the GCC states as hosting "Suspected Terrorist Financing," within a list of 21 forms of money laundering and financial crimes, except the country of Kuwait, which was just given this distinction in 2014.

Saudi Arabia

In October 2014, at the 2014 NCUSAR Arab-US Policymakers Conference, HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal took a turn in his otherwise diplomatic keynote speech to address the assumption that Saudi Arabia is a terrorist financer: "And for once and for all, I say to those that accuse Saudi Arabia or 'Saudi wealthy sheiks' of supporting ISIS, ISIL, or '*Fahish*,' or any other terrorist group to either put up or shut up." Then, HRH bullishly instructed the audience to provide the names of these so-called Saudi terrorist financers so that he and his government could bring them to justice.

The prince was referring to the many accusations that have been leveled at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) since 9/11 that fault the government's laxity, donations from private citizens, and, in some cases, Saudi government officials or royalty themselves. These are not empty accusations. In 2004, knowledge that US authorities examined the bank accounts of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C., searching for "possible violations of money laundering rules, including the use of large amounts of cash" and upon suspicion that the embassy's high expenses ($300 million per year), which could be used for domestic terrorism promotion in the United States (Alexander 2004, 77). The 2004 suspicions were based on reports that Princess Haifa Al Faisal indirectly sent money to members of the 9/11 hijacking team (Alexander 2004, 77). In 2006, documents prepared for the US Congress claimed that Saudis fund international Islamic charities that can easily transfer

funds for low-cost terrorist operations (Blanchard and Prados 2007). The report further claimed that KSA's financial system makes tracing financial transactions difficult, which is exacerbated by the fact that "personal income records are not kept for tax purposes" and "many citizens prefer cash transactions" (Blanchard and Prados 2007, 1). Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey claimed in a 2007 interview, "If I could somehow snap my fingers and cut off the funding from one country, it would be Saudi Arabia" (Ross 2007). The reality of terrorist financing in the Kingdom has changed since 2007 through a continuation of KSAs "undeniable progress" in CTF efforts that has been recognized and praised by the US government (Snow 2003).

The dynamics of Saudi Arabian AML/CTF efforts are not quite as simple as either the prince or most US pundits claim. A necessary consideration is the relative importance of Saudi Arabia's regional role, which cannot be overstated. KSA has the highest GDP in the GCC, with the UAE holding a distant second place. It is also the biggest oil producer and exporter in the world because of its ownership of the largest oil field in the world, Ghawar, in the Al-Ahsa Governate. KSA has been the undisputed political leader within the GCC since the founding of the trade bloc in 1981. Even when another state, usually Qatar, rises as a leader within the GCC or Arab League, KSA's will is still voiced and highly regarded. The king of Saudi Arabia is also a cultural leader as the custodian of the two holy mosques sacred to Islam. Of course, most significant to those concerned with KSA's CT strategy is the Kingdom's complex history with terrorism itself. Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, plus Osama bin Laden, were Saudi. The Kingdom also experiences terrorist attacks hostile to the Al Saud regime within its own borders, exacerbated by an unstable border with Yemen. There are elements within Saudi society that align with terrorist ideology; this link is most often found within the religious doctrine of Wahhabism, a fundamental interpretation of Islam that was instrumental to Saudi Arabia's founding and modern cultural dominance.

The CT framework in Saudi Arabia is adequate according to standards as defined by FATF's *40 Recommendations*. The Kingdom's AML/CFT system has been in place since 2003. Unlike the other GCC states, KSA all bases laws upon *shariah* (Islamic law); accordingly, terrorist finance is criminalized on the grounds that it fuels unrest, which is against Islam. The freezing of terrorist assets is also included in Saudi *shariah* because all "proceeds, instrumentalities used and instrumentalities intended" can be confiscated for the purpose of preventing terrorism as per Royal Order S/2496 of March 2003 (MENAFATF 2010, 7). The Kingdom applied these laws in May 2014, when it arrested 59 citizens for "supporting AQAP in fundraising and logistics" (Boghardt 2015a). It also created an FIU in 2003, which has been well funded

and staffed since gaining independence from the rest of the cumbersome Saudi bureaucracy and joining the Egmont Group (MENAFATF 2010). However, the 2010 Mutual Evaluation of Saudi Arabia claimed that the FIU was potentially ineffective as proven by the relatively low number of STRs processed, given the large FIU staff (MENAFATF 2010).

One could certainly produce a more lengthy analysis of Saudi Arabia's institutional framework for combatting terrorist finance, but as the KSA is the home of many individual donors themselves, the real battle exists in convincing the people themselves not to fund violence. Saudi Arabia has addressed this problem in concert with the United States and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Countering Violent Extremism Working Group on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing. Grassroots campaigns in the KSA focus on educating citizens about Islamic values and the dangers of violent extremism and terrorism, sometimes hosting seminars meant to refute violent Islamic messages. The Ministry of Interior operates a deradicalization program called the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue as well as a prison rehabilitation program intended to reduce recidivism among inmates. As it does in the development of its laws, Saudi Arabia always relies on Islamic principles to motivate its counter-radicalization efforts.

Despite its steps in the direction of enhanced CTF, the United States frequently bemoans Saudi antipathy toward the cause because donations are still reaching terrorists. The limitations within Saudi's application of its laws reflect the country's need to cater to its right-wing Sunni population in order to maintain the monarchy's legitimacy. Saudi Arabia is in the most delicate position of all GCC states because it has an obligation to balance the interests of the West with interests of Islamists while it is directly threatened by terrorism. Saudi Arabia produces terrorists and also falls victim to their attacks. It is also directly threatened by the rise of ISIS, which considers itself best representative of the *ummah* and therefore rightful custodian of Islam's holiest places.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is unique within the GCC for a number of reasons because it is such a large regional trade and finance hub. It is home to 34 free-trade zones containing 5,000 multinational companies and an extensive offshore financial center with another in development, according to the 2014 State Department INSCR (202). UAE law illegalizes the establishment of shell companies, and there is little domestic corruption, indicative of an administration that is not blind to the risks associated with such an open economic system. Opium traffickers, however, are reportedly increasingly attracted to the UAE's trade centers (US Department of State 2014, 202). Further, there are ways the UAE's loose system can be exploited by *hawaladars* and other money transmitter firms.

The UAE has been the GCC state most dedicated to strengthening its international cooperation and domestic capacities in countering terrorist financing. The UAE is a regional leader in AML/CTF. It chairs the MENAFATF Training and Typologies Working Group. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE Central Bank conducts AML training regionally and locally. The UAE is also a founding member and host of Global Counter Terrorism Forum and cochaired the organization's Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism, also known as *Hedayah*.

The UAE is easily the United States' greatest AML/CTF training partner. General Anthony Zinni, former commander of American forces in the Middle East, called it "the strongest relationship that the United States has in the Arab world today," and National Public Radio reported it as "an indispensable partner for Washington" (Boghardt 2015b). The UAE's Regional Legal Advisor, supported by the US Interagency Transit Funding Working Group, runs the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Division on Assistance and Training for all of the GCC states plus Yemen (US Department of State 2014, 10). It also routinely participates in joint-trainings with the FBI. A primary reason that the UAE is able to act cooperatively with Western CTF efforts is that it does not need to balance the opinions of a right-right Sunni population in order to maintain its regime security.

On April 30, 2014, the UAE Federal National Council passed a draft law regarding the criminalization and punishments for money laundering, amending Federal Law 4/2002 in response to recommendations made by the MENAFATF in 2012 (Al Hamrani and Khattab 2014). According to the same report, the UAE has an adequate CTF legislative framework that criminalizes both money laundering and terrorist financing. Additional laws are in place to confiscate terrorist funds and apply due diligence in customer transactions through the filing of STRs. Regarding the application of these laws, within the first quarter of 2012, the State Department found that the UAE had filed only 479 STRs, which the MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation staffers found inadequate for such a large and thriving financial center; but within the 2013–2014 INSCR assessment period, the UAE filed 2,576 STRs, indicating a desire to improve due diligence processes and apply international governmental recommendations (MENAFATF 2012, 9; US Department of State 2012, 177; US Department of State 2014, 202).

The US State Department has criticized UAE policies regarding cross-border bulk cash smuggling and money laundering and encouraged further cooperation among Emirati financial communities. The United States would also like the UAE to distribute lists of UN-designated terrorists to these financial institutions more regularly, put political considerations aside when confronted with the opportunity to freeze terrorist assets, and complete more

follow-up work with neighboring governments on compiled STRs. In November 2014, the UAE updated its list of designated terrorists to include groups like the Nusra Front in Syria and ISIS; however, the UAE also condemned groups that are widely considered moderate Muslim organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and some American groups. This incredibly low threshold for the classification of terrorists reflects the UAE's general lack of concern for right-wing Sunni groups. This broad stroke against terrorism, combined with the UAE's position as a regional leader and training partner, is an effective counteraction to the criticisms of its AML/CTF framework, especially since these lax systems have not yet directly led to a successful terrorist attack in either the Gulf region or the West.

Bahrain

Bahrain, already in its fourth year of political and social unrest, has certainly taken steps to reduce the prevalence of terrorist attacks within its borders, but as its population is not a significant source of terrorist funding, it has not taken many revolutionary CTF steps to counter it. The capital, Manama, is an important regional financial hub, so Bahrain has similar vulnerabilities to large cash flows as the UAE and Qatar but on a much smaller scale. Accordingly, Bahrain's laws, supported by the AMLU, focus on money laundering rather than direct terrorist financing; these laws include Decree Law N. (4) of 2001, Ministerial Order 7/2001, Ministerial Order 102/2001, and Ministerial Order 18/2001. Regarding terrorism specifically, Article 1 and 3 of Decree Law No. 54 (2006) defers to the definition appearing in the Treaty of the Islamic Conference Organisation for Combating International Terrorism and criminalized participation in all terrorist acts (Bahrain Ministry of the Interior 2006). Bahrain is not as vocal about CTF as its GCC counterparts are. The United States is not aware of any public prosecutions of terrorist financers, and the Bahraini government is not forthcoming with information on prosecutions (US Department of State 2013, 133). Beyond CTF, Bahrain has taken institutional measures to counter radicalization and violent extremism through the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs' annual review of government schools' Islamic studies curricula.

While there is not much complaint with Bahrain's compliance with FATF guidelines, some additional transparency would make analysis of the efficacy of Bahrain's initiatives easier. Additionally, Bahrain has come under international scrutiny for its painting of domestic Shi'a movements as terrorist organizations. Bahrain misuses its counterterrorism framework, such as the 2006 Bahraini Anti-Terror Act, to undermine entities it considers threatening based on perceived or real support of the Shia Crescent, which represents threats presented by Iran, Bashar al Assad, and domestic unrest.

Oman

Oman is an important counterterrorism ally to the United States even though it is lacking in some of the CTF framework that other GCC states have developed more fully. Oman's primary AML/CTF framework is contained within Royal Decree 79/2010. It also fully addresses the security risks within *hawalas* and Islamic banking networks in Royal Decree 69/2012. Oman criminalizes money laundering but does not completely criminalize terrorist financing because it does not explicitly make financing terrorists illegal; however, the US State Department points out that certain parts of the Penal Code can be used to prosecute terrorists (US Department of State 2014, 165). This issue arises because Oman lacks a proper definition of a terrorist act (MENAFATF 2011a, 9). There is not adequate legislative structures in place to facilitate the freezing and seizing of terrorist assets as per UNSCR 1373, and MENAFATF found in its 2011 Mutual Evaluation that there is a relatively low number of confiscations and low amounts confiscated, likely indicating an ineffective system. By 2011, Oman had not designated any entities as terrorists nor had it frozen any assets in accordance with 1373 (MENAFATF 2011a). Due diligence processes of filing STRs exist with adequate supporting legislation; however, likewise Oman produces a questionably low, but steadily increasing, number of STRs according to MENAFATF (2011a). Oman has created an FIU with "sufficient powers and access to perform its tasks" that is supported by the country's Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO) (MENAFATF 2011a, 9).

Oman cooperates with US initiatives but lacks some interagency coordination. More positively, the Central Bank of Oman has "a high degree of oversight of its commercial banking sector," unlike the UAE and Qatar (US Department of State 2014, 165). Royal Decree 69/2012 formally introduced Islamic banking into the Omani economy without major incident, and the Sultanate has illegalized *hawalas* and has been effective in ending all existing operations (US Department of State 2014, 165).

Kuwait

Kuwait represents one of the greatest impediments to combatting terrorist financing, despite some genuine efforts on the part of the state. The 2013 US State Department Terrorist Report claims that Kuwait's legislation is "inadequate" and lacking in its implementation (152). Further, US Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen claimed in April 2014 that, along with Qatar, Kuwait is allowing terrorist fund-raisers to operate in permissive jurisdictions and claimed, "Our ally Kuwait has become the epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria," a title that had been bestowed on Saudi Arabia by Cohen's predecessors.

In 2011, MENAFATF's Mutual Evaluation of Kuwait claimed that neither money laundering nor terrorist financing pose a serious threat to the Kuwaiti economy, with no evidence of major money laundering and no major terrorist attacks occurring in recent history. MENAFATF, however, criticized Kuwait on the grounds of its AML/CFT legal framework, primarily because terrorist financing was not explicitly criminalized; however, even at that time, Kuwait was party to all international conventions that criminalized TF, making it still illegal, as in Oman. The Mutual Evaluation further criticized Kuwait's lack of legal support for the freezing of terrorist finances and operationally of the country's FIU. Finally, the report criticized Kuwait's international non-judicial information-sharing platforms because all communication from the Central Bank of Kuwait had to travel through a "cumbersome and restrictive" Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO) (MENAFATF 2011b, 15). In 2006, the UN's Anti-Terrorism Department investigated Kuwait's Ministry for Social Affairs and Labor, prompting the adoption of stricter laws pertaining to Islamic charities in the country (Sloan 2014). The second follow-up investigation report in September 2014 had yet to be made public at the time of this research.

Today, criticisms arise despite Kuwait's passage of Kuwait Law 106/2013 regarding the Combating of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, which explicitly criminalizes terrorist finance (Article 3), upgrades and strengthens the country's FIU (Article 16), enables the freezing of terrorist assets (Article 22), and ensures that institutions follow due diligence such as filing STRs (Article 5) (Al Tamimi & Company 2014). The punishments for money laundering and terrorist financing are outlined in Articles 28 and 29. The Central Bank of Kuwait also produced supplementary circulars addressing customer due diligence practices in order to encourage the success of the new law (Al Tamimi & Company 2014). Regarding *hawaladars*, according to Article 20, Kuwait goes a step further than the UAE's registration law by requiring all persons exiting the country with currency or negotiable financial instruments for themselves or on behalf of others to disclose the value of these items to the Kuwaiti Customs Authority, information that can further be reviewed by the FIU.

Kuwait further calls for implementing UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1373 (2003) directly in its national legislation. These laws are quite similar to those of the UAE in their explicit nature and reflect earlier UN Resolutions. Kuwait Law 106/2013 also provides a definition of terrorism. In 2014, after two Kuwaitis were placed on the UN list of designated terrorists, Anas Al Saleh, Kuwait's finance minister, reiterated his government's intention of "complying with antiterrorist commitments" (Kerr 2014). Saleh further claimed that the government pursues "legal action" against persons suspected

of terrorist financing and will participate in more Arab League–sponsored antiterrorism measures (Kerr 2014).

Qatar

Qatar criminalizes terrorist financing in a limited way, according to a 2006 IMF report, under Article 4 of Law No. 3/2004 (here after "CT Law"). It illegalizes the provision of collection of "material or financial assistance" for the purpose of "terrorist crimes," whether or not the crimes are actually executed. The 2004 CT law also created the Qatari Authority for Charitable Activities. The limitations of this law's application appear in the 2008 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation report in Article 10 of the Executive Summary, and the State Department Terrorism Report on Qatar for 2014 describes the provisions for defining and prosecuting terrorist-related activities as "broad." Under AML law (Law No. 28/2002) and further through CT Law, Qatar has appropriate asset confiscation, freezing, and seizing measures Qatari law addresses legislation created in the UN through implementation of UNSCR 1267 and its associated international conventions, but the government had not fully implemented UNSCR 1373 at the time of MENAFATF's Mutual Evaluation in 2008.

Further limitations exist in Qatar's interagency information-sharing framework. This trend exists also in the country's otherwise well-developed FIU. More interagency cooperation and leadership from the Qatar FIU, which is also a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs, was needed in 2008, leading to the creation of the interagency group the National Antiterrorism Committee.

The State Department Terrorism Country Profile on Qatar states, "Qatar's monitoring of private individuals' and charitable associations' contributions to foreign entities remained inconsistent," despite the facts that terrorist activity is generally low and the state has the ability to monitor and disrupt terrorist plans (US Department of State 2013, 165). The ascension of the new emir, Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani, after his father's abdication did not lead to any governmental changes that would produce inconsistency in Qatar's ability to fight terrorism (US Department of State 2014, 166); however, that does not mean that other important steps have not been taken since the publication of the last MENAFATF evaluation. Qatar passed the Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law in 2010 to accompany the 2004 CT law. The new law places requirements on Qatar's PPO to freeze assets of terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council and requires the distribution of information and lists of UN-designated terrorists to financial institutions. However, no designations of terrorists in the country were made as of 2013 (Levitt 2014).

Qatar has taken further steps than some other states in its countering of terrorist financing through charities and informal money networks. Qatar's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs requires foreign partners to submit to a "vetting and licensing process" before receiving funds and more closely monitors charities (US State Dept. 2014, 166). Further, the US State Department reports that the government has ordered some Qatari institutions to cut ties with charitable organizations, a great policy difference from MENAFATF's 2012 Summary Article 12 statement that Qatar knowingly harbored an individual that was designated a terrorist by the UN. Recently, at the 2014 Arab-US Policymakers Conference, Ambassador (Ret.) Patrick Theros, the executive director of the US-Qatar Business Council, spoke about the status of *hawala* networks in the country. The ambassador claimed that *hawala* networks are essentially no more in the country, largely owing to a new law requiring all foreign workers to open a bank account and have their paychecks directly deposited into it, moving the flow of remittance funds from the informal to the formal economic sector. This new law clearly disadvantages foreign low-wage expatriate workers in the country who have until now relied on *hawala* networks as a low-cost way to transfer money back home, and it is yet to be seen if this law places further imposition on potential terrorist financing.

The Qatar and Kuwait "Disconnect"

There is a great difference between governmental claims and the AML/CFT laws passed in Qatar and Kuwait and the US government's assessment of the countries' efforts. These countries continue to appeal to terrorist financers because of their perceived lenience in application of its laws. David Cohen, the US undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, made some of the boldest accusations in recent years. According to Cohen, Al Qaeda's affiliates in Syria and Iraq, the Nusra Front and ISIS, both benefit from the "permissive [fund-raising] jurisdictions" in Kuwait and Qatar. In line with these accusations, Cohen furthered that "the US will not hesitate to act on its own to disrupt these … networks." He claimed that Qatar "has for many years openly financed Hamas" and indicated that this support extends to Syrian extremist groups despite being an otherwise constructive partner in the CT fight. Cohen similarly criticized Kuwait, deeming it "the epicenter of terrorist financing," a title that had long been awarded to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The US government was disheartened by Kuwait's appointment of Nayef al-Ajmi to the two positions of minister of justice and minister of Islamic endowments (*awqaf*) because he has a history of being a Syrian jihad promoter and prominent Nusra Front financer. This unease appears to be justified, as the Ministry of Awqaf passed a law allowing charities to collect donations for

Syria inside mosques, something the Treasury Department expects terrorist financers can later exploit. Terrorist financers exploit the humanitarian sympathies of the Kuwaiti and Qatari populations. The US government understands that most of the funding reaching extremists in Syria and within ISIL/ISIS originates from regular citizens hoping to simply fulfill the Islamic requirement for *zakat* and do some good in the world, particularly in the war-ravaged land of Syria.

Mindful of the extra scrutiny Qatar and Kuwait have received regarding AML/CTF in the last few years, Boghardt (2014a) explained that there was a "disconnect" between these states and the rest of the world, using the 2013 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism as her main resource. Boghardt explains that the "unique policy and security calculations" in the two countries produce an incentive to allow some terrorist funding to slip through the cracks (2014a, para. 4). This sentiment echoes those she wrote in her 2006 book on Kuwait, where she explained that the small states of the GCC are inclined to focus policy on "regime security," as opposed to the "state" or "national" security that developed states focus on in military terms. To Kuwait and Qatar, keeping some funding channels open shields them from potential backlash from Al Qaeda or other Sunni groups that find support in the states' majority populations. Her assessment of the two countries in relation to each other corresponds to that made by Robert Cohen that Qatar houses smaller key fund-raisers and Kuwait the larger terrorist-financing networks themselves. Boghardt claims that Kuwait is "more politically vibrant as well as more volatile than Qatar," and that the Kuwaiti people criticize the government for not taking as strong a stance against Syria's Assad as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have done (2014a, "Challenges").

Analysis and US Policy Implications: Support Domestic and Regional Deradicalization Programs over External Critique

The states of the GCC will continue to act as economic partners and military allies, and the punishment-heavy rhetoric the United States levels at the region is not a sustainable policy. As Anne Clunan suggested in 2006, the United States needs to shift its focus from "sticks" to "carrots" to encourage improvement of CTF structures in the GCC in order to counter the incentive to shirk CT responsibilities as per collective action theory. GCC countries are motivated by regime security, not the state or military security like countries of the industrialized West. While it is apparent to the United States that Gulf states often lack in operational framework and more so in the application of laws, necessary positive changes must and will come from within the region, not in reaction to external pressures. The presence of Al Qaeda continues to

threaten GCC states directly, radicalization of anti-Assad forces in Syria removes credibility from the Sunni side of a waging ideological battle, and ISIS can regenerate and expand at an alarming rate. These and other threats give Gulf states incentive to remove the ability for terrorist organizations to sustain themselves and carry out attacks. Even non-Sunni groups like Hamas and Hezbollah threaten the GCC in various ways, including by removing moral credibility from the side of the Palestinians in Israel or supporting an anti-Arab Iran as a bastion of Shi'ism. The US counterterrorism strategy was effective in many areas, notably against the Taliban, but the same tactics are not effective in a reality that requires Arab involvement.

The greatest contribution GCC states can make to stop the funding of terrorists is by creating grassroots deradicalization programs within their own borders, such as the Saudi Arabia prison rehabilitation Sakina Program. Of course, regional cooperation and leadership from the Arab League or GCC can help in funding and providing incentive for implementation of these measures. The United States can counter the effects of the present collective action challenges better with positive incentives than with constant media scolding. The problem of violent Islamic radicalization can only be countered by Muslims; the West can only give aid in humanitarian areas, for its responsibility to fight an ideological battle in the Gulf has passed, if it ever existed.

Acronyms

AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
AMLF	Anti-Money Laundering Forum
AMLU	Anti-Money Laundering Unit (Bahrain)
CT	Counterterrorism
CTF	Counterterrorist financing (also CFT)
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
INCSR	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INCSR	International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
INL	Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ISIL	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MENAFATF	Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
NCUSAR	The National Council on US-Arab Relations
OIS	Organization of Islamic States
PPO	Public Prosecutor's Office
STR	Suspicious Transaction Report (UAE)
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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Are You Experienced?
African American Candidates in
Statewide Elections, 1964–2014[1]

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Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965, African Americans have increased their numbers in elected office from the hundreds to the thousands. Yet African American candidates for governor or the US Senate have not been as successful at winning their elections. In only ten cases have African American candidates won higher statewide office over the last 50 years. Instead of overt race-based ads, black candidates face a series of code words, including questions about job qualifications. This research examines whether holding a lower statewide elected office can help African American candidates overcome these attacks and prevail. Additional factors concerning the candidate, position, and the state in question are also examined.

Twenty-five years ago, L. Douglas Wilder made history, prevailing in a Virginia gubernatorial race. He was the first African American elected governor since Reconstruction. But he was not the only gain for African Americans in 1989. That same year, David Dinkins was elected mayor of New York City, and Norm Rice prevailed in Seattle's mayoral contest. Across the country, African Americans made substantial gains (Jeffries 2002). It was a far cry from 25 years earlier in 1964, when no African Americans held any of the highest statewide offices in the country, and only a handful could be found as

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mayors, members of Congress, or even elected to the state legislature. It was also the same year as the landmark Civil Rights Act, to be followed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Williams 1989). A year later, Republican Edward Brooke made history by being elected to the US Senate from Massachusetts (Sonenshein 1990).

In the 48 years since then, there have been 48 elections with an African American running for the US Senate or for governor. But in these elections, only ten African-American candidates have been victorious. Scholars have speculated that this is due to racist attitudes still harbored by whites (Edge 2010; Ehrlinger et al. 2011; Piston 2010). But racism alone cannot account for why some black candidates win and others do not. Why did Wilder, Brooke, and other candidates prevail while others came up short?

Our research has shown that while there is some lingering racism, it is hardly as overt as it was in the old days. It has become more subtle, with "code words" being employed so opponents cannot be seen as racists. Code words are used to show that the targets are not adopting American values and should be opposed for such reasons, rather than for objection to the color of their target's skin. A recent example of this is when former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani told a Scott Walker fundraiser in Manhattan "I know this is a horrible thing to say, but I do not believe that the president loves America … He doesn't love you. And he doesn't love me. He wasn't brought up the way you were brought up and I was brought up through love of this country" (Berenson 2015).

One of these code words is "experience," implying African Americans have been handed jobs, promotions, and other recognitions without earning them, such as the reaction to Barack Obama winning the Nobel Peace Prize (Pilger 2009). The belief is that as a result, they are bound to be inept in office. But black candidates who amass a strong record of political service can counter these charges. Not all elected experience may be considered the same, but Wilder and Brooke have something in common. The former was a lieutenant governor, while the latter was the state's attorney general. The research question before us is whether holding statewide elected experience could serve as the key to overcoming these code words, leading African Americans to prevail in elections for higher statewide office.

Old Racism vs. New Subtle Attacks

African Americans may have experienced some success in recent statewide elections, either running for the US Senate or gubernatorial contests, or even in the state-by-state battles for the Electoral College. But that does not mean all or even most have prevailed, or that the road to victory has been easy.

Some in academia have claimed blacks running for statewide office have experienced a new type of racism that is more subtle in character than earlier days, when racial attacks were more overt. Examples of these "old" racist ads can be found in the Willie Horton ads employed by the George H. W. Bush campaign against Michael Dukakis, or North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms's campaign advertisement against his African American challenger Harvey Gantt (Kern and Just 1995). This commercial showed a white man with a layoff notice, and explained his job was taken by a black man, blaming racial quotas that Helms claimed Gantt supported (Strickland and Whicker 1992).

Overt and Covert Racial Attacks during the Obama Era

"Obama is a lightning rod for the politics of fear and loathing," writes Gary Dorrien (2012, 115) in listing all of the conspiracy theory books and charges against Obama levied by such authors. According to scholars, the issue of race itself has become more important than social values and economic policy. "On the basis of the evidence presented, if a presidential election were a card game, the rules would be: Race trumps values, values trumps class," writes Si Sheppard (2013, 304). "In other words, race, as it has always been, is the primary driver of partisan loyalty in America. The second most important factor influencing voter choice is value judgments. Class only comes into play when filtered through these prisms." And Walsh (2009) examines the coverage of race and power for the 2008 election by examining media coverage of the primaries, and whether the coverage of the event really involved color-blind tactics and reinforcing the status quo. Even the optimistic article by Steele about Obama transcending traditional models of black politics included the quote "Saying that race doesn't matter is an admission that race has mattered" (2009, 9).

Ditonto, Lau, and Sears (2013) use the American National Election Survey (ANES) data from the 2008 election to examine both "old-fashioned" and "symbolic racism," also known as the "Affect Misattribution Procedure" or AMP, as well as evidence gathered from tests for implicit negative attitudes one group has for a different group. "Looking at our data across subsamples, the evidence suggests that symbolic racism continues to be the most consistently politically influential measure of racism across the U.S. mass public … since it is a significant predictor of all four variables for White respondents, three of four for Latino respondents, and the summary scale of policy issues for Black respondents. Measures of implicit associations, on the other hand, seem to add little to our ability to predict survey questions for either Black or White respondents" (Ditonto, Lau, and Sears 2013, 504–5).

Indeed, some scholars claim that "Old Fashioned Racism" or OFR might be making a comeback in American politics, as a result of Obama's electoral success. "Old-fashioned racist attitudes … were a significant predictor of white Americans' partisan preferences—2008 presidential vote intention, 2009–2011 partisanship, and 2010 congressional vote choice—in the early Obama era after neither affecting their party identifications nor their partisan voting behavior for at least a generation prior to the 2008 election. These results obtain in spite of the fact that President Obama was substantially less likely to address issues of race during his first two years in office than his predecessors … It appears, then, that Obama's rise to prominence, rather than anything he or his party did politically, is primarily responsible for the renewed effects of OFR on partisan preferences" (Tesler 2013, 121).

Such issues are not just linked to candidates, but also to policy support. Weber et al. (2014, 75) "demonstrate that the political relevance of one index of racial hostility—stereotype endorsement—hinges on both racial context and individual differences in susceptibility to impression-management pressures, as well as the fit between particular stereotypes and particular policy issues." In other words, stereotypes about blacks being "violent" may increase support for capital punishment, seen as "relevant" to the debate (Weber et al. 2014).

The Rise of Code Words

But such overt racist ads have tended to backfire in recent years. Some believe that a Republican attack ad with a white playboy bunny telling African American Congressman Harold Ford Jr. to "call me," helped elect GOP Senate candidate Bob Corker in 2006. But evidence from surveys showed that a backlash against the ad actually gave Ford momentum in the race, which was why the Republican National Committee quickly pulled the ad and Corker condemned it (O'Donnell 2006). An attack ad by Republican Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healey of Massachusetts against her Democratic gubernatorial opponent Deval Patrick, linking race and crime, similarly backfired (Lewis 2010). Patrick cruised to an easy win in a landslide in 2006.

The success of Obama in 2008 and 2012, as well as Patrick in 2006 and 2010, winning elections with a fair number of white voters (Steele 2009) shows that OFR attacks have their limit (Maxwell, Dowe, and Shields 2013), a finding echoing research by Citrin, Green, and Sears (1990) shortly after Wilder's win. OFR attacks may be up, and may make the press (whereas in the past, they were so frequent as to not merit much attention) but they may do little more than "raise the temperature" of partisan politics without knocking out a candidate. They can fire up a base and make the attack literature more odious, but fail to prevail in an election.

Instead of such overt appeals, opponents of African American candidates for statewide office have employed a new line of attacks, more subtle in character. These arguments use code words, which are designed to employ racial cues on how to vote, without explicitly attacking one's skin color (Himelstein 1983). They focus more on values in ways that imply African Americans hold values that are different from that of most Americans, and even the American character (Kinder and Sears 1981). New York Governor David A. Paterson, who is African American, claimed that Senator John McCain was employing "overtones of potential racial coding" in his presidential campaign (Confessore 2008, 2). Maxwell, Dowe, and Shields (2013, 325) find that just as "policies regarding taxes, busing and crime were as racially loaded indirectly," so too had "religious preference may have become, at least in the 2008 election, a mask for racially motivated opposition to Obama's candidacy."

Another example of symbolic racism and code words concerns ideology. For example, Virginia Governor Doug Wilder claimed that liberalism was being used as a code word for being black (Jeffries 2002). For many Virginians, that would mean racial quotas and affirmative action, food stamps and other welfare payments, and other policies that would benefit blacks and the expense of whites (Tures 2014). Yet evidence has shown that African American candidates can overcome such charges of liberalism by developing a moderate image (Frederick and Jeffries 2009). Those candidates who crafted a centrist voting record have fared better in elections (Tures 2014).

Experience

Another such racial code word that has been employed in this new style of attack is a focus on experience. Kinder and Sears (1981) demonstrate that this new symbolic racism claims blacks oppose US values of individualism, discipline, and a Protestant work ethic. The Helms ad against Gantt claimed that the white person laid off was more qualified than the black person who got the job (Strickland and Whicker 1992).

But these attacks do not just end with claims that the average black person is unqualified; they claim that the black candidate for statewide office is personally inexperienced and has gotten a job only because of skin color. Hacker (1992) reveals that some whites are angry that blacks tend to settle for candidates who are inexperienced for the job, just because they are African American. This happens even though not all whites are experienced for the job they seek (Jeffries and Jones 2006). Yet if African American candidates can overcome charges of being "too liberal" by adopting a moderate voting record, could such politicians defeat charges of being unqualified by adopting a strong resume full of experience?

The scholarly literature on African American candidates for statewide office has repeatedly shown support for the argument that experience is important for such candidates (Frederick and Jeffries 2009; Jeffries and Jones 2006; Sonenshein 1990; Turner and Jeffries 2010). Holding one elected office before seeking another shows one is willing to "pay dues" and learn on the job before taking the next step (Strickland and Whicker 1992). Jeffries and Jones (2006) provide numerous examples of candidates who fared poorly in statewide elections because they had not held elected office before their quest for a US Senate seat or governor's mansion.

Is holding any office enough to demonstrate experience for the voters? On this matter, the literature seems to be in agreement. One needs what is known as an "appropriate apprenticeship," before seeking the highest offices in the state (Frederick and Jeffries 2009). And that includes holding a lesser statewide office first, before going for the top spot (Sonenshein 1990). In their comparison of Wilder and Gantt, Strickland and Whicker (1992) find that Wilder prevailed in his race for Virginia governor because he had been elected lieutenant governor four years earlier. At the same time, Gantt fell short because though he had been mayor of Charlotte, he had not held statewide office before running for the US Senate. The work of Kotter and Lawrence (1974) indicates that a mayor's post is rarely a strong stepping stone for higher statewide office.

Nonetheless, there are several reasons why a lower statewide office might help an African American running for governor or senator. Blacks do not make up a majority in any state (Sonenshein 1990). They are therefore dependent upon white voters for success in statewide elections (Johnson, Oppenheimer, and Selin 2012). Holding statewide office gives African Americans a chance to meet with whites, gain their trust, and show they can "govern whites fairly" (Edds 1987). Such lower statewide offices also provide political experience helpful for higher statewide office, such as getting the chance to implement laws passed by the legislature (Jones and Clemons 1993). African Americans who hold minority districts in the House of Representatives, state legislature, or big cities cannot demonstrate this experience. This is why Jeffries and Jones (2006) find that talented candidates such as Ford, Gantt, Tom Bradley (Los Angeles mayor) Andrew Young (congressman and Atlanta mayor), and Ron Kirk (Dallas mayor) came up short in their bids for higher office, while Wilder and Edward Brooke (a Massachusetts attorney general before he ran for the US Senate) succeeded.

Another reason suggests why a strong statewide resume is needed. According to Edds (1990), Wilder has pointed out that you have to be "twice as good" to win. Wilder had far more legislative and executive experience than his opponent, J. Marshall Coleman, and still managed to prevail only by a

narrow margin (Jeffries 2002). Brooke needed his statewide law enforcement experience to combat his opponent Endicott Peabody, a former Massachusetts governor. A candidate's record matters (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Williams 1987). This does not mean all lower statewide office holders will prevail, as New York State Comptroller Carl McCall discovered in his bid to unseat Governor George Pataki in 2002 (Turner and Jeffries 2010) and Maryland Lieutenant Governor Andrew Brown learned in his unsuccessful gubernatorial bid in 2014 (Wagner and Johnson 2014).

Other Factors Influencing African American Bids for Statewide Elections

Political Party

In addition to the experience of an African American candidate, other factors play a role in his or her electoral success. In particular, the party of the candidate could play a role in victory or defeat for a US Senate seat or a gubernatorial election. Jeffries and Jones (2006) contend that a political party label is an important cue. They find white reluctance to vote for black candidates, while African Americans are reluctant to cast ballots for Republicans, a finding corroborated by Dingle (2006). Gay (1999) and Highton (2004) look at whether a candidate's race and political party has any impact on electoral victory. Highton (2004) in particular discovers that aversion to African American Democrats by Republicans is offset by a greater level of support for black candidates by white Democrats. Therefore, we look at whether an African American candidate for statewide office fares better by choosing a particular party.

Timing

The year that an African American candidate pursues higher statewide office could play an important role in the outcome of the election. Strickland and Whicker (1992) claimed that Douglas Wilder's triumph in the Virginia governor's race was a "breakthrough," making other African American victories possible in statewide elections. Sonenshein (1990) similarly sees Wilder's win as a big boost for future African American candidates. Jeffries (2002) adds that Wilder was not the only big winner that year, as African Americans won mayoral contests in New York City (David Dinkins) and Seattle (Norm Rice). It led to a new class of African American candidates who prevailed in areas with a white majority (Jeffries 2002). Therefore, we assess whether African American candidates who ran for senate and gubernatorial races after 1989 did better than their counterparts who ran in earlier times.

Office Factors

Office Sought

Perhaps the type of contest an African American candidate pursues could have an impact on whether he or she wins or loses. Strickland and Whicker (1992) theorize that when African Americans are less of a threat to dominate a place, less racism is likely to appear in an election. Jeffries and Jones (2006) agree with this conclusion. Scholars are still divided as to which office is less of a threat to dominance. Strickland and Whicker (1992) contend that the state's highest executive office is actually less of a threat to whites because it tends to be term-limited. For example, Wilder could only serve one term as Virginia's governor because of term limits. US senators have no term limit. However, there is no evidence from surveys to suggest that whites feel more threatened by an African American governor than by an African American US senator.

Others argue that an African American as a governor is more threatening. Sonenshein (1990) offers that Brooke and Wilder did not run for the "threatening" post of governor first, preferring to pursue other offices in their first statewide run, but Bradley's race for governor was seen as "threatening" to whites. Williams (1989) provides evidence from a survey that shows the percentage of whites who would not vote for a black for statewide office. In this poll, 5.6 percent of whites said they would not vote for an African American for the US Senate, while 7.5 percent of whites said they would never vote for an African American for governor (Williams 1989).

The issue then becomes, "Why?" Jeffries and Jones (2006) identify several reasons. Governors can appoint many positions with a state. The top executive post in the state also plays a strong role in the awarding of contracts, as well as the veto or signing of legislation in many cases. Rather than merely speculate, our research will test whether African Americans fare better in races for governor or senator.

Opponent Incumbent

For African Americans, it matters not only which office you run for, but whether it is held by another politician. Walton et al. (2007) write of the challenge blacks face in going up against an incumbent, as opposed to an open seat. Turner and Jeffries (2010) state that running against an incumbent matters, which is the case in any contest, and not just for African Americans. Johnson, Oppenheimer, and Selin (2012) recommend that African American candidates avoid challenging incumbents. And Highton (2004) observes that arguments of discrimination in voting say little about black challengers facing incumbents.

Indeed, Strickland and Whicker (1992) recommend running for an open seat. In their example, Wilder did not face an incumbent, while Gantt went up

against an entrenched incumbent in Senator Jesse Helms. Sonenshein (1990) points out that Wilder was not the only successful African American candidate to prevail in an open seat. Edward Brooke was able to do so in 1966 for the US Senate, facing an ex-governor instead of an incumbent. African American candidate Deval Patrick may have prevailed because he was going for an open seat (Jeffries and Jones 2006).

In 1982, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley narrowly lost to Attorney General George Deukmejian for the California governor's seat. In a rematch four years later, Bradley lost by a wider margin, despite perhaps running a campaign that critics claim was better on the issues than in 1982 (Jeffries and Jones 2006). Frederick and Jeffries (2009) also document how New York State Comptroller Carl McCall also had statewide experience, but had an uphill climb against incumbent governor George Pataki, who had already served two terms and was seeking a third. It makes it harder to argue that an African American candidate is "twice as good" as the one holding the office (Jeffries and Jones 2006).

State Factors

African American Population in a State

Another factor that could be key in determining the success of an African American candidate for the top statewide offices could be the percentage of African Americans living in that state. Blacks are a minority everywhere, something Sonenshein (1990) and Jeffries and Jones (2006) note. But the more African Americans there are in a state, the better a candidate should fare, according to Sonenshein (1990), who claims that Wilder did well in Virginia, which has a sizable African American population. Johnson, Oppenheimer, and Selin (2012) assert that African Americans rarely succeed in districts where whites dominate.

But not all agree that a state must have a large black population for an African American candidate to win a statewide office. Jeffries and Jones (2006) point out that blacks are heavily dependent upon white votes because they are a minority in each state. Strickland and Whicker (1992) may feel that there is less polarization when blacks are not seen as a threat to whites, but are African Americans seen as more of a "threat" when they make up 4.5 percent of the population, or nearly 45 percent? Highton (2004) feels that in areas where blacks make up a smaller percentage of the population, black candidates (incumbents or challengers) would fare better among white voters. Such results are also linked to policy, not just candidates. Weber et al. (2014, 76) find "With respect to state-level politics, for example, political disagreement about welfare benefits, Medicaid, and income-based benefit programs subject

to state-level policy variation may be substantially rooted in racial animus in states where blacks comprise a comparatively large portion of the population but have little to do with such debates elsewhere." Opinion is split on whether African Americans need to be more numerous in a state or not; we will test to see whether this is the case.

National and Statewide Coattail Effects

In addition to making the case for the African American population size as an important factor, Sonenshein (1990) adds that blacks should look at states with a large body of white liberals in order to prevail. In other words, he looks at whether the state is more supportive of the party ideology of the African American candidate as a factor (Jeffries and Jones 2006). Johnson, Oppenheimer, and Selin (2012) agree that the ideology of the district or state can make a difference. This can be demonstrated in cases where the state votes for other members of the same political party. African American Democrats should therefore do better in states where voters pick other Democrats for statewide and even national office, while black Republicans should have an edge in states that vote for other GOP candidates. This is known as the coattail effect. Squire (1989, 535) notes how coattail effects can play a role in Senate elections, particularly in midterm elections when the incumbent's party holds the White House. Such elections are also subject to national polling tides (Squire 1989, 541).

On the national level, having a strong presidential candidate at the top of the ticket could help propel an African American candidate to success in a race for governor or the U.S. Senate. Walton, Starks, and Allen (2008) observe that Carol Moseley Braun won her contest when Bill Clinton was running for US president. And even state legislator Barack Obama did well in his Illinois Senate race during a presidential election (Walton, Starks, and Allen, 2008) where John Kerry defeated George W. Bush in the state by a comfortable margin, even though he lost a narrow contest in the overall balloting. Highton (2004) agrees that general elections are different from other battles over ballots. Therefore, we will look at whether elections where a president takes the state can help African American candidates from the same party down the ticket.

But national coattails are not the only example of a strong ticket benefiting African American candidates. There are statewide coattails to be considered. Jeffries and Jones (2006) state that endorsements from whites give African American candidates for the US Senate and state governor's office a better chance with the voters, as well as the ability to raise more money. They explain how Deval Patrick, who had never held elected office before he ran for Massachusetts governor, was able to team up with US Senators Ted Kennedy and John Kerry, as well as Bill Clinton, which helped him win in a state with relatively few African Americans (Jeffries and Jones 2006).

Others write about the importance of a state's party unity as important for African Americans. Strickland and Whicker's (1992) article concludes that party factionalism matters. Turner and Jeffries (2010) agree, saying that sufficient party support matters, noting how a bitter primary battle with Andrew Cuomo sapped Carl McCall's strength, making it difficult to unseat New York Governor George Pataki. Frederick and Jeffries (2009) include McCall's case as well as that of Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk, who pursued an open Senate seat in Texas. Once he won the nomination, the Democratic Party was united. But a three-way primary against Congressman Kent Bentsen and a nasty runoff against Victor Morales drained Kirk's campaign coffers and energy. Party support for US Congresswoman Denise Majette was key to her victory in the state primary (Walton et al. 2007). Therefore, it is important for African Americans to be party insiders to have any chance of winning a statewide election, especially the highest offices (Jeffries and Jones 2006).

Region

Finally, there is the geographic region of the state to consider. Walton et al. (2007) say that the political experience of the South is the key to understanding the African American experience. Sonenshein (1990) argues that research from a Gallup poll indicates that the South in general, and the Deep South in particular, gives the lowest support for an African American president. Himelstein (1983) and Jeffries (2002) contend that race-baiting is most prevalent in the South. And Voss and Lublin (2001) find that white candidates in the South get more votes than African American candidates, in an analysis of elections in 1992 and 1998. Yet a Harris poll reveals that the South gives the lowest percentage of support to the notion that African Americans face discrimination (Sonenshein 1990). In order to determine whether geography matters for African American candidates seeking a statewide office, we compare whether such elections occur in the South or not.

Research Design

In order to test these hypotheses, it is important to define how the variables will be measured. We are looking at all cases of African American candidates who ran for statewide office, either in contests for the US Senate or a race for a state's governor. From 1966 through the 2014 election, there were 48 cases. Our dependent variable is whether or not the candidate prevailed in the election, measured as a dichotomous variable (1 = win, 0 = lose).

Among our independent variables, there is a measure of prior statewide experience. If a candidate has won an election for a lower statewide office (lieutenant governor, attorney general, state school superintendent, secretary of

state, state labor commissioner, comptroller, state agricultural commissioner, etc.), he or she receives a score of one (1) for yes, zero (0) for no.

The political party of the African American political candidate for statewide office is similarly measured as a binary variable, with a one for Republicans and a zero for Democrats. And there is also a variable for election timing that is also treated as one of two choices. A case with an African American candidate for higher statewide office who runs after 1989 gets a score of one. Those running in 1989 or before receive a zero. This is measured this way because the historic victories happened after the November triumphs for African Americans, boosting the confidence of black candidates and their supporters as well as giving whites a chance to see these winners govern effectively.

Another dichotomous variable is used for which statewide office is sought by an African American candidate. If the office pursued is a state governor spot, it receives a score of one; US Senate elections get a score of zero. If an African American faces an incumbent, that case receives a one, while other cases are given a zero. But the measure of the African American population of a state that has a black candidate for higher statewide office is trichotomous. If a state's African American population is below 10 percent of the state's population, it receives a zero score. For a one, a state's African American population must be at least 10 percent but less than 20 percent. To receive a score of two, the African American population of a state must be at 20 percent or higher.

Both coattail measures are also trichotomous. One measures whether the candidate's party wins the national presidential election (2) or not (0), with a midterm election getting a score in between (1). The second looks at whether the candidate's party wins the state in the Electoral College (regardless of the general election outcome nationwide). If the African American candidate (seeking statewide office) has a presidential candidate on the top of the ticket who wins the state, the case gets a score of a two. If the presidential candidate loses the state while the African American candidate runs for governor or senator, the case gets a zero score. As with the other variable, a midterm election case gets a score of one. Finally, the region of the state where the African American runs for higher statewide office gets a dummy variable: southern states get a zero, while non-southern states get a score of one.

Our analysis looks at two types of tests: bivariate and multivariate. The former, using a chi-square test, looks at the relationship of each independent variable upon the dependent variable separately. Results can be found in Tables 1–9. We also run a multivariate ordinary least squares regression equation, in order to see the combined effect of all of these independent variables upon the dependent variable, to see which factors contribute to the success or failure of African American candidates seeking higher statewide office. This is located in Table 10, which is displayed at the end of the section.

Table 1: Statewide Experience and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
Did an African American Candidate Hold Statewide Elected Office?	No Statewide Elected Experience	Observed	31	4	35
		Expected	27.7	7.3	
	Statewide Elected Experience	Observed	7	6	13
		Expected	10.3	2.7	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = 6.93$, p < .01***

Table 2: Political Party and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
Political Party for African American Candidate Seeking Statewide Elected Office	Democrat	Observed	26	7	33
		Expected	26.1	6.9	
	Republican	Observed	12	3	15
		Expected	11.9	3.1	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = .009$, p > .10

Findings

The strongest factor in helping an African American candidate for governor or the US Senate prevail is having prior statewide experience by winning a contest for a lower office (lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state, etc.). Among those with statewide experience, almost half prevailed in their bid for governor or a Senate seat. But that is a much better average than the 4 of 36 (11.1 percent) who won without have statewide experience (see Table 1). The result is statistically significant, both in the bivariate test and the multivariate model (see Table 10), controlling for other factors.

Table 3: Election Timing and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
	1966–1989	Observed	7	3	10
		Expected	7.9	2.1	
Timing of the Election	1990–2014	Observed	31	7	38
		Expected	30.1	7.9	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = .644, p > .10$

Table 4: Statewide Office Sought and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
	US Senate	Observed	23	8	31
		Expected	24.5	6.5	
Timing of the Election	Governor	Observed	15	2	17
		Expected	13.5	3.5	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = 1.313, p > .10$

The political party of the candidate, however, is not statistically significant (see Table 2). Whether the African American candidate runs as a Democrat or a Republican, it does not boost his or her chances of prevailing in contests for the highest statewide office in either model (bivariate or multivariate).

In addition, the timing of the election (before or after 1989) is not a significant factor (see Table 3). Whether the African American candidate ran before Wilder's successful election, or thereafter, the results do not significantly differ from what an expected model would generate.

Which office an African American pursues also has somewhat of an impact upon electoral success. African American candidates who ran for higher statewide office were more likely to win a US Senate seat than a governor's race (see Table 4). The result was not statistically significant in the bivariate model, but statistically significant in the multivariate model (see Table 10).

Table 5: Incumbent Opponent and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
Is Opponent an Incumbent?	No	Observed	15	10	25
		Expected	19.8	5.2	
	Yes	Observed	23	0	23
		Expected	18.2	4.8	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = 11.621$, $p < .001$***

Table 6: African American Population and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
Percentage of African Americans in the State	0.1%–9.9%	Observed	8	4	12
		Expected	9.5	2.5	
	10%–19%	Observed	12	5	17
		Expected	13.5	3.5	
	20%+	Observed	18	1	19
		Expected	15	4	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = 4.688$, $p < .10$*

When it comes to facing an incumbent, African Americans do not fare as well. In 23 cases, not a single black candidate defeated an incumbent governor or US senator. In the 25 other cases, African Americans won 10 times (see Table 5). In the multivariate model, there is a negative relationship between African American success in higher statewide elections and facing one holding that position (see Table 10).

The state's racial makeup plays somewhat of a role in a black candidate's success. African Americans were actually more likely to win in states with smaller black populations (4 of 12 for those states whose African American population comprised less than 10 percent of the total population, and 5 of 17 for cases with an African American population between 10 and 20 percent of the population

Table 7: Nationwide Coattail Effect and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
Was There a Nationwide Coattail Effect?	Presidential Election, Party Lost National Election	Observed	3	1	4
		Expected	3.2	0.8	
	Midterm Election	Observed	27	7	34
		Expected	26.9	7.1	
	Presidential Election, Party Won National Election	Observed	8	2	10
		Expected	7.9	2.1	
	Total		38	10	48

$X^2 = 4.688$, p > .10

Table 8: Statewide Coattail Effect and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
Was There a Statewide Coattail Effect?	Presidential Election, Party Lost Statewide Election	Observed	8	1	9
		Expected	7.1	1.9	
	Midterm Election	Observed	27	7	34
		Expected	26.9	7.1	
	Presidential Election, Party Won Statewide Election	Observed	3	2	5
		Expected	4	1	
	Total		38	10	48

$X = 1.631$, p > .10

Table 9: Election Region and Winning Statewide Office

			Did African American Candidate Win Statewide Election?		
			No	Yes	Total
	South	Observed	18	2	20
		Expected	15.8	4.2	
Is Opponent an Incumbent?	Non-South	Observed	20	8	28
		Expected	22.2	5.8	
	Total		38	10	48

X = 2.44, p > .10

but only 1 of 19 cases where the black population exceeded 20 percent of the total population). The results were significant in the bivariate model (see Table 6), but not when all factors combined were examined in the multivariate model (as noted in Table 10).

Neither coattail measure seems to matter in assessing an African American candidate's chances. The measure of a national coattail effect differs little from the expected model (see Table 7), a finding similar to what is discovered in testing for a statewide coattail effect (see Table 8). Neither coattail variable is a significant factor in a multivariate model either (as noted in Table 10).

The region of the state (South or non-South) does not have an impact upon whether or not an African American candidate prevails in a race for higher statewide office (see Table 9). Whether running in the South or away from it appears not to improve the odds of an African American prevailing in the statewide election for governor or US senator. Such a factor does not have much of an impact in a multivariate model, either.

As revealed earlier, when all the variables are examined in a multivariate model, only two factors stand out as having a significant effect on the chances an African American has in prevailing in an election for higher statewide office (see Table 10). The first involves garnering experience in a lower statewide office, which improves the chances such a candidate will prevail in a gubernatorial or senatorial contest. The second involves avoiding challenging a sitting governor or senator, as African American candidates for higher office at the statewide level tend to lose to incumbents.

There is an argument that having any elected experience would be better than nothing for African Americans. This argument came from the 1980s, when experts tried to explain why the Rev. Jesse Jackson did not win the nomination in 1984 and 1988, despite having a spirited base and wins in several primaries

Table 10: Did the African American Candidate Win a Statewide Election?

Independent Variables	B	SE
Candidate Factors		
Has Candidate Held Statewide Elected Office Before?	.251*	(.137)
Political Party of African American Candidate	-.183	(.139)
Timing of the Election (pre-1989 or post-1989)?	-.021	(.153)
Office Factors		
Statewide Elected Office Sought	-.191	(.119)
Was Opponent an Incumbent?	-.245*	(.122)
State Factors		
Percentage of African Americans in the State	-.103	(.096)
Was There a Nationwide Coattail Effect?	-.014	(.105)
Was There a Statewide Coattail Effect?	.075	(.106)
Election Region (South vs. Non-South)	.030	(.154)
Other		
Constant	.447*	(.265)

Cell entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
$* = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01$
$F = 2.58**$
Adjusted $r^2 = .232$
$N = 48$

(Williams 1989). So we reran the bivariate and multivariate models, replacing the dichotomous variable that includes lower statewide office experience with a dummy variable that includes any elected office experience for an African American candidate (statewide, municipal, elected judicial, national or state legislature). While all but one African American candidate who won had elected experience (Deval Patrick in Massachusetts in 2006), the chi-square statistic was not significant, even at the .10 level. That is because African Americans with elected experience won only 9 of 36 contests. Those with statewide experience won 6 of 13 elections for governor or US senator. In a regression model, the variable showing any elected experience was not statistically significant (only a negative relationship between facing an incumbent and electoral success was significant in this second test). Clearly certain types of experience benefit African American candidates more than other types of experience.

Conclusion

Over time, African American candidates have won mayoral posts and districts in the US House of Representatives. But it has been a different story

when running for US Senate or a state's governor race. Barely one in five have prevailed. Traditional explanations have focused on overt racial appeals. Some even claim "the election of the country's first black president had the ironic upshot of opening the door for old-fashioned racism (OFR) to influence partisan preferences after OFR was long thought to be a spent force in American politics" (Tesler 2013, 121).

But not only has OFR failed to prevent Obama from winning the 2008 and 2012 elections, but there is evidence that such actions have been shown to even backfire in cases like the Patrick and Ford elections over the last decade. "Blatant racial rhetoric has become politically disadvantageous," according to Maxwell, Dowe, and Shields (2013, 324). But that does not mean that discrimination has vanished. Rather, it may have become more subtle. Racial code words have been employed that point to a black candidate's "experience," implying that he or she is not qualified for the position sought. Not only would such an inexperienced candidate do a poor job, but violates the traditional (white) values of hard work and earning one's way.

To counter these charges, African American candidates can demonstrate to the voters that they do, indeed, have experience for the job. Many have run for legislative, judicial, and municipal offices before trying their hand at a more highly visible contest like governor or senator. This seems like a good strategy; only one candidate who never held any elected office managed to prevail. But that may not be the best strategy. Our results show that it is better to run for a lower statewide office before taking the plunge for a US Senate seat or making an attempt at the governor's mansion. Our additional test showed that having held any elected office was not a significant factor in African American success in statewide elections.

What constitutes enough experience for higher office? "Even scholars are unsure what the experience qualifications are for a successful president," write Simon and Uscinski (2012, 514). "Political commentators, for example, often cite presidents' prior experiences, but these accounts appear to be based on little more than the commentator's political preferences (Simon and Uscinski (2012, 516)." They cite conservative commentators mocking Obama's lack of experience, as well as liberal pundits pooh-poohing George W. Bush's resume. The two find contradictions and post-hoc analysis from scholars as well.

In contests for the Senate, Squire (1989, 532) found "attractive candidates—members of Congress, governors, and statewide officials—were both more strategic in choosing when to make a race and more successful in the campaigns they ran … [t]hey won well over half of the open seats they contested and did reasonably well against incumbents." Furthermore, "more seasoned candidates … benefit from some level of name recognition among some number of voters, have created campaign organizations, and have

established the contacts necessary to raise money" (Squire 1989, 533). And this translates to positive media coverage as well. "Challengers with experience receive considerably more coverage and more prominent coverage than do challengers with no experience," notes Kahn in her analysis of Senate elections (1991, 358). "Again, reporters may consider political experience a surrogate for the electoral strength of the candidate" (Kahn 1991, 359).

Squire (1989, 533) codes governors ahead of US House members, with that group ahead of statewide officials. Yet Hamman (2004) noted that mayors fared better than those with legislative experience for governors, with even state legislators outperforming those with congressional experience. Thus, those with executive or statewide experience outdid those with national experience in the US Capitol in gubernatorial performance. Squire (1989, 534) even shows how being one of many members of a large state's congressional delegation (like California's) may not provide the same advantage as it would in a small state.

Experts themselves seem to have come to this conclusion. Nearly all of the scholars cited concluded that African Americans should serve an "appropriate apprenticeship" before running for higher office, with most suggesting a run for a lower statewide office as opposed to serving in Congress or being mayor. Most conclude (often unfairly) that such candidates are only winning these minority district seats simply because they are minorities and minorities make up the majority of voters in these races. But the evidence listed above shows that holding congressional office, or other lower offices, may not help a candidate fare so well in a statewide office, even if race is not injected into the contest. Though they look at a different type of election (presidential, rather than statewide), Simon and Uscinski (2012) find that state executive experience was one of the stronger predictors of success for a candidate, better than legislative examples of experience tested.

Holding a lower statewide office shows that blacks can win an election where whites are the majority (as African Americans do not consist of a majority in any state). Prevailing in a lesser statewide contest gives the candidate the experience of getting to know the whole state and giving the chance for voters to know him or her better. Finally, whites can see African Americans administer the office fairly, without bias, countering charges to the contrary by opponents.

Congressman Cleo Fields, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, Congresswoman Denise Majette, Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt, and Representative Harold Ford Jr. were all competent candidates who could have been effective US senators or state governors. But each might have done better if they followed the path of Doug Wilder, who ran for lieutenant governor first. Or they should have learned from the example of Edward Brooke, who became a state attorney general first before seeking a US Senate seat from Massachusetts.

Even Governor Wilder offered the observation that Andrew Young, who had a lengthy resume (including being an Atlanta mayor, congressman, and even a post as US representative to the United Nations) might have fared better if he had run for lieutenant governor first, in 1990 (Jeffries 1999). As a result, he wound up facing Lieutenant Governor Zell Miller, who had held his position a long time and had won many statewide elections, knew the voters better, and was a proven candidate to Georgians. Young lost the gubernatorial primary, and never ran again. Wilder was not the only one who wondered "what if," especially as Young would have run on the Miller ticket and would have had the chance for an open US Senate seat just six years later, or the governor's office eight years later. Now we know the value that a lower statewide office holds for African American candidates.

Additionally, it helps for African American candidates to avoid running against an incumbent. Black candidates have done better in US Senate races than gubernatorial contests. And, counterintuitively, an African American candidate need not shy away from running in a state with a smaller black population. But none of these factors is as strong as prior statewide experience.

Our study has clearly added to the literature, which had provided many insightful theories on the successes and failures of African American candidates for statewide office, but which had rarely offered tests of such arguments. Yet the results are not the last word on the subject. Future areas of study could look at gubernatorial or Senate primaries, as Highton (2004) suggests. They could look at a different level of success, including whether these factors help in close contests, not just victories, as Frederick and Jeffries (2009) do.

Most importantly, as this research shows the benefits of holding a lower statewide office before running for tougher contests, it begs the question: what factors help African Americans prevail in lower statewide office posts? Sonenshein (1990) and Jeffries (2002) look at Wilder's lieutenant governor's race. We could look at how candidates like Georgia Labor Commissioner Michael Thurmond, Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell, and Massachusetts Attorney General Edward Brooke won their posts. Such information would be useful for candidates who eventually want to seek the state's top post.

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What's Time Got to Do with It? Ballot Measures, Strategic Timing, and Midterm Elections[1]

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The past few decades have seen a wide variety of research into direct democracy ranging in topics that include, but are not limited to, the effect of ballot propositions on voting behavior, issue agenda-setting, and political knowledge. With all these advances, there is surprisingly little work on the effect timing has on proposition proposal and passage rates. Knowing that the uninformed electorate rarely participates in low-stimulus elections, and in accordance with the work on uninformed voters "no" vote as well as on vote cue taking, this research addresses the question: Is an initiative more likely to pass by direct vote in a midterm election, when there is low voter turnout, the demographic of uninformed "no" voters are removed, and biased voting cues from informed to uninformed voters are muted? Hypothesizing that initiatives are more likely to pass in midterm and off-year elections than during general elections, and that more initiatives will be proposed during low-stimulus elections, the study uses a panel data set of all initiatives from 1978 to 2014 in order to test the effect of time on proposal and passage rate. Preliminary results indicate that timing fails to have a significant effect, and that there is little difference in proposal rate. However the results suggest a large increase in the number of initiatives proposed during recent midterm elections. This finding alone demonstrates that initiative entrepreneurs may be strategically timing measures for low-turnout

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> *elections, removing the potential of uninformed citizens voting*
> *against the measure, hopefully increasing the chance of passage.*

Over the past few decades, the state politics literature has seen a sizable increase in the amount of research completed on direct democracy. These works include topics ranging from ballot propositions' effect on voting behavior (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984), issue agenda-setting (Nicholson 2005), political knowledge (Biggers 2014; Smith and Tolbert 2004), interest group populations (Boehmke 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Gerber 1999), policy making (Matsusaka 2004, 2007) and governmental trust (Dyck 2010, 2012). In spite of all the attention, there seems to be little investigation into the effect timing may have on the initiative process itself.

Time adds an interesting component to the study of the initiative process because it suggests that initiative entrepreneurs may be targeting certain measures for particular elections with a distinct electoral makeup. It makes intuitive sense that initiative entrepreneurs would seek to place measures on a general election ballot when a large number of citizens could cast votes, therefore increasing the likelihood of passage; however, the counterintuitive also makes sense as it suggests that entrepreneurs would actually seek elections in which fewer come to vote—or specifically, a midterm election. By strategically timing measures for midterm elections, these entrepreneurs may be trying to limit the number of status quo–preserving "no" votes cast by uninformed voters (Bowler and Donovan 1998) who come to the polls during a highly visible presidential election. Knowing that the uninformed voter defaults to "no," because they fear what can be lost by voting "yes," these entrepreneurs could be taking a chance by hoping that only those who know about the measure would turn out to vote on it, hopefully increasing its chance of passage. Either of these reasons for timing is plausible and creates an interesting question about the proposed effect that the targeting of measures for certain elections could have on direct legislation. By empirically investigating time, this work seeks to uncover whether there are strategic advantages to the proposal and passage of ballot initiatives.

Initiative Usage, Strategic Timing, and Access to the Ballot

How Findley Lake, New York, Got Wet

Findley Lake, a small town in western New York, was partially dry until 2007. It was illegal to operate a liquor store, and supermarkets and convenience stores were prohibited from selling beer and other alcoholic beverages. The town being partially dry was not too much of an issue for

many years. However, it became a growing problem for the business owners of the town in the late 1990s, during which the town began experiencing higher rates of summer residents as use of the man-made lake, for which the town was named, became free to use for all interested parties. As is the case in many other areas with boating activities, citizens tend to purchase alcoholic beverages, albeit illegal; and bring the beverages onto their watercraft, allowing for the enjoyment of their activities without being interrupted. When the out-of-town citizens found that they were prohibited from purchasing alcohol in Findley Lake, they would leave the area; make the four-mile drive to French Creek, New York, a wet town; and purchase not only their alcohol needs, but other supplies that they could have purchased in Findley Lake.

Realizing the high volume of revenue that they were losing, the businesspeople in Findley Lake came together in hopes of changing the town's liquor laws. The businesspeople held multiple town meetings to gauge local response to the idea of changing the laws and explained the potential benefits to the area regarding the sale of alcohol. After receiving vast amounts of vocal approval and signatures from the townspeople, the owners proposed legislation in 2000, expecting success, but witnessed massive failure. In 2004, with greater vocal and written support of the town, the businesspeople again attempted direct legislation but witnessed the same result as in 2000. In 2007, the business owners attempted legislation one last time and, in the waning summer months, received enough signatures to make the ballot; although the vocal and outward support of the town was substantially less than in earlier elections, the measure finally passed (Schenk 2007).

Given that the measure seemed to have sufficient support from the townspeople in 2000 and 2004, why did it fail to pass until 2007, when measure passage seemed very unlikely? One possible reason, and the answer supported by the Findley Lake Business Association, deals with the town's composition. Ignoring the summer months, Findley Lake has a population of approximately 1,000 citizens, a distinct majority of which came from the senior citizen demographic. Most of the senior citizens have lived in Findley Lake most or all of their collective lives and were residents when the prohibition laws for the town were put into place. Understanding that the senior citizens were reluctant to change the system, the businesspeople looked to weaken the power these older citizens had in the area. The business owners took note that a large number of the senior citizens of the town left for their summer residences in the South at the end of summer every year except when there is a general election; therefore, the business owners believed that if they proposed the legislation during an off-year election, when the senior citizen population was absent, there might be a higher probability of the legislation

passing. Consequently, the measure passed in 2007, after the senior population left town for the winter (Schenk 2007).

Understanding the potential of Findley Lake being a unique case, the story nicely sets up an empirical investigation into the initiative process. First, the investigation seeks to uncover evidence of three separate phenomena, with the foremost being (1) whether timing matters in initiative passage, as the story suggests; (2) more specifically, whether there is a strategic timing advantage to the usage of the ballot initiative process; and (3) more generally, what predicts the presence of initiatives on the ballot? Although there has been a surge in research on the initiative process, there is surprisingly little work on the effect timing has on the ballot initiative process. This work attempts to fill this hole in the literature by uncovering a relationship between the two.

Strategic Timing: Surge and Decline vs. Status Quo "No"

Based on an observation and a hunch, the business owners in Findley Lake not only posited a relationship between their initiative proposal and timing, but also created the foundation for an investigation into the role timing has in the initiative process at the state level, where a wide degree of variation is in usage. This study seeks to uncover evidence suggesting whether initiative entrepreneurs believe a strategic advantage to exist during certain elections and not others.

There are potentially countervailing reasons as to why these entrepreneurs might want to time initiatives for the general and midterm elections. During a general election, a large amount of political information is dispersed, causing an increased number of advantaged partisans, independents, and uninformed voters to participate, and leading to a surge in voter turnout (A. Campbell, 1960; J. Campbell 1987). A well-focused presidential campaign that brings voters to the polls creates an opportunity for initiative entrepreneurs to manipulate these uninformed groups into voting for the measure, because they may have paid more attention to a salient candidate campaign and little to the content of the ballot measures. Knowing that a portion of voters who normally would not come to the polls are participating, initiative entrepreneurs try to soften the impact of "no" votes by the better informed coming out to vote against the measure, by increasing "yes" votes among those duped uninformed voters who are at the polls voting for a presidential candidate.

Although this may make sense to some initiative entrepreneurs, others may take issue with the logic, as voters with low levels of political awareness tend to default to a "no" vote (Bowler and Donovan 1998). Acting similarly to how they would during a primary election, uninformed voters will default to a vote of "no" when a ballot proposition is unfamiliar, in order to preserve the status quo. This strategy is employed because the uninformed voter worries more about what can potentially be lost by voting "yes" instead of

what can potentially be gained (Bowler and Donovan 1998). Therefore, the most beneficial opportunity for entrepreneurs to time initiatives is either during an election when the uninformed voters turn out at a low rate, or during the midterm election. By proposing initiatives during midterm elections, when the majority of voters who participate are either strong partisans and/or the better informed of the electorate, initiative entrepreneurs are looking to limit the number of status quo "no" votes cast against the measure, increasing the likelihood of passage.

As can be seen, either reasoning for the timing of initiatives makes sense, but what needs to be determined is which reasoning is correct in relation to proposal and passage rates. The first question seeks to uncover the proposal rate portion of this puzzle. It asks whether more initiatives are being proposed during midterm elections when there is a decline in the electorate or during general elections when there is a surge. A second question asks whether there is a strategic advantage to timing initiatives for either the midterm or general election. This addresses the issue of whether the potential for passage is greater in one of these elections. These two questions lay the foundation for the investigation into the role of time in relation to initiative usage.

Access: Why Some States Use the Initiative Process More Than Others

To comprehend the importance of the timing issue, it is necessary to understand what factors may determine the presence of an initiative on a ballot. First and foremost, rule strictness explains the variation in initiatives proposed from state to state. States with more lenient rules witness a greater impact from initiative usage, and states with more difficult rules are insulated from their impact. The frequent use of the process in states such as Oregon and California suggests that they have more lenient rules than in other states such as Massachusetts and Wyoming (Bowler and Donovan 2004), but the literature lacks a good explanation for why this occurs. What is currently known is that states with lenient rules should have more initiatives proposed, and states with stricter rules should not.

In addition to the strictness of rules, it is known that the quality of a legislature may affect the number of initiatives that are proposed from state to state. The capacity of a legislature matters, and therefore the perceived weakness, or strength, of the body either increases or limits the threat of initiative usage. Specifically, the threat of initiative has the potential to influence legislators' behavior by encouraging the passage of policy (Kogan 2015) that prevents the group seeking direct control over setting the policy agenda from actually obtaining that power (Bowler and Donovan 2004; Gerber 1996; Huder, Ragusa, and Smith 2010; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). Due to this, states with professional responsive legislatures should

witness less proposed initiatives, regardless of rule strictness, than states with less professional legislatures.

Finally, interest group activity plays a substantial role in the initiative process, as most of the recent literature suggests that the initiative process encourages citizen involvement (Boehmke 2002; Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 2004; Smith and Tolbert 2004), such as the joining of interest and citizen groups (Boehmke and Bowen 2010). Gerber (1999) argues that these citizen groups are better suited to use the initiative process as they benefit from the financial and personal resources needed to bypass the barriers to initiative proposal, and Boehmke (2002, 2005a, 2005b) finds that states with higher levels of interest group activity should witness higher frequency of initiative usage. Recognizing the existing relationship between interest groups and initiative proposal rates, it is necessary to uncover the extent to which the existence of these groups predicts variation in initiative usage rates among the states.

Using what is already known on initiative usage, the literature would benefit from the discovery of how these variables predict initiative usage among the states. Combining this question with the previous two, and the literature on surge and decline, status quo "no" voting, and ballot access, yields five hypotheses regarding timing and initiative usage:

1. More initiatives will be proposed during midterm elections than the general election as initiative entrepreneurs look to limit the number of status quo–preserving "no" votes cast against a measure.

2. Based on the limited number of "no" votes cast during the midterm, initiative passage rates will be greater during midterm elections than the general elections, as the majority of the uninformed "no" voting electorate is removed.

3. States with more lenient rules governing the initiative process will witness more initiatives on the ballot than will states with stricter rules, regardless of the election in which the measures are proposed.

4. States with high levels of legislative professionalism will have fewer initiatives proposed per election than will states with less professional legislatures, regardless of strictness of rule.

5. States with high interest-group activity scores will have more initiatives proposed per election than states with low interest group scores.

Data, Methods, and Measurement

The data used in the analysis is from a panel data set of the 24 states that allow the initiative process from 1978 to 2014.[2] The unit of analysis is state-year, and the dependent variables for tests are the number of initiatives proposed in each election and passage rate, respectively. The number of initiatives proposed and passed was collected from the Initiative and Referendum Database, created by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), while the passage rate is computed as a percentage of the number of initiative passed divided by the number proposed each year for each initiative state.

The control variables included in the models range in scope from legislative rules governing the process to interest group activity ratings within the states. To begin, the first control in this study is the strictness of rules governing the process in the 24 initiative states. Rule strictness[3] predicts the variation in initiatives proposed from state to state, accounting for differences among states with more lenient rules, or those who witness greater impact from initiative usage, and those states with more difficult rules, who are insulated from their impact (Bowler and Donovan 2004). To account for this phenomena, a rules variable was created using Bowler and Donovan's (2004; 2007[4]) measure of governing rules for the states, which accounts for ease of direct democracy usage since the state's adoption of the process. It utilizes a scale from 0 to 6, with 10 being the generic code for states without the process. A 0 code is reserved for states where the rules are the most lenient, such as in Oregon, and a 6 is for the states with the most difficult rules, such as Wyoming. Because this is a historical scale of the state's ease in usage, the strictness code is the same every year from 1978 to 2014, for each state. Including this variable will account for the large shifts in usage from one state to another, which could potentially bias the results, suggesting a relationship between midterm elections and proposal rates when there may not be and vice versa.

The second control is the level of professionalism of the state legislatures in the initiative states. Understanding that the threat of initiatives has the potential to influence legislators' behavior (Kogan 2015), encouraging the

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[2] The year 1978 is chosen as the starting point as it includes Proposition 13 in California that capped annual property tax increases by 2 percent and brought the usage of the process into the mainstream media (Tugend 2006).

[3] Rule strictness was used instead of a dummy variable for region, as it accounted for greater variance. As the western states have easier rules of usage, more infinitives make the ballot in these areas. Rule strictness accurately accounts for this increased usage.

[4] Bowler and Donovan's state governing rules measure accounts for the numerous discrepancies in usage among the states, including single-subject rules put in place by Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Single-subject rules require initiatives to have only one issue or subject.

passage of policy that prevents the group seeking direct control of policy agenda from actually obtaining that power (Bowler and Donovan 2004; Gerber 1996; Huder, Ragusa, and Smith 2010; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001), I include a legislative professionalism measure to account for the reason why some states have fewer initiatives than others. Formally, the variable is made from Squire's legislative professionalism scores, created yearly from 1978 to 2014, with professionalism associated with unlimited legislative resources, superior staff resources, and sufficient pay to allow members to pursue legislative service as their profession (Squire 1992, 2007), coded on a scale from 0 to 1. A score closer to 0 indicates a less professional legislature, one in which a legislature's members/organization are less likely to generate and digest information in the policy-making process; while a score closer to 1 indicates members/organization who are more likely to generate the aforementioned policy (Squire 2007). This variable controls for the possibility of a state having easy governing rules but few initiatives per election due to a professional legislature, as well as a state with more difficult rules having many initiatives due to a less professional organization.

The third control is a lag of the number of initiatives proposed to account for the correlation between numbers of initiatives proposed from election to election. I create a time lag, which assumes the number of initiatives proposed during an election in a given state is correlated to the number of initiatives proposed in the same state in a later election. This accounts for the possible existence of the increasing number of counter-initiatives that are used to defeat proposals already on the ballot (Banducci 1998) in a state from year to year. Adding this variable controls for the aforementioned biased result on the relationship between usage and timing.

The final three controls create the proxy for interest group activity scores and include state ideology, gross state product, and state population (Boehmke 2002).[5] The first is the ideology measure of the state governments, calculated yearly from 1978 to 2014. It details the mean position of elected public officials on a liberal-conservative scale in a state, weighted according to the power they have over public policy decisions (Berry, Ringquist, Fording,

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[5] Boehmke (2002) creates a measure to account for interest group activity in the initiative states. This measure is created from Boehmke (2000), Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998), Mueller and Murrell (1986), Mitchell and Munger (1991), and Gray and Lowery (1996). Boehmke (2000) found that interest group activity is magnified in states where the legislature has failed to act on popular policy supported by a large minority of the population, which occurs in mostly large states. Mueller and Murrell's (1986) and Mitchell and Munger's (1991) works find that states that spend more money attract more groups; and Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and Gray and Lowery (1996) found that ideology of the state legislature and divided government and legislative ideology affect initiative usage.

and Hanson 1998, 2015). Weighting the measures allows the distinction between states with simple majorities and states with a dominant ideology, accounting for states with a slight ideological majority on one side, that still has policies influenced by the other side and states in which a party is in complete control. With the coding of the variable from 0 to 100, where 0 is most conservative and 100 is most liberal, we should expect to find evidence of the ideology of states predicting the number of measures proposed each year. What is unknown is which ideological leaning predicts usage.

The final two variables in the proxy are gross state product and state population. Gross state product (GSP), a per capita measure collected yearly from 1978 to 2014, is the measure of economic output by a state, and should affect the process, as states that have higher GSP should have a higher number of initiatives per election. One of the largest barriers to the use of direct democracy is the financial burden caused by fulfilling the requirements to put the initiative on the ballot (Ellis 2002; Herzberg 2012; Magleby 1984). Therefore, states with higher GSP will not encounter this setback, as there will be an influx of money statewide (Gardener 2012), allowing more initiatives to make the ballot. State population[6] should also be controlled for, as states with larger populations should witness the use of initiatives more than states with smaller populations (Boehmke 2002). Having large populations makes it difficult for legislators to represent all of the views of his/her constituents. Therefore, not all policies supported by the voters can be adequately covered by the representative. As a result, citizens look to the direct democracy process to pass the policies that their representative cannot.

Combining state population with GSP and state ideology creates a proxy measure for interest group activity levels. Adding the proxy allows a test for whether or not an advantage exists for interest groups in using the initiative process (Gerber 1999), and whether states with higher levels of interest group activity scores, i.e., liberal, states with high levels of GSP and large populations, should witness higher rates of proposed initiatives (Boehmke 2002, 2005). This potential increase is due to subsets of voters feeling they are being more adequately represented by the interest group than by their representative (Boehmke 2005b). Controlling for this event displays the effect interest groups have on the direct democracy process, in relation to ballot proposal and passage rates.

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[6] State population is measured in the year 2000 and is used across the data set for the years 1978–2014. Although this leads to error in the data set, the effect is minimal.

Results

The first estimate, using event count data, utilizes a panel corrected Poisson[7] model to test the proposed relationship of timing on the initiative process because a linear model[8] would produce biased coefficients (Boehmke 2005b; King 1988).[9] The second model estimated is a panel corrected regression on passage rates to find whether passage is statistically related to timing.[10] Both models include the control variables for lagged proposals, midterm elections, strictness of rules, legislative professionalism, and the proxy variable for interest group activity, to determine specifically whether a statistically significant difference exists in initiative proposal/passages rates between midterm and general elections, and more generally to test what predicts the presence of initiatives on a ballot.

Beginning with Figure 1, which graphically displays initiative proposal rate during the midterm and general elections, it can be seen that the test of the first hypothesis shows a steady increase in the number of initiatives proposed during the midterm elections in the years 1978–2014. This alone suggests that initiative entrepreneurs may believe there is a strategic advantage to timing ballot measures for the midterm election. But, as can be seen in Table 1, initial evidence reveals that there is no discernable difference in the number of initiatives being proposed during midterms and general elections. Therefore, those initiative entrepreneurs who either may be isolating their measure from the uninformed electorate or may be trying to trick uninformed groups into voting for their measure, as they may have paid more attention to the well-focused presidential campaign and little to the content of the proposal, are the ones truly being duped. Either belief, targeting measures to soften the impact

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[7] A Poisson regression is estimated in this instance as the count data on initiative proposal follows a Poisson distribution, or the assumption that the proposal of initiatives in a specific year/state are independent of all other initiatives proposed in the state and all other states in all years. What this means is that this event (initiative proposal) occurs at an average rate (an election year), but independent of the last event (Green 2011; King 1988, 1989).

[8] A panel corrected linear regression assumes that residual error follows a normal distribution, but it would be the incorrect model when using count data as the dependent variable, proposal rate, is discrete and limited to nonnegative numbers. As there are a high number of 0s in the data set (years when no initiatives where proposed in a state), this stops the data from following a normal distribution and could produce negative predicted values, which is not possible (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995; Long 1997, Sweet and Grace-Martin 2011).

[9] Understanding that the Poisson model may return standard errors that are too small due to the model prohibiting overdispersion, or greater variability (Boehmke 2005b; King 1989), I estimated a negative binomial regression, which allows for overdispersion, but the model failed to converge.

[10] A time series–cross section (TSCS) panel corrected standard error model supported by Beck and Katz (1995) failed to work on this data set as it produced inefficient standard errors that suggest model misspecification (King and Roberts 2014).

Figure 1: Midterm and General Election Initiative Proposal Rates, 1978–2014

Note: Graphical representation of the number of initiatives proposed during the midterm and general elections between 1978 and 2014. The *y* axis represents the overall number of initiatives proposed in the 24 initiative states. The *x* axis represents the year of the election that the initiatives were proposed.

Table 1: Poisson Model of Initiative Proposal Rates

Independent Variable	B	SE	p-value
Number of Initiatives Proposed in Previous Election	0.0397**	0.0077	0.000
Midterm Election	-0.0927	0.0567	0.103
Strictness of Rules	-0.3081**	0.1050	0.003
Legislative Professionalism	-3.2863**	0.8854	0.000
Population 2000	0.0001**	0.0000	0.028
Gross State Product	3.6107**	1.6707	0.031
State Ideology	-0.0047**	0.0017	0.008
Constant	2.3375**	0.4100	0.000
N	447		
Log Likelihood	-908.66		
Wald chi^2	83.47**		
Prob > chi^2	0.000		

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; 2-tailed test.
Dependent Variable is coded as number of initiatives proposed in each election, 1978–2014.

of "no" votes of the better informed coming to vote against the measure, by increasing "yes" votes among those uninformed voters, or proposing more initiatives in midterm election years when the proposed status quo "no" voters are less likely to be at the polls, is unfounded. Overall, what is found is that strategic timing of initiatives has little predictive effect on the use of direct legislation.

Apart from timing, a significant and interesting relationship does exist between the number of initiatives proposed in a given election and the number proposed in the following election. Specifically, the analysis indicates that there is an increase in initiative usage from one election to the next. This makes sense, because we have evidence that the initiative process increases political efficacy among the electorate (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Nicholson 2005; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Even though recent skepticism about the magnitude of this effect exists (Dyck and Lascher 2009), the evidence here supports the previously cited secondary effects literature of direct democracy, suggesting that as citizens become familiar with this process from one election to the next, there would be higher rates of usage. Also, this finding potentially adds support to Banducci (1998), who argues that the increasing number initiative proposals from year to year are based on the existence of counter-initiatives. Further work needs to be done to determine if the counter-initiative argument is correct, focusing specifically on how many of the initiatives proposed in one year are repeals of previous initiatives.

The next set of findings specifically addresses the issue of why some states use the initiative process more than others. Generally, the strictness of rules governing the process, legislative professionalism, and interest group activity within a state all statistically account for variation among the states' initiative usage. Bowler and Donovan (2004) found that the process was not the same for all the states and the impact of initiatives on state politics and policy is based on these institutional differences, positing that the direct effect of initiatives should be greater in states where more measures make it on the ballot. The strictness of rules governing the process variable has a significant and negative effect in the model yielding support for this hypothesis. This suggests that as the rules governing the process increase in difficulty from state to state, the number of initiatives proposed per election in these states decrease. Although not terribly surprising, the finding provides a starting point for why some states use the initiative process more than others.

The next usage variable in the model accounts for legislative professionalism. Knowing that professionalism is associated with unlimited legislative/staff resources, and sufficient pay (Squire 1992, 2007), it is expected that states with high professionalism scores will have low numbers of initiatives proposed, because professional legislators have more time to juggle

their legislative demands than do less professional members (Squire 2007). The model returns evidence of this phenomenon in that we see initiative proposal rates drop as legislatures become more professional from state to state. This finding supports the argument that initiative usage encourages the passage of policy from legislators, preventing the use of the direct procedure (Bowler and Donovan 2004; Gerber 1996; Kogan 2015; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). Having the security of increasing income, staff, and ability to understand the legislative process, career legislators focus their attention on representing their constituents' policy wants, ultimately thwarting the use of the initiative process by the voters and accounting for the decrease in direct democracy usage in states with professional legislatures.[11]

The last usage variable included in the model is the proxy for interest group activity (Boehmke 2002). Taking each variable on their own, the model returns evidence that the population of states, GSP, and state ideology all affect initiative usage. First, GSP and state population are the largest factors in determining initiative usage. As previously discussed, the largest barrier to the use of direct democracy is the financial burden caused by fulfilling the requirements to put the initiative on the ballot. As a result, states with a high GSP should be isolated from this problem. Estimates from the model support this finding, as GSP increases per state, the number of initiatives proposed substantially increases, due to the financial burden being virtually nonexistent. This finding is magnified in large states, where it is more difficult for the legislature to represent all views, and causes citizens to look to alternative methods to pass policies that they support. The most common of these methods is direct legislation, and, as can be seen in Table 1, initiative usage is significantly higher in large states, and therefore suggests that interest groups will flock to the more affluent and larger states to help single issue–oriented policy to pass.

In regards to ideology, a fascinating result occurs in the model, finding that as states become more liberal, the number of proposed initiatives drops. Although the finding seems to be contrary to what we witness in the real world—because California, a liberal state, has high proposal rates annually—it fits well within the recent literature regarding conservative voting in ballot measure elections. Matsusaka (2004, 2007) finds that conservative policy

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[11] In relation to the role of legislatures, a question remains as to whether this finding remains significant with the addition of state party competition index (Holbrook and La Raja 2008). Specifically of interest is whether more initiatives are proposed for the ballot in states with one-party, modified one-party, or competitive two-party rule. Although this is beyond the scope of this work, a future investigation into the partisan makeup of state legislatures and the potential effect that this has on the use of direct measures is warranted.

prevails in the initiative process,[12] and Dyck (2010) finds that distrust in government predicts conservative ballot initiative preferences. This suggests that the majority of liberal states, minus California and Oregon, seem to be actively avoiding the initiative process, as they are fearful of the conservative policies it produces. Regardless, the results of the proxy for interest group activity suggests that large states with wealthy citizens will be inundated with high rates of interest group activity and will witness an increased number of conservative ballot measures, which may be contrary to the state's ideological composition.

The overarching question of this research is whether there is empirical evidence of the strategic timing of initiatives to increase passage rates. As can be seen in Table 2, the estimates from the model return no evidence of this proposed relationship. The result of the panel corrected regression displays no discernable difference between the midterms and general elections, suggesting that the overall initiative passage rate of 45–50 percent,[13] as seen in Figure 2, encompasses all elections.

Table 2: Panel Corrected Regression of Initiative Passage Rates

Independent Variable	B	SE	p-value
Number of Initiatives Proposed in Previous Election	-0.0018	0.0066	0.789
Midterm Election	- 0.0075	0.0392	0.849
Strictness of Rules	0.0367**	0.0151	0.015
Legislative Professionalism	-0.3337	0.2455	0.174
Population 2000	3.0206	5.7306	0.598
Gross State Product	2.0207	1.5207	0.183
State Ideology	0.0013	0.0008	0.129
Constant	0.4082**	0.0687	0.000
N	331		
Wald chi^2	11.46		
Prob > chi^2	.1199		

Notes: * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; 2-tailed test.
Dependent Variable is a percentage derived from the number of initiatives pass/proposed in each election 1978–2014.

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[12] Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco (2008) disagree with Matsusaka and argue that some policies reflect public opinion and some do not and has less to do with initiatives creating conservative policy.
[13] The Initiative and Referendum database compiles the passage rate for all measures proposed.

Figure 2: Midterm and General Election Initiative Passage Rates, 1978–2014

Note: Graphical representation of initiative passage rate during the midterm and general elections between 1978 and 2014. Passage rate calculated as number of initiatives passed divided by the number proposed. The *y* axis is the percentage rate of passage. The *x* axis represents the year of the election that the initiatives were passed.

Regardless of the lack of significance of strategic timing, we do find significant coefficients on the rules variable. The model returns results that suggest passage rate in initiative contests are positively related with rules governing the process. This suggests that as the rules governing the initiative process make it more difficult to propose legislation, the probability of passage of the few measures that make it to the ballot increases. Therefore, when a measure makes the ballot in a strict state, a variety of assumptions can be made about the reason it was proposed initially. The most basic of assumptions could be that the issue brought must be of importance to the electorate, because if it were not, the entrepreneur would not waste their resources by bringing it to the public to vote on it when it would be sure to fail. A more nuanced assumption could also be that a large amount of resources, be it time, money, and/or grassroots participation, was used to secure passage of the measure. Regardless of the reason, which in itself sets up for interesting future investigation, when the measure, which reflects the public's interest, makes the ballot by achieving the necessary and sometimes arduous number of signatures, the probability of passage increases.

The final variable of interest in the passage rate model is the ideology of the state. The model suggests that, albeit very slightly, liberal states may witness increased passage rates for the proposed initiatives. We already know

that liberal states propose fewer measures, as initiatives tend to be conservative in nature (Matsusaka 2004, 2007); therefore, a conundrum is created when we find that liberal states pass more initiatives. This puzzle can be easily solved, as we know that "trust makes liberals out of conservative Republicans and distrust makes conservatives out of liberal Democrats" (Dyck 2010). As long as these liberal states have citizens with high levels of governmental distrust, they will continue to seek the passage of more conservative policy measures, such as Proposition 13 in 1978 (Dyck 2010). That said, the ideology finding is truly fascinating and calls attention to the need of future work done on the topic. Specifically, an investigation into the content of the measures being passed—whether social (Dyck 2012, Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012), economical (Matsusaka 2000, 2005), or both (Gerber and Phillips 2005)—or the influence of the political elite (Tolbert and Smith 2006) on proposal and passage rates could begin to unravel this puzzle. To be sure, future research is warranted on the ideology topic. Overall, what is currently known from this study is that the rules to proposing initiatives dictate their presence on the ballot and passage rate more than the placing of a measure during a specific election.

Conclusion: Apparently, Time Has Little to Do with It

Overall, the main goal of this work was to investigate the proposed role that timing could play in the initiative process based on the story of a small town whose prohibition laws were sinking local business. When looking at a snapshot of initiative usage, it is easy to posit a relationship between time and initiative proposal rate. In 2008 and 2012, general election years, the average number of initiatives proposed was 5.8 and the average number passed was 3.3, for a passage rate of 59 percent. In 2010 and 2014, midterm election years, the average number of initiatives proposed was 4.8 and the average passed was 2.9, for a passage rate of 54 percent. Anecdotally, this confirms that there is a difference in elections and that some nefarious initiative entrepreneurs may time measures to influence their chance of passage. However, when studying initiative usage since 1978, there is little significant difference between the two passage rates, and no difference in proposal. Specifically, passage rate hovers around 45–50 percent, or the historical initiative passage rate, and proposal is about 50 percent per two-year election cycle. What this means is that initiative entrepreneurs should focus more on the rules governing the direct legislation process than the actual type of election in order to attempt to influence passage.

Yet, using the businesspeople's posited relationship between time and passage, the analysis found no empirical evidence that suggests high rates of

strategically timed initiatives on the midterm ballot, which allow a more informed electorate to vote on the measures. Instead, the evidence shows that more initiatives make the ballot during the general election, when a wide variety of voters have the opportunity to weigh in on the measure and that initiative entrepreneurs believe there to be no, or at least very little, strategic advantage in timing initiatives.

Turning the discussion to usage, evidence exists that indicated that states with stricter rules governing the initiative process, and those that have professional legislatures, decrease the reliance on the direct democracy process for policy creation. Continuing, states with high interest group activity scores witness higher numbers of proposed conservative policy initiatives, as the financial burden of the process, the largest barrier to usage, is nonexistent. Although this work looks to only three variables affecting usage, the literature now has evidence of why some states use the process more than others and lays the groundwork for future work on the topic. Returning to the earlier story, the anecdotal evidence that the Findley Lake business owners were correct in believing timing affects initiative passage was found to be just that, anecdotal. In the Findley Lake case, strategically timing an initiative for an off-year election was beneficial to passage for that town, but there is no empirical evidence of that trend at the state level.

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The Enemy Within:
The Challenge of Domestic Terrorism

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Since the 9/11 attacks, the American media has focused heavily on terrorism, terrorist attacks, and the possibility of a "homegrown" terrorist threat. In this study, the researchers use the Global Terrorism Dataset to analyze terrorist incidents in the United States and its territories since 1970 to identify trends in domestic terrorism. The analysis demonstrates that the number of terrorism incidents has dramatically declined since the 1970s. However, the lethality of attacks has significantly increased. Over time, the pendulum between right- and left-wing-inspired attacks has also swung back and forth; currently, legitimate threats from both ends of the political spectrum exist in the form of the militia and sovereign citizen movement on the right and environmental groups on the left. While a legitimate concern exists about online radicalization of Muslim youth, the severity of the threat appears to be overblown in the media, as the Muslim community has itself been the prime source of information disrupting potential terrorist attacks inspired by radical Islam.

T errorism has a long history both internationally and in American history. Indeed, Gage (2011) argues that many acts in American history that are viewed positively (at least by Americans) would be labeled terrorism today. She cites such activities as the Boston Tea Party as just one of many examples of "patriotism" that would meet today's definition of terrorism in the US Code.

Terrorism also has received much media coverage in post-9/11 America. Based on the media coverage, one would think that terrorism is common, very violent, and only rarely happens in the United States. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database, this article analyzes domestic terrorism data to pick out trends since 1970 to evaluate the true nature of the threat. While it may surprise many, the number of domestic terrorism incidents has dropped dramatically since the 1970s. However, the source of the threat and its potential lethality has changed significantly over the years. The authors trace these developments in order to project how the threat could evolve in the future.

Background

While there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism (Hoffman 1998, 37), agreement does exist about its broad outlines. Generally, terrorism definitions include the use of violence (or threat of violence) directed at a broad audience by individuals or groups with a political goal in mind. Such goals often include redistributing power, influence, or wealth that are not achievable within the constraints of the normal political process (see Hoffman 1998, 30; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). Since perpetrators either cannot or will not use the political process, they resort to terrorism as the mechanism for drawing attention to their cause. While it is not explicitly stated, this definition assumes that terrorism is an activity undertaken by nonstate actors.

The US Code defines terrorism as an offense that "is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct" and involves a violent crime (18 U.S.C. § 232b). Domestic terrorism refers to activities that have three characteristics, which are included in the definition of domestic terrorism outlined in the US Code: (1) involving acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; (2) appearing intended to intimidate or coerce the population, government policy, or the conduct of government; and (3) occurring primarily within US territory (18 U.S.C. § 2331).

There are a number of problems with this definition. Some critics claim the definition is too vague and could be used to suppress dissent. For example, Amster (2006) argues that the definition in use, which includes property damage, is overly broad. In his view, including property damage in the definition results in subsuming constitutionally protected protest activity into terrorist activity. Hoffman (1998, 38) argues that excluding psychological components of terrorism, the threat of action, as opposed to direct action, is also problematic.

But there are also practical concerns with the definition, particularly as it is actually implemented in the law enforcement and judicial systems. For example, the FBI has historically operated with the understanding that domestic

terrorists not only operate inside the United States, but also lack foreign direction. Bjelopera (2013, 4), in a Congressional Research Service report, asserts that the FBI's shorthand definition of terrorism is "Americans attacking Americans based on US-based extremist ideologies." Using this definition, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the attacks on 9/11, and the bombing of the Boston Marathon in 2013 were not domestic terrorism incidents, even though all three occurred within US territory and meet the legal definition outlined in the US Code.

The result is that it is highly difficult to determine just how many terrorist acts take place in the United States. There is evidence that the federal courts and the Department of Justice use different criteria when sorting, counting, and categorizing terrorist prosecutions in general (Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 2009). This opens the possibility that what one agency refers to as "terrorism" is not counted as such by another agency (Bjelopera 2013).

Complicating matters further, domestic terrorism incidents typically involve both federal, state, and local law enforcement and multiple crimes. Incidents often encompass firearms, arson or explosive offenses, fraud, vandalism, property damage, threats, and hoaxes. In some cases, what the FBI describes as a domestic terrorism suspect may not be charged with committing a federal crime. Instead, the suspect may be charged under state law for crimes committed as part of a terrorist incident. As a result, "individuals considered domestic terrorists by federal law enforcement may not necessarily be federally charged as terrorists" (Bjelopera 2013, 6).

Since terrorism is by definition a political act, law enforcement officials may be neither able nor willing to label an act as "terrorism" early in an investigation. It can be challenging for investigators to distinguish between political motives and personal malice (Bjelopera 2013). As an example, consider violent acts committed by white supremacist groups. Are their violent actions driven by political motivations such as a desire to set up an apartheid system, or simply by hate? "Hate crimes" pose a particular challenge, as differentiating them from terrorism may be virtually impossible.

Finally, Bjelopera (2013) points out that the FBI often uses the terms "extremism" and "terrorism" interchangeably. In part, this may be due to a desire to reconcile the FBI's traditional definition of terrorism as American-based and originated with the reality of individuals on US soil conducting terrorist operations under the direction or influence of overseas parties. Alternatively, this could be an outgrowth of the government's reluctance to label domestic groups as terrorist groups due to civil liberties concerns. Officially, the US government does not have a list of "terrorist groups," presumably due to concerns that the creation or maintenance of such a list would lead inevitably to lawsuits challenging the practice as a violation of First Amendment rights.

Given these difficulties, how can one reconstruct the scale and scope of domestic terrorism? Sources vary concerning the number of domestic terrorist events. For example, the FBI counted 308 domestic terrorist events between 1980 and 2005 (FBI 2005), but the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (hereinafter START) recorded 1,058 such incidents. Why the difference? The FBI is using investigatory records. START conducts content analysis of media reports to develop its data set rather than formal prosecutions or investigations. In addition, it includes all terrorist incidents occurring in US territories, regardless of whether or not the attack had an international connection. In short, for understanding the scale and scope of domestic terrorism, START's dataset is far more comprehensive than government records.

START's Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD) will be used, then, to reconstruct the story of domestic terrorism since 1970. The GTD includes incidents that meet their definition of terrorism: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." START uses a computer screening process as the first step in filtering and identifying media reports to create a pool of reports that meet their broad definition of terrorism. Those reports are rerun through a second computer program designed to eliminate duplicate reports of the same incident. The final collection is then reviewed by hand by trained analysts at START before being included in the final dataset. While the GTD includes terrorism incidents from around the world, for purposes of this article, only terrorism incidents that occur inside the United States or its territories are included for analysis and discussion (START 2013). Specifically, we retained for analysis in this article those cases meeting the three criteria included in the definition of domestic terrorism outlined in the US Code, which bears repeating here: (1) involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; (2) appear intended to intimidate or coerce the population, government policy, or affect the conduct of government; and (3) occur primarily within U.S. territory (18 U.S.C. § 2331).

The History of Domestic Terrorism since 1970

Since 1970, there have been 2,611 incidents that meet the definition of domestic terrorism outlined in the US Code. These domestic terrorism incidents account for just 2.3 percent of 113,113 terrorism incidents in the GTD. Domestic terrorism has decreased significantly over time, from its high of 468 incidents in 1970 to just 13 in 2012. Over this same time period, 2,652 individuals have been killed and another 2,613 wounded.

Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in the 1970s by Type of Group

	Number of Attacks	%
Black nationalists	173	11.8
Left-wing radicals	498	33.9
Environmentalists	2	0.1
Puerto Rican nationalists	220	15.0
Other nationalists	254	17.3
White supremacists	56	3.8
Right-wing radicals	12	0.8
Islamic fundamentalists	3	0.2
Other[1]	33	2.2
Unknown[2]	218	14.8

[1] "Other" refers to individual attacks.
[2] "Unknown" attacks are those where no group was ever identified as being responsible. In the 1970s, these were primarily student demonstrations on college campuses, protesting the Vietnam War or in support of civil rights, where no specific group was identified as being responsible.

Source: Global Terrorism Dataset, START

The states that were most often targeted for terrorist attacks were California (568, or 21.8% of all attacks) and New York (498, 19.1%). Although not a state, Puerto Rico has endured 246 terrorist attacks (9.4%). The most common type of attack was a bombing or explosion (1,352 or 51.8% of all attacks), followed by sabotage/vandalism of a facility or infrastructure (791, 30.3%). Suicide attacks are extremely rare—just nine domestic terrorism incidents were classified as a suicide attack.

The 1970s

In the 1970s, domestic terrorism incidents were originating primarily from the left wing of the political spectrum. There were 1,470 attacks during this decade (56.3%) of all attacks between 1970 and 2012), resulting in 185 deaths and 616 wounded. Table 1 summarizes the types of groups involved with terrorist activities during this decade.

Sparked by resistance to the Vietnam War, the civil rights and women's movements, protest movements swept the United States and were most prominent on college campuses. Many of those groups were inspired by left-wing ideologies such as communism and socialism. Such groups clearly dominated the 1970s in terms of terrorist activities. Of the 1,470 terrorist incidents in the 1970s, 498 (33.9%) were perpetrated by left-wing radical groups such as the New World Liberation Front (86) and the Weathermen (44).

Table 2: Terrorist Attacks in the 1980s by Type of Group

	Number of Attacks	%
Black nationalists	6	1.2
Left-wing radicals	34	6.6
Animal rights	6	1.2
Environmentalists	8	1.5
Puerto Rican nationalists	94	18.2
Other nationalists	112	21.7
White supremacists	39	7.5
Right-wing radicals	97	18.8
Islamic fundamentalists	5	1.0
Other	29	5.6
Unknown	87	16.8

Source: Global Terrorism Dataset, START

Another 173 were associated with Black Nationalist groups such as the Black Panthers and the Black Liberation Army. Those groups were also heavily influenced by Marxist ideology (Rosenau 2013), as were Puerto Rican and other nationalist groups active during this decade.

The 1980s

As the energy began to leave the Left, and law enforcement became more effective in infiltrating groups and prosecuting their members, the number of terrorism incidents began plummeting in the mid-1970s. In the 1980s, there were 517 attacks, or about one-third the number that occurred in the 1970s, resulting in 54 deaths and 924 wounded. As illustrated in Table 2, nationalism was the driving force behind much of the terrorism during the 1980s. Groups such as the Jewish Defense League (30 attacks, 5.8% of the total) were joined by Puerto Rican groups such as the Macheteros (31.6%) in using violence as a way to bring attention to their cause.

As the Left became quiet, groups from the Right end of the political spectrum began to increase their activities. In this decade, white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Order, and Aryan Nations were responsible for 39 incidents (7.5% of the total). This was also the decade that witnessed the emergence of the violent antiabortion movement. As legal and political efforts to overturn *Roe v. Wade* failed, some opponents adopted terrorist tactics and targeted abortion clinics and doctors as a way to protest the legalization of abortion. Of the 97 domestic terrorism incidents identified as right wing but not white supremacist, 90 (93%) were attributed to antiabortion groups.

Table 3: Terrorist Attacks in the 1990s by Type of Group

	Number of Attacks	%
Black nationalists	0	0.0
Left-wing radicals	1	0.3
Animal rights	49	13.2
Environmentalists	12	3.2
Puerto Rican nationalists	14	3.8
Other nationalists	12	3.2
White supremacists	37	10.0
Right-wing radicals	84	22.6
Islamic fundamentalists	3	0.8
Other	54	14.6
Unknown	105	28.3

Source: Global Terrorism Dataset, START

The 1990s

During the 1990s, Puerto Rican and other nationalist groups moved away from terrorism, and the overall number of attacks continued to decline. There were just 371 attacks; however, there were 219 deaths and 945 wounded. Most of these casualties, however, were attributable to one attack—the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal office building in Oklahoma City in 1995.

In this decade, terrorism continued to be originating from the right wing (see Table 3), with antiabortion extremists accounting for 79 attacks (21.3%). A new cause did emerge from the Left—animal rights. The Animal Liberation Front was responsible for 33 (8.9%) of the domestic terrorism incidents. With that emergence came a shift in the type of weapon preferred in attacks. For the first time, incendiary devices were used more frequently than explosives in terrorist attacks.

The most memorable terrorist event during this decade was the Oklahoma City bombing. The perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh, was heavily influenced by radical right-wing writings and ideology, and drew his inspiration for the method of attack from *The Turner Diaries*, a fictional account of a successful white supremacist uprising. McVeigh was not part of a right-wing group. He applied for membership with the Militia of Michigan and was rejected as too radical, but he shared their ideology. In that attack, 168 people died, including 19 children, and another 680 were injured, making Oklahoma City the single most devastating domestic terrorist attack until 9/11 (Michel and Herbeck 2001).

Table 4: Terrorist Attacks 2000–2009 by Type of Group

	Number of Attacks	%
Black nationalists	0	0.0
Left-wing radicals	0	0.0
Animal rights	31	14.5
Environmentalists	66	30.8
Puerto Rican nationalists	0	0.0
Other nationalists	0	0.0
White supremacists	5	2.3
Right-wing radicals	16	7.5
Islamic fundamentalists	5	2.3
Other	42	19.6
Unknown	49	22.9

Source: Global Terrorism Dataset, START

The 2000s

While the decade 2000 to 2009 will no doubt be most remembered for the 9/11 attacks, Islamic extremism was responsible for just five terrorism incidents in the United States. Driven by the 9/11 attacks, the casualty rate from domestic terrorism skyrocketed to 1,555 dead and 104 wounded. In contrast with the 1980s and 1990s, the Right largely disappeared from the terrorist scene as law enforcement, in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, focused its attention on militia and white supremacist groups.

In this decade, domestic terrorism took a decided left-wing turn as animal rights and environmentalism emerged as the major contributors (see Table 4). Of the 214 terrorism incidents in the United States, 57 (26.6%) were attributed to the Environmental Liberation Front and 29 (13.6%) to the Animal Liberation Front. Overall, 46.3% of terrorism incidents were attributed to such left-wing groups.

Changes in the Level of Violence

Just as the origination of the incidents has shifted with time, so has the level of violence. In the 1970s, the largest number of deaths associated with a single incident was 11, compared to the 168 associated with the Oklahoma City bombing in the 1990s, and 1,381 attributed to the 9/11 attacks in New York City. Table 5 summarizes the results from conducting one-way analysis of variance including all domestic terrorism incidents. The high number of casualties associated with just the Oklahoma City and 9/11 attacks raise the concern that these two incidents may be skewing the results in Table 5. To test this possibility, we excluded the Oklahoma City and 9/11 attacks and ran the

Table 5: Results of One-Way ANOVA, Decade of Attack and Number of Persons Killed

	Mean	Maximum	F	Sig.
1970s	.1298	11		
1980s	.1109	2		
1990s	.6000	168		
2000s	14.216	1382		
Overall			5.044	.000

Source: Global Terrorism Dataset, START

ANOVA a second time. In that analysis, while the mean number of deaths continues to increase slightly over time, the difference between the decades is no longer statistically significant.

This suggests that the increase in violence over time is attributable to the type of group or individual responsible. Some groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front and the Environmental Liberation Front, deliberately plan attacks to avoid human casualties. There have been no deaths attributed to any of their attacks. On the other hand, some groups plan attacks in ways designed not only to ensure casualties, but to maximize them. Such was clearly the case with Timothy McVeigh's truck bombing in Oklahoma City and al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks on office buildings. Both attacks took place during a business day, using a weapon that was guaranteed to kill large numbers of people. In fact, when using one-way ANOVA to compare the number of persons killed by group category (Table 6), Islamic fundamentalists emerge as the most violent. In other words, as the perpetrators' identity has changed, so has the casualty rate.

Based on the data presented, the number of domestic terrorism incidents has dramatically declined, while the level of violence associated with terrorism incidents has remained stable. Terrorism in the United States originates on the extreme fringes of both the left and right ends of the political spectrum. The most recent trends demonstrate that left-wing groups are the most common source of terrorism incidents in the United States; however, those groups deliberately avoid targeting human beings. Violence against human beings is currently associated with Islamic extremism and, if data from the 1990s is included, the extreme fringes of the right wing.

Table 6: Results of One-Way ANOVA, Type of Group and Number of Persons Killed

	Mean	Maximum	F	Sig.
Black nationalists	.4722	8		
Left-wing radicals	.0250	2		
Animal rights	0	0		
Environmentalists	0	0		
Puerto Rican nationalists	.0717	4		
Other nationalists	.1288	11		
White supremacists	.1926	5		
Right-wing radicals	.0529	2		
Islamic terrorists	199.8667	1382		
Other	1.4826	168		
Unknown	.0895	2		
			45.619	.000

Source: Global Terrorism Dataset, START

What Causes Terrorism?

What separates terrorism from more conventional forms of criminal behavior is motive. Terrorism is by definition a political act. Thus, the general public, the media, and political leaders tend to ascribe the emergence of terrorism to some sort of political grievance. This suggests that addressing the underlying grievances would end terrorism. But researchers are learning that terrorism is a more complicated phenomenon than a simple reading of a terrorist group's manifestos would suggest. Analysts and researchers have suggested several potential causal factors for terrorism, including: economic deprivation; modernization and the economic, political, and social changes that accompany it; the nature of the political order; regime instability; competition for leadership; and identity clashes. This section turns toward examining each of these as potentialities for investigating the causes of domestic terrorism.

Economic deprivation is often cited as a causal factor behind terrorist activities. According to this school of thought, violence is used when individuals believe there is a discrepancy between what they believe they deserve and what they actually receive (Gurr 1970). Perceptions matter in this theory, as it is perceptions that drive behavior. Known as "relative deprivation," this framework suggests that addressing economic inequality or causes of economic deprivation is the most effective counterterrorism approach. For

example, job losses in rural areas of the United States have been linked to the emergence of right-wing radical groups (Freilich and Pridemore 2005).

An alternative to this viewpoint suggests that modernization, and the economic and social change that comes with it, are major contributors to the emergence of terrorist groups. The transition from a traditional to a modern society often results in major shifts in labor markets, which can create grievances (Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins 2006). Outside the United States, that same transition carries with it moves to more Western (secular, modern) ways of living and thinking that could conflict with traditional ways. The conflict between the "old" and the "new" sparks resistance and, potentially, terrorist activity (Ross 1993). Barber (1995) suggests that these conflicts lie at the heart of the emergence of many "resistance movements" like the Muslim Brotherhood.

Another purported cause of terrorism is regime instability. Essentially, instability creates power vacuums within which terrorist groups may emerge. Failed states are the most extreme example of this line of thinking. In such environments, it becomes much easier for groups on the radical fringe to operate without fear of state action, creating a "safe space" where terrorist groups can train and operate (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). A contemporary example of this is Yemen, where conflict between groups competing for power has resulted in a collapse of state authority in sections of the country. That collapse has created "safe havens" for terrorist groups intent on destabilizing the Middle East and attacking Western nations (Mullen 2015).

Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), combining causal factors of political order and regime instability, conclude that transnational terrorism largely emerges in settings where political institutions are authoritarian in nature, but unstable. There is little evidence in their study that economic conditions in and of themselves cause terrorism. However, their work addresses only transnational terrorism such as that conducted by al Qaeda. Importantly for this work, Krieger and Meierrieks illustrate the importance of combining potential causal factors of terrorist activity.

Identity clashes have also been put forward as causes of terrorism. While Huntington's "clash of civilizations" may be the most well-known, other terrorism theorists have noted that terrorists often build on ethnocentric ideologies, stressing the superiority of "their group" over others or the threat that other forces pose to their own ethnic or religious group's survival. Bernholz (2006) notes that such conflict often involves absolute values. Absolute values have tremendous power for motivating individuals to join terrorist groups and justifying their extreme actions and are particularly dangerous when based on ethnic or religious ideology. Taulbee notes that while many terrorist groups aim to increase publicity, rather than the casualty rate through their actions, "groups

motivated primarily by ethnic or religious zeal have no such reservations … they have more interest in punishment than publicity" (2001).

Eitan (2011) suggests that terrorism is not the product of broad societal factors such as poverty, but that terrorist groups emerge out of social relationships. Specifically, terrorist groups emerge when radicalization happens, that is, when a faction splinters from a larger oppositional group. This emergence occurs primarily as a result of social interactions. Eitan's research suggests these social interactions include three important dynamics. The first is competition for power between leaders within the oppositional movement. The second and third dynamics link the group to the broader society. When the group is "losing" in its struggle for change, it is more likely that a faction advocating radical action will emerge. In addition, when the movement's actions and state counteractions begin to escalate, splintering of the oppositional group is more likely.

Most transnational or international terrorist activity can be researched using several of the previously discussed theories. For example, Islamic fundamentalism often takes root in areas undergoing dramatic sociopolitical and socioeconomic change, where changes in the political order may be occurring, old and new cultural norms come into conflict, power vacuums and instability exist, identity clashes are widespread, and fundamentalists often grow their cause through social relationships. Although many of the causal factors discussed in this section may also be applied to domestic contexts, the domestic terrorist threat has generated unique theories to address the particular social, economic, and political contexts of the United States.

What Causes Terrorism in the United States?

In the United States, which of these theories appears most relevant to understanding domestic terrorism? The overwhelming focus of terrorism research on transnational terrorism has resulted in little literature that explores this topic. Clearly, based on the data presented, there is at least some evidence in favor of Gurr's relative deprivation theory. For example, the Black Panthers and its more radical offshoot, the Black Liberation Army, aimed their attacks primarily at law enforcement to combat what they perceived as White oppression expressed through police harassment and violence (Rosenau 2013). Similarly, Freilich and Pridemore (2005) demonstrated that economic deprivation, as measured by the number of farming and rural jobs lost, was positively related to the number of right-wing militia groups in a given US state.

There is also some evidence in support of the identity clash theory. Terrorist groups in the United States that have been nationalist or white supremacist in nature provide excellent examples in support of this theory. For

example, Vertigans (2007) traces the development of the radical right and notes the strong thread of defending the "American way of life" that runs through the literature produced by such groups. The statement of purpose put forward by one right-wing terrorist group, the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, includes statements about the superiority of the White race and its endangered status in contemporary America ("The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord: Statement of Purpose" 1995). The sense of threat and imminent collapse is also strong in publications from ecoterrorism groups. These groups believe that human activity, particularly in the form of capitalist economic activity, is destroying the earth and that for its survival, humanity must greatly reduce its numbers and return to subsistence living (Eagan 1996; Lange 1990).

Finally, we can also see evidence for Eitan's theory of relational dynamics. For example, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) was a splinter group off of Earth First! which was itself founded by disaffected members of the Wilderness Society (Eagan 1996). The Black Liberation Front in the 1970s was a splinter group off of the Black Panthers that emerged as a result of leadership struggles and the escalation/counterescalation Eitan describes (Rosenau 2013). Eitan (2011) uses the Weathermen, a splinter group off of Students for a Democratic Society, as a case study in his research, tracing the leadership fights, increasing sense of failure within SDS, and the escalation of confrontation and violence between the SDS and law enforcement as principal causes for the emergence of the Weathermen in the 1970s.

While no one theory appears to provide a comprehensive explanation for the emergence of terrorism in the United States, several offer valuable insights. There appears to be some evidence for relative deprivation theory, along with theories concerning identity clash and relational dynamics. Finally, although not a theory about terrorism's causation, the widespread ownership of weapons in American society makes resorting to violence an easy step to take for both groups and individuals wanting to intimidate the public. More research is needed to explore the causes and sources for domestic terrorism.

Current Domestic Terrorism Concerns

Contemporary terrorism concerns in the United States can be broken down into three broad categories: threats from the left, threats from the right, and Islamic fundamentalism.

From the Left

Radical environmental and animal rights groups are the only significant terrorism concern from the left end of the political spectrum. Some argue that

ecoterrorism is not "terrorism" at all (see Amster 2006), because humans are not targeted. In fact, the most prominent of these groups, the ELF and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), plan and carry out their attacks in ways that are designed to avoid human casualties. Nonetheless, the activities of these groups meet the legal definition of domestic terrorism.

Ecoterrorist groups emerged out of the belief that mainstream environmentalist groups compromised too much as they participated in the political process (Eagan 2006). Thus, these groups splintered off of more mainstream groups, as Eitan (2011) predicts. The common threads in these groups are an unwillingness to compromise on environmental/animal rights issues, a focus on "direct action" as opposed to participation in the political process, and grassroots organizational structure that deliberately avoids any form of hierarchy (Eagan 1996).

These groups focus their activities on targeting property, typically using incendiaries, or releasing animals from "captivity." Common targets for ELF include newly built subdivisions, car dealerships (especially those selling SUVs), and other corporately owned structures, most recently including farms experimenting with genetically modified crops. ALF is routinely involved in activities that release animals from laboratories or farms (Bjelopera 2013; Eagan 1996; FBI 2007).

The ideological basis for ecoterrorism comes from "deep ecology." According to this viewpoint, humans are simply another part of the biological community. Humans are not special, nor do they have a right to use other species except for the purposes of subsistence. According to "Principles of the Left Green Network," such groups "oppose all forms of domination, of both human and nonhuman nature" (1995, 356). Since the capitalist economic system is seen as the primary cause of environmental degradation, ecoterrorist and animal rights groups deliberately target businesses, laboratories that use animals in experimentation, and symbols of humanity's "excessive" growth such as subdivisions emblematic of urban sprawl and SUV dealerships (Bjelopera 2013; FBI 2007).

From the Right

Domestic terrorism incidents involving white supremacists and the antiabortion movement have declined steeply in the past 10 to 15 years. For example, extreme antiabortion groups accounted for 90 attacks in the 1980s, declining to 79 in the 1990s, and just 15 in the first decade of this century, probably in response to the movement's success in restricting abortion legally at the state level. But two movements on the right end of the political spectrum have raised concerns at the national level: the militia movement and sovereign citizens. The militia and the sovereign citizens' movements share much of the

same ideology, an ideology that poses a direct challenge to the legitimacy of government. The principle difference between them is in organization. Militias are paramilitary groups that organize and train together in military-style operations. Sovereign citizens are individuals, who operate independently of each other (Bjelopera 2013).

Militia groups and sovereign citizens share a deep distrust of government, in particular at the federal level. They can be seen as examples of either relative deprivation theory or identity clash, as their ideologies illustrate. Both share a belief that government above the local level is either illegitimate (sovereign citizens) or limited to only those functions specifically mentioned in the Constitution (militias). Militia groups band together based on a common belief that there is a vast conspiracy to destroy what they see as the "American way of life." The conspiracy is variously claimed to come from the United Nations, or sometimes ZOG (the Zionist Occupation Government). With this in mind, militia groups and their members stockpile weapons and supplies either to prepare for a full-scale rebellion against the government, or to defend themselves from government "overstepping" its authority (FBI 2011a; Vertigans 2007).

Sovereign citizens, on the other hand, operate alone. They declare themselves "sovereign" and claim immunity from the legal system. These individuals are, therefore, often involved in what has been referred to as "paper terrorism"—the filing of frivolous lawsuits and false liens—as a means of extorting money from other individuals and tying up the legal system. They also commonly fail to pay taxes, register vehicles, and get and maintain valid drivers' licenses, and they have been known to produce false warrants and other legal documents (Bjelopera 2013; FBI 2011b).

While the militia movement may seem to be the bigger threat, they have not been responsible for any terrorist attacks in the United States. Their tendency to stockpile weapons, however, and involvement in *planning* attacks on law enforcement and government facilities have earned them the attention of the FBI and other government agencies (FBI 2011a). Sovereign citizens have also been known to become violent. Since 2000, they have killed six law enforcement officers (FBI 2011b).

Islamic Fundamentalism

Much of the media's focus on "homegrown" terrorism has been on the American Muslim community. Well-publicized events, such as Major Nidal Hassan's attack at Fort Hood, have led many to conclude that the American Muslim community may become a source for a new generation of terrorists. Such concerns appear, however, to be somewhat exaggerated (Bjelopera 2013; Brooks 2011).

The Muslim community in the United States has not been a source of terrorists in the past primarily because the community is well integrated into US society and largely middleclass. As a result, there have been just a few cases of American Muslims participating in terrorist attacks. Moreover, the Muslim community has been instrumental in providing tips to law enforcement that have led to the arrest of individuals and the prevention of attacks (Brooks 2011). According to one report, Muslims have been involved with 60 terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11; 53 have been thwarted. In virtually every case, cooperation with the Muslim community was an integral part of law enforcement's operations (Brooks 2011; Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano 2013).

The results of this report are buttressed by in-depth research involving four US Muslim communities conducted by Kurzman, Schanzer, and Moosa (2011). This research documented not only the public positions of Muslim leaders, but the concrete steps taken within mosques and Muslim communities to police themselves. These actions include condemning the use of violence to promote religion, reporting individuals to authorities who behave in suspicious ways, and attempting to reach socially isolated individuals who may be more vulnerable to radicalization.

The availability of radical material through the Internet is a key concern of both the Muslim community and US law enforcement. Alienated individuals, many of whom have a poor understanding of Islam, may be attracted to online communities where they think they find friendship and support (Bizina and Gray 2014). The proliferation of jihadist activities overseas makes it easier than ever for young Muslims radicalized online to gain training and experience in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria (Bjelopera 2013) before (possibly) returning to America to commit acts of terrorism.

Law enforcement agencies are engaged in a delicate process with the Muslim community. It is clearly critically important to keep a good relationship with the community since it is the source of much valuable information about would-be jihadists. However, the fact that, historically, the most violent attacks have been associated with jihadist individuals and groups, and the growth of online sites attempting to radicalize the young, make it critically important for government agencies to stay alert to this potential threat.

The Future of Terrorism in the United States

As this essay has shown, the United States has not been free of terrorism in the past. Terrorist tactics have been used by groups from both the left and the right end of the political spectrum as ways to gain attention, publicize the

cause, and spark political change. Consequently, we should expect terrorist attacks in the future.

The increase in government surveillance and the erosion of civil liberties associated with the PATRIOT Act both have made government's task of tracking and apprehending terrorists and preventing their attacks easier. This has led to a number of well-publicized successes, such as Ahmed's attempt to bomb the Washington, D.C., subway system in 2010 (Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano 2013). Ironically, however, as a nation, we do not feel safer. If anything, we feel ever more uneasy, as terrorist groups and tactics are increasingly used by groups to gain the attention of the media, and attacks continue to increase in lethality.

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Pulling Back from the Brink in 2014:
A Case Study of the Civil War in Syria

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It is clear that the ongoing Syrian civil war is very disruptive to the international system, tragic for the citizens who suffer within that nation, and in need of both new thinking and innovative solutions. Refugees from that civil war and others have created a tremendous challenge for the European Union in the spring and summer of 2015. This analysis investigates the Syrian case study within the framework of the literature on ethnic conflict as well as authoritarian leadership. Since 2000, Hafez Assad has ruled in an increasingly authoritarian way as president of Syria and has ensured the continuance of the authoritarian legacy of his father. In Syria, Assad is part of the Alawite/Shi'ite group, while the vast majority of his fellow citizens are Sunni Muslims. The combination of an authoritarian leadership model and membership in a minority group has been a lethal mix. Two hypotheses provide a framework of inquiry, including the idea that the greater the ethnic separatism, the greater the instability; and the more intense authoritarian leadership, the greater insecurity within a state. The analysis demonstrates the importance of ethnic separatism as an important factor within Syria. Speculation about alternative models that could create the basis for legitimacy and stability are also considered in the Conclusion. These would constitute efforts to pull Syria back from the brink.

It is clear that the ongoing Syrian civil war is very disruptive to the international system, tragic for the citizens who suffer within that nation, and in need of both new thinking and innovative solutions. Since 2000, Hafez Assad has ruled in an increasingly authoritarian way as president of Syria. He took over a family dynasty in a society that was ripe with ethnic conflict, and he is a member of a minority group in his country. In Syria, Assad is part of the Alawite/Shi'ite group, while the vast majority of his fellow citizens are Sunni Muslims. His combination of an authoritarian leadership model and membership in a minority group has been a lethal mix. There are also smaller groups such as the Kurds in Syria that float in a fearful way within this complicated war. The role of the international community has been twofold. On the one hand, there have been regional conferences on the Syrian war. On the other hand, a number of outside nations have played a more disruptive role. Iran has sent arms to the Assad regime, while Lebanon-based Hezbollah penetrated Syria with the same objective. Russia has also played an independent role with its support of Assad in the United Nations. It is important to explore the above problems in a systematic effort to add more light to the two research arguments outlined immediately below.

Article Perspective

Conflict occurs when several factors emerge and/or are present, including ethnic separatism and authoritarianism. These factors do not serve to explain the existence of conflict in the case study nation; rather, they serve as a lens with which to view the embroiled conflicts within the nation under study. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive approach to understanding the complicated nature of the conflict in Syria and a greater understanding of the role of two variables: ethnic sectarianism and authoritarian leadership.

Two hypotheses structure a framework to explore the impact of ethnic separatism and authoritarian rule on the conflicts in the case study nation of Syria. The first hypothesis is that the sharper the ethnic separatism, the greater the level of instability that results. The second hypothesis posits that the more intense the authoritarian leadership, the greater the sense of insecurity within the nation.

The first hypothesis is based upon the idea that the polarizing role of ethnicity can be particularly divisive, and the greater the perceived distance, the more extensive opportunities are opened for violence and instability within a nation-state. Multiethnic nations do not ensure the presence of conflict, but it certainly can provide the fuel for an unstable situation, and in some circumstances it serves as the root of instability. The forthcoming literature

will lend support to the idea that the presence of ethnicity can garner conflict. The second hypothesis is based upon the literature within this essay that the intense nature of authoritarian rule and the use of force by authoritarian regimes can certainly cause and exacerbate conflict. The legacy of authoritarian rule can cause a culmination of negative feelings by the polity, and the use of force by the authoritarian regime to maintain order can lead to conflict.

An area of future interest could explore the extent that the two factors presented in the two hypotheses interact in a particularly volatile manner. Determining which factor has the most power to predict or cause conflict is of particular interest and will require more research. It is likely that the factor of ethnic separatism has the most conflict contagion as expressed in societies that mirror ethnic nepotism (Vanhanen 1999). In addition, ethnic hostilities can clearly be linked to conflict when certain thresholds are met including history of conflict between ethnic groups and when ethnic groups are many (Payne and Nassar 2003). While authoritarian leadership is a powerful factor that offers insight in existing conflicts, it is more specifically the mix of authoritarian rule by an ethnic minority that imposes "divide-and-conquer" techniques across ethnic groups to maintain order (Phillips 2012). The use of divide-and-conquer techniques can be implemented in many ways, but the technique applied across ethnic groups points to the strength of ethnic sectarianism as a variable that has more relevance to conflict.

Conversely, some research exists that discounts the importance of the identified factors. Olga Onuk (2014) demonstrated that ethnic issues may not be at the forefront of concerns for a polity that is embroiled in turmoil. Through empirical research on the case study of Ukraine, Onuk noted that the protestors are seeking not policies that impact ethnicity and language, but economic and political stability (Onuk 2014, 51). The true meaning of economic and political stability as defined by the protestors is difficult at best to define and is certainly subject to cultural relativism. Clearly, further research regarding the importance of ethnic conflict and authoritarianism must be explored, including which factor has the most relevance and the presence of other intervening factors.

Social and Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic struggle is at the root of the ongoing civil war in Syria. Attention to the general nature of such conflicts provides a useful starting point to analysis of the political situation in the country and a stepping stone for evaluation of the role of internal leadership and external involvement by outside powers. The existence of a plurality of ethnic groups within a country is not a guarantee that conflict will eventually take place. In fact, there may be

considerable competition among groups, but the relationship among them never actually results in civil war. It is also true that violence can erupt in certain multiethnic societies without being rooted in the diversity of groups. Level of economic development and the nature of the political regime are two variables that also bear the potential to inject conflict into a variegated social setting. For example, Egyptians mobilized in 2011 and pulled down the authoritarian Mubarak regime. Part of the discontent was due to inattention to the economic conditions of the country. Ethnic differences did not play much of a role in this struggle. Later conflicts between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood were also not primarily based on ethnicity. Thus, it is critically important to assess "what it is that turns a dispute into an ethnic conflict" (Dion 1997, 645–48).

In seeking to get at the heart of the ethnic drives that reverberate so profoundly throughout selected transitional societies, Vanhanen introduces the concept of "ethnic nepotism." In a study that included 186 states from 1990 to 1996, he concluded that ethnicity is, at its heart, kinship. Thus, ethnic feeling really has its roots in "extended kinship groups," and therefore the interactions among them bear the signs of nepotism (Vanhanen 1999, 55–56). However, the conflicts have the potential in unstable situations to spread into other political, economic, and social arenas. There is always the possibility that the players or rivals on those other issues will look at them through the ethnic lens and intensify those divisions. In many countries, the common denominator of ethnicity percolates through different racial groups, units based on "linguistic, national, or tribal differences," and "stabilized old religious communities." The higher the degree of overlap among such ethnic categories, the more intensely does ethnic nepotism dominate the activities of a social order (Vanhanen 1999, 59–64).

As ethnic hostilities build and solidify, they have the potential to become "distinctive political sub-cultures." Instead of focusing only on developing instruments for promoting their own unit, they may transcend their group and generate debate and conflict on the meaning of the nation's history, on what the borders of the nation should be, and even on what political coloration and ideology the regime itself should adopt (Almond et al. 2008, 48–49). It is difficult to predict when these raging currents cross the boundary into conflict, but there are pointers to that transition. Conflict is more likely when the number of groups is many, when the groups are close to one another, and when relationships among them have been adversarial in the past (Payne and Nassar 2003, 300–301). Obviously, conflicts that are born within a group that shares only kinship ties can germinate and blossom into existential differences about the meaning of the state.

Internationalization of ethnic conflict can compound the dimensions of the growing internal stress points (Hughes and Sasse 2002, 12). One expression of globalization entails flows of population from the outside into a particular nation, as waves of immigration affect nearly every continent on the globe. As new groups settle in, they may increase the numbers of their minority in the state, or they may enter as a totally new group (Vanhanen 1999, 67). One example germane to this study is the flow of Tatar Muslims back into Crimea after the end of the Cold War. Their property demands often alienated the Russian majority on that peninsula and became a continuing source of conflict and discussion. A second expression of globalization includes pressures from inside one county out into others. For example, Russians looked out in protective ways to the new Russian minorities in states such as Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Similarly, Serbs in the shrunken Yugoslavia actually waged wars to protect their fellow Serbs in Slovenia, Croatia, and especially Bosnia. As the ethnic conflict spilled over into the neighboring countries, a powerful kinship tie injected "a transnational dimension to the (ethnic) polarization" (Forsberg 2008, 283).

It is clear that the potential for escalation of such crises is enormous, and Forsberg characterized these situations as one of possible "conflict contagion." If a group is part of a "nested minority" in one locale but part of a majority "in a wider geographical sense," then contagion can be a distinct possibility, especially when the general atmosphere is one of uncertainty and anxiety (Forsberg 2008, 284–86). The ideas of contagion and nested minorities are powerful analytical tools for scrutinizing such conflicts as those involving the Russian minority in Ukraine, the Serb minority in Bosnia, and the Alawite/Shi'ite minority in Syria.

Implicit in the above assessment of spillover and containment is the role of territorial issues in intensifying the conflict. The worst situations often emerge when "a territorialization of difference" occurs among some of the key opposed groups (Hughes and Sasse 2002, 8). Such intra-national situations make it possible for the minority to claim sovereignty over geographic units within the state, and this may become the foundation for either a demand for a special status of autonomy or for actual independence. Returning Tatars had old homesteads that were previously in their families in Crimea, even though those pieces of property did not really add up to an intact territory that could be claimed. Further, the Crimean Peninsula was itself a distinct territorial unit only linked to Ukraine by a narrow land passage. Russians on that piece of land were clearly a nested minority in Ukraine, and as such they clamored early on for a special status and eventually won separation and integration into Russia. Similarly, the Serbian minority in Bosnia utilized military assistance from the Serb majority in neighboring Yugoslavia to expand their

territorial unit in Bosnia until checked by NATO intervention and the Dayton Agreement in 1995.

Even in the Syrian case, Alawites associated with the Assad regime gradually sought to expand their control over a territorial unit that hugged the sea in the west. Thus, the injection of territorial claims into a situation of domestic conflict gives the nested minority a concrete and tangible goal. The presence of an outside player of consequence and similar ethnic background transforms the domestic issue into a regional one. Evidence to support that latter proposition includes Russia in relation to Crimea, Yugoslavian Serbs in connection with Bosnian Serbs, and Iran in the Alawite/Syrian case.

What can offer hope for unraveling this mix of ethnic, international, and territorial ambitions in ways that are positive for future stability? Some analysts have focused on such brutal conflicts by analyzing how the actual cleavages in the social order relate to one another. On the one hand, cleavages may be cross-cutting in the sense that groups of different ethnicity may discover that they share a common economic status or religion that links sizable numbers of persons across the groups. Stability is more likely if conflicting groups have points of commonality that connect them across the ethnic divide that separates them. On the other hand, cleavages may be reinforcing with the disparate groups in a society arrayed against one another on every dimension. In such situations, creating mutual understanding across the groups is next to impossible (Hughes and Sasse 2002, 7–8). If the cleavages are reinforcing, one documented way of working toward stability is creation of a consociational governmental structure. Inclusion of key members of each group in a grand coalition or cartel of elites can at least provide a picture of representation for each at the top level of the political system. This can be a workable solution in divided societies, as it takes the pressure off political leaders in the short run to create harmony among the groups at the grassroots level. In fact, consociationalism may work best if contacts among the multiplicity of groups are kept to a minimum (Lijphart 1992, 264–70). This solution would not work as well if group demands go beyond concrete interests to embrace nonnegotiable principles or even ideologies.

Role of Authoritarian Leadership

Just as we looked at some of the variables that contribute to ethnic conflict, it is appropriate to examine briefly the nature of authoritarian leadership to better understand how it can compound group misunderstandings and hatreds. Authoritarian regimes have a legacy that is imprinted on the corresponding society, and the implications must be explored. Former authoritarian societies must address and resolve the "baggage" that is inherited

from an authoritarian regime, especially when nation-states seek stability. It is important to understand that there are various forms of authoritarian rule that exist on a continuum, but they all have basic concepts or shared aspects, including: government exercises arbitrary control over the polity; polity has very little control over political decisions; and personal liberties of the polity are minimal or do not exist. Totalitarianism is often considered a more extreme version of authoritarianism, with the government having complete and oppressive control over the polity. There are many factors that are encompassed by governments that have a legacy of authoritarian rule, and nation-states must consider the factors when navigating political transition, seeking political stability, or when external actors are considering intervention.

Enduring authoritarian rulers have several fundamental challenges that they must constantly navigate including maintaining power amongst those that rule, if power is not singularly vested, and sustaining control over the people that they rule. Svolik (2009) explains the nature of authoritarian leadership as in need of equilibrium, and he further notes that it is imperative that the dictator and the broader ruling coalition must have a balance of power in order to thwart any potential opposition or coups (482). It is the balance of power among the ruling elite that is the most delicate aspect of authoritarian power to maneuver.

Authoritarian regimes must stay poised and navigate the challenges that are inherent to maintain control and authority within their geographic limits. The methods that are used by the central governing authority to ensure control can have a direct impact on the resulting society and those that are governed. Svolik (2009) further notes that the role of repression is a central tool for authoritarian rule, and force must be used to preclude a popular uprising invoking regime change (477). In an attempt to understand better the impact authoritarian leadership can have on the broader society, a theoretical framework will be incorporated into the discussion of authoritarian power to provide a more comprehensive analysis of authoritarian leadership in addition to a general discussion of the societal characteristics associated with authoritarian rule.

Hannah Arendt, through her analysis of Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia, provides insight into the nature of totalitarian rule (1951). Arendt asserts that racism can serve as the basis of an ideology, and she uses anti-Semitism as a prime example connecting racist ideology to the rise of totalitarian rule. Additionally, the ideology of racism can serve as justification for imperialism, and both can serve as conducive factors for the emergence of totalitarianism (Arendt 1951). There are some clear connections between the case studies and Arendt's theory. Race is a fundamental distinction within Syria and is superseded only by familial connections. The exploitation of racial divisions that exist within Syria by a minority-led authoritarian ruler is

inherent and appears purposeful to promote totalitarian rule. Imperialism is also relevant to the case study nation, for Syria, with a history of intrusion into Lebanon, has expansionist tendencies. The literature on authoritarianism has paid much attention to the role of political institutions and the cultural and societal sectarianisms that are present within nations that have a tendency towards a central, authoritarian form of government. Both Timur Kuran (2013) and Robert C. Tucker (1987) represent this point of view. These themes will be explored in the context of Syria.

A fractured polity often results from authoritarian rule because a divide-and-conquer leadership style results in fragmenting society. Phillips notes that the divide-and-rule technique can be used in various methods to maintain control over the polity including social, but also economic means (Phillips 2012). The legacy of authoritarian rule can exacerbate the cleavages that may exist within a polity and cause inherent distrust of the groups that then rely only on nepotism for interactions as a trustworthy source of resources and civil interactions. The focus on economic and ethnic fracturing directly detracts from the ability of a polity to focus on the necessity of political change or the willingness to coordinate efforts across ethnic or socioeconomic lines to promote institutional change. The role of a fractured polity is essential in an authoritarian state such as Syria, where the leader is of a minority ethnic group. The leader of the minority ethnic party must maintain vigilance toward the majority ethnic groups and focus their attention on the cultural issues between the groups to ensure that support does not build for an upheaval, and, in some ways, to ensure that the majority ethnic groups are grateful that a more despised group does not seize power. However, it must also be noted that in so many cases, the fractures preexisted the crises under consideration and were a causative factor themselves of the tension and conflict.

Government institutions inside an authoritarian nation are relevant to understanding the overall societal snapshot. Government structure is very commonly missing in authoritarian forms of government. Rather, governance depends upon informal methods that lack clear policy or protocols. In addition, government corruption is a common result of political authoritarianism. The lack of institutional checks and balances or separation of powers that are relied upon as imperative in Westernized nations are foreign to authoritarian forms of government and thus make the government unreliable, especially among ethnic groups that are not represented in the governing framework. Duplicate payments to government officials and multiple transactions to have access to government-distributed goods and services makes the polity very weary of government and makes them accustomed to the corrupt nature of governance. In addition, economic cronyism is often relevant to the government institutions as they favor certain targeted ethnic groups with unlimited government

funding and programs. In essence, the citizens are accustomed to widespread corruption with an authoritarian state, and as a result, they rely on family connections or nepotism (Kuran 2013). A decline in social trust and the existence of rampant corruption requires the continued reliance on family connections. Social fracturing and corruption both contribute to the reliance upon kinship or nepotism for fundamental needs and further negates any legitimacy in the governing institutions.

It is difficult to properly define civil society, but much easier to describe the factors that make up civil society. Nongovernmental or social institutions play a role in the development of society, and the ability of the people to experience freedom of association are certainly factors that contribute to a nation's civil society. Nongovernmental organizations do not exist in many authoritarian nations. Social organizations are not allowed to thrive; thus, institutions that would welcome their assistance are nonexistent. Salamey and Pearson (2012) argue that the strong coercive forces of an authoritarian form of government against a weak civil society can ensure that collective action will not grow and the continued dominance of authoritarian regimes often relies on the continued force of military and secret service–type institutions that control civil life and impede the nonstate media. Alvarez-Ossorio (2012) concurs and notes that authoritarian regimes have been very hostile to the growth or development of an independent civil society for fear that they may ultimately develop into an organized opposition group to state power (23). The careful control over civil society assists the authoritarian leadership to monitor dissenting voices and deter the development of opposition groups. Puddington (2009) notes that associational rights have declined in every region of the world, but are facing significant pressure in the Middle East, North Africa, and the former Soviet Union (70). Clearly, Ukraine and Syria fall within the geographical areas of the international arena that are noting marked declines in freedom of association.

Civil society has been virtually nonexistent since the implementation of the Emergency Laws in Syria in 1963. In fact, Article 8 of the Syrian constitution prohibits any political party other than the Ba'athist party from emerging (Alvarez-Ossorio 2012, 23). A small number of social groups exist within Syria; there is one trade union and another federation for women, but there is no other independent civil society organization under the Assad regime (Erdogan 2013). A lack of civil society is not exactly a singular association within an authoritarian form of government. While civil society is not necessarily a precondition for democracy, it certainly dissuades the ability of the polity to adequately organize and develop some sort of voice in the society. Only the Islamic groups are poised and somewhat organized and, as a result, are the main source of organized power in the anti-Assad form of government.

A theme of authoritarianism within the case studies of minority-led authoritarian regimes demonstrates a strong focus on ethnic sectarianism that is promulgated to retain stability and power of the regime. The framework of nationalism will be applied to authoritarian rule in order to analyze further the ethnic and social sectarianism that can prevail within authoritarian polities to provide some insight into the implications of sectarianism in spite of or in the eventuality of regime change. Nationalism can be a very controversial topic that encompasses a wide range of both definitions and sentiment. Some can view nationalism as a "Western construction" that provides little use or purpose in international theory but serves to support the Western perspective. At any rate, nationalist theory is a framework that looks at the role of nationalism or shared identity that can unify the polity within a nation-state. Anderson (1983) asserted that nationalism is an imagined sense of community or shared identity based on past experiences. Nationalism can serve to pull together disparate identities that can incorporate various ethnic identities and groups, and it explains how groups come to identify themselves as members of a specific nation despite clear ethnic, religious, or economic differences.

Mark N. Katz's theory of nationalism seems most relevant to the discussion of authoritarianism and the legacy of sectarianism, divide-and-rule leadership, poor government institutions, and lack of civil society. It is certainly difficult to develop a sense of nationalism within a nation-state that has experienced a divide-and-conquer leadership style, which would put ethnic groups purposefully at odds to detract attention from the central governance structure. Katz (1994) notes that resulting from authoritarian rule such as in the former Soviet Union, the polity identify themselves as a member of their ethnic group first and then secondly, if at all, members of the nation or common state interests (330–31). Authoritarianism can impact the sense of nationalism within a polity and thus serve to cause a decline in the aptitude to develop cross-cultural relations within a society and thus produce lasting conflict and fragmentation, which would certainly impede the ability of democracy to be established easily, if at all. Katz's theory of nationalism supports the previously explored assertions by Vanhanen of "ethnic nepotism" (Katz 1994, 330–31; Vanhanen 1999). The ability of nationalism to provide commonality amongst divergent ethnic groups is desirable but unlikely in nation-states that are riddled with ethnic strife.

The Case Study of Syria

Syria has a very strategic geographic location between the Mediterranean Sea and Iraq, and northeast of Libya and Egypt. This geographic location has served as a catalyst for foreign involvement and international interest. In 1944,

Syria declared independence from a French mandate, and a period of political instability followed. Syria's reality following independence was marked by a series of military coups that were ultimately followed by authoritarianism. Authoritarian leadership can be an elusive form of governance. Svolik (2009) notes that Hafiz Al-Assad ruled Syria for almost thirty years, but during the thirty years prior to his rule, Syria was under the rule of fifteen different leaders.

The Ba'athist Party has been in power since a military coup (1958) that followed with the 1963 Syrian constitution that established the party as the official party of Syria. Syria, with the implementation of the Ba'athist Party, instituted an Arab socialist experiment that clearly favored an anti-secular agenda. Bashar al-Assad has been in power since the death of his father, Hafez al-Assad, in 2000. Assad and his father were both members of the minority Alawite ethnic group that is outnumbered by the Kurds and Sunnis and roughly matched by the Christians and Druzes in number.

The authoritarian leaders, Assad and his son, that are members of a minority ethnic group, maintained power over the other groups by targeting the needs of the other ethnic factions and maintaining divisions between the groups. The Sunni population that has a large presence in Syria was very impoverished and received economic benefit from the socialist agenda of the Assad regime. Conversely, the Kurd population, which is a larger portion of the Syrian population than Alawite, was composed of mostly wealthy segments of the population, and they opposed the socialist agenda. The Christian and Druze groups enjoy the stability that comes with authoritarian rule that does not require the strict implementation of a Muslim state. The Alawite ethnic group benefits from increased access to government positions, resources, and security. The delicate balance between ethnic groups is at the forefront of the authoritarian control of the state. Syria. Table 1 breaks down the Syrian population according to religious identification, and Figure 1 demonstrates the regions held by ethnic groups within Syria.

Another method of ensuring the continuance of the regime's power includes the suppression of civil society, and that was pragmatically implemented with the Emergency Laws. The Emergency Laws have been in effect for 48 years, which coincides with the inception of the Ba'athist Party. The Emergency Laws prohibited most civil liberties and criminal due process of law (Kelly, Walker, and Dizard 2007). In essence, the laws allowed the regime to investigate and detain any suspect, and the government could also prosecute alleged individuals in a special court system that was outside of the mainstream criminal justice system. The Emergency Laws exemplify bureaucratic authoritarianism and were justified by the need to take swift and decisive action against Israel or Israeli sympathizers (Kelly, Walker, and Dizard 2007).

Table 1: Syrian Population according to Religious Perspective

Religious Perspective	Percentage of Total Population
Muslim (Sunni)	74%
Muslim (Alawi, Shi'a, Ismaili)	13%
Christian	10%
Druze	3%

Source: Data provided by Central Intelligence Agency (n.d.).

Figure 1: Syria's Ethnic Distribution by Region

Source: Khazan (2012).

Upon Bashar al-Assad coming to power, he implemented a slight lessening of the authoritarian grip on repression, and this period became known as the Damascus Spring. As a result of the Damascus Spring, a rise took place in the number of social groups, discussion forums, and associations created with the general goal of political liberalization; and the result of their efforts included the Declaration of 99, which called for an end to the state of emergency and martial law imposed since 1963; a public pardon of all political detainees and political exiles; a desire for freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and freedom from state monitoring and surveillance (Alvarez-Ossorio 2012, 23). Strides were made for political liberalization, but they were short lived. In response to the desire for open discussion of political liberalization, the regime rounded up the leaders of the Declaration of 99, persecuted them, and held them in detention in September 2001. The small strides provided a glimpse into a more open civil society and spurred increased interest in reform.

The Syrian people began to have grievances against the Assad regime that were based on economic inequality and a secular agenda (Zisser 2013). In 2011, antigovernment demonstrations began to occur throughout Syria, and the regime responded with violent attempts to retain control. The Assad regime is accused of a severe military reaction to the protestors. The antigovernment rebel group demanded an end to the government corruption, release of political prisoners, and ending the 48-year-old Emergency Law (Abouzeid 2011). The protestors were met with brutal and swift response by Assad. In April 2011, in the wake of massive human rights violations, the United States imposed additional sanctions. In addition, the United States offered support to Syrian antigovernment rebels in the form of nonlethal assistance, including medical kits, uniforms, food, and night vision goggles (Myre 2013).

The rebel factions within Syria consist of an evolving blend of groups. The Free Syrian Army is a loose group of civilians and army defectors (Barnard and Saad 2013). The ideological base within the group varies from secular nationalists to Islamist extremists (Myre 2013). The broad range of ideologies found within the rebel forces can account for the significant amount of infighting within the rebel effort. The conflict within Syria is escalated by the use of deadly weapons. Syria is thought to have one of the biggest inventories of chemical weapons in the world, including sarin, mustard, and VX gases (Starr, Yellin, and Carter 2013). On June 13, 2013, the United States announced that there was reliable evidence that Syria had used chemical weapons against its own people in an attempt to end the rebellion, and the United States further warned that the use of the chemical weapons crossed a red line (Starr, Yellin, and Carter 2013). Exactly what further assistance may be implied due to the use of chemical weapons is not yet completely clear. Meanwhile, the death toll continues to rise.

The alleged use of chemical weapons garnered international attention and caused international actors, such as the United States, to contemplate intervention. The rebels have also received support from other external actors not only because of the use of chemical weapons, but also because of the desire for a more democratic rule. Still others oppose Assad's secular rule in favor of a more Islamic form of government. The United States has pledged support, and the US president attempted to garner support from Congress and the international community in an effort to avoid unilateral military intervention. Vladimir Putin, in the midst of American discussion on military intervention in Syria, wrote an open opinion piece in the *New York Times* in an attempt to appeal directly to the American people. Russia remains an ally to the Assad regime and would certainly attempt to block the United Nations Security Council from authorizing any foreign intervention against the current Syrian government. Putin warned that American intervention in Syria would have a destabilizing effect on the entire region; he also noted that the unilateral effort of the United States would be in direct opposition to the United Nations (Putin 2013). The Assad regime, under pressure from Putin and the United States, agreed to allow for the disposal of chemical weapon arsenals. Ultimately, Putin mediated an agreement that appeared to temper immediate discussion regarding the United States using military force in Syria.

The interest in international intervention was spurred again by a militant, rebel group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). ISIL has roots in western Iraq and has actively engaged in militant activities in eastern Syria. In Syria, ISIL forces fought Assad's military, and at times it also violently engaged the rebel forces in the summer of 2014. The withdrawal of American troops in the region provided an opportunity for ISIL to grow. ISIL had success in capturing key cities in Iraq and established and declared a Muslim political state. ISIL's progress is marked by the brutality of their force and the utilization of propaganda videos that are intended to promote their cause and assist in recruitment. The success of ISIL alarmed the international community and spurred interest in external military intervention in the region. In August 2014, the United States began airstrikes against ISIL targets within Iraq. In retaliation for the air strikes, ISIL beheaded two Western journalists and an aid worker, and the horrific murders were captured on video. In September 2014, the United States and a broader coalition including Middle Eastern partners announced a more involved air campaign against ISIL that included targets within Syria. The inclusion of Syrian targets by the United States means a further exacerbation of an already strained relationship.

Syria and the Principal Arguments Revisited: Strength of the Key Factors

Based on the above analysis, it seems evident that ethnic separatism plays a more central role in the Syrian crisis than does authoritarian leadership. However, the situation is complicated because both factors continuously interact as centralized administrative decisions exacerbate the ethnic differences in Syria. Further complicating the matter is the fact that those decisions flowed from a president who represented the minority group. Citizens in the majority thereby perceived an even greater sense of humiliation and exclusion.

Ethnic Separatism

In the Syrian case study, the division between Shi'ites and Sunnis was the paramount one, with the two Assads representing the minority Alawites, a minority sect within the Shi'a tradition. In addition, the ongoing civil war has revealed a more complicated ethnic picture, in terms of the opposition to the government. Of courses, Sunnis are central in the opposition, but Kurds, Alawite Christians, and the Druze also are part of the configuration. During the early part of the civil war, al Qaeda forces entered the picture in opposition to Assad, and that made it profoundly difficult for the West to offer assistance of any sort to the anti-Assad groups. In 2014, ISIS entered the fray as well, as they envisioned a large portion of Syrian territory as part of their planed recreation of a Caliphate or Islamic State (Yeginsu and Cooper 2015). Both of the latter groups utilized terror and excessive violence, and their Sunni background made them very unwelcome members of the opposition.

Authoritarian Leadership

The Assad leaders, father and son, have taken drastic steps to preserve control and maintain internal stability. Hafez Assad destroyed the town of Hama in the early 1980s when opposition emerged to him, while earlier, very restrictive emergency decrees had destroyed many vestiges of civil rights. The second Assad's response to the fact that protesting teenagers wrote critical graffiti on walls was an overreaction that carried with it military force. In 2013, the military clearly violated international norms by introducing chemical weapons into the mix of instruments used to pulverize the opposition.

Conclusion: A Way Out?

It is not a simple matter to delineate in realistic ways what the likely "end game" is for Syria. It is tempting to endorse subnational regionalism as a possibility for the future. One variant of subnational regionalism might simply be federalism that allocates considerable power to aggrieved peoples in certain

regions. A second option would be the consociational model that provides for representation within the political elite for all key ethnic groups but makes no effort to generate harmony at the grassroots level. In Syria, the divisions among the ethnic groups are less geographically clear-cut, a situation that may point to endorsement of a consociational model for that nation. Positive outreach by elements of the international community might eventually interact with domestic leadership in the nation to create a political model that profoundly disenchanted groups might find to be an acceptable first step. The workability of this solution will depend on how practical or apocalyptic the goals of the group are.

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In the Crosshairs:
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Government employees often find themselves dealing with unhappy citizens. But what happens when those situations involve members of the radical right wing and turn violent? This article examines two specific instances when government employees found themselves dealing with individuals who refused to comply with government orders based on right-wing ideology. In one case, violence ensued. In the second case, violence was avoided. We conclude by suggesting federal government representatives should avoid escalating the situation with shows of force and instead work more closely with local law enforcement to seek a peaceful resolution.

In 2013, the Department of Justice published a report summarizing data from 1994 to 2011 on workplace violence against government employees. According to that report, government employees were three times more likely than private-sector employees to experience violence in the workplace. During that time period, the annual average rate of simple assault and serious violence (rape/sexual assault, robbery, and aggravate assault) for government employees was three times the rate for private sector employees. In 2011, 1 in 5 victims

of a workplace homicide was a government employee. While law enforcement accounts for a significant proportion of these incidents, if they are excluded from the data, the rate of workplace violence against government employees (8.7 per 1,000) was still significantly higher than the similar rate for private-sector employees (4.6 per 1,000) (US Department of Justice, 2013).

The recent events at the Cliven Bundy ranch in Nevada highlight one potential source of that violence. The standoff at the Bundy ranch pitted Cliven Bundy, who grazed his cattle on federal land near his ranch illegally for 18 years despite multiple court orders and fines, and his supporters against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). After winning yet another court case against Bundy, the BLM, with help from armed rangers from the National Park Service, attempted to round up and confiscate Bundy's cattle. Within 24 hours, supporters of the rancher converged on the scene. By April 8, hundreds of Bundy supporters had arrived. Many of them were well armed and identified themselves as members of militia groups or as "sovereign citizens." Militias are paramilitary organizations, while sovereign citizens are individuals; however, both share much of the same radical right-wing ideology. Stephen Dean, a member of the Peoples United Mobile Armed Services militia group, told a CNN reporter that what brought him to Nevada was "tyranny in government" (Martinez 2014).

Local law enforcement became increasingly concerned about the potential for violence. Sheriff Gillespie stated, "We saw all the guns. We knew the potential. These militia guys were very well armed." Fortunately, the sheriff managed to de-escalate the situation before anyone was seriously hurt or killed, and the BLM left without the cattle or a resolution to their dispute with Bundy (Ralston 2014).

This incident highlights the fact that government employees from many different agencies can come into contact with individuals who can be armed and dangerous. It also raises important questions about how, in a pluralist society, government employees can carry out their duties in the face of well-armed opposition that may view such actions as tyrannical. To address these questions, this article reviews what is known about the modern militia and sovereign citizen movements with a particular focus on their ideology and the motivations of its membership. We then examine what research suggests are best practices for dealing with individuals or groups that are highly suspicious of government before moving on to review two incidents, the 1992 incident at Ruby Ridge and the 2014 incident at the Bundy ranch. Our goal is to glean lessons for how to successfully de-escalate and resolve disputes with individuals or groups who are highly suspicious of government and its representatives.

The Militia Movement

The modern militia movement is a collection of paramilitary groups loosely bound together by a shared belief in the oppressive nature of the federal government and a sense that the "American way of life" is under attack. Scholars (Freilich, Pienik, and Howard 2001; Pitcavage 2001; Stern 1996; Vertigans 2007) view militias as an extreme radical-right reaction to social and economic changes that have taken place over the past thirty years or as a right-wing social movement (Aho 1990; O'Brien and Haider-Markel 1998; Freilich and Pridemore 2005). Social and economic changes that scholars have linked to the emergence of the militia movement include the shifting of the US economy away from manufacturing toward a service base, the commercialization of agriculture, and the perceived erosion of traditional American values. As political and social conservatives, militia members focus their criticism on a variety of issues including government surveillance programs, restrictions on owning weapons, illegal immigration, the growing acceptance of gay marriage and abortion rights, and the loss of farming and manufacturing jobs. Modern militia groups blame a tyrannical federal government and the New World Order—a perceived Communist or United Nations plot to take over the world—as the causes of these changes. However, the roots of the militia movement are much older.

While militia groups themselves often trace their roots to colonial militias, scholars who study the modern militia movement tell a different tale. Essentially, they assert that militias are just the latest manifestation of America's long history of right-wing extremist groups. Based on their paramilitary organization and character, Stern (1996) traces them back to the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) when it emerged after the Civil War to intimidate African Americans. Similarly, Freilich and his coauthors (2001) place militias as the latest in a string of right-wing extremist groups, beginning with the KKK and the Know Nothing Party, continuing through the Silver Shirts during the Great Depression, and on to more modern groups such as Posse Comitatus. Pitcavage (2001) specifically refers to militias as an offshoot of the older Posse Comitatus.

The Posse Comitatus began around 1970. With its base in the Pacific Northwest and the Great Plains, the Posse had a worldview that significantly influenced the militia movement (Pitcavage 2001). The central belief of the Posse is that the current federal government is not legitimate. Instead, they claim that the true seat of government is the county. Levels of government beyond the county have only the most limited authority. Actions such governments take that are beyond the limited tasks outlined in the Constitution are illegitimate and need not be obeyed. Moreover, the only legitimate law enforcement officer in the nation is the county sheriff; all others are illegitimate (Pittman 1995). In

addition to noting that "both politics and war" will be necessary to save the nation from federal tyranny, Pittman (1995), a Posse member, encourages his posse members to elect "friends" of the movement to local government, especially as sheriff, since that is the most important position in government.

This belief in a radically decentralized government coupled with the belief that the federal government in particular is illegitimate have become central to militia groups' world view (Pitcavage 2001; Stern 1996). For example, the web posting "Adverseries of the Militia" (Constitution Society n.d.) proclaims that "the primary threat to which the Militia needs to respond comes from domestic enemies of the Constitution." The posting goes on to list those "enemies," and the first broad categories encompass all government officials, singling out federal officials in particular. In "The Militia for Beginners" (Michigan Militia Corps n.d.), the author discusses the Declaration of Independence and its listing of charges against King George III before going on to say, "It is very interesting to note here, that most of the crimes King George III was committing against his people are identical to what our government is doing to us today." Vertigans (2007) concludes that there is a strong, and undeniable thread of "defense of the American way of life" that runs through the individuals and groups involved in the militia movement. And militia members believe government itself is the primary source of the threat to that way of life. These themes are pulled directly from Posse Comitatus and are commonly expressed by modern militia groups and their members (Aho 1990; Pitcavage 2001; Stern 1996).

Scholars typically use social movement theory as the framework for studying the modern militia movement (Aho 1990; Freilich and Pridemore 2005; O'Brien and Haider-Markel 1998). Social movements can be formal or informal, political, social, economic, and/or cultural, but require the mobilization of a group of individuals working toward a common goal or within a common frame, sometimes against more powerful opponents (Tarrow 1998, 2).

Scholars who study the modern militia movement tend to use a resource mobilization or a cultural frame for their work. Examples of the resource-mobilization approach include Dyer (1997), O'Brien and Haider-Markel (1998), and Freilich and Pridemore (2005). Dyer (1997) explains the modern militia movement's emergence as the product of economic upheaval and resulting deprivation in rural America. O'Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) use state-level, primarily economic and political data, to explain the growth of the modern militia movement as a product of the growing strength of political conservatism, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and economic downturn. Freilich and Pridemore (2005) replicated and expanded on O'Brien and Haider-Markel's approach.

A significant limitation to resource-mobilization approaches is the lack of data on the number and strength of militia groups. The only source for such

information is the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). The Hate and Extremism section of the SPLC specifically targets hate groups such as neo-Nazis, Klansmen, border vigilantes, and black separatists, rather than ecoterrorist groups or other extremist groups. The SPLC attempts to track the activities of right-wing extremist groups, collecting data on the number of groups through the use of informants or analysis of webpages. A major weakness of this approach is that it does not provide information about the number of members, or the strength or influence of the militia movement (Bjelopera 2013; Freilich and Pridemore 2006).[1] As a consequence, resource mobilization studies that use the number of groups as the dependent variable have significant limitations.

Other scholars have adopted a cultural approach. For example, Barkun (1997) studied the theology of Christian identity before examining how it is connected to white supremacists and militia groups. Aho (1990) spent a year interviewing individuals associated with radical right-wing groups in Idaho and concluded that individuals joined such groups because of friendship or familial ties, not out of a sense of deprivation or class displacement. Vertigans (2007) found that militia members share a belief that their culture is under attack. Shapira (2012) used a participant-observer approach to studying such groups by joining a conservative group monitoring the US-Mexican border, and concluded that joining gave members a sense of meaning and purpose. While studies such as these are valuable and can provide great insight into how and why individuals join such groups, the results cannot be generalized.

In short, while there is a body of literature surrounding the behavior and beliefs of the modern militia movement, the research has significant limitations. In part, this reflects the nature of the movement itself, in particular its distrust of government. This distrust has bred a level of suspicion of "outsiders" that makes it difficult for scholars to study the movement, and for government to monitor its activities and strength.

The Sovereign Citizen Movement

The sovereign citizen movement began in the 1970s and was an outgrowth of the teachings and ideology of Posse Comitatus, tax protestors, common-law

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[1] Freilich and Pridemore (2006) offer a cogent critique of SPLC's method of using websites to count the number of extremist groups. The SPLC's almost exclusive focus on right-wing radicalism is in line with its mission and purpose of combatting "hate"; however, it does open the organization up to charges of bias. A close reading of reports, such as "Terror from the Right" (2012), also raises questions. For example, one of the incidents listed is the April 25, 2009, arrest of a former National Guard member who shot two deputies trying to arrest him for domestic violence. The description reads more like a situation involving a mentally ill man rather than a radical right-wing extremist.

courts, and the patriot movement. The movement's ideology did not mature until the 1980s, when a recession and farm crisis led many to become a part of the movement (Anti-Defamation League 2012; Theret 2012). Many blamed the government for the hardships they faced and sought an outlet to voice their rage.

Like members of the militia movement, sovereign citizens believe the government is operating outside its authority, so they refuse to recognize government policies or regulations at any level. The dominant sovereign citizen conspiracy theory is known as "Redemption Theory." According to this theory, the US government (USG) went bankrupt when it abandoned the gold standard in 1933. This resulted in the USG using citizens as collateral in trade agreements with foreign governments (FBI 2011). The government then created secret accounts at the US Department of Treasury. These accounts are in a third party's name or a "strawman" that citizens can access. According to sovereign citizens, these accounts can be accessed by filing a combination of specific legitimate and fraudulent forms with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). This then compels the US Treasury to give citizens access to their "strawman" accounts (FBI 2010, 2011).

Members of the sovereign citizen movement file paperwork with their local and state governments renouncing citizenship, along with other claims. Once this is done, sovereign citizens believe they no longer have to abide by national or state law. Moreover, when they file paperwork with the state, they receive a document known as an Apostille. This document serves as proof that an official document was received and the secretary of state certifies the authenticity that the document is an original and has been filed. Sovereigns believe that once they receive an Apostille, they can obtain access to their account (FBI 2010).[2]

The Apostille certifies that the document is a true copy and was successfully filed with the state. It does not certify the validity or legitimacy of the original document or give it legal status. However, sovereign citizens believe that the original filed documents *are* legitimate and can be used as evidence in court cases, as a means of protection against the government. The number located on the Apostille is also used by sovereign members on various documents as a form of identification. This includes fake passports, driver's licenses, vehicle license plates, and even law enforcement documents that indicate they are no longer citizens of the United States (FBI 2010).

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[2] To see an example of how sovereign citizens get an Apostille, go to http://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/apostille-georgia.html. According to this website, this group exists because "We hate bureaucracy and are continually amazed at how absurd government agencies make running a business. Each federal, state, county, city, and appropriate agencies have their own set of rules and requirements that can get very confusing. We spend our time learning and researching to attempt to translate all this crap into English for our clients."

The types of activity in which sovereign citizens engage range from minor offenses, such as not paying their taxes and creating false license plates, driver's licenses, and currency, to more serious crimes. The more severe crimes consist of financial scams and impersonating or threatening law enforcement and other federal officials. Sovereign citizens seem harmless on the surface with their conspiracy theories about the government; but when faced with government interference, or when they feel threatened, sovereign citizens will not hesitate to kill. Since 2000, sovereign citizens working alone have killed six law enforcement officers (FBI 2011).

It is important to note that sovereign citizens will use any tactic that disrupts the government from being seen as a legitimate force by the rest of the population. They usually target government officials and engage in what the FBI calls "paper terrorism." "Paper terrorism" refers to practices such as putting false liens on property and filing frivolous lawsuits. These activities tie up courts and government agencies in needless paperwork. Moreover, the victim of the false claims is forced either to pay expensive legal bills or to settle with the sovereign citizen plaintiff. Some of their other methods consist of refusing to cooperate, demanding an oath of office or proof of jurisdiction, filming law enforcement and placing these films online, and creating their own courts and issuing fake indictments or warrants. They also use real government documents by creating malicious reports to damage credit scores and financial histories of specific people (FBI 2011).

Finally, since this is not an organized movement, there is no way for the government or any other organization to give an accurate estimate of how many individuals are "sovereign citizens." Typically, as was the case with Cliven Bundy, this becomes evident only when government employees encounter such an individual in the course of performing their duties.

Distrust of government is at the heart of both the militia and the sovereign citizen movements. This same distrust of government lies at the heart of the challenge for public administrators who encounter members or sympathizers of these groups in the course of their duties. What should government employees do to successfully carry out their duties when dealing with individuals or groups who view their actions as illegitimate and with extreme suspicion? When those individuals or groups are heavily armed, how can violence be avoided?

"We Have Met the Enemy, and He Is Us"

"Where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault 1978, 95–96), and "where there is resistance, there is power" (Abu-Lughod 1990, 42). The phrase "power corrupts, but absolutely power corrupts absolutely" pervades US

society's understanding of the political arena and denotes an underlying notion that those with power over individuals and groups often abuse or misuse that power. Most people find small ways to rebel against the state structures, rules, and regulations, discovering their own way to subvert the power of politicians, police, and government. James C. Scott (1985, 1989) refers to these as "everyday acts of resistance," and these everyday acts reflect what can be referred to as a continuum of public subversion and confrontation and hidden subversion (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013, 3).

This notion also reflects the importance of recognizing domination and resistance as key components of everyday social life as opposed to just dramatic and poignant moments in time (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013, 3). For example, we can identify discourses related to gun control, whether portrayed accurately or inaccurately by media or political figures, as being *perceived* by members of militia groups as a process of repression and domination by the state, in turn characterized as stepping beyond its constitutional bounds or as being mismanaged by politicians. The discourse occurring between members of the same group who experience actual or perceived subordination is often restricted to intragroup dialogue and is rarely available to the public or the state until a dramatic form of resistance occurs. James Scott (2008) uses the term "hidden transcript" to describe those discourses occurring among subordinate groups dominated by a much more powerful entity, group, or individual. This is the "discourse that takes place offstage, beyond direct observation by power holders" (Scott 2008, 4), and it is perhaps a point where states can begin to rectify the suspicion subordinated groups often have toward those in power.

A common mistake made when a dramatic act of resistance occurs is to increase the number of police, military, or other members of institutions with power as a way to quell the dissidence and bring the situation back to normal. However this often leads to further suspicion, paranoia, and perhaps even violence. As the state ramps up its response to the subordinated group, the marginalized individuals see this as a potentially dangerous situation and become more paranoid and suspicious about what the state will do, how they will respond to the incident, and so on. Therefore, the purpose of the state's response should not necessarily be to increase their presence or footprint, as this might just serve to make relations worse, but to actually work through the problematic situation and civil-government relationship itself. Focusing energy on determining what the hidden transcripts are—what the underlying issues and problems are and how those involved can work to resolve them as opposed to increasingly militarizing the situation on both sides. The process of unveiling these hidden transcripts, however, would require time, effort, and economic input as well as a veritable army of individuals working to parse out

these hidden transcripts, often by working closely with those subordinated groups. The long-term benefit, however, is that these hidden transcripts, which indicate deep-seated suspicion (or perhaps paranoia in some cases) of the state, can be revealed before violent incidents erupt.

Given the resource constraints facing most government agencies, it is not likely they would invest in following the approach outlined above. But, one step federal officials could take would be to determine if there are *local* government officials who are familiar with the "hidden transcripts" of suspicion and hostility that could spark a violent confrontation. Close consultation with local officials knowledgeable of the individual or group could save lives and help ensure government employees can fulfill their responsibilities safely. To illustrate this concept, we present two cases. The first involves a confrontation at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, one of two violent events that sparked the birth of the militia movement and inspired Timothy McVeigh to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah federal office building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The second event is the confrontation at the Bundy ranch where violence was avoided.

Ruby Ridge

In the early 1990s, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) was attempting to curb illegal gun sales associated with the Aryan Nations compound in Idaho. As part of this operation, an undercover ATF agent known as Gus Magisano purchased two sawed-off shotguns from Randy Weaver, an Aryan Nations sympathizer who subscribed to many of the beliefs typical of the Posse Comitatus described earlier in this article. A former Green Beret, Weaver lived with his wife and children about 60 miles from the compound at a place known as Ruby Ridge (Stern 1996).

On January 17, 1991, two ATF agents, posing as a couple that appeared to have car trouble, succeeded in taking Weaver into custody. During his arraignment for his criminal conduct, Judge Ayers (incorrectly) told Weaver he would have to pay $10,000 bond and reimburse his court-appointed attorney if he lost his case. Since he did not have the money, this amounted to Weaver losing his only asset, his property. In his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee (1995), Weaver said he concluded from this there was no reason for him to cooperate with the government.

After Weaver was arraigned, the court date was set for February 19, 1991. Later the probation office sent Weaver a letter that incorrectly referenced a change stating that the trial date was moved to March 20, 1991. When Weaver failed to appear at his trial, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On March 14, 1992, a federal grand jury issued an indictment. After investigation the Department of Justice determined that the United States Attorney's Office

(USAO) sought an indictment against Weaver before March 20, which was thought to be the actual trial date (US Department of Justice 1994).

Before Weaver's trial, a letter was sent to Gerry Spence, Weaver's attorney, informing him that the letter sent by the probation office was incorrect. Spence tried to notify Weaver of the error, but was unable to do so. When Weaver later read in the local paper that the probation office denied that the trial date was changed and that they had even written such a letter, Weaver took this as confirmation that he could not trust anything government officials told him and concluded he would probably not get a fair trial (Oliver 1996; Senate Judiciary Committee 1995; US Department of Justice 1994).

Weaver was now officially a fugitive. For a period of six months, the US Marshals Service (USMS) was involved in efforts to apprehend Weaver. Their efforts included gathering information about Weaver to be used in developing a plan for his arrest (US Department of Justice 1994). As the standoff between Weaver and the USMS continued, a reporter, Bill Morlin, wrote a front-page article (2012) asking why the government had not arrested Weaver, spurring the area press to demand an answer. Pressure from the press led the USMS to create a Special Operations Group (SOG) to survey Weaver's property to search for possible ways they could apprehend the suspect (Mayo 2008).

Based on information about Weaver that they gathered from his neighbors and other sources, the USMS concluded that he was armed and dangerous. Those rumors included that the land surrounding Weaver's cabin was covered with booby traps, and that he had underground tunnels that were stocked with howitzers and other weapons, including explosive devices (Senate Judiciary Committee 1995; Stern 1996). At no time did the USMS attempt to check the reliability of those sources, at least one of whom had lost a lawsuit he filed against Weaver (Senate Judiciary Committee 1995). As it turned out, none of those rumors proved to be true.

The conflict that led to the deaths of Weaver's son Sam, his wife Vicki, and US Marshal Billy Degan began on August 21, 1992. Degan, a former Marine, together with five other deputies began their surveillance of Weaver and his family (Oliver 1996; Stern 1996). During their surveillance mission, Sam Weaver and Kevin Harris exited the Weaver cabin and began walking with Sam's dog Striker. Sara Weaver was walking behind them and was followed by Randy Jr. and Rachel. As they began walking, Striker began barking and yelping and running down the hill. The agents noticed the dog and tried to hide (Oliver 1996; Stern 1996; Walter 1995). Sam and Harris thought that the dog was chasing after a wild animal and followed to see what had drawn Striker's attention (Senate Judiciary Committee 1995; Walter 1995).

As the dog approached, followed by Sam and Harris, the marshals retreated further down the slope they were on. While trying to take cover,

Larry Cooper noticed Randy Weaver approaching from a higher trail and believed that they had fallen into an ambush. Marshals Cooper and Roderick claim they yelled at Weaver to "stop, back off! US Marshal!" Cooper pointed to the dog with his rifle but it ran past Roderick. When Cooper looked back at the trail, Weaver was running back toward the cabin. As the dog came close, Roderick claimed that it was growling and looked like it would attack, so he shot the dog (Senate Judiciary Committee 1995; Stern 1996; Walter 1996).

Angry at the marshals for killing his dog, 14-year old Sam started shooting in their direction. During the ensuing exchange of fire, as Sam turned to run back to the cabin, he was shot in the back and died. The USMS claimed Harris killed Marshal Degan (Walter 1995). After investigation, it was determined that Marshal Cooper could have been the one that shot and killed Marshal Degan. During the confrontation, Degan covered approximately 22 feet running right in front of Cooper's position (Senate Judiciary Committee1995; Walter 1995).

Following the confrontation that ended in the deaths of Sam Weaver and Marshal Degan, Marshal Dave Hunt contacted Washington to relate what had occurred. After meetings between the USMS and the FBI, Larry Potts, the head of criminal investigations, and Richard Rogers, the leader of Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), loaded a helicopter with supplies and headed for Idaho (Walter 1995). On the flight Rogers and Potts discussed revising the FBI's official rules of engagement, which stated that agents were allowed to fire at a suspect only if someone's life was in danger. The new rules would allow the snipers to shoot at the Weavers for whatever reason and without provocation. Once they agreed on the new rules of engagement, Potts created new orders concerning those new rules and distributed them to the agents on the Ridge before he had approval from FBI headquarters (Oliver 1996; Walter 1995).

The new rules of engagement created by Potts and Rogers gave agents the authority to use deadly force on any adult carrying a weapon, leaving the use of deadly force up to the agent's discretion and creating an atmosphere that encouraged agents to use deadly force when it may not have been necessary. The altered rules of engagement contributed to the chaos at Ruby Ridge following the deaths of Sam Weaver and Marshal Degan (FBI 1995; US Department of Justice 1994; Walter 1995).

After the two deaths, Randy Weaver found himself under siege from government forces. The FBI, ATF, USMS, Idaho State Police, local law enforcement, and the National Guard now surrounded the Weaver cabin. Outside the siege lines, people from all over gathered to support the Weavers and angrily protested, demonstrating their frustration at the government (Mayo 2008). Equipped with new rules of engagement and a larger force, the

government made it clear that negotiation was not an option (Mayo 2008; Oliver 1996; Walter 1995).

On August 22, the second day of the siege, FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi was set up 200 yards away with his sights trained on the Weaver cabin. Weaver left the cabin to take one last look at the body of his son Sam and say goodbye. Kevin Harris and Weaver's 16-year-old daughter Sara went with him. Horiuchi noticed them leaving the cabin, following them through the scope of his rifle as the party approached the birthing shed that stored Sam Weaver's body. Randy was directly in front of the birthing shed and about to open it, when Horiuchi pulled the trigger. The first shot hit Weaver in the arm exiting his armpit (Mayo 2008; Oliver 1996; Stern 1996; US Department of Justice 1994).

As they ran back toward the house, Sara Weaver positioned herself to shield her father from further fire, assuming that the agents would not shoot a child (Oliver 1996). As the party approached the cabin, Weaver hurried inside followed by Harris. Vicki Weaver, holding her infant daughter, was holding the door open waiting for them to enter. As they were entering the cabin another shot was fired, hitting Vicki Weaver in the head and killing her. Harris was hit by a bullet and bone fragments leaving a silver dollar–sized hole in his upper left arm and causing damage to his chest (Oliver 1996; Stern 1996; Walter 1995).

After the death of Vicki Weaver, the FBI began to attempt negotiations by placing a robot with a phone on it in front of the house. Understandably, Weaver did not trust the phone or the FBI. The federal authorities also brought Randy's sister up to try to persuade him to surrender (Senate Judiciary Committee 1995; Stern 1996; Walter 1995). Ultimately, Bo Gritz, a presidential candidate and former Green Beret, persuaded Eugene Glenn, the FBI special agent in charge on the scene, to allow him to speak with Weaver. As Gritz shared many of Weaver's ideas about government, he became the main negotiator and was responsible for ending the confrontation (Stern 1996).

Weaver was tried and found guilty of minor weapons charges. His defense attorney, Gerry Spence, called no witnesses for the defense, but used cross-examination to skillfully uncover how the government mishandled the Weaver case from beginning to end (Spence 1993). Subsequent internal FBI investigations led to disciplinary action against 12 agents for the improper changes made to the rules of engagement used during the siege, tampering with evidence and the crime scene, and the unnecessary amount of force used during the Weaver siege (Senate Judiciary Committee 1995; Spence 1993; Stern 1996; US Department of Justice 1994).

The Bundy Ranch Standoff

Cliven Bundy owns a 160-acre farm in Nevada, just southwest of Bunkerville. Bundy's father purchased the property in 1948. Bundy grazed his cattle legally on public lands known as the Bunkerville Allotment administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) from 1954 until 1993. He did so by paying grazing fees to BLM (Fuller 2014).

The BLM manages approximately 245 million acres of land owned by the federal government, primarily in western states. The BLM issues about 18,000 permits and leases to ranchers that allow them to graze livestock on 155 million of those acres in accordance with the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. The objective of the program is to preserve open spaces necessary as habitat for wildlife, protect the watershed and wildlife, and provide livestock-based economic opportunities in rural communities (BLM 2014).

In 1993, Bundy stopped paying grazing fees to protest changes to the grazing rules. As a result, the BLM cancelled his permit in 1994. However, Bundy continued to graze his cattle on the Bunkerville Allotment. On November 3, 1998, in *U.S. v. Bundy*, the US District Court permanently barred Bundy from grazing his cattle on public lands and ordered him to remove all his cattle by November 30, or pay trespassing damages of $200 per day per head for any of his cattle remaining beyond that date. Bundy ignored the court order and not only continued to graze his cattle on the Bunkerville Allotment, but began grazing his cattle on other public lands, including some owned by the National Park Service.

In his court defense, Bundy claimed the BLM had no authority to control or regulate grazing, and that the federal government had overstepped its constitutional bounds by attempting to do so (*U.S. v. Bundy* 1998; *U.S. v. Bundy* 2013). To his supporters, Bundy has said that he is a citizen of the state of Nevada, and "I don't recognize the United States government as even existing" (Suckling 2014, para. 11). In interviews, he has repeatedly used language typical of the Posse Comitatus, sovereign citizen, and the militia movements, describing federal actions as tyrannical and illegitimate (Fields 2014).

In 2012, the BLM planned to round up Bundy's cattle and get them off public lands. After Bundy made violent threats against BLM employees, the bureau asked the local sheriff, Doug Gillespie, for assistance. He told the bureau they needed a new warrant. So, in 2013, the BLM went back to the US District Court. After yet another court victory, the BLM began to plan the roundup. By this time, Bundy had accumulated more than $1 million in unpaid grazing fees and court-ordered fines (Fuller 2014; Ralston 2014).

To execute the roundup, the BLM had to close the Gold Butte, Mormon Mesa, and Bunkerville Flats Areas, a total of 802,571 acres. Since some of this area belonged to the National Park Service, they were involved in the planning and decision making about the operation. BLM contacted state and local authorities to let them know about the operation, but did not ask them for advice or assistance. Instead, the bureau centralized all decisions in Washington, D.C. They designated two areas as "First Amendment" zones for peaceful protests, and another area for the media, an action that infuriated reporters and protestors alike (Fuller 2014; Ralston 2014).

Bundy was aware of what was coming. In late March, he began rallying supporters with language drawn from the Posse Comitatus, sovereign citizen, and militia movements. By the beginning of April, armed members of militia groups were joining peaceful protestors. By April 8, the number of protestors was well into the hundreds—and many of them were heavily armed. Sheriff Gillespie, in an interview, said, "I've never seen so many guns" (Ralston 2014, para. 5).

Critics, including Bob Abbey, a former BLM director, claimed the bureau did not follow its own procedures by having too many law enforcement people involved with the attempted roundup. Abbey claimed the armed presence was provocative and unnecessary since all that was needed was to ask the sheriff to arrest Bundy. Tensions mounted daily between federal officials and the militia members. On April 9, one of Bundy's sons was Tasered after he allegedly kicked a police dog. That event was captured on video and posted online, stirring up even more anger (Ralston 2014),

As the days went by, tensions between local law enforcement and federal officials began to rise, and between the protestors and government representatives. The BLM insisted on executing the roundup while local officials were increasingly concerned about the potential for violence. On April 12, the BLM pulled off the table its offer to purchase Bundy's cattle, and officials in Washington ordered the roundup to proceed. This decision led to the standoff later that day between heavily armed protestors, backed by snipers, and 24 BLM agents and local sheriffs (Ralston 2014). Assistant Sheriff Lombardo said "they were in my face yelling profanities and pointing weapons. We were outgunned, outmanned, and there would not have been a good result from it" (Knapp 2014, para. 15).

Sheriff Gillespie rapidly began making phone calls to the governor and federal officials and succeeded in negotiating a peaceful end. The BLM withdrew and returned the cattle they had rounded up to Bundy and announced they would seek administrative and judicial action against him (Ralston 2014).

Discussion

In these two cases, we see what can happen when government agencies find themselves dealing with individuals holding radical, right-wing viewpoints. As is typical of militia members and sovereign citizens, Weaver and Bundy both deeply distrusted government and questioned its legitimacy. This distrust led Weaver to conclude he had no chance of a fair trial, so there was no point in showing up for his court date. This same distrust was behind his rejection of the FBI's initial efforts to negotiate a settlement. Bundy's position, that the federal government was not legitimate, led him to repeatedly defy court orders and violate the law.

In both cases, federal officials did not fully grasp the situation they were facing. They underestimated the significance of the antigovernment worldview shared by Weaver and Bundy. They expected Weaver and Bundy to behave like most citizens and comply with legal requirements. When they did not comply, they anticipated that a display of force would lead to compliance. Instead, the display of force merely provided proof to Weaver and Bundy that their view of government as tyrannical was accurate. As a consequence, they chose to resist rather than comply.

In the two cases presented, government agencies escalated the situation by ramping up its armed presence when compliance was not immediately forthcoming. From the standpoint of Weaver and Bundy, this escalation was evidence that the government was tyrannical and the "enemy." In the Weaver case, this escalation tragically ended in the deaths of his wife and son, along with a US marshal. In the Bundy case, no violence resulted because the only government official Bundy did consider legitimate, the local sheriff, successfully negotiated a peaceful end to the standoff.

Federal officials also did not take full advantage of local knowledge. In the Weaver case, the USMS did consult with locals to learn about him. But they did not check the reliability of those sources. Instead, they used information from people known to have a grudge against Weaver. The result was the creation of a highly inaccurate picture of the Weaver property as booby-trapped, and Weaver himself as a heavily armed, very violent man who posed a significant danger to the public. This encouraged federal officials to increase their manpower and resources to create what amounted to an armed siege of the Weaver property. Tragically, this escalation led to violence.

In the case of Bundy, the BLM chose to proceed with confiscating Bundy's cattle without considering the concerns of local law enforcement about the potential for violence. While they did offer to purchase Bundy's cattle, they apparently did not consider bringing local law enforcement in to discuss the situation and potential solutions. As a consequence, the situation

escalated to the point where local law enforcement and the BLM found themselves staring down the rifle barrels of hundreds of heavily armed, right-wing radicals from across the nation.

Finally, in today's environment of the 24-hour news cycle and social media, government officials should pay careful attention to the visual impact of their actions and behavior. In the Bundy incident, the video of Bundy's son being Tasered went viral overnight. Images of the "first amendment zone" where protestors were confined looked like citizens exercising their constitutional rights were being herded into cattle corrals. Visuals such as these confirm the "hidden transcripts" of militia members that the government is repressive and intent on stripping citizens of their constitutional rights.

Given the ideology of militia groups, sovereign citizens, and their sympathizers, government officials should expect to encounter noncompliance with laws and regulations. Since that same ideology holds that the sheriff is the only legitimate law enforcement officer, the best approach in dealing with such individuals is to seek to work with and through local law enforcement. State and federal resources should be brought in only as a last resort and only after careful work with local officials to gain insight and understanding into the nature of the individuals or groups involved. Such insight, coupled with careful negotiation through local officials, could make the difference between living and dying, both for the accused and those government officials trying to carry out their duties.

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Crouching Dragon:
The Role of Beijing in the
South China Sea Embroglio

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The South China Sea has long been regarded as one of the most complex and challenging ocean-related maritime disputes in East Asia. This region has become critical among the disputing parties because of its geographic position in major oceanic routes used by crude oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Asia and for transporting goods to the rest of the world, as well as for promising offshore oil and gas reserves. China is asserting its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea, maintaining its long-standing claim over the Taiwan Strait, and even extending claims to areas of the Indian Ocean. This article analyzes whether China's blue-water strategy as well as her unclear intentions often create the image that South China Sea will be the best place for China to wage wars. The article ends with the discussion whether Beijing will learn how to share and bear in the South China Sea amidst chaos and tension.

Southeast Asian states are highly sensitive to issues of sovereignty, and this has made the principle of nonintervention the bedrock of foreign policy and interregional state relations. Seas are a central concern for Southeast Asian countries (Bradford 2005), so it is hardly surprising that the countries in the region are strongly nationalistic in asserting and protecting their claims. Mark Valencia (1999) comments, "Indeed, when countries in Asia think maritime, they think first and foremost about boundary disputes, not protection of the

deteriorating marine environment or management of dwindling fisheries," and he further states that, "[i]t is these perceptions that must change."

Southeast Asia has long been of significant interest to scholars, and its importance tends to grow not just politically and economically but also militarily. Besides being an important engine for global economic growth, Southeast Asia has also witnessed a plethora of important political changes and the emergence of new security threats. In fact, historical mistrust, enduring territorial disputes, and competing maritime claims have combined to weaken an at least partially successful regional security structure (Richardson 2009). Southeast Asian countries will face enormous challenges over the next decade (Roy 2012). They will not just have to be competent in sustaining economic growth and addressing environmental issues, but they must also keep up with increasing energy demand and—and as this article emphasizes—manage potential conflicts in the region. Southeast Asia's position as a bridge between two oceans as well as between the continents of Asia and Oceania gives the region a distinctive identity and importance. Not only is it an important area for trade and transport but it also includes vital sea-lanes, which account for 32 percent of world oil net trade and 27 percent of world gas net trade (Richardson 2009).

Reasons for Standoffs

The South China Sea region (SCS) is regarded as one of the most dynamic and controversial regions in the world. Multiple issues or matters of concern include territorial sovereignty; disputed claims to islands, rocks, and reefs; jurisdiction over territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and the seabed; regional and international rights to use the seas for military purposes; maritime security; rapid economic development; and environmental degradation. China has long viewed the "near seas" (the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea) as regions of geostrategic interest. China's recent public designation of the SCS as a "core national interest" (*hexinliyi*) is one of the primary reasons numerous observers suggest that China is getting tough.

There are four main island groups in the SCS: the Paracels, the Spratlys, the Pratas, and the Macclesfield Bank. Although the Natunas, a fifth group of islands, is not considered part of the SCS, they are worth mentioning because Indonesia and Vietnam are in dispute over the continental shelf of these islands. Before the end of the Cold War, the presence of both Russian as well as US naval facilities in Vietnam and the Philippines largely provided a stabilizing balance of power in the region. However, their withdrawal from this region has made China the dominant naval force.

The complex disputes in the SCS seem to be full of intractable challenges. Notable incidents include China's attack on Vietnam regarding the Paracel Islands in 1974, China's attack on Vietnam near Fiery Cross Reef in 1988, and China's clash with the Philippines over the Mischief Reef in 1995, as well as other more recent incidents like the USNS *Impeccable* and the USNS *Bowditch*. China's insistence upon "indisputable sovereignty," supposedly based on historic rights; its recent land reclamation strategies; and the related "Nine-dotted/Ten-dotted Line Controversies" has only added to tensions in the SCS. As realism suggests, China would become more forceful in asserting its interests as its relative power rises. In fact, China is becoming more aggressive in asserting its claim in the South China Sea region, which has become visible in China's recent confrontation with other vessels in the area, its attempts to cut cables from a Vietnamese oil exploration vessels, and its land reclamation strategies.

Neighbors fear that Beijing is trying to establish the entire region as a "Chinese Lake" (Chakraborti 2001). Territorial claims to the islands and reefs are especially important in order to establish an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the disputed islands that would include the oil and natural gas resources in the area. The SCS has numerous archipelagoes, islands, peninsulas, coral reefs, seasonally reversing monsoon winds, and underwater currents. All these combine to produce exceptionally favorable conditions for a fertile marine ecosystem (Rosenberg 2010). No one paid much attention to the Spratlys until World War II, when the Japanese started using this island for military purposes. Taiwan has reportedly deemed "the entire area within the U-shaped line to be China's historical waters" (Rosenberg 2010). According to Keyuan (2001), historic rights fall into two types: exclusive with complete sovereignty, such as historic waters and bays, and nonexclusive without complete sovereignty, such as historic fishing rights in the high seas. However, historic rights claimed by China are unique and different from these types because they are connected with the EEZ/continental shelf regimes. Such situation is known as "historic rights with tempered sovereignty," whereby China can claim sovereign rights and jurisdiction, but not complete sovereignty (Keyuan 2001). Since the declaration of the nine-dotted line, international society made no diplomatic protests nor voiced any disagreements. Later, a number of maps produced abroad were delineated along the nine-dotted line indicating the area as belonging to China.

Ninety percent of Japan's oil passes through this area, and China has called the sea a "second Persian Gulf" (Valencia 1999). Estimates of the oil resources near the Spratly Islands range from 105 billion barrels to 213 billion barrels (Valencia 2010). Estimates of total gas reserves also vary, from 266 trillion cubic feet (TCF) to more than 2,000 TCF (Valencia 2010). Regarding

the Spratly issue, Beijing continues to move forward with a "three no's" policy—no specification of claims, no multilateral negotiations, and no internationalization of the subject. China has even consolidated its facilities at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago with the installation of an early warning radar system. At the same time, China maintains a continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef off the west coast of the Philippines (Thayer 2010).

China argues that the expansion and contraction of control and influence over China's extended boundary has constantly been a function of the rise and fall in China's comprehensive national power. China is interested in preserving not only its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also security and other developmental interests. In fact, China's intentions as well as its size, population, nuclear capability, and dealings in the SCS have always kept its Southeast Asian counterparts guessing (Swaine and Tellis 2000). China has pursued three important objectives in the SCS: regional integration, resource control, and enhanced security. Over the past several decades, Chinese actions have perhaps best been explained in terms of achieving such objectives. The seabed is thought to contain oil and gas, and the islets are said to be strategically significant for sea-lane defense and surveillance for both major as well as minor powers. In addition to the claimants, the disputes involve navigational and economic interests for powers such as the United States, Japan, and India. In fact, this has become one of the main security problems affecting the region over time, and it also shows that the SCS dispute has broad geopolitical implications that go far beyond drilling oil and managing the fertile marine ecosystem.

No global maritime power can ignore the SCS since all maritime traffic traversing that sea passes between the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos. Hence, the importance of sovereignty and strategic control over these groups of islands is plainly apparent. As Mahan, as cited in Livezey (1981), pointed out, "sea power consists in the first place of a proper navy and a proper fleet; but in order to sustain a navy, we must have suitable places where a navy can be protected and refurnished." Sea power, it might be argued, is experiencing a major revival today, and thus it is clear why the SCS in general, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands in particular, are strategically important. They offer potential for a strong maritime presence as well as places to shelter and re-equip naval forces in the area. It seems that China is following its blue-water strategy both to increase prestige and to support pursuit of expanding national interests, much as the United States did back in the early twentieth century.

China's pursuit of its perceived "core interests," as well as other parties' defense of theirs, is clearly realist. China's rise calls to mind neorealism's concern with global structure and power shifts. In fact, China's engagement with a wide variety of international organizations from the UN to the WTO to

ASEAN points to liberal institutionalism. The concept of the ASEAN way as well as the various SCS parties' different conceptions of their own claims and the threat posed by others belongs to the constructivists. A realist approach predicts this more aggressive behavior and well explains the recent efforts of regional states to balance against China. However, this multilateral approach undertaken by other ASEAN states in their dealings with China is to address what Walt (1985) calls the "balance of threat." China is perceived as a threat to her neighbors and hence they are eager to enter into alliances with other powers like the United States or India. As realism predicts state behavior, when states feel most threatened, they pursue closer ties with other powers. Constructivism as a positive social process has had transforming impact on the relationships among ASEAN countries (Hopf 1998).

Access to the Jackpot

As Asia's energy consumption grows in parallel with its economic development, access to and control of these resources will weigh heavily on claimant perceptions of the strategic value of contested areas—not least the Spratlys (Snyder, Glosserman, and Cossa 2001). The wider significance of disputes in the SCS relates to the threat that a higher level of military action could pose to vital SLOC arteries to other parts of the world, including the Middle East. If the SLOC gets disrupted due to armed conflict, then the economic interests of the Asia-Pacific countries as well as the United States could be severely affected (Rosenberg and Chung 2008). Over half of the top ten container shipping ports in the world are located in or around the SCS, which is the main artery of transportation for imports and exports. In fact, it is not too much to say that this region has become the hub of the industrial revolution of Asia (Rosenberg and Chung 2008).

The potential riches of the SCS and its adjacent waters have increased competition and conflicts, and thus it might be said that the Asian theater will be critical for shaping state practice regarding the law of the sea and determining whether or not the 1982 convention will really constitute the law in being (Bateman and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies 2006). The SCS dispute has an obvious geostrategic dimension. If China ever succeeds in realizing its territorial claims, it would then "extend its jurisdiction some one thousand nautical miles from its mainland so as to command the virtual Mediterranean or maritime heart of Southeast Asia with far-reaching consequences for the strategic environment" (Segal and Yang 1996). Each state has developed apparently irreconcilable positions regarding islands and archipelagos. The SCS has acquired added significance since it harbors large

energy reserves. Thus it has become quite impossible for the claimants to follow the "fences make good neighbors" policy at least in the sea (Frost 1914).

There are three kinds of maritime disputes in East Asia: territorial disputes over tiny islets, maritime boundary delimitation disputes between neighboring states, and disputes over the allocation and sustainable use of marine resources. It is difficult to have a plausible solution for the first kind of dispute since the disputing states have asserted sovereignty claims over the islands. The maritime boundary delimitation set out in the UNCLOS is also a source of tension between China and its neighbors. Although China and Vietnam have signed the agreement on the maritime boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, there is no other maritime boundary agreement between China and other neighboring countries (Nguyen 2005). A report published by the *Washington Times* in 2005 stated that China was adopting a "string of pearls" strategy of bases and diplomatic ties, which would include a new naval base at the Pakistani port of Gwadar. The Chinese-funded port is only 390 nautical miles from the Hormuz Straits. In case of a disruption in the Straits of Malacca, oil imports could be diverted through there and then transported via the Gilgit region to western China (Gertz 2005). The 2011 Pacific Energy Summit held in Jakarta, Indonesia, featured the theme "Unlocking the Potential of Natural Gas in the Asia-Pacific." The summit explored the role of natural gas with regard to energy security and climate change in the region. Experts predicted that a Golden Age of gas in the Asia-Pacific region is on its way. In fact, unconventional gas production technology is providing access to vast new reserves of natural gas. At the same time, emerging liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure in the region, rising production, and increased global availability have enabled natural gas to play a significant role in energy diversification efforts.

Unprecedented growth is the characteristic of the Asia-Pacific region today, with China at the forefront of rapid economic expansion followed by India. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projected that China will account for half of global oil demand growth in the next five years, while over the next twenty-five years, demand from OECD countries such as the United States, Japan, and Europe will remain flat (USEIA 2012). Despite various constraints, new regional pipeline developments have begun to take shape as the continental markets of Asia evolve. Beijing is also enhancing its pipeline diplomacy initiatives, sponsoring new major regional gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Myanmar. The objective is to construct a large west-to-east domestic trunk-line gas pipeline infrastructure to accommodate China's growing imports of LNG (Herberg 2011). Huge advances in drilling technology and the growing interest of foreign companies in exploring petroleum resources in this region have further intensified disputes. Rich hydrocarbon

deposits in Brunei and the Malaysian state of Sabah have also been discovered (Stanslas 2010). It is estimated that the SCS region, excluding the Paracels and Spratlys, has proven oil reserves of approximately 7.8 billion barrels, and current oil production within the region is well over 1.9 million barrels per day (USEIA 2012). In fact, total SCS production continues to grow as more and more oil wells in China, Malaysia, and Vietnam have become operational.

The Crouching Dragon

China's intentions in the SCS region are quite significant (Roy 2012). If the SCS issue is really a matter of "core interest" to China, which would place it on at par with other sovereignty issues such as Tibet and Taiwan, it would perhaps justify military intervention in the region. A foreign ministry spokesperson commented at a news conference that China has "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands. But there have been no such statements concerning their position in the SCS as a whole. Critics even comment that China may have internal political disagreements regarding the South China Sea, because Beijing does not speak with precision about the region (USEIA 2012). Besides, some of their claims are not even officially documented. This shows that China's outward policy has been somewhat ambiguous with regard to any claim of total sovereignty over the area (Roy 2011).

Nonetheless, the Chinese military (the People's Liberation Army, or PLA) has declared that China has "indisputable sovereignty" over the SCS, and this has naturally generated grave concern in both Washington and Asia. Countries have started to believe that China's policy is becoming increasingly aggressive at sea, seizing fishing boats, arresting sailors from other countries, and exchanging gunfire (Pomfret 2010). As China becomes more developed and powerful, it tends to adjust its strategy to protect its interests. The importance of the SCS and China's growing capability have led it to assert its interests more proactively. However military conflict might not be a viable option for China at the moment. It might be that the strong US presence in the region is adding up to her uneasiness (Fravel 2011).

General Mi Zehnyu bluntly stated: "China must develop a strong sea power to protect and not yield a single inch of its three million square kilometers of ocean territory. China must 'build a new Chinese maritime great wall'" (Yuan 2000). The SCS's growing strategic significance as well as increasing military competition in the region guarantee that there will be more opportunities for miscalculation. With the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducting further exercises and activities at sea far and beyond, the risks will tend to rise. Research vessels will do their preparatory work, and other militaries will step up surveillance, resulting in an increased number of vessels in a limited space.

One plausible interpretation of this article is that China is trying to dominate the entire area militarily by establishing a chain of outposts in the SCS region. China is also moving fast with its land reclamation strategies on various islands in the SCS region. For example, her moves on Duncan Island (seized by China from Vietnam in 1974), shows landfill has increased the size of the island by approximately 50 percent since April 2014 (Parameswaran 2015). The island houses a military garrison, four radar domes, a concrete manufacturing plant, and a port that has recently been expanded via dredging and coral cutting. High-resolution satellite images also show that Woody Island, occupied by China since 1956, is undergoing a major expansion of its runway and airport facilities. In fact, within the past five months, a 2,400-meter airstrip has been completely replaced by a new concrete runway, a new taxiway, and large buildings, which have created some noise among its neighbors (Parameswaran 2015). Besides, aerial-refueling programs and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) will allow for extended air operations into the SCS. At the same time, China is trying to use soft power through capacity-building assistance in a range of marine and environmental initiatives, such as Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)/Global Environment Facility (GEF) South China Sea project, and the Cooperative Mechanism for Navigational Safety and Environmental Protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

In sum, although China's official policy of "peaceful rise" recognizes the international values of peace, international order, and cooperation, that policy is becoming increasingly suspicious (Glaser and Medeiros 2007). Besides, China's "string of pearls" strategy has become an important one in terms of expanding its power (Pan 2011). If leaders of other South Asian states contemplate militarizing some of these "pearls," it would be difficult for Beijing to convince them that hosting PLAN bases is in their best interests. As "swing players" in an emerging Indo-Pacific "great game," the littoral states of the Indian Ocean will probably prefer not to align but rather oscillate between Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington (Townshend 2011).

The question now depends upon whether the US military presence in East Asia is a part of US strategy to counterbalance China's efforts in creating the Energy Silk Road or to complete the geographical containment of China (Vannarith 2010). The United States could strengthen its own position by becoming a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, various obstacles stand in the way of improved security relations with China—for example, the US sale of arms to Taiwan or the intense patrol activities of US aircraft and ships in the South and East China Sea.

Most tension in the SCS has been between China and Vietnam as well as between China and the Philippines. Other actors in the region have generally been less assertive. Recently, Vietnam and the Philippines expressed their support for each other against claims made by China in the disputed South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines have been the most vocal claimants in their territorial disputes with China. The battle is now being fought before the tribunal in The Hague. Vietnam not only took its dispute with China to the legal platform challenging Beijing, but has also rejected China's legal objections to an arbitration case filed by the Philippines (Parameswaran 2014).

In fact, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are all striving to bolster their maritime capabilities. For example, Malaysia increased its defense budget by 10 percent in 2015 to meet two concerns: security threats from the southern Philippines, and Chinese assertiveness in the seas around James Shoal. Chinese intrusion has posed a clear threat not only to the country's claims in the South China Sea, but also to its extensive natural resources as well as its territorial integrity. Vietnam was also involved in an intense round of defense diplomacy both in 2014 and 2015. In fact a more substantial defense cooperation has emerged in Vietnam's relations with Russia, India, and the United States. Even the Philippines announced that it would bolster its P90 billion-force modernization program due to the urgency in the South China Sea region (Parameswaran 2015).

Dragon's Vouch to "Share and Bear"

China's two-track hard/soft policy toward SCS disputes indicates a pattern it has been following in both settled cases and those that are unsettled, such as the dispute with Japan over islets known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. The Japanese government declared that it would buy the privately owned islets, which upset China. In response, China decided to send two patrol ships to safeguard the islets. China is strongly opposed to any application of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in its dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu. While Japan has decided to pursue a "mutually beneficial strategic partnership" with China, which would allow both economic engagement and develop better relations (Serizawa 2012), it is still building up its self-defense forces (SDFs) in reaction to China's expanding maritime capabilities. As such, it has been strengthening the ability of its SDFs to operate at long range. With the passage of the Law Relating to Measures for Preserving the Peace and Security of Japan, the permitted area of its SDF activity has been expanded to encompass "peripheral areas" lying outside of its main islands, including the SCS. The Japanese government even declared that in emergencies Japanese forces would be permitted to conduct missions in

areas outside Japan (Serizawa 2012). Japan is also conducting military exchange visits and joint exercises with countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia as well as strengthening its relations with Russia and other Central Asian nations. The most important aim is to ensure balance in the Asia-Pacific region and also to counterbalance asymmetric dependence.

The question remains whether China would try to "share and bear" amidst creeping tension in the region. In fact, the string of pearls describes the manifestation of China's rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Straits of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean and into the Persian Gulf (Townshend 2011). The recent book published by the China Institute for Marine Affairs, titled *The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications*, explores a historical line of maritime rights over the disputed waters. It also puts forth arguments on China's so-called right to fishing and the right to explore in waters covered by the dotted line (Wu 2014).

Australia too is sufficiently unsettled by China's military transformation and modernization to embark on its most expensive procurement program, which involves the acquisition of 12 submarines, new air warfare destroyers and frigates, cruise missiles, and 100 joint strike fighters (Wong 2006). The *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* commented:

> We would be concerned about the emergence of a security environment dominated by any regional power, or powers, not committed to the same-shared goals. It would be in our strategic interests in the decades ahead that no power in the Asia-Pacific region would be able to coerce or intimidate others in the region through the employment of force, or through the implied threat of force, without being deterred, checked or, if necessary, defeated by the political, economic or military responses of others in the region. (Wong 2006)

Australia acts as the quintessential "status quo power" (White 2010) and wants its relationships with Asian nations to remain balanced amidst growing economic integration with China, on the one hand, and its security dependence on the United States on the other (Kaplan 2011).

A US Defense Department paper, *China's Military and Security Developments—2011*, argued that China's near-sea politics has seriously disturbed not only India but also other countries such as Japan, Australia, the United States, and the ASEAN countries (Roy 2012). A recent statement by China has added to tension in the region: "We should not leave the world with the impression that China is only focused on economic development, nor

should we pursue the reputation of being a peaceful power" (Roy 2011). This position was not consistent with China's *peaceful development strategy*, which argued that China's key to success was mutual economic dependence across the Pacific and a good-neighbor policy. However, things have tended in the opposite direction because China has pushed its neighbors away so much so that they have already invited the United States into the region. However, as Surin Pitsuwan, the secretary general of ASEAN, commented, "The U.S.-China rivalry is certain to play out in ASEAN; of course nobody in Southeast Asia wants to choose between the United States and China" (Tonnesson 2012).

China might learn some lessons from Norway's earlier claims over Svalbard. According to the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, Norway was granted sovereignty over the Spitsbergen archipelago, or Svalbard. However, the treaty restricted Norway's control to some extent, and Norway was obliged not to discriminate against any nation or company from the signatory states seeking to undertake maritime or mining activity on the island. In fact, Norway has never interrupted the global supply of oil, not surprisingly perhaps because it is both an oil exporter and explorer (Khanna and Gilman 2012).

There are rumors that Beijing is investing money in developing advanced air defenses, submarines, anti-satellite weapons, and anti-ship missiles, and using them to deny other countries access to the SCS. Furthermore, China has recently announced new rules allowing for the interception of ships in the SCS, which has raised serious alarm across Asia (Perlez 2012). If China were to fully enforce these new rules beyond the 12-nautical-mile zones, it would represent a significant threat to all countries concerned (Sen 2012). Beijing has published a new vertical-format map of China including 130 islands and islets in the SCS, which were not featured previously ("Xinhua Insight" 2012). Such actions are certain to increase tensions all the more in the region rather than spreading the message of "share and bear." Moreover, China's activities in the Maldives, which are viewed by the Maldives as important for maintaining security in the IOR, are fast emerging as a new area of conflict. China is actively engaged in building ties with other island nations located on or near to India's border, like Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and even Mauritius.

Conclusion

China has announced to pursue a foreign policy "to jointly construct a harmonious world," and invokes the cultural idea of "all under heaven" (Acharya 2011). In fact, the SCS dispute has become a great bargaining game in which the littoral countries consider their ownership in zero-sum terms. Those with the most bargaining power leave the game successfully as opposed to those who have no bargaining power. China, being the most powerful player

in this dispute, maintains a very staunch position. A particularly serious issue associated with this zero-sum game is the lack of agreement on some fundamental legal principles relating to boundary delimitation, maritime jurisdiction, and the 1982 UNCLOS. On the one hand, China authorizes the use of force to maintain its authority in this region and, on the other hand, tries to woo its neighbors' faith through its charm diplomacy.

For its part, the Beijing-based *Global Times* stated that regional stability would be difficult to maintain if the Southeast Asian states allow themselves to be controlled by the United States. While Australia appears to favor China's bilateral approach in resolving the SCS disputes, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines seem to prefer the current arrangement of placing the matter on ASEAN's agenda or even beyond (Valencia 2010). If China is convinced that the United States is stealthily trying to draw ASEAN or some of its members together with Australia, Japan, and South Korea into a soft alliance to constrain China, then the world can only expect even greater rivalry and tension in the years ahead. China is continuously upgrading its military technologies and maintaining a strong physical presence in this region. It is thus hard to determine whether China is actually trying to establish a maritime sphere of influence and hegemony in the SCS or Beijing is trying to use its "share and bear" policy as the bargaining chip to explore further. After all: "Never let out your real intentions. Lull your adversaries by all possible means. Hide your capabilities."

Maps

Map 1.1 shows the occupied islands by the claimants in the South China Sea (South China Sea Virtual Library).

Map 1.2 highlights four main island groups in the SCS. (http://www.chinatouristmaps.com/china-maps/china-sea-maps/south-china-sea-map.html)

Map 1.3 highlights the importance of the world's shipping route as a chokepoint for the flow of crude oil between the Gulf and East Asia. (http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC).

Map 1.4 displays China's "String of Pearls" route. (http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-string-of-pearls-strategy.html)

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Modeling Student Success:
How Model UN Programs Can Enhance
Performance and Persistence

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Scholars and universities have made substantial efforts to resolve the student departure puzzle, yet it remains one of higher education's greatest dilemmas. Evidence suggests student persistence is closely connected to social and academic integration. In this case study of a university's Model United Nations program, we investigate whether this program encourages student persistence. Using a mixed methods approach, we find participants in the program have higher graduation rates, graduate on time, and see significant improvement in their cumulative GPAs. We also find participation has a significant positive impact on social and academic integration, which helps increase retention. The authors recommend that universities invest in similar outside the classroom programs to increase student retention.

Although university administrators and scholars have been searching for theories, paradigms, and programs that lead to increased student success and retention, the student departure puzzle remains difficult to solve. This dilemma has led to the development of comprehensive means to properly measure retention, fully understand the problem, and help students persist from enrollment to degree completion. While this has steered the creation of diverse academic and support programs in higher education, there is limited research on preexisting college programs, beyond freshman seminars, that may help. We believe that the Model United Nations (Model UN) is one such program that can encourage student persistence and increase retention. Using a mixed methods approach including several measures widely found to increase retention, this article examines a university Model UN program with a study away component. It measures the program's impact on the degree to which students are integrated academically and socially. We argue that taking the students out of the physical classroom can lead to greater persistence toward graduation.

The university studied is a regional public university with an enrollment of just under 7,000 students. The average age for undergraduate students is 25 and minority enrollment currently stands at 34 percent. The university struggles with retention rates; at the beginning of the fall semester of the sophomore year, it loses approximately 32 percent of the cohort that began the previous fall as freshmen. Further, when this cohort reaches the four-year graduation checkpoint, the graduation rate is a mere 5.3 percent, with just 14 percent graduating in five years and 20.2 percent graduating in six. The university has identified lack of institutional connectedness as a primary factor in low retention. The only university housing accommodates fewer than 500 students and is located miles from the main campus. In a campus-wide survey, students indicated that they did not actively participate in university life outside the classroom such as student activities, sponsored events, athletic events, or intramurals.

Our research explores the impact of enrollment in a Model UN course on academic and social integration. The Model UN course includes participation in the National Model United Nations (NMUN) in New York City. We argue that since the class is a semester-long three-credit-hour program, students may be motivated to enroll for the credit, but the study away component facilitates a life outside the classroom that provides connectedness to the university, faculty, and fellow students. We posit that the trip component provides the students a unique view of the faculty and facilitates social and academic integration with students and faculty in a way that cannot be achieved in the traditional classroom setting.

Utilizing student graduation rates, cumulative grade point averages, reflective essays, and a pretest and posttest skills audit, we find the students experience significant improvement in both academic and social integration after completing the program. Our research adds to the literature on student persistence and retention by proposing that such programs encourage students to persist in college and to excel academically. We argue that these programs provide an exceptional educational experience, exposing students to diversity that they may not ordinarily experience, and we believe universities should invest greater time and resources into them.

Understanding Student Success:
Persistence, Retention, Integration, and Study Abroad

Student success in college is measured by retention, persistence, and attrition rates (Noel 1985). Retention is a university measure of the percentage of students who continue in their education at the school (Wild and Ebbers 2002). A general conceptualization of retention is the ability of an institution to retain a student from admission through graduation (Berger, Ramírez, and Lyons 2012). Persistence is a measure of the desire and action of the student to stay from beginning year through degree completion (Berger, Ramírez, and Lyons 2012; Seidman 2005). Hagedorn (2012, 85) helped distinguish retention from persistence by writing, "institutions retain and students persist." Attrition refers to the decrease of the student body as a result of low retention rates (Hagedorn 2005). It denotes a student who has failed to re-enroll at an institution in consecutive semesters (Berger, Ramírez, and Lyons 2012).

Students cause positive attrition when they transfer to another school or discontinue their education after mastering a certain skill or meeting job requirements (Polinsky 2002–2003). Negative attrition is the result of several contributing factors. Students more likely to leave school are those who enter college with a low high school GPA, who have no stated goals for college or declared major (Fralick 1993), who have problems scheduling school around jobs, or who may be unhappy with professors' instruction methods (Polinsky 2002–2003). Zepke, Leach, and Prebble (2006, 597) found one-fifth of students who considered withdrawing from classes attributed this to "inadequate teaching, a lack of recognition of their learning needs and an absence of a sense of belonging."

Integration and Retention

Theories of college success incorporate factors that encourage students to continue to pursue their education. Tinto's (1975, 1987) Student Integration Model placed responsibility for retention on both individual students and

academic institutions. Together, the students and institution form a social and academic community, and students' integration into this community plays a significant role in retention. Tinto argued that students' success in both academic and social integration determines attrition; a student who is not integrated into the college community is less likely to finish college. Additionally, Bean and Eaton (2001–2002) reiterated that for students to be successful in college, and thus more likely to persist, students need to be academically and socially integrated. We therefore contend that both social and academic integration foster student retention.

Social Integration

According to Tinto (1975, 1987), measures of social integration include students' interaction with peers and involvement in extracurricular activities. Deil-Amen (2011, 87) also found a variety of social integration measures that affect persistence, including: participation in school clubs and fine arts events; sports; going out with friends from school; peer group interaction; and informal outside-the-classroom interaction with university agents. Studies also demonstrate that institutional agents like support staff, as well as contact with professors, increase social integration and influence retention. As Braxton and McClendon wrote (2001–2002, 57), "Social integration positively influences subsequent institutional commitment … and subsequent institutional commitment, in turn, positively affects persistence in college."

One area of social integration that can potentially affect persistence and retention is in regard to commuter students. While traditional students live in dorms and participate in campus life, commuter students maintain their previous social connections rather than making new ones. Often, commuter students do not have to adapt to the social norms of the university if they maintain their old attachments to family, work, or other previous commitments. Deil-Amen (2011, 61) found that for commuter students, 92 percent of students surveyed "highlighted a college specific 'agent' or 'agents' who were instrumental in their sense of adjustment, comfort, belonging, and competence as college students." Approximately 75 percent of students stated that the support and approachability of teachers and other students within the classrooms were fundamental to their comfort in college. Contact with faculty outside of class is also found to be important in student academic development and the decision to remain in college (Endo and Harpel 1982). Additionally, Graunke and Woosley (2005) found that greater satisfaction with the opportunities to interact with faculty had a significant impact on sophomore students' academic performance, increasing potential progression toward a degree. Programs similar to the Model UN may increase the quality of

interaction among students and faculty, strengthen social integration, and positively affect student persistence and retention.

Academic Integration

Though Tinto placed importance on both social and academic integration, Halpin (1990) found that academic integration plays a much larger role, especially for students who commute. Ryan and Glenn (2002–2003) argued although social integration is critical to improve retention, more emphasis should be placed on academic integration. One of their most striking findings was "what our students most needed was support in developing the academic competencies that would allow them to thrive as learners in our classrooms" (Ryan and Glenn 2002–2003, 200). Their research stated that academic integration, development of student skills, and academic confidence positively relate to retention. Programs that concentrate on improving academic skill sets are also likely to increase retention rates.

Measures of academic integration include GPA, the student's assessment of the value of what they are learning, the extent to which they enjoy learning, and the student's perception of their academic performance. Deil-Amen (2011, 87) found multiple measures of academic integration that included: actual or predicted first-year grades; a student's sense of intellectual and academic development; a student's perception of faculty concern; the frequency of social contact or conversations with faculty and advisors about academic and career matters outside the classroom; participation in study groups; time spent on homework; and enrollment in freshman seminars.

Academic integration involves not only meeting academic standards, but identifying and embracing the norms of the academic setting. Chemers, Hu, and Garcia (2001) found that self-efficacy directly influences students' academic expectations and academic performance. Highly efficacious students are more likely to view academic work as a challenge to be overcome than as a threat to them. Programs like the Model UN that increase students' self-efficacy have a high chance of also encouraging those students to remain in school instead of dropping out.

Another method that has been shown to enhance academic integration is active learning. Active learning techniques employ the use of methods that encourage more direct participation such as discussions, debates, and class polling (Braxton, Milem, and Sullivan 2000). In measures of thinking, problem solving, and motivation to learn, students engaged in active learning have performed much better than those in lecture only classes (McKeachie et al. 1987). Braxton et al. assert that active learning is an antecedent of academic integration; like self-efficacy, active learning influences the students' perception of their own academic development and can also increase

performance. We argue that the Model UN program fosters academic integration by including the active learning techniques of simulations, speeches, debates, and negotiations.

Active Learning and Model UN Simulations

The literature exploring active learning and simulations in political science includes single-session simulations (Baranowski 2006); the effectiveness of specific simulations on student learning outcomes (Frederking 2005; Shellman and Turan 2006); and the design of simulations to stimulate student engagement (Damron and Mott 2005; Rivera and Simons 2008). While this literature lacks significant coverage on Model UN simulations specifically, there are a few that study the role of Model UN in the Political Science curriculum.

The seminal study on the Model UN argues that the Model UN serves as a learning laboratory, where students combine practical politics with political concepts and facts and apply these elements in the form of strategies and techniques of international diplomacy (Hazleton and Mahurin 1986). The authors administered large-N surveys to both regional Model UN platforms and the National Model United Nations. They found that the Model UN has a great impact on students' academic integration and academic skills, specifically, by motivating intellectual curiosity, developing cognitive strategies, improving verbal and writing skills, and facilitating a change in attitudes toward the object being simulated. Concerning social integration, the authors argue that the Model UN simulation increases students' self-confidence by having participated in a large group-learning project.

McIntosh (2001) describes the success within class Model UN simulations have on peer mentoring. He notes that when Model UN is used to connect classes, it can encourage students to teach one another, a form of academic integration and arguably, social integration. McIntosh describes several ways Model UN can encourage peer mentoring: students can prepare structured briefings on particular countries to be used by future Model UN students; students with Model UN experience can take on leadership responsibilities in future conferences by serving as committee chairpersons and organizers; and veterans can play the role of policy experts, advising newcomers in the simulation. Ripley, Carter, and Grove (2009) argue that Model UN is the quintessential active learning simulation. The authors note Model UN can facilitate substantive learning and skill development.

Concerning substantive knowledge, Ripley, Carter, and Grove (2009) state that Model UN gives students the chance to research international problems and to see them from multiple, often varying perspectives. Students

gain an appreciation for international organizations and their complexities, as well as the multifaceted aspects of policy formation, negotiation, and policy implementation. The authors also note that Model UN conferences carry over into the classroom, creating more confident, well-informed contributions during class discussions. Concerning academic/practical skill development, Model UN requires substantial preparation that focuses upon and improves research and organizational skills. The authors further note that students benefit from the opportunity to develop public speaking skills, as well as from improved writing skills and the ability to evaluate information sources, convey ideas accurately and concisely, and practice constructive criticism.

Because of the clear impact of Model UN on student success, conferences and participation in Model UN activities have increased dramatically. Although recognizing some gaps between the simulations and practice, Muldoon (1995) argues that educators have found MUN programs to be so successful that participation in these programs and the numbers of programs offered worldwide has grown exponentially. The author details that in 1993 alone, the United Nations Association of the United States of America lists over 170 conferences convened that year, including over 70,000 high school and college students. This success can be attributed to the increase in student skills, academic and social integration that educators experience because of the MUN conference.

Additionally, a glance at the current NMUN report suggests growth has continued. The NMUN now includes over 6,000 college students from six continents who participate in NMUN-associated conferences in New York City; Washington, D.C.; Sangdo, South Korea; and Portland, Oregon. The report also details self-assessed survey results that illustrate the conference's substantial impact on indicators of academic growth. Statistics demonstrate that 91 percent of participants developed skills in negotiation and conflict resolution; 88 percent developed team-building skills; 84 percent stated they saw improvement in personal leadership; 85 percent demonstrated improvement in public speaking; 87 percent saw growth in their research skills; and 81 percent improved their writing (NMUN 2014).

Study Abroad Programs and Retention

Several scholars have found direct links between retention and study abroad programs (Hamir 2011; Metzger 2006; Posey 2003; Young 2003). Metzger (2006, 167) went so far as to call study abroad a "21st century retention strategy." Hamir (2011, 4) concluded students who participated in a study abroad program increased their graduation prospects by 64 percent in five years and 200 percent in six years. Young (2003) found similar results,

noting that students who participated in one study abroad program stayed enrolled a full semester longer, on average, than students who did not. Young (2003) also argued that study abroad increases opportunities for social and academic integration. Younes and Asay (2003) discovered that students benefited from forming and strengthening social relationships with one another. One of the most ambitious efforts to explore achievement of learning outcomes through study abroad is the Georgia Learning Outcomes of Students Studying Abroad Research Initiative (GLOSSARI). The decade-long project found that students who studied abroad in the 35-institution University System of Georgia had higher GPAs after returning and had higher graduation rates than those who did not (Sutton and Rubin 2004). Furthermore, study abroad was beneficial to at-risk students by providing the focus needed to be successful academically.

Study abroad programs can also increase social integration due to students living closely with one another and being able to get to know their peers and faculty members outside the classroom. Further, these programs help with academic integration, as students are shown to be more intellectually developed and curious after studying abroad. Interestingly, little research has been done exploring whether shorter, less expensive domestic trips are capable of fostering similar social and academic integration. We hypothesize that study away programs have many of the attributes of study abroad programs that encourage retention, but do so at a fraction of the cost. Using a descriptive case study method, we explore a Model UN program that includes a study away trip to the NMUN competition in New York City to document the benefits of this type of program in retention efforts.

Case Study: National Model United Nations Study Away Program

The NMUN is sponsored by the National Collegiate Conference Association (NCCA), which has been hosting NMUN conferences for over 40 years. While Model UN conferences are held around the globe, the New York City conference is the premier conference and concludes its final day of simulation at the United Nations headquarters. More than 5,000 delegates, half of whom come from outside the United States, attend the NMUN conference each spring. The stated goal of the NCCA in hosting the NMUN is to bring together the next generation of international leaders in a quality program to discuss current global issues.

The NMUN is a four-day conference designed as an immersive simulation of the international diplomacy required of United Nations delegates. Students attend committee meetings as delegates who represent their school's assigned country. Each delegation includes one or two students for each committee.

Students are also expected to assume the role of their assigned country by arguing for positions appropriate to that country's political culture. Within each committee are a series of formal and informal caucuses. Formal caucusing requires students to abide by the rules of order specific to the NMUN, to vote on committee issues or points of concern, and to give short speeches on the topic of interest or the work being done. Informal caucusing consists of diplomatic negotiation, group work with other delegates, and the writing of draft resolutions and working papers. Students are encouraged to meet with delegates outside committee meetings to complete negotiations and papers. At the end of the conference, NMUN staff awards the best performing delegations as well as individual delegates for position papers and outstanding performance.

While participation in NMUN requires a university affiliation, there are no set requirements for how the delegations are formed or how they prepare for the conference. Many schools offer Model UN as an extracurricular activity. Given our university's struggle with engaging students outside the classroom, we partnered with the study abroad program office to develop the Model UN three-credit-hour course that included the trip to New York City as a study away program. Although the conference lasts only four days, the trip itself is usually an eight-day journey, allowing two days for travel and two free days in New York City. Collaboration with the study abroad program has several advantages, including reduced administrative burdens for the faculty, the ability to offer course credit, and student eligibility for fund-raising and scholarship opportunities to offset the cost of travel. The trip cost individual students around $1,600 (covering airfare, hotel costs, ground transportation, etc.), although tuition for the course and living expenses while in New York City were additional costs. While the cost is not a trivial amount of money to the university's average student, it is still well below the cost of a conventional study abroad trip, and several students were able to fund-raise for the entire cost of the trip.

The participants could enroll in either a lower- or upper-level political science course. The course met each week for three hours. Students were expected to dress in professional attire for each meeting to prepare them for the conference and to promote a group identity. Coursework included reading multiple texts on the United Nations, parliamentary procedure, and the assigned country. Other assignments included writing multiple drafts of position papers, public speaking exercises, and simulations of the conference negotiation process. The students' grades for the course were based on in-class work and preparation, the quality of position papers, and performance at the conference itself.

Methodology

In order to determine whether a Model UN program can have an impact on retention, we explore the extent to which participation in a program helped to develop participants' social and academic integration. We look first at each student's progression toward graduation after enrolling in the program to see whether they persisted and eventually graduated in an appropriate length of time. We also look at cumulative GPAs before and after participation in the program to determine if the students improve overall academically after the course. In addition, this research utilizes three different data sources to explore social and academic integration. First, the students completed open-ended questions in class at the end of the semester that allowed them to express their sentiments about how, if at all, the program affected them pertaining to social and academic integration. In addition, students were given a week after returning from the trip to write a reflective essay outside of class. Students were instructed to imagine they had the opportunity to write a letter to their former, naïve self from the first day of class, describing the ways this class impacted their life. Since academic integration includes the student's assessment of the value of what they are learning as well as their perception of how they are performing academically, we feel these self-reported measures are valid for our research purposes.

The student responses to these questions and reflective essays were content-analyzed independently by three coders for reliability. Through this analysis, we discovered themes in the responses that suggested the experience increased the students' intellectual development as well as social and academic integration. While the parameters of the reflective essay were much more open than the direct questions, the theme of enhanced academic skills permeated those essays. Specifically, themes that emerged were increased skills in writing, speaking, and negotiation as well as increases in self-confidence and personal growth in general. Themes in social integration included bonding with peers and faculty advisors as well as the development of a group identity.

While these sources provide a useful measure of the students' perceptions, we wanted a more objective measure of improvement that would include an assessment of skills prior to the experience as well as an assessment afterward. Therefore, in the second, third, and fourth years of the program, we utilized pretest and posttest skills audits on the first day and last day of class, where students rated themselves in areas that we believe capture elements of social and academic integration. The instrument was a modified version of a skills audit utilized at the University of Sheffield (Sheffield Graduate Development Programme 2012). The audit, which appears in the Appendix, asked students to assess various skills on a five-point scale ranging from no experience to wide experience. While the survey included nine general skills, we focused on

six we felt related to social and academic integration, including ability to think critically, work as a team, problem-solve, communicate effectively, examine personal development, and creatively apply knowledge. The audit included multiple measures/facets for each skill. We aggregated the individual measures to create indices for each specified skill and then did reliability analysis for each index to confirm that the components measured the same basic ability. To determine if individual students improved from pretest to posttest and whether the improvements were significant, we conducted matched pairs difference of means analysis for each aggregated component.

Data Results and Analysis

We are interested in exploring whether our Model UN class that included a trip to the NMUN conference in New York City successfully increased social and academic integration as well as overall intellectual development. We examined the program over the span of four spring semesters in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. A total of 64 students participated in the course over the four semesters. There were a total of 33 females (52 percent) and 31 males (48 percent), which was a slight oversampling of males compared to our general population of students (65 percent female and 35 percent male). Of the students enrolled, 17 could be classified as underrepresented racial or ethnic minority members. This 27 percent minority rate in our sample is slightly under the 35 percent minority status in our general population. The students ranged in age from 18 to 51, with a mean age of 24.13 and a standard deviation of 5.79. There were 43 political science majors, five English majors, three business majors, three biology majors, two communications majors, and two physics majors. The remaining students either had majors in history, foreign languages, psychology, nursing, or sociology, or were undeclared.

To assess the impact of the study away program on retention, the most obvious measure would be individual student persistence in their education after completing the course. Clearly, it is impossible to determine direct causality in this scenario since we cannot isolate the impact of other contributing factors. However, we assert that the Model UN study away program increased the social and academic integration of the students, which has been shown to positively affect student persistence and retention. Of the 64 students enrolled in Model UN over the four semesters, 10 students (15.6 percent) graduated in the same semester. We readily admit that participation in Model UN had little, if any, impact on these students' progress toward graduation given the timing of enrollment. Of the remaining 54, 50 enrolled again the following semester, which is a 93.6 percent persistence rate. Of the remaining four students, three experienced positive attrition by enrolling the following term in other schools, and the other one appears to be a case of

negative attrition. We continue to track the students over time, and Table 1 contains the status of each student at the end of December 2014 divided by the year they first took the Model UN course.

As can be seen in Table 1, 39 of the 64 students who participated in the program graduated by December 2014, resulting in a 61 percent graduation rate, much higher than the university rate of approximately 20 percent within six years. In addition to calculating the graduation rate, we looked at pace of degree progression. Specifically, we calculated how many hours the students needed to graduate before completing the program and then estimated the number of semesters it would take to graduate if the students enrolled full time each semester. On average, students enroll in the Model UN course with 74 hours completed and 50 more needed to graduate, which should take approximately four semesters. For the 29 students that graduated, but not in the same semester they enrolled in Model UN, four was the mean number of semesters taken to graduate. Therefore, the students participating in the program are not only graduating, but graduating on time.

These raw graduation and persistence numbers suggest that Model UN may have a positive impact on these rates, but our sample size limits our ability to make any sweeping conclusions. Further, measuring gains in academic achievement can be problematic in such programs due to the self-selection of participation (Hadis 2005). In order to partially control for self-selection, we compare the student's individual academic performance before and after participating in the program. For the 50 students who persisted after taking the Model UN course, their mean cumulative GPA prior to enrollment was 3.182. At the end of the following semester, the mean cumulative GPA for that same group of 50 students was 3.197. While the GPAs did increase, a matched-pairs analysis found that the difference was not statistically significant. We do have data on 35 of these students a year after completing the

Table 1: Student Status in December 2014 by Year First Enrolled in Program (n = 64)

| Student Status | Year First Enrolled (Spring) | | | | |
	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Dropped out	1	0	1	0	**2**
Transferred	2	2	1	0	**5**
Persisted	1	2	4	11	**18**
Graduated	14	11	10	4	**39**
Total	18	15	16	15	**64**

program. For these 35 students, the mean cumulative GPA before the program was 3.079, while the mean cumulative GPA a year later is 3.197, a tenth of a point higher. Furthermore, the matched-pairs difference of means test confirmed this positive difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. In other words, on average, students who complete the Model UN program experience a statistically significant increase in their cumulative GPAs within a year of enrolling in the course.

To further isolate the program's effectiveness for our sample, we looked at student perceptions of the program and its influence on their intellectual development and academic performance that demonstrate the degree to which students are integrated academically. A summary of these results appears in Table 2. First, we asked students to explain, if at all, the ways in which their writing skills improved because of Model UN. Fifty-five students (86 percent) stated that their writing skills had improved because of the class. Further, 40 students (63 percent) specifically mentioned that their technical writing skills improved. In the reflective essays, one student said, "You will learn how to be a more concise writer." Another stated, "I would encourage students that are looking for an opportunity to further develop their research skills while feeling uncertain of the outcome to take this class."

We also asked the ways in which their speaking skills had improved because of Model UN. Fifty-six students (88 percent) responded that the program

Table 2: Indicators of Improved Academic Integration According to Students' Own Perceptions (n = 64)

Academic Integration Skill	Evidence/Features of Skill	Number of students seeing improvement	Percentage of students seeing improvement
Writing	General writing	55	86%
Writing	Technical writing	40	63%
Writing	Political writing	10	16%
Writing	Write diplomatically	8	13%
Public speaking	General	56	88%
Public Speaking	Confidence	34	53%
Public Speaking	Speaking concisely	15	23%
Negotiation	General negotiation	49	77%
Negotiation	Group work	15	23%
Negotiation	Consensus building	15	23%
Negotiation	Persuasion	12	19%
Self-confidence/ growth	General	57	89%

did improve their speaking skills. In addition, 34 (53 percent) said they were more confident, less nervous, or no longer scared of public speaking. One student wrote, "You will most importantly, however, gain confidence in your academic and speaking skills."

The literature suggests students who experienced intellectual development and increased motivation were less likely to drop out (Fralick 1993; Friedman and Mandel 2009). We measured this type of development by probing about increased self-confidence and self-growth. Fifty-seven of the students (89 percent) felt that MUN improved their self-confidence overall. Many students felt more confident and less nervous about public speaking due to the numerous opportunities they were given to practice speeches and converse with international students. The essays also included many references to increasing self-confidence and personal growth due to participation in Model UN. Students explicitly mentioned they overcame fears due to their experiences in class and on the trip. One student wrote, "For the first time you will also learn how to write a speech for the allotted time and learn how to deal with your public speaking fears." Another reflected on overcoming lifelong insecurities, writing, "You will acquire a sense of self-confidence in your abilities that you never had before." Students articulated the experience helped them become better-rounded, worldly, and educated individuals.

Students also noted the importance of getting to know their professors outside the classroom, and this type of social and academic integration has been found to greatly increase student persistence (Endo and Harpel 1982). At our university, students do not participate in many activities outside the classroom, so it is more difficult to make student-faculty connections. The study away trip substantially increased the interactions between the students and faculty. As one student writes, "Having a connection [with your professors] will help you with struggles in anything, academic wise at least, and having that is priceless because it gives you a big sense of support from a figure that knows what they are doing."

A sense of social integration a student has with other students is another critical factor that influences a student's decision to remain in college. Developing a sense of integration at a commuter school is an uphill battle. We argue that by taking the students off campus as a group to compete in a conference where they represent the university, we were able to cultivate a sense of integration with their peers, faculty advisors, and the university.

To explore this concept, we asked students to explain the ways they bonded with their classmates during the NMUN conference. A majority of the students indicated that they acquired a sense of camaraderie during the trip through group outings, hotel arrangements, and discussion about the experience. Multiple students noted that the trip was a turning point in feeling

bonded with other classmates and wished that they had felt that way before the trip. The idea that the trip itself was necessary to cultivate cohesion that did not exist prior to the trip was a primary theme. Multiple students indicated things changed once they began the journey of the trip. One student wrote: "you may be very distant from classmates and find some unapproachable, but that will change as soon as you get to NYC. There will be a bond between you and them by the time the trip is halfway done."

While we should not undervalue these students' personal reflections, a more rigorous test of whether the students experienced improvement in skills due to participation in the Model UN program comes from our analysis of the skill set audits. Students enrolled in the program during the spring 2012, spring 2013, and spring 2014 terms completed a skill set audit on the first and last day of class. We had a total of 47 students complete both the pretest and posttest over these three semesters, with students who took the course more than once only doing the audit the first time they enrolled. The summary statistics and reliability measures for each of the nine components audited at both the pretest and posttest appear in Table 3.

To test whether the individual students improved, we ran matched-pairs difference of means tests for each aggregated component. The results appear in Table 4. The first component measured the student's ability to think critically and analytically, both within their area of study and beyond. The survey contained seven questions measuring the ability to compare data, distinguish between types of information, use reason to find solutions, and be proactive in problem solving. We aggregated the responses to create the Ability to Think Critically index, and calculated the means. The mean for the pretest was 24.53, and the mean increased in the posttest to 31.64, which represents a statistically significant 7.11 increase in the index, suggesting the students improved their ability to think critically by participating in the program.

The second component measured the students' teamwork skills. The index, Ability to Work as a Team, contained nine indicators that included abilities such as empowering others, contributing to a team even if others had different ideas**,** recognizing when to compromise, and understanding team roles. The pretest mean was 33.51, while the posttest was 40.49. Students, on average, improved by 6.98 units, and the difference was significant. Participation in the NMUN program improved the students' perception of their team-building skills.

The third index, Problem Solving Abilities, contained seven indicators that assessed a student's ability to use objective approaches, explore multiple solutions, and demonstrate resilience and lateral thinking. On average the index mean for the sample went up pre- to posttest from 24.98 to 31.28, a

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Measures for Self-Assessed Skills Set Indices (n = 47)

Index	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	# of Indicators	Cronbach Alpha Value
Pretest						
Ability to Think Critically	24.53	5.20	13	35	7	.88
Ability to Work as a Team	33.51	5.69	19	45	9	.81
Problem-Solving Abilities	24.98	4.91	15	35	7	.83
Communicating Effectively	21.00	4.42	10	29	6	.79
Examine Personal Development	21.74	4.58	8	30	6	.83
Creatively Apply Knowledge	14.02	3.31	7	20	4	.78
Complete Skills Set	139.79	21.35	75	186	39	.85
Posttest						
Ability to Think Critically	31.64	3.02	25	35	7	.90
Ability to Work as a Team	40.49	4.19	27	45	9	.87
Problem-Solving Abilities	31.28	3.09	25	35	7	.82
Communicating Effectively	27.00	2.74	19	30	6	.82
Examine Personal Development	26.94	3.06	18	30	6	.77
Creatively Apply Knowledge	17.80	2.18	12	20	4	.83
Complete Skills Set	175.13	14.65	133	195	39	.88

Table 4: Paired T-Tests for Self-Assessed Skills Set Indices (n = 47)

Index	Mean	Std. Dev.	Difference	T	Sig (1tail)
Ability to Think Critically			7.11	9.61	.000
Posttest	31.64	3.02			
Pretest	24.53	5.20			
Ability to Work as a Team			6.98	8.50	.000
Posttest	40.49	4.19			
Pretest	33.51	5.69			
Problem-Solving Abilities			6.30	9.49	.000
Posttest	31.28	3.09			
Pretest	24.98	4.91			
Communicating Effectively			6.00	9.52	.000
Posttest	27.00	2.74			
Pretest	21.00	4.42			
Examine Personal Development			5.19	8.61	.000
Posttest	26.94	3.06			
Pretest	21.74	4.58			
Creatively Apply Knowledge			3.77	7.97	.000
Posttest	17.80	2.18			
Pretest	14.02	3.31			
Complete Skills Set			35.34	12.17	.000
Posttest	175.13	14.65			
Pretest	139.79	21.35			

statistically significant improvement of 6.30 units. The fourth index, Communicating Effectively, had six indicators that measured a student's ability to communicate both orally and in writing. Indicators explored the student's ability to check work for errors, give a presentation, and interpret audience feedback during a presentation. The mean on this index went from 21 in the pretest to 27 in the posttest, suggesting on average students saw a 6-point significant improvement in this area as well.

The next component required students to reflect on their own personal development, with six indicators looking at the student's ability to recognize and pursue opportunities for growth and with career paths as a motivating

factor. The mean for the index, Examine Personal Development, went from 21.74 to 26.94, which indicated that students saw a 5.19-point significant improvement in their abilities to review and reflect on their personal and career development after participating in Model UN. The final component, Creatively Apply Knowledge, had four indicators that measured whether students felt they could apply the knowledge learned in school in other settings. The mean for this component went up 3.77 points, from 14.02 to 17.80, at the .001 level of significance. This suggests students had more confidence in their ability to apply academic knowledge outside the classroom after finishing the course.

We aggregated all the components to create a Complete Skills Set index. With a total of 39 components, the minimum value possible is 39 and the maximum is 186. The mean score for the total index in the pretest was 139.79, whereas the mean score for the posttest was 175.13. Thus the cumulative significant difference in skill sets represented a significant 35.34-point increase from the beginning of the term to the end of the semester. We feel this analysis further demonstrates the program's influence on students' academic integration by providing empirical evidence that the students perceived measurable improvement in their skill sets by participating in a Model UN program.

Discussion

In order to further assess the influence a Model UN program has on academic and social integration beyond our limited case study, we also collected data from schools and universities in the University System of Georgia (USG) that participate in the Model UN program in New York City. There a total of six institutions in addition to ours within the USG that have participated in the Model UN program in New York City over the last three years. We contacted the advisors for the Model UN programs repeatedly, and four out of the six institutions agreed to answer questions about their programs. We asked advisors questions regarding the effect the Model UN program has had on the degree to which their students are academically and socially integrated into their institutions. In addition, we asked how the Model UN program has influenced retention and graduation rates of participating students. Before proceeding to the results from our survey, we will briefly discuss the background information of the institutions that responded to our survey.

The number of years the four USG institutions have participated in Model UN ranges from 4 to 44 with an average of 19.75. All four institutions offer the Model UN program for course credit. In addition, two have Model UN clubs associated with the course. The size of the Model UN delegations ranges from 4 to 20 students, with an average of 13. All four institutions reported that

upon entering the programs, the students in their delegations performed above average academically compared to their general student bodies.

Of the demographic information available, one institution indicated that their delegation's gender demographics were different from those of their school overall, while another indicated that their delegation and school had similar gender compositions. Two schools responded that their delegations' racial and ethnic makeup was similar to that of their institutions. The remaining institutions were not able to accurately assess these demographics.

These schools employed multiple methods to recruit students into their programs. Three institutions used an advisor to recruit students. Three institutions had former Model UN participants recruit students. One institution used their department to recruit students, and one institution did not participate in recruitment activities because students self-selected into their program. One institution provided full funding for the program through school subsidies. School subsidies at the other three schools provided funding for 50 percent, 80 percent, and 90 percent of the costs of participation, while students individually paid the remaining costs.

In order to gauge the potential effect the Model UN program has on academic and social integration, we first asked the participating USG institutions to indicate how Model UN influenced their students' improvement with respect to eight skill areas. In regards to students' ability to think critically, two institutions indicated substantial improvement, and two institutions indicated significant improvement. In regard to the ability to creatively apply knowledge, one institution reported substantial improvement, and three institutions reported significant improvement. All four institutions reported significant improvement regarding their students' ability to work as a team. These findings so far mirror the results from our study in which our students demonstrated statistically significant increases on the Ability to Think Critically, Creatively Apply Knowledge and Ability to Work as a Team indices. In addition, all four institutions indicated significant improvement regarding the ability to negotiate.

With respect to students' ability to communicate effectively in writing, one institution reported substantial improvement, and three institutions reported significant improvement. All four institutions indicated significant improvement regarding their students' ability to communicate effectively orally. These findings are similar to the results from our study in which students had a statistically significant increase of six units on the index Communicating Effectively, including improvements in technical writing, general writing, and public speaking skills. Regarding the ability to reflect upon personal development, one institution indicated substantial improvement, and three institutions indicated significant improvement. Furthermore, one

institution reported substantial improvement in self-confidence, and three institutions reported significant improvement. These findings were again comparable to the improvements seen in our own Examine Personal Development index and self-confidence measure.

Three institutions reported that their students were more connected with one another after completing the Model UN program. Furthermore, three institutions reported that they believed their students felt more connected with their university or became more involved in campus activities after completing the Model UN program. In addition, all four institutions indicated that the Model UN program helped the faculty advisor become more connected with their students. These findings were similar to the information presented by our students in their reflective essays, in which they expressed a closer relationship with their classmates, university and faculty advisors following their Model UN experience.

In regard to Model UN's effect on academic performance, one institution indicated that students' GPAs increased after completing the program. One institution reported no real change in student GPAs after completing the program, and two institutions were unable to assess the Model UN program's effect on GPAs. While we found a statistically significant positive growth in GPAs in our own study, we are unable to assert any similarities among institutions.

We also asked the USG institutions to assess the Model UN program's effect on retention. Three institutions reported that students were more likely to remain enrolled in their institution after completing the Model UN program. One institution reported no real change in enrollment patterns. This finding is somewhat similar, although not identical, to our results where we found 93.6 percent of our students remained enrolled at our school the semester following their Model UN experience. As for the Model UN program's influence on graduation rates, one institution reported that students were more likely to graduate after completing the program. Two institutions indicated no real change in student graduation patterns following program completion. Our own findings showed a 61 percent graduation rate among Model UN students compared with the university rate of approximately 20 percent within six years.

In addition to the survey results presented above, the faculty advisors indicated that the Model UN program had a positive influence on their students and university. One faculty advisor stated, "The Model UN program is highly consistent with the goals of the University, it promotes global awareness, and it provides unique opportunities for high school and college students in our region." Another faculty advisor said, "It's not unique, but one of the major strengths of the program is that it brings together students from a

variety of academic disciplines, regions, and countries who might not otherwise have an opportunity to meet or work together. It introduces students to pressing global issues and forces them to address these issues from a non-American perspective. There are few other programs that challenge parochialism so effectively."

Conclusion

This work has reviewed several ways universities can increase retention and persistence rates including academic performance, academic integration, and social integration. In our study, we found that participation in Model UN class that included a study away trip to the NMUN increased student confidence in their academic performance and in their own perceptions of their writing and speaking capabilities. Furthermore, the experience created a sense of both academic and social integration. This provided students with a sense of belonging: with each other, with faculty and the university and, through investigating international affairs and diplomacy, with the world at large.

We believe that this study illustrates that a program like Model UN can potentially impact retention through increasing academic and social integration. However, the Model UN program at our university is still in its infancy. Our current data includes the first four years of the program, but our sample size is limited to 64 students, and our skill set audit was not performed in the first year, yielding a sample size of 47 for that data set. We readily admit that having such a small sample size limits our ability to generalize and to make broad claims regarding the utility of the program. However, given that the content analysis and the difference of means test provide complementary results, and given that we found statistically significant results in the difference of means test despite the small sample size, we believe the research has merit as a foundational study. Further, the data on progression toward graduation and improvement in grade point averages suggest the program is having a measurable impact on student success in college. Finally, the information from other USG schools participating in Model UN appears to mirror many of our findings, which suggests that the effectiveness of the program is not idiosyncratic to our university.

While we assert that this study provides evidence that a study away program can improve retention of students and should be explored as an option to help students stay in college, the costs of these programs must be taken into account. A key argument in favor of study away trips in retention efforts is that they are less expensive than study abroad trips. However, these more affordable trips may still be cost prohibitive to many students, and

unfortunately, those least likely to be able to afford the trips are also the most likely to benefit from this type of experience. Further, the self-selection of students who enroll in the program limits researchers' ability to evaluate the full impact such programs may have for lower-income or lower-performing students. However, while this may moderate some of our findings, we do not believe it detracts from the ultimate merit of Model UN or similar programs. In many ways, these mitigating factors lend further value to both future research and arguments to redirect resources to make such programs more accessible to all students.

Universities concerned with retention often look to student affairs programs first to solve the problem. We suggest that raising awareness of the importance of academic integration in retention is critical to help direct resources toward successful academic programs like Model UN. We are confident that continuing research in this area will validate the positive effects these types of programs have on persistence rates. We assume that many of our colleagues are directing similar programs at their universities and may be struggling to obtain resources to enhance or grow these programs. We feel that establishing an empirical link between these programs and retention is vital to elevating their importance and attracting resources. Essentially, we suggest leaving the classroom to stay in college.

Appendix

Self-Assessed Skills Audit for Model UN Students
You are asked to self-assess your skills on a five-point scale:

> **1 = no experience**
> **2 = a little experience**
> **3 = don't know/not sure**
> **4 = some experience**
> **5 = wide experience**

The skills list is not exhaustive; it is designed to stimulate you to reflect upon the skills you are practicing, raise self-awareness, and increase your ability to articulate your skills.

1. Think critically and analytically within your subject areas and beyond					
	1	2	3	4	5
• relate and compare data from different sources, identify issues and obtain relevant information					
• reason and apply decision-making processes and consider how to find solutions to problems					
• identify appropriate data sources					
• review a range of different points of view and select the most appropriate conclusion					
• distinguish between different types of information to inform conclusions					
• capture key information from written or verbal sources					
• identify significant opportunities and be proactive in putting forward ideas for problem solving.					

2. Work as part of a team					
	1	2	3	4	5
• build and develop working relationships with academic staff, peers and colleagues					
• work effectively with others to complete tasks and achieve results					
• empower others to work together as part of a team or group					
• recognize and understand when compromise and accommodating others is necessary					
• interact well with others and work cooperatively as a team member					
• understand how to gain the attention of others in a team or group when required					
• understand how to contribute effectively and cooperatively with others even if they do not share the same ideas and ways of working					
• express self effectively in a group and in one-to-one situations					
• have an understanding of team roles					

3. Use your problem-solving abilities					
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
• use an appropriate approach to questioning in order to gain information from which to draw conclusions					
• use an objective approach to relate to others in order to achieve goals					
• make good use of verbal reasoning skills, able to handle complex data and make selective use of information					
• explore more than one solution in order to solve a problem					
• consider the ideas of others to help solve problems					
• manage the process of problem solving over a period of time					
• demonstrate resilience and lateral thinking abilities when applied to problem solving					

4. Apply your communication skills, both orally and written					
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
• understand the differences in presenting types of documents, e.g. reports, essays, summaries					
• check written work for errors before submission					
• express and convey ideas appropriately and accurately in writing					
• successfully give a presentation or demonstration					
• demonstrate that information being received is understood by using a range of verbal and nonverbal signals					
• understand when people have taken account of your views and you of theirs					

5. **Reflect upon and review your own personal and career development**					
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
• recognize and develop skills and competencies required for learning and future employment					
• develop opportunities for learning activities through current and future roles					
• recognize the importance and value of activities outside the curriculum, e.g., work experience, sports, clubs					
• identify when extra support and help may be useful					
• maintain positive attitudes to work and understand when a task has not been completed well and identify changes for the future					
• understand how to gain feedback on work or performance					

You are asked to self-assess your skills on a five point scale:

       1 = no experience
       2 = a little experience
       3 = don't know/not sure
       4 = some experience
       5 = wide experience

6. **Work autonomously and set your own goals**					
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
• aspire to and maintain a results-driven approach where appropriate					
• focus on results and performance indicators and use different strategies to achieve targets					
• apply suitable approaches and put in extra effort if required in order to meet tight deadlines					
• work without close supervision and use own initiative					
• identify resources required to complete a set task					
• harness motivation and hard work to assist in the completion of work objectives					

7.	Plan, monitor and evaluate in order to influence change					
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
•	make use of effective planning and preparation in order to anticipate and overcome problems					
•	maintain effectiveness in changing environments					
•	make appropriate adjustments when undertaking tasks					
•	set own goals and review these systematically					
•	adjust to meet different work styles					
•	work alongside colleagues in different environments					

8.	Develop time management and organizational skills					
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
•	establish a course of action for self and others to achieve goals					
•	plan and prepare effectively for assignments, including use of appropriate resources					
•	plan day in order to manage time more effectively					
•	prioritize own and others' work					
•	meet set deadlines and understand the process required to meet project outcomes					
•	keep track of work schedules and deadlines by applying multitasking abilities					

9.	Creatively apply your academic knowledge in work- and non-work-related settings					
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
•	generate and recognize best practice and apply imaginative ideas to different situations					
•	work out a preferred course of action					
•	think laterally and encourage others to do so and consider how they approach an unconventional task					
•	present complex and unusual ideas to friends and colleagues					

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